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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGES
BARROW, GEORGE A.	
The Reality of the Religious Experience.....	400-410
ELLIS, R. S.	
The Attitude Toward Death and the Types of Belief in Immortality	466-510
ERSKINE, WILLIAM HUGH	
The Disposition of the Dead in Old Japan.....	245-251
ERSKINE, WILLIAM HUGH	
Religious Offerings in Japan.....	511-524
GILBERTSON, ALBERT N.	
Some Ethical Phases of Eskimo Culture. II.....	45- 74
HALL, G. STANLEY	
The Psychology of the Nativity.....	421-465
HARVEY, MCLEOD	
The Pedagogy of Missions.....	345-399
KARLSON, KARL JOHAN	
Psychoanalysis and Mythology	137-213
KAPLAN, JACOB K.	
The Daughters and Their Mother, or the Relation of Religion and Her Offspring	325-344
RADIN, PAUL	
Peyote Cult of the Winnebago.....	1- 22
SCHROEDER, THEODORE	
Erotogenetic Interpretation of Religion.....	23- 44
SHEPHERD, W. T.	
Concerning the Origin of the Ideas of Gods.....	237-244
SHEPHERD, W. T.	
Concerning the Religion of Childhood.....	411-416
STOUTEMYER, J. HOWARD	
Religion and Race Education.....	273-324
VAN TESLAAR, J. S.	
The Problems and Present Status of Religious Psychology,	214-236
VAN WATERS, MIRIAM	
The Adolescent Girl Among Primitive Peoples. II.....	75-120
WALLIS, WILSON D.	
Durkheim's View of Religion.....	252-267
Books Reviewed	121-133, 268-272, 417-420, 525-530
Periodical Literature	134-136
Index to Volume 7	531

JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

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No. 1

A SKETCH OF THE PEYOTE CULT OF THE WINNEBAGO:¹ A STUDY IN BORROWING

BY PAUL RADIN, PH. D.

The phenomenon of borrowing meets us at every phase of ethnological research; and although in no case has any attempt ever been made to study its mechanism, we know, in a large number of modern instances, both the approximate time of borrowing and the participating tribes. In view of its far-reaching importance for an understanding of the development of specific cultures and culture-areas, any light obtained from the study of borrowings occurring under our own eyes ought to be gladly welcomed. Within the last hundred years enough direct borrowing has taken place to illustrate, if carefully studied, most of the methods by which elements of culture can be diffused from tribe to tribe; and enough time has elapsed, in many cases, to show in what manner specific cultures reacted upon these newly introduced elements.

We have in the Ghost Dance, the Handsome Lake doctrine, the teachings of the Shawnee Prophet, etc., a vast amount of material, which, when critically worked out, will certainly yield a rich harvest of suggestions. In the changes these doctrines underwent as they spread from tribe to tribe, and in the various new features they introduced in their wake as they were disseminated from each center of dispersion, we will certainly find many characteristics of a normal type of diffusion. On the whole, however, it appears to me that the diffusion in these

¹ Read before the American Ethnological Society, New York, April 30, 1913.

cases represented a highly specialized type. Is it indeed necessary to have a stimulus for borrowing as powerful as the teachings of these prophets? For the large majority of cases, borrowing surely represented merely a normal reaction to a normal cultural contact. I am, of course, well aware of the fact that the crux of the problem really lies in the nature of this normal reaction, and that any reaction between cultures will ultimately depend on more than the mere proximity of one culture to another.

It does not seem likely that in pre-Columbian times borrowing in connection with religious and ceremonial life was ever stimulated by the spread of new doctrines such as those of the nineteenth century. Any attempt to study the nature of the mechanism of borrowing under normal conditions ought, therefore, to be based on an example of diffusion connected with the friendly intercourse of one tribe with another. To make the conditions even more definite, it might be best to select for study, cultural elements disseminated as a result of visits paid by individuals for purely social purposes, or in a spirit of adventure.

The peyote cult, now spreading so rapidly over the western part of the United States, presents us with the opportunity for making a particularly intensive study of what represents, on the whole, a fairly normal type of borrowing. For that reason I took the opportunity, while studying the Winnebago of Nebraska, to collect data relating to the introduction and development of this cult among them. It had only begun to make headway a few years before I first visited the tribe, in 1908, and I was thus permitted to follow its formative stages. For the important years preceding 1908, which, I understand, were taken up with attempts to obtain proselytes, I have comparatively little data, but sufficient, on the whole, for a general bridging over of these preparatory years.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CEREMONY AND ITS ORGANIZATION

The ceremony is generally held in a building, called by the peyote worshippers a church, although frequently it likewise takes place in the open. In the beginning of its organization as many meetings as possible were held. At the present time,

however, there seems to be a tendency to restrict the number, and to have them generally take place on Saturday evening.

The ceremony is opened by a prayer of the founder and leader, this being followed by an introductory speech. Thereupon, the leader sings a peyote song, to the accompaniment of a drum. He then delivers another speech, and, when he is finished, passes the drum and other regalia to the man to his right. This man, in turn, delivers a speech, and signs a song, and when he is finished, passes the regalia to the third man, who subsequently passes the same to the fourth. The fourth man returns the regalia to the leader. In this way the regalia pass from one to the other throughout the night. It not infrequently happens that one of these four gets tired, and gives up his place temporarily to some other member of the cult. At intervals they stop to eat or drink peyote. At about twelve the peyote begins to affect some people. These generally rise and deliver self-accusatory speeches, and make more or less formal confessions, after which they go around shaking hands with everyone, asking for forgiveness.

The peyote cult has a rather definite organization at the present time. There is always a leader, and generally there are four principal participants. John Rave, the Winnebago who introduced the peyote, is always the leader whenever he is present. On other occasions leadership devolves upon some older member. The four other principal participants change from meeting to meeting, although there is a tendency to ask certain individuals whenever it is possible. As we have seen, the ritualistic unit is a very definite one, consisting of a number of speeches and songs and the passing of the regalia from one to the other.

During the early hours, before the peyote has begun to have any appreciable effect, a number of apparently intrusive features are found. These, for the most part, consist of speeches by people in the audience, and the reading and explanation of parts of the Bible. After the peyote has begun to have an appreciable effect, however, the ceremony consists exclusively of the repetition of the ritualistic unit and confessions.

There is an initiation, consisting of a baptism, always performed by John Rave. It is of a very simple nature. Rave dips his fingers in a peyote infusion, and then passes them

over the forehead of the new member, muttering the following prayer:

“ God, His holiness.”

This is what the Winnebago really means, although some of the newer members, with strong Christian leanings, translate the prayer into “ God, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.”

Whenever the ceremony is performed in the open, a fireplace in the shape of a horseshoe is made. At one end of this fireplace is placed a very small mound of earth, called by Rave “ Mt. Sinai,” and in front of this is traced in the earth a cross. Upon the small earth mound are placed the two “ chief ” peyote, the Bible, and the staff. The latter, called by Rave the shepherd’s crook, is always covered with beadwork, and generally has a number of evenly cut tufts of deer hair on the end, and at intervals along its length. The sacred peyote, known as *hûñka* i. e., “ chief,” are exceptionally large and beautiful specimens. They are regarded by a number of people, certainly by Rave, with undisguised veneration.

In addition to the above, there is found a large eagle-feather fan, a small drum, and a peculiar, small type of rattle. To my knowledge this type was unknown among the Winnebago before its introduction by the Peyote Eaters.

A second description of the ceremony by another informant is reproduced in the following pages:

John Rave belongs to the Bear Clan, the members of which had the functions of what might be called sergeants-at-arms. He and his ancestors used to be in charge of the *manûpétei*, i. e., the sergeant-at-arms lodge, to which all malefactors would be brought for punishment.

Rave, although he belonged to this highly respected class of people, was a bad man. He was a hard drinker and roamed from place to place. He participated in all the ceremonies of the Winnebago with the exception of the Medicine dance. He had been married many times. Up to 1901 he was a heavy drinker. In that year he went to Oklahoma and while there ate the peyote. He then returned to the Winnebago and tried to introduce it among them, but none with the exception of a few relatives would have anything to do with it. This did not in any way discourage him, however, and he continued using the peyote, now and then getting a new convert.

There was not very much religion connected with it in the beginning, and the reason people drank it was on account of the peculiar effects it had upon them. Nevertheless, these peyote people preached good things and gradually lost all desire for intoxicating drinks or for participation in the old Winnebago ceremonies. Now Rave began to do away with his

old Indian customs. About four or five years ago, the membership in the peyote religion began to increase, for many people now noticed that those connected with the Peyote cult were the only people in the tribe leading a Christian life.

At this time, the Bible was introduced by a young man named Albert Hensley. He, too, had been a bad person although he was educated at Carlisle. Like Rave, he was a heavy drinker and fond of wandering.

During the last few years our members have increased so fast, that now almost half the tribe (500-600 individuals) belong to our religion. We all make efforts to lead a Christian life and we are succeeding very well.

We use the New Testament, especially the Revelations.

Our meetings take place at any time. We gather together in the evening and as soon as everything is in readiness, the leader arises and offers a prayer called, "Turning themselves over to the care of the Trinity." Then all sit down and the leader makes the regular announcements. The peyote is then passed round either in the dry condition, or steeped. The leader thereupon started the singing. These are some of the songs:

1. Ask God for life and he will give it to us.
2. God created us, so pray to him.
3. To the home of Jesus we are going, pray to him.
4. Come ye to the road of the son of God; come ye to the road.

Then Albert Hensley calls upon twelve educated members to translate and interpret certain portions of the Bible for the non-reading members. He arranges with the leader to have the singing stop at certain places so that some of these young men can speak. When these are finished, other individuals are called upon to give "testimony." Hensley always talks and so does Rave.

John Rave baptizes by dipping his hand in a diluted infusion of peyote and rubbing it across the forehead of the new member saying, "I baptize thee in the name of God, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, which is called God's holiness."

The Peyote-eaters wanted to get baptized and unite with the church in Winnebago, but the clergyman in charge would not permit them, so they went and did their own baptizing through their leader John Rave, who, though he is not educated, is full of real intelligence and religion.

If a person who is truly repentant eats peyote for the first time, he does not suffer at all from its effects. But if an individual is bull-headed, does not believe in its virtue, he is likely to suffer a good deal. This I know from my own experience. After eating peyote, I grasped the meaning of the Bible, which before had been meaningless to me.

If a person eats peyote and does not repent openly, he has a guilty conscience, which leaves him as soon as the public repentance has been made.

Old men and women who had been brought up to worship animals and all kinds of spirits, have cast them all away, and in many cases burnt their idols, not because they were told to do so, but because they felt that way.

Whenever, at our meetings, a person wishes to pray, he does so; when

he wishes to cry, he does so. Indeed, we show no timidity about worshipping God in the right way. In the Bible, one often reads of Christ casting out the devils and of the people shouting, etc. So does the peyote act on us in the beginning, although afterwards it abates in effect.

If a peyote-eater relapses into his old way of living, then the peyote causes him great suffering.

At first our meetings were started without following any rule laid down by the Bible, but afterwards we found a very good reason for holding our meetings at night. We searched the Bible and asked many ministers for any evidence of Christ's ever having held any meetings in the day-time but we could find nothing to that effect. We did, however, find evidence that he had been out all night in prayer. As it is our desire to follow as closely as we can in the footsteps of Christ, we hold our meetings at night. Then, too, when we pray we wish to get as far away as possible from earthly things and the night is the best time, for then we are not likely to be bothered by anything.

We have made earnest efforts to become Christians since we began eating and drinking this peyote, but many people say sarcastically that we have drunk ourselves to Christianity, and that we are demented. I am a peyote-eater, but I have never found a demented person among us. We claim that there is virtue in the peyote. To you who do not believe and desire to find out, let me quote the 4th Chapter of the 1st Epistle of St. John:

"Beloved, believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God: because many false prophets are gone out into the world.

"Hereby know ye the spirit of God. Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God."

We claim that you cannot find out anything by standing off at a distance and only talking about it. We claim that some earthly things can have the virtue of God, for instance the Bible, which is entirely made up of earthly material—the ink, the paper, the cover—yet it has survived the ages.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION

The above description is based on performances witnessed in 1908 and 1910. It is quite plain that at the present time a definite organization exists; that there are five principal participants, a leader and four helpers, these positions, with the exception of that of leader, not being associated with definite individuals, although, as I have said before, there is a tendency to consider them as belonging to the most active participants and disciples. No specific requirements, with the exception, of course, of that of being a peyote eater, are associated with the right to occupy these positions, although we shall subsequently see that certain requirements were soon formulated.

The first problem that confronts us is naturally, "Did this

organization exist from the very beginning; or was there an elaboration of any kind?" The data in my possession are not very explicit upon this matter. When Rave first returned with the peyote, after a visit to Oklahoma, he naturally found his tribe hostile to the innovation, and he succeeded in converting only his wife. At that time the only regalia used were the drum and the rattle. We cannot, of course, speak of any organization between these two. From what Rave says, all that took place was the singing of the peyote songs. The earliest converts to the belief were relatives, and even when the number of disciples had increased, there seems to have been little more than this singing of songs. I take it, that only when converts other than members of the immediate family began to participate, did any semblance of an organization begin to show itself. The essential point is, when did the actual performance become limited to five people? This I cannot answer. It is quite clear, however, that it took place very early, and that there is nothing to justify the assumption that there was any growth of organization. In other words, it seems quite clear to me that, as soon as there was a definite organization, it took the form of the leader and four participants.

As no specialized features have become associated with the positions of the four helpers, the only other point of interest is the manner in which leadership on certain occasions is delegated by Rave to others. As a matter of fact, it can hardly be said that leadership is ever definitely delegated by Rave to anyone else, and it would not be improper to say that many peyote people do not regard the performance of the ritual by others in the same light as that under Rave's guidance. Still, there certainly is a tendency to delegate leadership temporarily, and it may be significant to note that it is to a small group of men that leadership is thus delegated—men whom I know to have been among the first of the converts outside of Rave's immediate family, and who were leaders in the old pagan ceremonies. This delegation of leadership is, I believe, a very recent tendency, conditioned on the one hand by the size of the reserve and the impossibility of Rave's being everywhere; and, secondly, by Rave's frequent absence on proselytizing missions. To sum up, then; it seems that even at the present time leadership is associated, first, with length of membership; and, second, with strength of personality and belief.

As to the organization, what I wish to insist upon more than anything else, is the fact that there was no development in the sense of a gradation from a loosely to a definitely organized unit; or in the sense of the breaking up and assimilation on the part of the Winnebago, of an alien type. From the moment the cult became more than a purely private or family affair, that is, became socialized, the principal ceremonial unit of the Winnebago formed its basis of organization.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RITUALISTIC COMPLEX

The peyote was introduced among the Winnebago by John Rave, a prominent member of the Bear clan. He was in the habit of traveling a good deal, but had on earlier occasions paid little attention to the peyote. On the particular visit which resulted in his first eating the peyote, he was, he informed me, in a most distressed and unhappy condition of mind, owing to the death of his wife and children. He left Winnebago with the intention of staying away as long as possible from the scenes associated with his loss.

Rave's account of how he first ate peyote tells us nothing of what induced him to do so. When I put the question to him, he answered that it was only because of repeated requests. As soon as the effects of the peyote began to manifest themselves, he repented of his action, for he began to have visions of horrible creatures pursuing him, springing upon him from all directions. Finally, during a particularly harrowing experience, in which he thought he was being pursued by a horrible monster, he suddenly came to the realization that the peyote might be causing these visions. He shouted out:

"Ah! Perhaps it is you, peyote, who are doing this to me. Help me, grandfather (i. e., the medicine). I should have known that it was you from the very beginning. As long as the world exists I shall use you (i. e., make offerings to you)."

The following night Rave ate more peyote, and in the middle of the night he saw God, up above. "Father!" he cried, "have mercy upon me. Let me know what sins I have committed. Let me know all the evil I have done. I am trying to pray to you, God, and to you, Son of God. Help me. Let me know what this religion is. Help me, peyote—grandfather. . . ." Then (he goes on to say):

"I saw the morning star, and it was good to look upon. Then I knew that I had merely been scared. Now I became happy. Day appeared—so perfect a day that nothing was invisible, and I suddenly thought of my people at home. Then it seemed to me that my home was quite close. From the window I could see my children. My wife came and stood outside the door of our house. I saw her and all my relatives. They were getting along well. Ah! Peyote, you are holy. All that is connected with you I would like to know; for now I first realize what holiness is. . . . Would to God some of the other Winnebagoes knew this religion likewise."

To judge from Rave's words, his first belief in the peyote had nothing of the nature of a conversion to a new religion. It seems to have been similar to the average Winnebago attitude toward a medicinal herb obtained either as a gift or through purchase. There is only one new note—stimulation by a narcotic.

Rave goes on to say that the peyote cured him of a disease with which he had been afflicted for a long time, and that he begged his wife, who was afflicted with the same disease, to eat it. When she finally consented, he painted her face, took the rattle, and sang peyote songs while she ate peyote. Thus he cured her. Rave's attitude throughout, both from his own testimony and from that of others, seems to have been practically the old attitude of a Winnebago shaman. According to some informants, he even offered tobacco to the peyote before using it.

We have, then, at the beginning, apparently the introduction of only one new element,—the peyote; with possibly a few Christian teachings. Everything else seems to be typically Winnebago, and in consonance with their shamanistic practices. On the whole, the extension of the Winnebago cultural background seems to have been so instantaneous that as far as the specific cultural traits of the Winnebago are concerned, there was no introduction of a new element. This view does not, of course, interfere in the least with the fact that to the Winnebago themselves the presence of the peyote represented the introduction of a new element.

The elaboration of the peyote practices at Rave's hands is the most difficult problem to trace, on account of lack of data. His attitude toward the old Winnebago life was certainly passive and unantagonistic for some time. Then it changed to one of violent hatred and antagonism. Why, and under what circumstances this took place, I do not know. It seems idle to

speculate upon the specific causes. It probably represented the interaction of many elements, the hostility of the tribe, the drawing of issues sharply around certain points, and the gradual assumption on the part of Rave of the rôle of a prophet who had solved the problem of the adjustment of the Winnebago to the surrounding white civilization. Into this question I do not wish to go at length, for to me it seems a modern by-product. However, with regard to the development of a passive into a hostile attitude toward one's own culture, it might be suggestive to point out that a similar phenomenon has occurred very frequently in the history of religious reforms of European civilization. The problem belongs, however, more properly to the study of the changes within the same culture, even although the initial stimulus for the change came from without.

Whatever were the causes, Rave's attitude toward the old Winnebago past was momentous.

It was apparently at a time when this hostility was at its height that a new convert, Albert Hensley, revolutionized the entire cult by introducing the reading of the Bible and positing the dogma that the peyote opened the Bible to the understanding of the people; and by adding a number of Christian practices, such as, perhaps, the interpretation of giving public testimony and Bible interpretation. He too had been in Oklahoma for a long time. He brought with him many peyote songs, generally in other languages, and dealing with Christian ideas, upon which subsequently Winnebago songs were modeled. He introduced likewise either baptism itself, or an interpretation of baptism, and induced Rave to attempt a union with the Christian church. He seems to have been the only prominent man connected with the peyote who, to my knowledge, was subject to epileptic fits. He had the most glorious visions of Heaven and Hell while in his trance; and these he expounded afterwards in terms of Revelation and the mystical portions of the New Testament.

Hensley's additions represent a second stratum of borrowed elements, all of which are in the nature of accretions, as far as the peyote itself is concerned, not modifying its fundamental interpretation, but on the contrary explaining the Bible in its terms. Neither he nor his followers ever interpreted the peyote in terms of the Bible. He, his immediate followers, and

even Rave himself, interpreted other elements of the old Winnebago culture in terms of the Bible. However, the elements so interpreted represented features that even in the old Winnebago cults exhibited a great variability in interpretation.

Rave's attitude toward the innovations of Hensley seems to have been that of benevolent acquiescence. He himself could neither read nor write. Yet he immediately accepted the Bible, and added it to his other regalia. As such it seems to have remained to him essentially. To Rave, after all, the peyote was the principal element; and if Hensley chose to insist that the Bible was only intelligible to those who partook of the peyote, why, that naturally fell within its magical powers. From the entire omission in Rave's account of the peyote cult, of the more important things that Hensley introduced, and from the fact that whenever Hensley's influence was not dominant there seems to have been little Bible reading, I think it justifiable to say that Rave's attitude toward these innovations was merely passive.

As far as I know, there never was any rivalry between Rave and Hensley. The latter was, however, a much younger man, quick-tempered, conceited, dogmatic, and withal, having a strong mixture of Puritan Protestant ideas. A conflict developed after a while, and in a very interesting manner. Rave had allowed a man with an extremely bad reputation, yet who had been admitted as a member of the peyote cult, to occupy one of the four positions. Hensley violently protested, on the ground that a man of X's character could not properly perform the rites associated with that position. Rave, however, retorted that the efficacy of the peyote, and of any position connected with its cult, was in no way connected with the character of the performer, and that it was inherent in the peyote and in the peyote ritual. Thereupon, after much parleying to and fro, Hensley formally seceded, taking with him a number of followers. The bulk of the peyote-eaters, however, remained with Rave, and within a comparatively short time quite a number of Hensley's followers returned to Rave, so that in 1911 Hensley had merely a handful of people. Since then he has ceased to be a force, although his innovations have been retained by many of the younger peyote members, especially by those who read English.

We find here in the later development of the peyote cult the addition of the Bible, its interpretation in terms of the peyote, and the Christian conception of the giving of testimony, or confessions, and possibly the Christian conception of baptism. To these we must add certain accretions, such as the introduction of the fire-place, the interpretation of the mound, the cross, and the staff, the introduction of a new type of songs,—peyote songs; and a peculiar development of symbolical drawings, generally upon rattles and representing visions or scenes from the Bible.

There is apparent at the present time no unification of the ideas of Rave and Hensley. They exist side by side, the ideas and practices relating to the peyote being, however, fundamental. It is impossible now to forecast the fate of the separate features of the complex, or what their reaction toward one another will be. It would certainly be one of the most interesting and suggestive problems to watch its future development, both among the Winnebago themselves, and among those tribes to whom the latter are bringing it.

DISSEMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE

Let us see now how the ideas of Rave and Hensley were transmitted in the tribe itself, who the first and the later converts were, what the nature of their conversion was, and what they, in turn, brought to the new cult.

The first and foremost virtue predicated by Rave for the peyote was its curative power. He gives a number of instances in which hopeless venereal diseases and consumption were cured by its use; and this to the present day is the first thing one hears about it. In the early days of the peyote cult it appears that Rave relied principally for new converts upon the knowledge of this great curative virtue of the peyote. The main point apparently was to induce people to try it, and I hardly believe that any amount of preaching of its direct effects, such as the hyper-stimulation induced, the glorious visions, and the feeling of relaxation following, would ever have induced prominent members of the medicine bands to do so. For that reason, it is highly significant that all the older members of the peyote speak of the diseases of which it cured them. Along this line lay unquestionably its appeal for the first converts. Its spread subsequently was due to a large number of interacting factors.

One informant claims that there was little religion connected with it at first, and that people drank the peyote on account of its peculiar effects.

The manner in which it spread at the beginning was quite simple and significant; viz., along family lines. As soon as an individual had become a peyote-eater, he devoted all his energies to converting other members of his family. From instances that have come to my notice, this lay in an insistent appeal to family ties and personal affection. He showed unusual courtesy, showered innumerable favors upon relatives he was anxious to convert, and thereby earned the gratitude of the recipient, who at some critical moment, let us say, such as illness or mental depression, showed it by partaking of the peyote. The same methods were employed in the more general propaganda. I have known peyote people to drive out many miles in order to be present at the bedside of some old conservative, who was ill, perhaps neglected by his relatives, bring him food, and spend the night with him in the most affectionate solicitude. They would not obtrude their peyote upon him. He generally knew how to draw the inference, however—that his gratitude was to be shown by trying it. I was fortunate enough to obtain a fairly complete account of a conversion, illustrating both these features, and will give it at length here.

I was at the Old Agency. There they were to try me for murder. At night, as I sat in jail, certain people came to me and told me that they had a gallon jug of whiskey, and that if I was free that night, I should come and drink with them. They would wait for me. That same night there was a peyote meeting at John Rave's house, and my brother Sam invited me to go there. Sam stood around there waiting for me. He was very low in spirits. He knew of the other invitation I had received, and he told me that he would go with me wherever I went. I wanted very badly to go to the place where they had the liquor, and should have done so if Sam had given me the least chance. However, I couldn't get rid of him, so I decided to go to the peyote meeting. When I arrived there, we found just enough room in the center for myself and Sam. Sam sat at the right of me, and John Bear at the left. In front of me there was some peyote infusion, and some dry peyote, and some peyote ground up and dampened.

As we sat there, Sam began to cry, and then I began to think. I knew why Sam was crying; he wanted me to take some of the peyote. After a while I began to think of my own troubles. But I thought that it wasn't the proper way of taking it just because I was in trouble. Then I thought of the other peyote-eaters, how much they must be wanting me to take it. After awhile I spoke to Sam and said, "I am going to eat this medicine,

but . . .” Then I began to cry. After awhile Sam tried to get me to say the balance; but I couldn’t. I drank some of the solution. As the others saw that I was willing to take it, they gave me a big ball of peyote, dampened. However, I didn’t like that, and asked for some more peyote in the dry state. I sat there, asking for more and more peyote. This I kept up all night. When morning came I stopped. Just then Harry Rave got up to speak, and no sooner did he get up, than I knew exactly what he was going to say. This must be the way of all peyote-eaters, I thought. I looked around me; and suddenly I realized that all these within the room knew my thoughts, and that I knew those of all the others. Harry Rave spoke, and finished his speech; but I had known it all before he said a word. Then A. Priest, who was leading the meeting, arose and asked the rest to get up, so that they might turn themselves over to Christ. I also arose; but when I got up I was seized with a choking sensation. I couldn’t breathe. I wanted to grab hold of Bear and Sam; but I didn’t, thinking that I was going to stand, whatever was coming to me. When I made up my mind to that, I felt relieved. Then I knew what the real meaning of turning one’s self over to Christ meant.

In the morning they stopped the meeting, and everyone seemed happy and glad. I, however, was very serious, and wondered why they were all laughing. Every once in awhile they would come and talk to me. I wondered why they did it, when they knew what was going on within me. For that reason I wouldn’t answer them.

That week there were four meetings, and I went to all of them, and ate very much peyote. The fourth meeting was at the usual place, John Rave’s house. I sat with Sam, as usual. At night I became filled with peyote. All at once I heard a voice saying, “You are the one who is to tell of the Medicine dance.” And I thought that Sam was speaking to me; so I turned around and looked at him; but he hadn’t said a word. Soon I realized that nobody near me had said anything, and I began to think, “Why should it be I? Why not one of the others?” I rather pushed the idea from me; but no sooner had I done so, than I began to have a tired and depressed sensation. This passed all over me. I knew that if I got up with the sincere purpose of giving in to the power that was wanting me to speak of the Medicine dance, I should be relieved. However, for some reason, I know not why, I felt like resisting.

The next morning I asked to be baptized, and said that I would thereafter have nothing more to do with offerings to the spirits; that I would not give any more feasts; and that I would not have any more to do with the Medicine dance. From that day on I quit all my old beliefs. I did not feel like saying all this, for indeed my heart was turned just the other way; but I couldn’t help it, for I was filled with the peyote.

From that time on at every meeting which I attended, I could not rid myself of the idea that I must tell of the Medicine dance. At all such times a feeling of heaviness would come over me. There I would be, with but one thing on my mind; should I, or should I not, tell of it? I did not want to, and thought of all sorts of excuses,—that I was not a member of the Nebraska division, etc.

In this frame of mind I was, while living with John Walker. There I received word that I would be wanted to tell of the Medicine dance. From that moment I could not rest easy. I went to the barn and prayed and wept, asking that God might direct me. I went about, but could not sit quiet. My wife staid around me, crying. As I stood there, some one drove up with a white team. Then I thought of all the unhappiness I would cause to members of the medicine lodge, if I told the secrets of the Medicine dance; and I asked myself whether it would not really be a sin to cause so much misery. The man who was driving the white team was John Baptiste; and he told me that I was wanted to tell of the Medicine dance. I got ready, and entered the buggy. I was still crying and praying. Then it occurred to me that I should like to see John Rave. No sooner had I thought of this than John Rave appeared in the road. I got out and shook hands with him and told him where I was going and for what purpose, and asked him what he thought of the matter. He began to thank me for the work I was going to do, and said, "This is what we should try to do, to help one another and to work for our Creator." Then he thanked me again. Perfect happiness now came over me, and I went to Sioux City and got married legally. From now on I was entirely filled with the desire to tell all that I knew about the Medicine dance. This must be the work assigned to me by the Creator, I thought; and yet I have rejected the idea all the time.

On Paul's last trip, although I had not finished the translation, I didn't care to have any more to do with it, and that somebody else should finish the work, my excuse being that I was busy. So as soon as I heard that Paul had come, I packed up and hurried out west as quickly as possible, for I knew that he would bother the life out of me if he found me. However, no sooner had I reached the home of my friend than I was seized with an attack of rheumatism, with which I had never been afflicted before, and on the very next morning Paul appeared, with a wagon, to take me back to Winnebago. Now I know that the telling and the translation of the Medicine dance is my mission in life, and I am willing to tell all to the full extent of my knowledge.

What these converts introduced individually it is quite impossible to establish; nor is it really necessary to assume that they brought any specific additions to the cult. What they did bring were Winnebago; and with that, the emotional and cultural setting of the old pagan background. To one, the eating of the peyote gave the same magical powers as were formerly associated with membership in the Medicine Dance; to another, the visions were direct blessings from God, directing him to perform certain actions. To a third, faithfulness to the teachings of the peyote cult became associated with a certainty of reaching God, of being able to take the right road in the journey to the spirit land. Even a man so thoroughly saturated

with Christian doctrines as Hensley himself felt it necessary to introduce an origin myth; and although I know that it was borrowed from some southern tribe, in Hensley's narrative it has already assumed all the characteristics of a Winnebago fasting experience and ritualistic myth, similar to those connected with the founders of the old Winnebago cult societies. In its totality, the atmosphere of the peyote cult became thus highly charged with the old Winnebago background. In 1911 it cannot be said that they had displaced the distinctively Christian elements introduced by Hensley. All that can be said is that the pagan background existed side by side with these Christian elements. Among the younger members, especially those who were trained in the East and could read and write English, the influence of the Christian ideas in the interpretation of old pagan features is still quite strong. The following homily will show how the old myths were used by some to point a tale.

The old people often spoke of the Trickster, but we never knew what they meant. They told us how he wrapped a coon-skin blanket around himself, and went to a place where all the people were dancing. There he danced until evening, and then he stopped and turned around. No one was to be seen anywhere, and then he realized that he had mistaken for people dancing the noise made by the wind blowing through the reeds.

So do we Winnebagoes act. We dance and make a lot of noise; but in the end we accomplish nothing.

Once, as the Trickster was going toward a creek, he saw a man standing on the other side, dressed in a black suit, and pointing his finger at him. He spoke to the man, but the latter would not answer. Then he spoke again and again, without receiving any reply. Finally he got angry and said "See here! I can do that too." He put on the black coat and pointed his finger across the creek. Thus both of them stood all day. Toward evening, when he looked around again, he noticed that the man across the creek, pointing his finger at him, was really just a tree stump. "Oh my! What have I been doing all this time? Why did I not look before I began? No wonder the people call me the Foolish One."

So are we Winnebagoes. We never look before we act. We do everything without thinking. We think we know all about it.

The Trickster was walking around with a pack on his back. As he walked along, some one called to him. "Say! We want you to sing." "All right," said he. "I am carrying songs in my pack, and if you wish to dance, build a large lodge for me, with a small hole at the end for an entrance." When it was finished, they all went in, and the Trickster followed them. Those who had spoken to him were birds. He told them that while dancing they were not to open their eyes, for if they did so, their eyes would become red. Whenever a fat bird passed the Trickster,

he would choke it to death, and if it cried out, he would say, "That's it, that's it! Give a whoop!"

After a while one of the birds got somewhat suspicious, and opened its eyes just the least little bit. He saw that the Trickster was choking all the birds. "He is killing us all!" said the bird. "Let all who can, run for their lives." Then he flew out through the top of the house. The Trickster took the birds he had killed, and roasted them; but he did not get a chance to eat them. For they were taken away from him by somebody.

So are we Winnebagoes. We like all that is forbidden. We say that we like the Medicine dance; we say that it is good; and yet we keep it secret and forbid people to witness it. We tell members of the dance not to speak about it until the world shall come to an end. They are afraid to speak of it. We, the Winnebago, are the birds, and the Trickster is Satan.

Once, as the Trickster was going along the road, something spoke to him. He listened, and he heard it say, "If anyone eats me, all bad things will come out of him." Then the Trickster went up to the one talking and said "What is your name?" "My name is Blows-himself-away." The Trickster would not believe it; so he ate it. After awhile he blew himself away. He laughed. "Oh pshaw! I suppose this is what it meant." As he went along it grew worse and worse, and it was only after the greatest hardships that he succeeded in returning home.

So are we Winnebagoes. We travel on this earth all our lives, and then when one of us tastes something that makes him unconscious, we look upon this same thing with suspicion when he regains consciousness.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE CONSERVATIVES

At every phase of the peyote cult's development, Rave had to contend with the hostility of the conservative members of his tribe. It would be interesting to know in what manner and degree this hostility manifested itself upon the first introduction of the peyote. It seems to me that in the beginning there was very little difference between the beliefs relating to the peyote and those connected with the old Winnebago medicinal plants. Yet I know there was a hostility toward the peyote. Would the same hostility have been exhibited, had this new feature represented some development from within the tribe itself? In other words, what we should like to know is, whether the fact of the peyote having been derived from without, led to a hostility different in kind from that exhibited toward an innovation developing within the culture itself. I have found no evidence of any kind from conversations with the older conservative Winnebago, that would justify me in explaining their hostility toward the peyote as due in any part

to the fact that it was alien in origin. The explanation I obtained was always the same,—that their hostility was due to the fact that the teachings of the peyote departed from those of their ancestors, and that the peyote people were aping the habits of the whites. One old conservative assured me that it had long ago been prophesied that the peyote would make its appearance among the Winnebago. He told me:

“This medicine is one of the four spirits from below, and for that reason it is a bad thing. These spirits have always longed for human beings; and now they are getting hold of them. Those who use this medicine claim that when they die they will be only going on a journey. But that is not true; for when they eat this peyote, they destroy their spirits, and death to them will mean extermination. If I spit upon the floor, the sputum will soon dry up, and in a short while, nothing will remain of it. So it will be with death. I might go out and preach against this doctrine; but it would really be of no avail; for I certainly would not be able to draw more than one or two people away from this spirit. Many will be taken in by this medicine; they will not be able to help themselves in any way. The bad spirit will certainly seize them.”

THE RELIGIOUS CONTENT

Let us now briefly discuss the nature of the religious content and its elaboration.

We have of course first and foremost the peyote. When enough of it has been taken, it acts as a strong stimulant, apparently bringing the nervous system to the highest degree of tension. The pupils of the eyes become dilated, the eyes themselves assume a glazed appearance, while the limbs become rigid. The rhythmic movement of the rattles to the accompaniment of the songs and the drum-beats is quite remarkable for its unison. In short, there are present all the signs of emotional exaltation. This exaltation seems to last until morning. The reaction differs with different individuals; but in the large majority of cases seems to take the form of a long and profound sleep. Yet I have known quite a number of individuals who did not seem to have any reaction at all.

What the inner effects are, I know only from description. There seem to be two strongly marked elements; first, a disagreeable taste, and a choking sensation; and secondly, a tendency to have visions, generally accompanied by the most gorgeous color sensations. The visions are always interpreted.

To judge from John Rave's description of his conversion,

he did not interpret the vision initially. He of course experienced the choking sensation, and noted the fact that any tendency to struggle against the effects of the peyote accentuated this choking sensation; while acquiescence relieved it. He seems very early to have associated this struggle with a notion that it was connected with a disbelief in the efficacy of the peyote, and unwillingness to become truly contrite. Later on, he elaborated this into a kind of a dogma—that the disagreeable effects of the peyote varied directly with a man's disbelief in it. This explanation he persistently drummed into the ears of beginners, who might otherwise become terrified and give up too soon. Secondly, he seems to have claimed that the only relief for the sufferer was a formal public declaration of faith in the peyote. To this declaration of faith many details were added by individuals, as they joined the cult, so that gradually it took the stereotyped form of the narration of their former sinful life, magnifying it and announcing the completeness of the change wrought in them by the virtue of the peyote. With the exception of these details, there was a definite interpretation of the more immediate effects of the peyote from a rather early time; and this was followed, with variations, by all new converts.

The visions were of two kinds; either they were of monsters pursuing an individual, or they constituted more or less elaborate dreams. For the former I found no general interpretation. Each individual was allowed to interpret them or not, as he chose. A number of individuals accepted them as material manifestations of their personal defects of character, one man assuring me that he vomited bulldogs when he first took peyote, and that this symbolized to him deliverance from his bulldog, stubborn nature. The dream visions are interpreted individually, although some are not interpreted at all. For that matter, not all claim to have them. In some cases, the individuals are directed to perform certain actions; in others, salient facts in their lives are explained. Hensley paid a visit to God, and afterwards to Hell, and was rescued from being crushed to pieces by two rocks, by an eagle, swooping down from Heaven and bearing him away. Rave had a vision of seeing the sun in the middle of the heavens at midnight. His brother, who was ailing, had a vision of seeing four boxes swimming far out on mid-ocean. As they gradually came nearer and nearer,

he finally recognized them as receptacles containing love potions that his wife had, supposedly, thrown away long ago. In consequence of this vision, he discovered that his wife was still using the old pagan medicines in order to retain his love, and that this was causing his ailment. None of these visions seem as yet to have taken the form of real stories. It would certainly repay a person to make as large a collection of them as possible in the near future, to see whether a general type is developing, and what relation it bears to the older dream experiences.

RELATION OF THE PEYOTE CULT TO THE OLD CULTURAL BACKGROUND

To understand correctly the relation of the peyote cult to the old cultural background of the Winnebago, it is essential first to know what part Rave played in the latter. He was a member of the Bear clan, and had participated actively in all the prominent ceremonies, with the exception of the Medicine dance. He was thus thoroughly acquainted with the ritualistic and organization units. What relation did this old knowledge bear to the new cult he founded? Was there, for instance, a conscious substitution of the type of ceremonial organization and of the ritualistic unit of the older ceremonies; or was there a subconscious continuation of the same? I think that we are probably dealing with the latter, and that none of the units of the ceremonial complex really arose into his consciousness. It is rather important to bear this in mind; for it has a fundamental bearing on the question of the older cultural units playing the rôle of conscious patterns. In the same way it is quite probable that Rave's extension to the peyote of all the associations grouped around the medicinal herbs was unconscious and instantaneous. The only really new thing then he brought back to the Winnebago for future assimilation was the peyote itself, its ceremonial eating, and its effects.

It would appear at first, that the fact that the peyote was not associated with various guardian spirits represented a new feature. But medicinal herbs, it must be remembered, were frequently purchased, and the borrowing of the peyote might belong to the same category. It is very likely that as in the case of the sacred shell of the Medicine dance borrowed from the central Algonkin, the peyote would, under normal conditions of Indian life, have become associated with some deity.

As a matter of fact, the origin myth introduced by Hensley shows a development in that direction even at the present time.

The last, and in some respects the most important, influence of the old cultural background shows itself in the gradual adoption of old observances and features. So, for example, a ceremonial circuit of the lodge was at one time associated with the peyote cult; one finds two sacred peyote, one interpreted as male, the other as female; the old sacred mound of the buffalo-dance, interpreted as Mt. Sinai; the crossed lines drawn in the earth, etc. There are at the present time only a few old interpretations of the new features. However, it must be regarded as significant that some of the characteristics of the old religious experiences have become associated with the peyote—the hearing of voices, a visit to the home of God, the gift of song, etc. In a similar manner, the powers of a shaman, such as the foretelling of events, reading the thoughts of others, etc., have been connected with it.

There is also a marked influence of the new Christian upon the old Winnebago beliefs. Thus we have seen the mound interpreted as Mt. Sinai, the crossed lines as the cross with Christ upon it, and the ceremonial crook as the shepherd's crook, or as the rod with which Moses smote the rock. There seems to be, however, one marked difference between these interpretations and the older Winnebago ones. They differ from individual to individual, while the others seem to be more generally diffused.

There are a number of cases where it is impossible to determine whether we are dealing with a re-interpretation or with a substitution. As this is an exceedingly important question, I will enumerate a few examples: baptism; the crook; confessions; and the story of the two roads.

Dipping one's hand in water and drawing lines on the forehead of an individual sounds like the real Christian baptism, to be sure. Yet we know that painting the patient's face was a prominent feature in the shaman's treatment of disease; and that Rave speaks of it in connection with the conversion of his own wife. Are we then to regard the baptism here as a re-interpretation of the old Winnebago custom, or as a real substitution of Christian baptism? And if the later alternative is accepted, what influence are we to ascribe to the older Winnebago belief in suggesting Christian baptism? The same ques-

tion will have to be answered in connection with the crook, confessions, and the story of the two roads. The bear clan had two ornamented sticks, of which Rave's family was the keeper. In general appearance there was not much difference between these and the Christian shepherd's crook. What is the relation of the two? In the ritualistic myth telling of the road to heaven, one finds the bifurcating road, one leading to Earth-maker, the other to the Bad Spirit. In the peyote cult we find the familiar Biblical story of the two roads, one leading to Heaven, and the other to eternal damnation. Again, let us take the question of the confession. In their present form, they certainly seem Christian, with a strong suggestion of the early Methodists. Yet giving testimony to the magical virtues of herbs in order to prove that one has been blessed by certain spirits, was characteristic of all Winnebagoes when first participating in a religious cult society. Granted even that all these things really are Christian elements, it is quite obvious that the fact that they were so readily accepted, suggests a relation between them and the older elements enumerated, and that just as in the case of ceremonial units, so here too there has been a selective borrowing, determined by the specific possessions of the recipient's cultural background.

CONCLUSION

It would seem, then, that even this very cursory sketch of the development of the peyote cult may be of use to us in the more definite formulation of what we are really to look for in cultural contact; and to the realization that there is little significance in saying that certain beliefs, myths, objects, etc., are borrowed, when they are found in two areas between which diffusion is possible. What we want to know is, what lies at the bottom of the facts that just these have been borrowed, and how they were borrowed. How did the recipient culture and the person or persons who were the actual transmitters of new features limit the elements borrowed? Was there an inert substitution of a new for an old feature; was there a re-interpretation of the old in terms of the new; or, lastly, a re-interpretation of the old in terms of its own culture, but due to stimulation from without? These are a few of the questions that must be answered in each specific case, before we can arrive at even a preliminary concept of what really constitutes the mechanism of borrowing.

THE EROTOGENETIC INTERPRETATION OF RELIGION: ITS OPPONENTS REVIEWED

BY THEODORE SCHROEDER,

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From Pausanias of ancient Greece to the present time many observers have commented upon some connection between some religion and lust. It is high time that the multiplicity of observed and suggestive facts receive a more thorough psychologic interpretation, and synthetic treatment to the end that the numerous empiric inductions be combined into a rational generalization. I have been doing some work to this end; a portion of it has been published.¹ My own working hypothesis may be stated thus: The differential essence of religion is always reducible to a sex ecstasy. When frankly avowed as such, then the apotheosis of sex results in some form of phallic worship. When not recognized as a sex ecstasy, or not frankly avowed as such, the erotic origin of religion is revealed by an extravagant overvaluation of the sacredness or sinfulness of some sex manifestations. In this form the sex ecstasy becomes religious "experience" by being misinterpreted as the direct and immediate perception of the mysterious—superphysical—"transcendental," thus becoming an indiscriminating witness for the inerrancy of all those varying and often contradictory doctrines and ceremonials believed to be of "spiritual" potency in the promotion of present, material, ecstatic or post mortem well-being and which doctrines and ceremonials happen, in the experiencing persons, to be associated with the religious "experience" and therefore are accepted as a part of the religious percept. Thus it is that all variety of religionists know because they feel and are firmly convinced in proportion as they are strongly agitated. The religionist viewing this same process with a different predisposition might well speak of religion as the entelechy of sex.

So far as I am informed, no one has yet undertaken to state, or, by the conscious use of the whole of the scientific method, to justify so inclusive a thesis upon this subject, or to

point out in exact generalization the nature of the fundamental connections between religion and sex. Neither has any one among the many who have written in defense of some narrower thesis undertaken to give us any adequate study of the criteria of religion itself. In consequence of these defects in the earlier erotic interpretations of religion it was unavoidable that the criticisms of the erotogenetic theory should have fallen far short of an effective attack upon the later conceptions of the theory. This is so, largely because the advocates of the erotogenetic theory have not yet stated as clearly as might have been done the whole true foundation by which that theory is justified. Consequently the critics have failed to meet adequately their antagonist's case as it can be and will be presented. Notwithstanding this it is important to the progress of the controversy that the more important critics be answered; and this I now propose to do.

P. NAECKE

In reviewing the sexual roots of religion, P. Naecke affirms² that "the identity of religious and sexual ecstasy is mentioned as proof of the close relation between religion and the sexual instinct. The identity, however, is merely apparent. In both, the individual appears withdrawn from the world. In religious ecstasy there is present solely the idea of divinity, in which the faithful one loses himself; but in sexual ecstasy only the pleasurable emotion engulfs everything. In one all bodily functions appear hampered, in the other accelerated, etc. Religious ecstasy can certainly appear of itself, or may become mixed with the erotic, while sexual ecstasy remains sexual throughout and allows no other God near it. There is therefore, no necessary relationship between religion and the sexual even here."

Here the author exhibits his "will to believe" in the psychogenetic "purity" of religion as more potent than his devotion to the scientific method. Such writers would find their intellects clarified and their approach to the psycho-analysis of religion more comfortable, if they could be relieved of the influence of the prevalent sex-phobia and view the situation with the greater healthy-mindedness of G. Stanley Hall, who recognizes that religion is in no sense degraded if its origins are shown to root in sex.³

If the identity of the religious and sexual ecstasy is more

apparent than real, as Naecke asserts, then it rests upon him to supply the objective physical criteria for their differentiation. Many victims of religious enthusiasm as well as observing clergymen have found it difficult to distinguish between the two.⁴ When the distinguishability of sex ecstasy and the essence of religion is the very crux of the issue, we must look upon all dogmatic assertions not verifiable by objective physical criteria as expressing only the author's emotional predisposition.

Naecke's statement that in religious ecstasy "all bodily functions are hampered" needs a little comment. Even if religious ecstasy is a mere perverted sexuality, then still it could scarcely be otherwise than that during its active period the bodily functions should be hampered. According to the erotogenetic theory the religious ecstasy may be founded on an hallucination, or illusion which is often aided by looking at pictures of religious personages whose faces seem to move in reflection of the moods of the worshiper. In such cases the successful substitution of psychic stimulation, promotes a diffusion of the nervous excitation over the whole body. The victim feels lost in a swirl of emotions which in its extreme produces loss of consciousness and of course long before the extreme is reached may bring about an utter forgetfulness of the erotic origin of the excitation as well as of the immediate environment.

In such a case the violence of the erotic impulse is usually intense, involving the whole nervous organism. This impulse being spent autosomatically the accompanying physical inhibitions and attitudes differ of course from what they would be if the erotic climax had been normal in intensity and spent along the channel proper to it. The difference is one between normal sexuality with a consciousness of its source as well as its superficial nature, and psychic auto-erotism unrecognized as such and consequently spiritualized, transcendentalized and objectivized. This, I think, is a probable explanation of Naecke's statement that: "In religious ecstasy there is present solely the idea of divinity in which the faithful one loses himself; but in the sexual ecstasy only the pleasurable emotion which engulfs everything."

Upon another phase of the question, Naecke affirms that

"phallic worship appears to have developed after the creation of bad and good divinities as a deification of the sexual act to which was ascribed a direct divine influence . . . If the enumerated chronology of facts

be correct we must recognize that religion as such does not rest on sexual foundations alone, although it may show in its later development a few sexual twigs, or, more properly speaking, off-shoots, such as phallic worship at an early cultural period, and in later periods a degeneration of the love of God. Everything that is ordinarily pointed out as the sexual roots of religion is therefore the result only of secondary contamination and blending, not part of the original foundation."

I am at once made suspicious by the form of this statement, because to me it reads like a thinly disguised revamping of the revivalists' usual explanation that the concurrence of religious and sexual enthusiasms, is due to Satan's imitation of the holy, pure and divine love. My suspicion is strengthened when in the same article I find Naecke admitting that he knows of "no positive proof unfortunately" that it was relatively late when the phallic element was injected into religion. So then, according to his own admission, his statement of the chronological order of events is pure dogmatism. A very similar error is made by Crawley, but in form a better challenge to the psychologist. The reader is therefore referred to that discussion hereinafter for criticism upon this point.

Even Naecke is forced by the strength of evidence to admit that eroticism frequently manifests itself within the range of religious ecstasy; nevertheless he postulates the generalization that "religious ecstasy can certainly appear of itself." The erotic feature, where present, is an admixture. But this is the very point of issue and should not have been passed by Naecke without proof. As a mere assertion it is only significant of his preconception in the matter but of no value to the discussion. The religio-sexual ecstasy may not be a mixture at all and indeed is conceived to be only a particular manifestation of the sexual instinct. Where the erotic feature is very distinct we are confronted not simply with a mixture but with a clearer manifestation of that very essence which in its milder stages was easily concealed, and often misinterpreted.

Furthermore, this theory of religious chronology, which admittedly rests wholly upon the author's inner consciousness and his "will to believe," contradicts a necessary deduction from Spencer's formula of evolution, which asserts a progression "from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity." Elsewhere⁵ I applied this law deductively to the known objects of religious worship and concluded

that "only in the primal sex worship of racial adolescence, when every man finds a part of himself to be the source of every religious essence and the object of his religious sentiment can we find that ultimate incoherence and homogeneity which the law of evolution conditions as existing at the time of religious inchoation." This conclusion, that therefore, sex worship must have been the first of all religions, I further confirm by some anthropological data. Naecke had that argument before him when he wrote, but instead of answering it directly, contented himself with expressing his displeasure with the conclusion.

Naecke continues: "Is there religion without sexual basis? I believe the answer must be decidedly in the affirmative." Had Dr. Naecke taken the trouble to furnish us his differential criteria of religion it is probable that in the foregoing sentence we should find that he was not talking about religion at all but about a mere theology adopted by sympathetic imitation, or perhaps a scientific conviction about a religious subject-matter.⁶ Writing of the so-called later acquired sexual characteristics which happen in connection with divinities which represent the reproductive principle, he adds this: "And it matters little that these divinities happen to be among the earliest and the ones to fall into the background later." To me this seems to matter very much when one is concerning himself seriously with religious psycho-genetics. That Dr. Naecke could thus dogmatically reject this important evidentiary fact again shows the intensity of his predisposition.

ANDREW LANG

Andrew Lang has tried in a single clever sentence to reduce much of the discussion of the phallic origin of religion to an absurdity. The Rev. Arthur E. Whatman during the preparation of a paper on "The Sign of the Mother Goddess," wrote Lang, inviting an opinion. Dr. Lang expressed himself as follows:⁷

"It does not seem possible to know what Homer meant by the 'Gestus.' It may have been a necklace hanging over the breast, or a talisman or a pendant amulet. As we have no representation of the thing in art (very late Minoan or sub-Minoan) it is impossible to do more than guess. . . . No later author than Homer knew anything on the subject. I was unaware that the triangle (as on Bass' ale) was phallic. What will phallicists not call phallic?"

It seems to me that in spite of its brevity this disturbing bit of witticism does require some serious words in refutation of what is implied. It is of course absurd in our present environment to say that the triangle of a business trade-mark should be interpreted as a present phallic symbol. However, Lang's insinuation and implication that it is equally absurd to consider the triangle a sexual symbol under any other circumstance is quite untenable. In our time the word-symbol is the usual manner of representing everything. This was not so in the prehistoric times when crude drawing and crude sculpture were the only methods of symbolization. Hence a present-day triangle could hardly be rationally interpreted as symbolizing anything but mechanical objects or geometrical ideas. Not so among primitive peoples. There a crude drawing or sculpture was the only means for graphic presentation of any thing or idea. Among such people a triangle would be a most natural and quite a necessary selection as a symbol of the pudendal region as naturally outlined. The conception of its sacredness only supplied the motive for more frequent use of the symbol. If in addition the historical period during which the particular triangle in use is one in which sex worship and sex symbolism form an important part of the mental content of the people, then a very different inference arises as to the meaning of the triangle. This is not the place to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence adduced by Whatman; it is enough to point out in reply to Lang that it is a question of evidence and that the probative value of a triangle when its use in religious art relates to a time in which phallic symbolisms were rife is quite different from its evidential value in our own time. Mr. Lang's *reductio ad absurdum* shows that for once Mr. Lang descended to absurdity.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK

Prof. Edwin D. Starbuck⁸ acknowledges that "in a certain sense the religious life is an irradiation of the reproductive instinct." Such mystifying, figurative language as "irradiation of the instinct" is out of place except perhaps in theological literature and under poetic license. After consulting several dictionaries I am still unable to translate the words into any definite concept. The question arises in my mind whether this very mystifying simile is not in itself, illustrative of an

early step in the transition from normal conscious sensuality to religion. By trying to describe feelings of sexual origin in terms of the objective physical world by the use of figurative language we first lose sight of its essential nature and finally deny this nature altogether, and ascribe our experience to something objective and maybe extra-physical and transcendental. At any rate, Starbuck seems almost to concede that at the beginning, religion and sex may have been bound together but claims that religion has become something different. May it not be that we have only fooled ourselves by subterfuges invented to explain away the true sources of religion? Here are Mr. Starbuck's words:

"Even if it is true that religion was at first intimately bound up in those duties and ceremonies which are the outgrowth of sex, in its later stages it may have entirely changed its character. . . . We have to distinguish constantly between causes and conditions of growth."

Starbuck was engaged in scientific endeavor in the field of the psychology of religion. Having observed that "religion was at first intimately bound up in those duties and ceremonies which are the outgrowth of sex," manifestly his problem was to search for a psychologic explanation of that intimate relationship. Had the observed facts suggested to Starbuck the Freudian "unbearable idea" he could not have suppressed more thoroughly his consciousness of the real problem which confronted him. Although the outward manifestations and intellectual explanation of religions may change often yet it requires evidence which no one has yet undertaken to offer, to prove that its essential nature has ever been transformed. If now it is no longer generally recognized to be sexual, or not frankly confessed as such, this in all probability is mainly due to the fact that theologasters, also scientists like Mr. Starbuck, disguise or conceal their "unbearable ideas," behind such mystical verbiage as "irradiation of an instinct." Until contrary proof is offered, the law of persistence of type requires us to hold that religion is still in its essence sexual, if it ever was so.

ERNEST CRAWLEY

Ernest Crawley criticises the erotogenists by saying that "phallic worship proper is, however, extremely rare, if, indeed, it ever occurs; veneration it is true, is frequently found, but this like many a

so-called cult, is simply an affirmation of the sacredness of life. No student of anthropology now regards as serious the many attempts that have been made to raise such cases to the rank of organized phallic religion."⁹

By the last sentence Crawley really can mean only that he will not classify among the "students of anthropology" any of the numerous investigators who disagree with him. That this is only the dogmatic justification of an imperative preconception is evidenced by the preceding sentence which shows that the same predisposition blinded him to the fact that he was reversing the order of the evolution of reasoning. According to the erotogenetic theory of religion, out of certain personal sexual experiences coming into consciousness there grew the idea of the sacredness of the sexual organs and later their worship. The knowledge that many other phenomena were related to and dependent upon sex came long afterwards. Thus gradually some of these collaterals of sexuality were included with the religio-sexual concepts and at times supplanted them, as objects of worship. This sex essence of the later religious complex sometimes does not even come to the surface of consciousness, though always present as an essential of religion. All these general ideas and complexes are a late product of evolution, derived from the primal concrete idea of an independent intelligence, at first inhabiting and later manifesting itself through our own sexual apparatus, power which makes for happiness. Mr. Crawley reverses this process. He assumes that the general idea of life preceded the more concrete idea of a super-physical intelligence residing within the generative apparatus and that sacredness of sex was deduced from the sacredness of life. Of course the law of evolution implies exactly the reverse of this. Concrete concepts of and reverence for the particular reproductive agencies must have preceded general ideas of life and its value or the worship of the generative process as a whole.¹⁰ It is therefore manifestly absurd to say that primitive humans adopted phallic worship as a result of deductive processes. Indeed, long after man became conscious of the joy and sacredness of sex, he was unaware that copulation is a means to pregnancy. Since Crawley, in the course of criticism, virtually repudiates the law of evolution and ignores the evidences to be derived from sexual psychology and psychoanalysis, his objection may be dismissed without further comment.

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES

Edward Scribner Ames quotes Crawley with approval and specially emphasizes the error that love of life gives rise to the idealization of the life-giving process.

Ames admits that¹¹ "religion embodies many of these complex, ideal manifestations of the sexual impulse." Also that "both the synchronous appearance of the sexual instinct and religious awakening and the common social character of the two, point to their fundamental connection." But he states further: "Those who regard religion as a perversion of the sexual instinct, may be answered with facts. Phallic worship is often cited as evidence of the perversion of the sexual instinct."

In this last statement Ames shows clearly that he has no adequate conception of such views as I hold concerning the erotogenesis of religion. Phallic worship, as such, is further removed from perverted sexuality than many of our modern religious practices whose sexual essence is denied.

In the earliest beginnings phallicism was but a species of the extravagance of ignorance applied to some normal sex-manifestations and, of course, was accompanied by the misinterpretation of the nature and cause of sexual phenomena. It is withal a frank recognition of sexual processes as such. Phallic worship was the apotheosis of ordinary sex functioning, then but recently arisen into the consciousness of man just as the modern religion is but the apotheosis, more cleverly disguised, of the same sex ecstasy which furnished the content of the earliest 'religious' consciousness. Formerly it was usually normal sexuality that produced the religious ecstasy, now it is often psychic erotism which is called religious experiences, and its sexual character denied usually or at least often through ignorance. It matters little that by its victims and apologists alike the true essence of modern religion, is disguised under a complex figurative phraseology, that its true origin and nature are obscured by ignorance and misrepresentation and often by the fact that for the unskilled observer the perversion of the impulse conceals its real 'erotic' character. The psychologist who approaches the subject without bias should nevertheless be able to note that, instead of losing its sexual character, the denial of it in modern religion proves the greater frequency of sex-perversion in religion and leads to genuine phobias against normal sexuality. This warping or perversion of the instinct

with its resultant sex-phobia and the sympathetic imitation of the latter by the weak is really all there is to the seeming antagonism of religion and sensualism, which Ames lays stress upon. The development of sexual phobias cannot be looked upon as proof of such antagonism but on the contrary: such phobias, and asceticism testify to the presence of great sexual tension even though in a particular case a complete perversion of the sexual instinct has not yet been attained. Psycho-analysis, applied to the sex-phobias of religionists, I am confident, will clearly reveal the sexual nature of the religion of which those phobias are a part.

GEORGE BARTON CUTTEN

The Rev. George Barton Cutten¹² follows the argument of Prof. William James in his opposition to the erotogenetic theory of religion which argument will be critically examined hereinafter. When Rev. Mr. Cutten leaves the argument of James to pursue his own, he makes admissions most damaging to his conclusions, without having any apparent consciousness of their destructive properties, thus illustrating, rather forcefully, the blinding power of unreasoned predispositions.

In the first place Rev. Cutten would appear as a modern type of mind acquainted with and accepting the doctrine of evolution that "the history of the race is repeated in the individual."¹³ He admits, therefore, that, "the various phenomena—accession to puberty, rapid physical development, transformations in mental life, and spontaneous religious awakening—are so closely interwoven that we may say with certainty that they had in evolutionary development a direct and intimate relation." And yet the Rev. Mr. Cutten does not see that, "if religion and sex in evolutionary development have had a direct and intimate relation," and, as Haeckel has shown, the life of the individual is a "compressed reproduction" of the life of the race, then it must be that, as in the immaturity of the race so now and forever in the immaturity of the individual, religion must bear to sex "a direct and intimate relation."

Again he says (p. 432):

"Religious devoutness shows itself by sexual abnormality in two extremes, excesses of indulgence and repression. Why some devotees are led to sexual indulgence and others to abstinence is a question which can be

answered only by an appeal to the psychology of the individual, and the forces which are brought to bear upon his mind."

Let us not be too certain. Whether manifested in "spiritual" sensuality, or asceticism resulting from an extravagant overvaluation of the sinfulness of normal sexuality and usually accompanied by some form of perverted eroticism, the excessive lewdness admittedly accompanying the more intense states of "religious devoutness" is not a new element suddenly injected into the person. Dr. Cutten has admitted that it was so in the beginning also, that is, in evolutionary development. To the evolutionist, nature has no sudden and new creations or injections. All is development by more or less imperceptible changes largely of proportion. What is then admitted to be true of the present extreme devoutness, and at the beginning of religious evolution, must be also true, in a lesser degree, of all lesser devoutness down to that uncertain point where religion itself fades out.

Again, I agree absolutely with the following statement of Dr. Cutten:

"Much ado is made of a clergyman or prominent religious worker who is guilty of sexual sin; but in not a few cases the alienist might furnish us with a basis, not only for pity but for a partial (at least) justification. The very nervous constitution *which is necessary for excessive devoutness*, in different members of a congregation, *may make sexual desire more active* and at the same time, lessen the power of self-control."

I agree that in such circumstances there often is much unjustified harshness of criticism and a great deal of hypocritical deprecation. It is a little strange that one who presumes to write as a psychologist should not see in this last admission even a little evidence of a casual relation between religion and sensualism. Evidently the religious predisposition blinded Dr. Cutten to the probative force of this and other evidence which he furnishes, so that he could not see its connection with that which he must have known from some study of the psychology of hysteria. In view of his unexplained admissions which tend to support the theory which he opposes, Dr. Cutten's personal objections are of little or no value. At any rate, nothing said by him really answers the argument of his opponents, and his admissions increase the necessity for an adequate explanation for the continuing concomitance of religious "experience" and unusual sexual enthusiasm.

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES

Undoubtedly the best known American critic of the eroto-genetic theory is Prof. William James. His adverse comment has been followed most often by geniuses of lesser order. His views have an added interest also because intellectually he is one of the most highly evolved of our modern mystics. A fervid imagination enabled him to dress his thoughts in words of entrancing poetic charm. Generally speaking, James is so ingenious in his rhetoric that he bewilders and loses not only his readers but himself also, in mazes wherein it is hard to discriminate between illustrations of his imagination and argument from facts; or between literal truth, figurative language and mere analogies. This process of psychic transilience in many a religious enthusiast is completed in definite hallucinations in which figures of speech have assumed the appearance of literal reality. These mystical characteristics constitute James' strongest appeals to his uncritical readers but render him quite elusive to the true scientist.

It is convenient to review Prof. James' criticisms¹⁴ *seriatim*. He begins with admission against interest.

"It is true," he says, "that in a vast collection of religious phenomena some are undisguisedly amatory—e. g., sex deities and obscene rites in polytheism and ecstatic feelings of union with the Savior in a few Christian mystics. But then why not equally call religion an aberration of the digestive function, and prove one's point by the worship of Bacchus and Ceres, or by the ecstatic feelings of some other saints about the eucharist? Religious language clothes itself in such poor symbols as our life affords and the whole organism gives overtones of comment whenever the mind is strongly stirred to expression. Language drawn from eating and drinking is probably as common in religious literature as is language drawn from the sexual life. We 'hunger and thirst' after righteousness; we 'find the Lord a sweet savor'; we 'taste and see that the Lord is good.' 'Spiritual milk for American Babes Drawn from the Breast of Both Testaments' is a subtitle of the once famous New England Primer, and Christian devotional literature indeed quite floats in milk, thought of from the point of view not of the mother, but of the greedy babe."

"St. François de Sales, for instance, thus describes the 'Orison of quietude'; 'In this state the soul is like a little child still at the breast, whose mother, to caress him while he is still in her arms, makes her milk distill into his mouth without his even moving his lips. So it is here. . . . Our Lord desires that our will should be satisfied with sucking the milk which His Majesty pours into our mouth, and that we should relish the sweetness without even knowing that it cometh from the Lord.' And again: 'Consider the little infants, united and joined to the breasts of

their nursing mothers, you will see that from time to time they press themselves closer by little starts to which the pleasure of sucking prompts them. Even so, during its orison, the heart united to its God oftentimes makes attempts at closer union by movements during which it presses closer upon the divine sweetness.' *Chemin de la Perfection*, ch. XXXI; *Amour de Dieu*, VII, ch. 1."

These paragraphs show that Prof. James' "will to believe" predominated over his desire to know the whole truth. Otherwise he could not have remained so ignorant of the great erotic import and the clearly sexual features of the celebrations of Bacchus and Ceres¹⁵ as to see in them religious ceremonials so predominately gustatory as to preclude the inference of a sexual motive. Perhaps he only consulted expurgated Sunday-School mythologies published primarily to conceal vital truths and to sell.

It is no doubt true that religious language clothes itself in such symbols as our life affords. The problem of the genetic psychologist is to discover why different persons are impelled toward different kinds of symbols. In other words, why and whence comes the psychologic imperative which in each case makes the particular symbol used seem to the user the most expressive or suggestive? Subject to the restraint of conventions or fear, sensual men are prone to use unnecessarily such verbal imagery or to focus their attention upon such details, as are suggestive of sex to their own thinking. This is so because with these persons in response to their strongest bodily craving such imagery is nearest the surface of their consciousness. In this light, what is the obvious interpretation of such a phrase as "spiritual milk from the breasts of both Testaments," when used to describe a primer of religious content? If this is to be explained on the assumption of imagery from the standpoint of hunger and food, why was it not expressed as a "spiritual ham sandwich from both quarters of God's word?" In New England ham was just as important an element of diet as mother's milk. For the psychologist, this choice cannot be ascribed to chance. His problem is to discover what imperative determined the choice among images equally possible, when considered objectively, to the person under examination.

Suppose we imagine a primer written by a hungry nursing babe for whom the most frequent and the most important ex-

perience of life is the act of nursing. It would be the most natural thing conceivable for such an infant, in quest of figurative language by which to describe a "spiritual" craving or any "spiritually" satisfying experience, to select figures derived from nursing experience. Of course this would then be done from the view-point of a greedy babe with but few baby experiences to draw upon, and the illustration selected would naturally be the one nearest the surface of its infantile consciousness. The choice would be determined by the fact that within its limited supply of metaphor these two experiences presented or suggested the greatest similarity. However the present problem is to discover what force or craving compelled an adult man, writing a primer which imparts "spiritual food," to conceive of this as "milk from the breasts of both Testaments."

Obviously, his own religious experience could scarcely have had in it anything to suggest the visual, auditory or tactual cognizance of a nursing babe as something similar to a like cognizance of things of the "spirit." Nor does Prof. James suggest that such is the explanation. He seems to think the authors of such phrases are describing their own religious feelings as somehow related to women's breasts, but he thinks related from the standpoint of the greedy babe, not from the standpoint of the adult authors. Obviously then, the choice of a woman's breasts as a figurative description of some religious experience must have come to the consciousness of the author because his "spiritual" experiences were like some other experience of his with which women's breasts were closely allied in his thought. Can it be possible that the word-symbols in which Prof. James saw only food and hunger were after all sexual and therefore support the very theory which he sought to overthrow?

An orthodox Freudian psycho-analyst would probably hold such symbolism as "spiritual milk for American babes from the breasts of both Testaments" to imply an imaginative subconscious reversion to and comparison with the infantile joys of nursing experience. Perhaps even James might agree thus far. A Freudian predisposed to the erotogenetic view of religion might go further and assert that even in the sensuous joy of sucking, the infant experiences a diffused or undifferentiated sexecstasy, and conclude therefore that such a reversion as is

evinced by this symbolism supports or at least is consistent with, the erotogenetic interpretation of religion.

To my mind, these interpretations of the figurative language in question are fundamentally wrong in that they all attempt to hark back to infantile experiences which are so far below consciousness that we can not even assert their existence as a potential memory. When our infantile experience is so far forgotten that no effort can revive it in consciousness as a concrete reproduction in memory, I see no reason for believing it possible that it can be or will be revived from the subconscious for the purpose of making comparisons with or descriptions of a present experience.

To my mind, the choice of figurative language, such as is under investigation, is better explained in another way. The feelings which are evoked in an adult observer by the vision of a woman's breasts are not the feelings of a greedy babe. On the contrary, they are a reminder of some more recent occasion when the same feelings were associated with a woman's breasts. Those familiar with the puritanic obsession need not be told the source of that revived emotion. The religious feeling suggested woman's breasts in a manner that could not be frankly avowed, and the breast-concept pressing for expression the associated idea of a nursing babe came to mind as a tolerable means to that end. The unconscious testimony of this breast-simile is that "spiritual" experience is very much like, if not identical with, the feelings aroused in a puritan mind by the sight of woman's breasts. Thus, upon a more careful analysis, Prof. James' refutation of the erotogenetic theory of religion becomes a confirmation thereof.

Thus far we have considered the simile which Prof. James calmly assumes to be beyond all question of non-sexual character and origin, to have been the mental product of a man living a sex-life not far removed from the normal. In the absence of knowledge upon the subject, this assumption may be unwarranted. A searching inquiry into the sex-life of this author might reveal a very different explanation for this particular choice of figurative language. To illustrate, had Prof. James taken account of the available knowledge in the realm of sexual psychology, he would have had less confidence in his predisposition to find a non-sexual explanation for the breast-sucking allegory. He would then have recalled that woman's

breasts are a most important secondary sex attraction and that the sucking of the breasts is, for many persons, an highly effective aphrodisiac and may even become a means of perverted gratification. This practice of breast sucking by adults may also become obsessive and inhibitive of the normal intercourse, and, of course, like all other forms of sensualism, the perverted gratification may be spiritualized and become of religious significance.

I have before me some correspondence from a religious "crank," who writes me that he has not had sexual intercourse with his wife for nine years. He tells me to "gird" my loins, and gives directions as to how to do this "internally and spiritually." He says:

"Resolve never to touch your wife again after the manner of the beast. Say the Lord's Prayer often. You may nurse at the dry breasts of your wife three minutes every A. M. before rising. . . . By such a practice I believe a man will remain in the flesh a thousand years again and be the elect of God."

My correspondent finds material in the Bible to corroborate his view.

It seems that here the breast-sucking by an old man produced an exhilaration which induced the confidence of a thousand years of existence in the flesh and nearness to God. How can Prof. James ask us to assume without any evidence that this breast simile of the New England Primer was not the product of practices similar to those of my correspondent?

Prof. James, continuing his effort to reduce the erotogenetic theory to absurdity, proceeds thus:

"In fact, one might as well interpret religion as a perversion of the respiratory function. The Bible is full of the language of respiratory expression: 'Hide not thine ear at my breathing, my groaning is not hid from thee; my heart panteth, my strength faileth me; my bones are hot with my roaring all the day long, as the hart panteth after the water brooks, so my soul panteth after thee, O my God.' 'God's Breath in Man' is the title of the chief work of our best known American mystic (Thomas Lake Harris); and in certain non-Christian countries the foundation of all religious discipline consists in regulation of the inspiration and expiration."

This reasoning I should hardly have thought needed an answer had it emanated from a less distinguished source. However, with James as the author, many will be predisposed to give it undue credence.

Whether or not religion is the perversion of any bodily function is not to be determined solely by the character of the figurative language used. The inducing cause for its use, however, may furnish strong evidence. One may be impelled solely by his environment to give unusual thought to sex matters, and because of such sex-centered attention may with great frequency use sexual allegory in describing religious emotions or concepts. It would be ridiculous to argue *from that fact alone* that such a person had converted sexuality into religion. If, however, the use of sexual figures of speech is due to a sexual obsession arising mainly from conditions of the neuro-sexual mechanism and the states described as religious ecstasy are shown by psycho-analysis to be indistinguishable from sex-feeling; and if the sensual phrasing used is not a sex-figure descriptive of a non-sexual fact but rather a most literal description of a sex ecstasy which is called "religious" only because its true nature is sought to be concealed or is not understood; and if this condition is found to be generally true then perhaps religion is proven to be a sex ecstasy misinterpreted or perverted sexuality. But before we can pass a final and general judgment we must, with the aid of psycho-analysis, get behind the apparent facts. If then we find an identity of religious feeling and sexuality in practically all religious enthusiasts, we are warranted in believing that in a less conspicuous degree the same must be true also of those persons who are less intensely religious. Of course we must distinguish religious persons from those who have only a social habit of congregating with religious people or those who have a mere secular opinion about a religious subject-matter; that is those with whom religious opinions are wholly a matter of prior ratiocination based upon objectives. Then our general erotogenetic interpretation of religion will be strengthened if it shall be confirmed by other facts of religious history and psychology, and withstand generally all those tests which the scientific method would suggest.

The evidentiary value of such figurative language to the erotogenetic theory depends upon four other items. The first is the nature and source of the psychologic imperative which resulted in the choice of the figures used. Second, the indistinguishability of the author's religious experience from the psychologic imperative responsible for his choice of symbols. Third, the establishment of sex as the physical cause and es-

sence of the one and by virtue of their indistinguishability also as the causal essence of the other. Fourth, the checking of this conclusion by all the processes suggested by the scientific method. These I have outlined briefly in another place.¹⁶

Were a follower of James to reproduce these essential factors in relation to breathing and thus perfect the analogy we might then be compelled to admit with James that "one might as well interpret religion as a perversion of the respiratory function."

The theory of the erotogenesis of religion does not rest, as James assumes, upon the mere occasional conjunction of religion and sexuality. By psycho-analysis we can discover in the very nature of religion the psychologic imperative calling sexual images into existence, and this fact makes their existence one circumstance in a chain of evidence. The theory is not established by one piece of circumstantial evidence but by the probative force of all the evidence properly co-ordinated. Hence the erotogenetic theory of religion can not be discredited by merely pointing out the absurdity of some other conclusion which must depend solely upon a similar conjunction of facts. On some other occasion I will publish a study of the relation of sexual passion to respiration and the feeling of unreality. Then we may acquire some new light on Prof. James' notion that the respiratory similes in religious literature are necessarily non-sexual.

Continuing his refutation of the erotogenists, James adds this:

"The two main phenomena of religion, namely, melancholy and conversion, they will say are essentially phenomena of adolescence and therefore synchronous with the development of sexual life. To which the retort again is easy. Even were the asserted synchrony unrestrictedly true as a fact (which it is not) it is not only the sexual life but the entire higher mental life which awakens adolescence. One might then as well set up the thesis that the interest in mechanics, physics, chemistry, logic, philosophy and sociology which springs up during adolescent years along with that in poetry and religion, is also a perversion of the sexual instinct:—but that would be too absurd. However, if the argument from synchrony is to decide, what is to be done with the fact that the religious age *par excellence* would seem to be old age, when the uproar of the sexual life is passed? . . . When other people criticise our more exalted soul-flights by calling them 'nothing but' expressions of our organic disposition, we feel outraged and hurt, for we know that, whatever be our organism's

peculiarities, our mental states have their substantive value as revelations of the living truth; and we wish that all this medical materialism could be made to hold its tongue.”

It is disappointing to find one of Prof. James' standing complaining of the superficiality of others when in the very act of exposing his own. Of course, it would be as stupid to claim that a *mere* synchrony between sexual and religious awakening is sufficient to prove a causal relation between the two as it is “simple-minded” for Prof. James to assume that the relation of pubescence or adolescence to religion is *necessarily* the same as that between sexual awakening and the adolescent's interest in mechanics. Prof. James should have seen that the real question is whether religion is related to sexuality in an essentially different manner than is the adolescent's interest in chemistry or mechanics. A person less wedded to mysticism than Prof. James would have noted that the interest in religion and sensualism are both centered upon and primarily arise from within the organism in a way that is not true of the interest in mechanics. He should also have remembered that, unlike theology, a knowledge of mechanics has not generally been derived from inner consciousness and it is only as to sex that religion prolongs into mature life the extravagantly over-valued sacredness and sinfulness of youthful judgment. Religionists and adolescents apotheosize love. The devotion to mathematics does not bear any similar relation to adolescence. Special interest in religion, unlike mechanics, is an accompaniment of the nervous disturbances of the period of sexual decline. This then suggests that before passing final judgment we should carefully inquire whether these differences do not imply all that is claimed under the doctrine of the erotogenesis of religion. If Prof. James wished the medical materialists to hold their tongues, he should have silenced them by arguments showing a more searching inquiry on his part.

Is religion a mere outgrowth of sex-mystery, a mere misinterpretation of an unidentified, diffused sexecstasy dissociated from the normal accompaniment of sensual ideas, which ecstasy is deemed religious only because through perverse suggestion the sexual consciousness has been replaced by religious concepts? Evidently this can not be proven by merely showing religion to be an accompaniment of adolescence, nor disproven by showing that interest in mathematics also accompanies adole-

science. How about art and music? As in religion, the first interest in them develops mainly during adolescence and it is believed by many that both persons of artistic temperament and those of religious temperament are peculiarly sensitive to lustful suggestion. Assuming that these suspicions are true, we can not yet draw the conclusion either that music or art are perverted sexuality or that religion is not such. Persons of artistic temperament are such because unusually sensitive to those emotions which art and music inspire. That there exists some physiological connection between sexual, artistic and religious emotions, few will deny. Physiologically viewed, all feelings are a mere nerve commotion. They can be differentiated only according to their origins and associated ideas. Because they are each but similar conditions of the same nervous organism, the originating and associated ideas are easily interchangeable. This accounts for the connection between sex and all other feeling. In all such cases the explanation is purely one of physiological connection.

But this does not get to the core of our problem which is to discover the essential nature of the psychic correlation, between lust and all religion. If a causal relation is found to exist between the two, it may be pertinent to inquire whether religion is ever a perverted sexuality, or whether religious "experience" is so related to one's own sex-activity as to be difficult or impossible without it. Here again we must explore deeper than has hitherto been done, into the psychic essence and the very reason for the existence of religion and its ecstasy. It would be interesting to know whether any one who had been made a eunuch before pubescence had ever "experienced" religious conversion and to study his "spiritual" experiences.

Our knowledge of physiology makes it possible to believe that art-emotion or any other may induce sex-emotions as a reflex action, just as does the excitement of battle. Likewise it is readily conceivable that a sex ecstasy induced by objective stimuli, may intensify an existing artistic emotion. It is difficult for me to see how a sex-feeling and the consciousness of it without anything more, could evolve into a non-religious artistic concept. But when, for the artistic concept, we substitute the so-called "transcendental," subjective and always personal religious elements, it is easy to see that by interpretation and objectivization a religious idea might result from adolescent

condition. In this respect the relation of adolescence to religion and art differs.

Prof. James once "heard a lady describe the pleasure it gave her to think that she could always cuddle up to God." (P. 81.) In determining the source of this figurative language we inquire first if there exists any such objective, sense-perceived resemblance in the relation of God and worshiper as should naturally suggest such figurative language. Since none such exists, we look for a subjective determinant. Here again there can scarcely be but one explanation. The love-relation of this woman and her God in the feelings which it implied or evoked, was so like the feelings formerly evoked by "cuddling up" to some male lover, as to compel expression of one in terms of the other, and quite automatically so and perhaps without consciousness of the reason for it or of its implications. This likeness of the two feelings is not, however, sufficient to wholly explain this choice of figurative language since there must be a cause for this figure having been chosen in preference to others equally descriptive of feelings more or less like the religious one. There can be only two explanations. Either the love of God had the most points of identity with that feeling derived from cuddling up to a male lover or the thought associated with it, or the craving for cuddling up to a man were so predominant in the mind of the woman as to compel this choice of similes in preference to all other possibilities. Thus analyzed, we again arrive by easy stages at the conclusion that in this instance, furnished by Prof. James, religious emotion and sex ecstasy are indistinguishable except in the interpretation which religious persons desired to have believed.

Neither can we allow Prof. James by a mere wave of his hand to wipe out our claim for the social utility of our thesis. If religion is but misinterpreted or perverted sexuality, its ideals of practical life need re-examination in order that we may see how far they are warped by perverted emotions or by the misinterpretation or supposed necessity for the concealment of intense sensuality. If my thesis be true, I think it can be shown that emotional religion is pernicious and all revival excitement conducive to injurious sexual irregularities and excesses. It may teach us that conventional "social purity" is but evidence of ignorance or erotophobia, or the sympathetic imitation of these, and in the leaders just as much a disease

as erotomania. Above all we will deny to moral sentimentalism its present super-rational sanctions and thus clear the ethical field of its perverted consciousness and prepare the field for a sane and scientific sexual morality which we have scarcely dared to contemplate as a possibility.

Now I believe I have shown that the arguments advanced by the opponents of the erotogenetic interpretation of religion either are side issues or upon closer analysis really support the theory. Furthermore, I have also briefly hinted at some points of social utility which may come from the discussion and with this I will close for the present.

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¹¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experiences*, p. 220.

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SOME ETHICAL PHASES OF ESKIMO CULTURE

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17. INHERITANCE

When we consider the small amount of property which an individual among the Eskimo can acquire, we realize that the question of *inheritance* is not a very important one in their economy. Another circumstance, which decreases the amount of transmissible property, is the custom of destroying or placing by the grave of a large part of the property of the deceased. Boas enumerates as objects which may be acquired by inheritance, the gun, harpoon, sledge, dogs, kayak, boat, and tent-poles of the man, and the lamps and pots of the woman. (5:580.)

The immediate heir is the oldest son living with the parents. Nothing falls directly to the widow, except the articles she brought in marriage. Adopted children are on the same footing as blood-descendants. Thus an elder foster-son has prior right over a young son born of the marriage. If there are no children in the family, a relative, such as a brother, becomes the heir. (53:25; 16,1:176.)

It should be borne in mind that, with the right of inheritance, goes the obligation of providing for the dependent survivors. So that, as Rink says, it "represents a question of obligations and burdens rather than of personal gain." (53:25.)

For rules of inheritance apparently peculiar to Alaska, see Nelson's monograph. (45.)

18. THEFT

From the nature of the case, private property being so limited, crimes "in violation of the rights of property can only have been trifling," as Rink points out. (53:34.) Conflicting reports are given as to Eskimo tendency to theft, especially in dealing with strangers.

It is the almost unanimous testimony that stealing is very

rare among members of the same community, and when it does occur, is condemned. Nansen says:

"The Eskimo regards it as in the highest degree dishonorable to steal from his housemates or from his fellow-villagers, and it is seldom that anything of the sort occurs." (43: 158.)

Hans Egede testifies that "they rarely steal from one another. Wherefore they let their goods lie exposed to everyone, without fear of anyone stealing or taking away the least bit of them. Indeed, this vice is so repulsive to them that if a girl steals, she thereby loses the chance of a good marriage." (19:69.) So too Crantz states, "They have no disposition to overreach each other, still less to steal, which is considered excessively disgraceful." (16.1:160.) Holm says that among the East Greenlanders, "theft is not uncommon," but adds that the causes are principally revenge or necessity. (30:87.) The report, given by other Eskimo to Hall, that the Neehilli "will steal whenever they can get a chance, even one Innuit from another" (26:421) was a rumor of the same status as that told Stefánsson of a distant tribe's eating all strangers. (59.) Exceptional, indeed, if correctly reported, is the situation at Point Barrow, where "men, who were said to be thieves, did not appear to lose any social consideration." (42:41.) Among the nearby tribes studied by Nelson,

"stealing from people of the same village is regarded as wrong. The thief is shamed by being talked of in the kashim. An incorrigible thief is held and beaten on the back."

An effective insurance method is reported by Murdoch:

"Before starting for the deer the hunters generally take the movable property which they do not mean to carry with them out of the house and bury it in the snow for safe keeping, apparently thinking that while a dishonest person might help himself to small articles left around the house, he could hardly go to work and dig up a cache without attracting the attention of the neighbors." (42: 261.)

There appears to be truth in Nansen's statement that "the Eskimo's conception of his duties towards strangers, especially toward white people, is not quite so strict." (43:159.) "To steal from a stranger or from people of another tribe is not considered wrong so long as it does not bring trouble to the community," according to Nelson. (45:293; cf. 16.1:160; 19:69.) Cases of thieving are frequently reported in the literature.

(30:171, 176; 56:187; 4:389, 398; 1.1:174, 181; 2:60; 42:41; 19:136.)

The actions of the thieves when detected throw light on their feelings about the matter. Murdoch says "the thieves when detected seemed to have no feeling of shame." (42:41.) Still a certain shame, even if not sense of guilt, is not wanting. According to Holm, "their blushes always betrayed them," when interrogated about thefts. (30:177.) Amundsen says of some detected thieves that they "slunk away sheepishly." (1.1:282.) Others appear to regard the matter as a good joke. Beechey relates that when thefts were detected, the goods were immediately returned, "with a hearty laugh in addition." (4:395.) Similar behavior is common in natives who indulge in fraud in trading. Amundsen speaks of a man who "grinned all over his face with glee, at having, as he thought, so successfully tricked me." And when discovered, he "could not help laughing at his failure." (1.2:56.) A woman, "when she saw she was found out, burst out laughing heartily, all the rest joining in." (1.1:173.)

Again they try to throw off suspicion by friendly actions, or if convicted, to offer excuses. Some Eskimo were suspected of stealing flour from the Beechey expedition, and the suspicion was strengthened by their unusual and conciliatory conduct. Also they

"protested that they were innocent of the theft, and as proof that they could not possibly have committed it, they spat into the sea with disgust, in order to show how much they disliked the taste of the material, little considering that the fact of their knowing it to be nauseous was a proof of their having tasted it." (4: 389.)

An East Greenlander, who, in buying knives, took two, one on top of the other, assured Holm that it had happened by mistake "as the knives were so thin." Later he confessed that a neighbor had whispered to him to act thus, "for it would not be discovered." (30:177.) A woman told Paul Eggede that she had stolen a knife from a ship; but she became dizzy, as a result of her act she thought, and went back and put the knife where she had taken it. Another Eskimo interjected that he had stolen many times from the Dutch and had always felt well afterwards. But then he "did not think God cared for the Dutch, nor they for him; they did not say grace at

meals as the Danish missionaries did, nor had they morning and evening prayer. (19:98.)

We are told by Murdoch that

“there was seldom any difficulty in obtaining restitution of stolen articles, as the thief’s comrades would not attempt to shield him, but often voluntarily betrayed him.” (42: 41.)

According to Holm, they informed about each other for fear of themselves being apprehended. Some sought reward for acting as informers. “When a man was accused of stealing, the first question was always who had reported him.” (30: 177.) This is significant as indicating that, while stealing from foreigners may not be condemned among them, on the other hand the thief acts only in his individual capacity at his own risk, not being able to claim the support or protection of his fellows.

There is evidence to show that this thieving habit is far from universal. Murdoch says there were many who resisted the temptation to steal. Other writers too speak very highly of some natives, even whole tribes. Amundsen found the Neehilli very trustworthy in this respect. He placed his depôt under their care. (1.1:281.) Beechey speaks of one group as “exceedingly honest.” (4:378; cf. 391.) Cartwright, after sixteen years among the Eskimo of Labrador, goes on record that “there is not a nation under the sun, with which I would sooner trust my person and property.” (12.)

Still, it is doubtless true that a certain double standard with respect to the appropriation of men’s goods is found among the Eskimo. One cause is probably to be found in one phase of their “ethnocentrism.” Says Nansen:

“We must remember that a foreigner is to him an indifferent object; it matters little to him whether he can rely on the foreigner or not, since he has not got to live with him. Thus he does not always find it inconsistent with his interests to appropriate a little of the foreigner’s property, if he thinks it can be of use to him.” (43: 159.)

Another consideration which enters in to determine their actions is the treatment the Eskimo, like other primitive peoples have been subjected to by representatives of “civilization.” A rehearsal of the records of injustice, robbery and fraud perpetrated on the Eskimo alone would stretch this discussion to unwarranted length; besides it would not be a discussion of

ESKIMO morality. For a few cases, see 43:159-161. To quote just one sentence from this authority:

"Let us suppose that it had been the Eskimo who came and planted themselves upon our shores, and behaved as we did in Greenland—would it then have been altogether inconsistent with our moral code to rob and filch from them whatever we could?" (43:160.)

One suspects that past experience has something to do with such behavior as that described by Beechey. Notwithstanding good treatment by his expedition, the Eskimo required

"much persuasion to induce them to come upon the deck, and even when some of them were prevailed upon to do so, they took the precaution of leaving with their comrades in the boat every valuable article which they had about their persons." (4:402.)

Then, a third, and it may well be the most important reason, may be found in the state of the property-sense and property-order among the Eskimo, a subject we have just discussed. With our insanely overwrought sense of the "sanctity" and "rights" of property, it is difficult to realize the Eskimo point of view. Their economic system is based on a practical application of the idea of the absolute subordination of material means to human and social ends. We have noted the principle on which they place restrictions on possession of unnecessary wealth. Now, as Nansen points out,

"it must be taken into account that in comparison with the Eskimo the Europeans possess property in superabundance. According to Eskimo morality, therefore, it appears that we ought to be able to dispense with some of our superfluity, and if we decline to do so, we are miserly and selfish." (43:160.)

19. BEGGING

We will mention briefly another practice, namely begging. Explorers frequently complain of this among the Eskimo. It is practically certain, however, that this is due to contact with the whites. According to Nelson, "begging is common only among Eskimo who have had considerable intercourse with white men." People not accustomed to meeting white men he found little addicted to it, and "their manner usually more frank and attractive." (45:295.) He believes that this habit has come about through indiscriminate giving of presents. This view agrees exactly with the experience and opinion of Stefánsson. He found no begging among the Eskimo he discov-

ered. He relates that, at one place, he made a present of one needle to each of over two score married women.

"Of course I kept no books, but I feel certain that every one of these women brought me something with which to pay for the needle, most of them saying that they did not want me to think that they were people who accepted gifts." (58:200.)

In Alaska he found just the opposite condition.

20. GAMBLING

According to Boas, "In winter gambling is one of the favorite amusements of the Eskimo." (5:567.) He describes a game of chance which looks innocent enough. (5:569.) Murdoch reports "only one game which appears to be of the nature of gambling"; it is "a very popular amusement." (42:364.) Certain Alaskan natives are described by Holmberg as "passionate gamblers." It is "not rare for them to lose all their belongings in this way." (32:123.) In the Ungava district, it is said that

"gambling is carried on to such a degree among both sexes that even their own lives are staked upon the issue of a game. The winner often obtains the wife of his opponent, and holds her until some tempting offer is made for her return. The only article they possess is frequently wagered, and when they lose they are greeted with derision. The women especially, stake their only garments rather than be without an opportunity to play." (66:178.)

The methods, and probably the extent, of gambling have been influenced by the white men. (See 66:178; 42:364.) Peary found no gambling among the Eskimo with whom he came in contact. (48:47.)

21. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

As we have already noted, the Eskimo have no clan organization. The selection of conjugal partners is restricted only by certain degree of kinship. First cousins are prohibited from intermarrying. (19:79; 16.1:147; 43:175; 5:579; 6:158.) The same prohibition seems to apply to a boy and girl who have been reared in the same family, they being regarded practically as brother and sister. An exception to the latter rule is noted from East Greenland. (30:94.) Waldmann says that in Labrador marriage was often contracted between first cousins. (69:435.) There are also traces of prohibition of marriage

between legal relatives. Thus, Crantz says that rarely did a man marry two sisters or a mother and her daughter; "such a contract draws down general odium upon the parties concerned." (16:147; 30:95.) On the other hand, Boas found no rule against a man's marrying two sisters among the Central Eskimo. (5:579.) Folk-lore tells of troubles resulting from efforts to marry sister-in-law and daughter-in-law, but it is doubtful whether the relationship of the parties plays any part in the narrator's mind. (53:397; 6:286.)

Nansen says that, in Greenland, "a man should, if possible, seek his wife in another village." (43:175.) Neither descriptions nor folk-lore give the impression that this is any widespread rule. The close kinship of fellow-villagers may lead to such conditions. Turner speaks of a group in which, although the females outnumber the males, the relationship is so close that many seek their wives from other localities." (66:189.)

There are frequent references in folk-lore to marriages within the prohibited degrees. This does not imply a similar frequency in real life. The contrary seems to be true. The most prominent incest-motive in Eskimo mythology is the story of the origin of the sun and moon. A man had sexual relations with his sister, who blackened his face with soot. He pursued her into the sky, where she became the sun, and he, with the sooty face, the moon. (20:54; 63:275; 6:173; 37:179; 30:99; 31:268.) A Cumberland Sound tale relates how a man was hated because he cohabited with his mother; he was killed by his brother (6:283); similar, with foster-mother (6:297). In a Greenland tale, a couple thought that the cause of their children's dying was "perhaps we are too near kin." (53:391.) Turner reports a case where a son took his mother for wife, apparently at her wish, but "the sentiment of the community compelled him to discard her." (66:180.)

Necessity appears to be an extenuating circumstance. The natives of Southampton Island ascribe their ancestry to a man, who was driven to the island, where he married his daughter; "the people are the descendants of this couple." (6:478.) According to a Greenland tradition, a man married his adopted sister; for they lived alone. (53:170.) A somewhat different situation was that of the giant who married his sister, "because she was the only woman tall enough for him." (6:292.) No

credence can be given Langsdorff's statement that certain Alaskan Eskimo "cohabit promiscuously, brothers and sisters, parents and children" (quoted 2.1:81), except that he may have heard of some cases.

A practice which seems to have been prevalent among the Eskimo is *child-betrothal*, decided by agreement of the parents. (53:23; 16.1:146; 42:410; 47:26; 25:567.) This may even go so far that "two friends, desirous of cementing their tie of fellowship, engage that their children yet unborn shall be mated." (66:188.) However, "these engagements not being strictly binding, may be broken off at any time." (5:578; cf. 48:60.) In some cases one of the parties may be an adult, the other a mere child, the arrangements being made by the latter's parents. (42:410; 1.1:307.)

Early marriages are the rule. (30:94; 69:434; 43:139; 42:411; 66:188.) Marriage may take place even before puberty. Holm says that in East Greenland it is not rare that young people marry three or four times before that age. Crantz' statement that "a man seldom thinks of marriage till he is twenty years of age" (16.1:145) does not seem to hold. The requisite qualification for the male is that he is a sufficiently able hunter to provide for the female, and "has the requisite strength to force her to become his wife," as Turner adds. She must be proficient in the arts which pertain to woman. (66:188; 43:138; 30:94; 42:410.)

As to the motives for marriage, Murdoch writes, "As far as we could learn, marriage was entered upon generally from reasons of interest or convenience, with very little regard for affection, as we understand it." He acknowledges, however, that "there were some indications that real love matches sometimes took place." (42:410; see also 16.1:145; 30:94.) The denial of the possession by primitive peoples of what is called "romantic love" is a favorite proposition with some writers, as for instance, Finck. But folk-lore and real life furnish evidence of its presence among the Eskimo. (5:615; 31:320.) Nansen's words are well chosen:

"Love is by no means unknown in Greenland; but the Greenland variety of it is a simple impulse of nature. It does not make the lover sick of soul, but drives him to the sea, to the chase; it strengthens his arm and sharpens his sight; for his one desire is to become an expert hunter, so that he can lead his Naia home as his bride, and support a family." (43: 138.)

Worthy of being noted here is a romance revealed by Peary's words (48:52):

"Hot-hearted young Ooqueah of my North Pole party fought his way with me to the goal for the possession of the daughter of old Ikway. This young knight of the northland is an illustration of the fact that sometimes an Eskimo man or woman may be as intense in his or her affairs of the heart as we are."

The usual principals in the preliminaries of marriage are the prospective bridegroom and the young woman's parents, or, if they are dead, her brothers. The advice of the man's parents is also given consideration. (19:79; 69:434; 53:397; 30:94; 16.1:145.) The services of mediators are sometimes enlisted in winning the desired maiden. (53:23; 69:434; 16.1:145.) Probably the employment of these third parties is not at all common. The dashing young Eskimo hunter ordinarily prefers to do his own wooing. In a folk tale we are told that the reason a youth sent a mediator was that he was "bashful and afraid to speak for himself." (5:615.)

There does not appear to be any regular system of purchase-money or of dowry, though traces of both are found. Holm says that "the young man must sometimes pay the father to get his daughter in marriage," but also, "good hunters are paid by fathers to marry their daughters." (30:96; cf. 55:188; 43:135.) A young man, who did not possess the necessary wherewithal to indemnify the parents secured the girl on credit, and "he owes them still," remarks Waldmann, who relates the case. (69:434.) It is customary for the woman to bring with her certain household utensils, besides her clothing. These things remain her own property. (16.1:145; 53:24; 42:414.)

Rink's view that marriage was rarely consummated "without some degree of force having been practiced upon the bride" (53:23; cf. 43:139) seems to be well substantiated, though there are undoubtedly not a few exceptions. Wife-capture is a favorite theme in folk-lore. (52:323, 450, 453.) The abduction may be without the knowledge and consent of the girl's parents. (1.146.) But ordinarily the marriage has been duly arranged, and the only resistant is the bride-elect. (16.2:105; 20:28; 42:412.) While to all appearances, the abduction is much against the girl's will, it seems that appearances are in this case often deceptive. Crantz says that, on hearing the proposal,

"the damsel directly falls into the greatest apparent consternation, for single women always affect the utmost bashfulness and aversion to any proposal of marriage, lest they should lost their reputation for modesty, though their destined husbands be previously well assured of their acquiescence." (16, 1: 146; cf. 19: 79.)

Paul Egede tells of a bride who ran away from the man's house several times, always, however, "where she expected to be found." (20:28.) Nansen's comment on this custom is interesting:

"In Greenland, as in other parts of the world, good taste demanded that the lady in question should on no account let it appear that she was a consenting party, however favorably disposed towards her wooer she might be in her heart. The Eskimo bride was bound to struggle against her captor, and to wail and bemoan herself as much as ever she could. When they first saw marriages conducted after the European fashion, they thought it very shocking that the bride, when asked if she would have the bridegroom for her husband, should answer Yes. According to their ideas, it would be much more becoming for her to answer No. When assured that this was the custom among us, they were of the opinion that our women must be devoid of modesty." (43: 140.)

However, "it sometimes happens that the young woman really objects to her wooer." (43:141.) In such cases, she either has her way (16.1:146) or she is taken against her will, when she may give the man visible remembrances of a strenuous fight. (66:181.)

More informal ways (for forcible abduction is "good form") obtain, however, in which the young people decide the matter between themselves (53:263, 406) Crantz' assertion that a woman "can never make choice of a husband" (16.1:159) must admit of exceptions. There are several instances on record where the girl has a definite choice in the matter (66: 188; 50:55; 53:208.) One of Cartwright's experiences shows that independence of spirit and action is not entirely wanting among Eskimo women. A man arranged with this English gentleman to give the latter one of his wives, a young woman of sixteen. All her relatives "expressed great pleasure at the honor of the alliance." But the woman thought otherwise. "You are an old fellow and I will have nothing to say to you," was her verdict. "So there ended my courtship," remarks the author. Like independence was shown by a widow who, according to a tale, "greatly harassed by the persecutions of a man who wanted to marry her, fled to the inland with

her little son, whom she educated with the view of making him a hater of the male sex." (53:462.)

It happens that a suitor encounters not only the objections of the girl or her parents or both, but also those of rivals. Peary reports that

"if two men want to marry the same woman, they settle the question by a trial of strength, and the better man has his way. These struggles are not fights, as the disputants are amiable."

Another method is reported by Boas (6:466); the woman is made to stand in the center of a hut, where the older people assemble, and the several suitors try to get possession of her, the strongest being allowed to marry her. "In one of these cases, two men struggled for a woman, and when they were tired out, a third man rushed in and carried her off." This custom is known also among the neighboring Athapascan Indians. A gentler method was that adopted by two Greenlanders who agreed to make the test a kayak race. (53:170.)

Marriage ceremonies seem to be almost unknown among the Eskimo. Rink's statement that "the wedding was performed without any special ceremony" appears to indicate the general rule. Hans Egede states that "well-to-do parents have a feast for their son's wedding." (19:80.) Murdoch reports a celebration in the home of the bride's parents. (42:411.) Bancroft does not give the authority for a description of an Alaskan marriage ceremonial. (2.1:83.) Hans Egede states that there was also a feast "the day after the bridegroom slept with the bride." (19:80.) This suggests a postponement of the consummation of the marriage. Light may perhaps be cast on this obscure passage by a remark by Paul Egede that a day or two should, according to custom, elapse after the bride had been brought to the man's house. (20:28.) These are the only references I have found to any such custom among the Eskimo. This people are singularly free from sexual rites and taboos, of the sort which fill Crawley's volume, *The Mystic Rose*. Evidence from Eskimo society tends to support Westermarck's very moderately expressed opinion that Crawley has "somewhat exaggerated" the danger attributed to sexual intercourse. (71.2:415.) Murdoch well states the Eskimo conception of marriage as far as its social relations are concerned: "The marriage bond was regarded simply as a contract entered into

by agreement of the contracting parties." (42:411.) The absence of ceremonial reflects this attitude of non-interference by the group.

The prevailing form of marriage is *monogamy*, but *polygamy* and even *polyandry* are allowed and practiced. (6:115, 466; 5:579; 50:65; 33:41; 16.1:147; 45:292; 19:77; 66:188; 63:276; 53:23; 43:145; 30:95; 42:411.) Polygamy is conditioned on a man's possession of sufficient wealth to support more than one wife; hence it is possible only for the ablest hunters. Thus it may be regarded as a mark of honor. Another condition influencing the form of marriage is the numerical ratio between the sexes in any given group. Thus, among the Polar Eskimo, polygamy is very rare, as there are more men than women. (50:65; cf. 30:96.) Another factor to be taken into account is the custom of the man's becoming a member of his wife's family. As Boas points out, this would serve as a check to polygamy. "It is only when the new family settles on its own account that a man is at full liberty to take additional wives." (5:579; cf. 42:410.) This custom is not universal, nor even usual, as far as our evidence tends to show. It appears to be more common for the young couple to live with the husband's parents. (See *e. g.*, 6:115.) When free from obligations to support relatives, the couple ordinarily maintain separate households.

Among the motives for polygamy, the desire for offspring plays the most important rôle, although Rink's statement that polygamy was "only approved by public opinion in so far as it aimed at the propagation of male descendants" is to be regarded as too sweeping. He makes the same assertion in regard to divorce and wife-exchanging, in which cases the exceptions to the rule he lays down are even more numerous. (53:23.) But we can accept Crantz' statement that

"since it is esteemed a disgrace to have no children, and especially no son to support their declining age, such childless Greenlanders as are competent to maintain several wives, will seldom restrict themselves to one." (16. 1:147; cf. 30: 97.)

Relief from further child-bearing on the part of the first wife may also be a desideratum. A woman, on being asked why her husband had taken another wife, replied, "I asked him to myself, for I'm tired of bearing children." (43:144; cf. 16.1:147.)

Another motive is desire for additional help in the female branch of the domestic economy. Thus we are told of a man who "married a young wife, so as to have somebody at home to do the work," his first wife being old and feeble. (33:41.) The wife herself sometimes suggests the second marriage, in order that she may have help in her household work." (43:144; cf. 55:189; 30:95.)

Hans Egede found, what he considered remarkable, that, before the preaching of the missionaries, there was no jealousy connected with the plural marriages. (19:78.) There are cases, however, where the women regard each other as rivals. (30:103; 63:276.) But as a rule they get along well together.

The first wife retains a primacy in the direction of the household. (19:78; 69:435; 53:25; 16:1:148.) This is true even if the husband shows a preference for the second. (43:145.)

Divorce is unrestricted, and as unceremonious as is the contracting of marriage. The causes of separation are legion, in fact, anything which either party may regard as sufficient. In this respect, wives are as free to suit themselves as are husbands. According to Peary, what he calls "trial marriage," is

"an ineradicable custom among the Eskimo. If a young man and woman are not suited with each other they try again, and sometimes several times, but when they find mates to whom they are adapted, the arrangement is generally permanent. . . . If a man grows tired of his wife, he simply tells her there is not room for her in the igloo. She may return to her parents, if they are living; she may go to a brother or a sister; or she may send word to some man in the tribe that she is now at liberty and willing to start life again." (48:59.)

Murdoch says that marriage is easily dissolved, "on account of incompatibility of temper, or even on account of temporary disagreement." One wife was discarded because of "a disagreeable and querulous temper." The husband married another woman, but "his second matrimonial venture was no more successful than his first, for his young wife proved to be a great talker." He said "she talked all the time, so that he could not eat and could not sleep." So he sent her away, and tried his luck a third time. Another man, who had two wives, divorced the younger one. "The reason he assigned was that she was lazy, would not make her own clothes, and was disobedient to the older wife to whom he was much attached."

(42:411; cf. 45:392; 5:579.) Crantz writes that the husband only gives an undesirable wife a sour look, and then absents himself for a few days.

"She immediately takes the hint, packs up her effects, and withdraws to her relatives, demeaning herself in the future, as discreetly as possible, in order to chagrin him, and bring scandal upon his conduct." (16, 1: 147; cf. 43: 143.)

Desire for children, which we have seen to be perhaps the chief reason for polygamy, is also a potent cause of divorce. Crantz says that a childless wife lives "in continual dread of divorce" (16.1:151), while

"it rarely happens that a separation takes place when they have children, and especially sons, who are their greatest treasure, and best security against future want." (16, 1: 148.)

Holm says that in East Greenland, disagreements between married people are usually settled without rupture of the marriage relation,

"especially if the woman has children. If she has no children it is not infrequent that the woman or the man, when opportunity offers, leaves without saying anything." (30: 97.)

The author just quoted enumerates an interesting and representative list of grounds for divorce, including the following: They had tired of each other, the wife was a poor seamstress, the wife wanted to live where her family lived, her husband's family neglected her. One man gave as his reason that "she ate so much that he didn't get enough to eat." (30:100.) As illustrating the frequency of divorce in some cases, he mentions one woman, twenty years old, who had had six husbands, and had just married the seventh. (30:101.) Another, after having tried eight husbands, remarried No. 6, whom she pronounced "the best of her husbands"; although he had struck and whipped her, "she longed so for him that she couldn't sleep at night." (30:103.)

Folk-lore, in this feature as in all others, truthfully reflects Eskimo life. Characteristic is the tale of a man who separated from three wives, with each of whom he lived only a month or two. Two of these he had divorced "because they didn't keep his boots in order." (31:329; see also 53:255, 303.) Boas records a tale, indicating that ideas of "emancipated women" are not unknown among the Eskimo. (5:628.)

Two women deserted their husbands, with whom they quarreled, and went to live by themselves. The husbands' wishing their wives back again, sent the women's fathers after them. But these found the women unwilling to return. The men "told the strange story that two women without the company of any men lived all by themselves, and were never in want."

It appears that primitive Enoch Ardens are to be found among the Eskimo. This theme is also dealt with in folk-lore.

In one tale, the first husbands return to find their wives married to other men. The women are given back to the former, who say to the second husbands, "Many thanks to you that ye have provided so well for our relatives." Certainly a philosophic attitude. (53:196; see also 31:298.)

Similar tactics to those pursued when two men wanted the same girl, seem to be resorted to if a man wants another's wife. Peary tells us that the former simply says to the husband, "I am the better man," and the husband has then either to prove his superiority in strength or surrender the woman. (48:59.) So also Nansen says, "If a man takes a fancy to another man's wife, he takes her without ceremony, if he happens to be the stronger." (43:143; cf. 30:96; 31:330; 20:65:) Sometimes a wife is carried away by another man, at the request of her family, that she may get better support. (30:100.) Cartwright gives an account, perhaps somewhat overdrawn, of a bloody struggle resulting from an affair of this kind. (12:328.) Nelson states that formerly, at Bering Strait, the husband and his rival were "disarmed by the neighbors and then settled the trouble with their fists or by wrestling, the victor taking the woman." (49:292.) More subtle methods may be pursued. According to Turner, a man may bribe an angakok to get a woman from her husband "under threats of supernatural evil." (66:189.) Designing women are not above pursuing similar tactics to get husbands away from their wives. (55:189.)

22. EXTRA-NUPTIAL RELATIONS

Many writers speak of the freedom enjoyed by the unmarried of both sexes among the Eskimo. For instance, Murdoch writes as follows:

"As to the relations between the sexes there seems to be the most complete absence of what we consider moral feelings. Promiscuous sexual intercourse between married and unmarried people, or even among children, appears to be looked upon simply as a matter for amusement. As

far as we could learn, unchastity in a girl was considered nothing against her." (42: 419.)

Turner says:

"Many of the girls bear children before they are taken for wives, but as such incidents do not destroy the respectability of the mother, the girl does not experience any difficulty in procuring a husband. (66: 189; see also 30: 96; 45: 292.)

On the other hand, Hans Egede, who was certainly not wanting in strictness as to the seventh commandment, says of the Greenlanders of his day (he was the first white man to live among them in modern times):

"Young women and girls are modest enough, as we have never seen them have any wanton relations with young men, or give the least indication of such conduct, either in word or deed. During the fifteen years I was in Greenland I knew of only two or three girls who became pregnant outside of marriage; for this is held to be a great disgrace." (19: 78.)

Dalager, an early authority, says of Eskimo girls that "in their first years of maturity they bear themselves very chastely, for otherwise they are certain to spoil their chances of marriage." (Quoted 43:167.) Of the Greenlanders in general he says that they are not so much given to incontinence as are other nations. It may be noted that Nansen accepts the above testimony of these two authorities, as substantially accurate. Crantz says, in one place, that

"however careful their young and single people may be to avoid all open irregularity in their deportment, they are in secret quite as licentious as those of other nations" (16. 1: 175),

but in another place he writes that

"the women are seldom guilty of incontinence, with the exception of young widows and those divorced from their husbands. Single persons of both sexes have rarely any connections." (16. 1: 145.)

The authority last quoted states that "there are among them harlots by profession, though a single woman will seldom follow this infamous trade." (16.1:176.) No matter what may be the exact condition of sexual morality in general, it is fairly certain that prostitution, when found among the Eskimo, is attributable to foreign influence. If Crantz' observation is correct, the cases he refers to may well have been due to contact with traders. Murdoch states that prostitution "is carried to

a most shameless extent with the sailors of the whaling fleet by many of the women" (46:420, cf. 54; also 1.1:202, 310), but among the natives themselves, "prostitution for gain is unknown." (*Ibid.*) Of the natives of Labrador we are told by Waldmann that "since they have been in contact with the fisherman, there has been a relaxation of their morals." (69:435.) Nansen discusses at length the effect in this regard of European occupation of West Greenland, which he regards as decidedly detrimental, in spite of the efforts of the missionaries. (43:163.) He says a young native woman "positively glories" in illicit relations with a European, and "seems to procure additional consideration among her female friends." Trebitsch received just the opposite impression, namely, that "girls who cohabit with Europeans are derided by the natives." (65:50.) He gives samples of satirical songs about such girls. He also believes that "prostitution is unknown in all Greenland." (65:16.)

Without attempting to resolve the contradictions in the evidence, I think we can conclude as true of the Eskimo in general, what Murdoch declares concerning the natives of Point Barrow, that while their sexual laxity "seems too purely animal and natural to be of recent growth," and hence can hardly be said to have been *introduced* by the whites (Holm's statement about the East Greenlanders is of special importance on this point, 30:96), yet this laxity has undoubtedly been encouraged by the whites, and, finally, these "taught them prostitution for gain." (42:420.)

There is more agreement of observers as to the extra-nuptial intercourse of married people than as to the sexual relations of the unmarried. To quote Nansen:

"The strict morality which obtained among the unmarried youths and maidens on the west coast in the heathen days [he follows Hans Egede, quoted above], seems to have been considerably relaxed when once they were married. The men, at any rate, had then the most unrestricted freedom." (43:167.)

According to Crantz, "the married will break their vows on both sides with the utmost shamelessness." (16.1:176.) One restriction to unlimited license is found in the objections of the husband of the woman in the case, when his consent has not been given. Nansen is of the opinion that if a heathen—and in many cases, even a Christian—Greenlander

"refrains from having to do with another man's wife, whom he has looked upon with favor, it is generally more because he shrinks from quarreling with the husband than because he regards adultery as morally wrong." (43:172; to the same effect, 69:436.)

Jealousy, in the male, at least, is not unknown. (66:178, 188; 30:97; 5:579.) Holm gives as an illustration of this a man who became jealous because his young wife smiled at a member of the expedition. Sometimes "the injured husband does not seek immediate punishment, but smothers his resentment, till he has an opportunity of revenging himself in a similar manner." Nelson says that the husband "rarely avenges himself on the man concerned," although the affair may form the excuse for an affray where there has been previous enmity. He may beat the unfaithful wife. (45:292, cf. 16.1:147.) The extreme penalty is given in a tale entitled "The Faithless Wife," in which the woman, who by stealth has had illicit relations, is killed. (53:143; cf. 6:224.) According to Turner, "the male offender if notoriously persistent in his efforts to obtain forbidden favors, is usually slain." (66:178.) The wives are allowed greater liberty "when they have no children by their husbands," says Paul Egede. (20:135.)

It must not be understood that this sexual license is universally indulged in. Nansen, after picturing the present-day laxity which he finds, says of the married Greenlanders that "their every-day behavior is, as a rule, quite reputable and void of offence; on that point all travellers must agree." (43:172.) Even Crantz admits that, after all, "their connubial intercourse is conducted with tolerable decorum." (16.1:147; see also 42:420.) A saying current in East Greenland, that "the whale, the musk-ox, and the reindeer left the country because the men had too much to do with other men's wives," suggests a belief that indulgence in that way is not quite right. Some of the men, however, declared it was "because the women were jealous of their husbands." (30:100.)

A custom found among the Eskimo everywhere is the exchanging and lending of wives. (5:579; 6:225; 66:189; 48:60; 42:413; 43:148, 169; 69:435; 26:424.)

The exchange is often a sign of friendship. Thus, at Bering Strait, where it is common for two men in different villages to become bond-fellows or brothers by adoption, one of them,

when received as guest by the other, is given the use of his host's bed with the wife during his stay. When the visit is returned, the same favor is extended; as a consequence "neither family knows who is the father of the children." (45:292; see also 5:579; 42:413.)

Sometimes this expression of good-will is connected with decided practical advantage. Thus, to quote Rasmussen,

"if a man has to go away on a long hunting expedition, and he wants a woman with him, he can, if his own wife, for instance on account of pregnancy, is unfitted to endure the hardships of an expedition by sledge, lend her to a man who is remaining, and in return receives his."

Also

"if a young wife is homesick for friends and family who live a long way off, if her husband is willing to humor her, but does not himself wish to undertake the journey, a man fond of travelling will often announce himself as agreeable to take the other on her visit, leaving his own wife as hostage." (50:64.)

Murdoch reports a similar case where a man, on going on a hunting expedition, borrowed his cousin's wife, "as she was a good shot, and a good hand at deer hunting," while his own wife went with the other man on a trading expedition. (42:413.)

A temporary exchange is sometimes made permanent. (43:148.) Murdoch gives as the reason that "the couples find themselves better pleased with their new mates than with the former association." Another reason, given by Holm, is that, since the men at the same time exchange various things besides wives, they "do not wish to part with the things they have come into possession of." (30:98.) But there may be also a quite different effect. "When marriage is disturbed, the man often exchanges his wife for an indefinite period," says Rasmussen, "It is asserted that the two are soon anxious to be together again, for a man generally discovers that his own wife is in spite of all the best." (50:64.)

Hans Egede describes a remarkable "game" found among the Eskimo of West Greenland, for which "married men and women come together, as to an assembly." After feasting, singing, and dancing, every man retired with some other man's wife. "They are held as examples of the best and noblest disposition who without chagrin, lend their wives to others."

While "married people see in it nothing to be ashamed of, the young and unmarried are forbidden by modesty to take part." (19:78.) Dalager states that this performance is of very rare occurrence and adds that "a married woman who has duly become a mother of a family never takes part in it." (Quoted 43:168.) A similar "lamp-extinguishing game" is found in East Greenland; it is played in the winter when the people live in the large communal houses." A good host always has the lamps put out at night when there are guests in the house." In this game, unlike the one described by Egede, unmarried people also take part. But, according to Holm, the same limitations as to kinship are in force as with regard to contracting marriage. (30:98.) One man claimed he did not participate in this game, for if he did, he would have to reciprocate when he had guests, and he did not like to have other men have intercourse with his wife. The neighbors denied this story. It may have been a fabrication with the purpose of appearing righteous in the eyes of the Europeans according to their standards. (30:99.)

Murdoch reports that, among some Eskimo on Repulse Bay, there is said to be, at certain times, "a general exchange of wives throughout the village, each woman passing from man to man till she has been through the hands of all, and finally returns to her husband." He gives as his informants "some of the whalemens who winter in the neighborhood." The character both of the story and the tellers make us look with suspicion, or at least caution, on such a statement.

In passing, we may refer to Murdoch's opinion that these wife-exchanging customs "seem to indicate that the Eskimo have not wholly emerged from the state called communal marriage, in which each woman is considered as the wife of every man in the community." Since Westermarek published his epoch-making argument against the theory of primitive promiscuity, we are not so inclined to this interpretation, which, it should be said, was a prevailing doctrine when Murdoch wrote the above.

We have noted that one of the principal causes of polygamy and divorce is desire for offspring. This appears to be a prominent motive in exchanging and lending of wives also. True to life is a tale in which the wives of two housemates could not get children. Therefore, they exchanged wives for

a time; whereupon both wives became pregnant and bore sons. (30:263.) Supernatural agencies may be employed in this connection. Thus in case of barrenness an angakok may take a trip to the moon, whence a child is thrown down to the woman, who thereupon becomes pregnant. "After this difficult journey, the angakok has the right to sleep with the woman"—a curious transposition of time-relations. (30:131.) The angakoks can bring about pregnancy, however, without such magical flights. (53:148.) According to Hans Egede, women regard it as an honor to cohabit with an angakok. Also

"Many husbands even regard this with favor, and will even pay the angakoks to lie with their wives, particularly if they themselves cannot get children by them; for they believe that a child begotten of an angakok will be more capable and fortunate above others." (19:78.)

Paul Egede, however, found that some Eskimo regarded this procedure as indecent (20:135), Klutschak alone refers to the angakoks' having "*jus primae noctis*." This lone instance may be due to misinformation, or misinterpretation of some other event.

The angakoks sometimes, by order of their tornaks, command other men to exchange wives with each other. (5:579; 6:158; 26:101; 66:179.) "The women must spend the night in the huts of the men to whom they are assigned. If any woman refuses to go, she would be sure to be taken sick." (6:158; from Hudson Bay; at Smith Sound it is the men who exchange sleeping-places, 50:64).

Rasmussen writes, "It sometimes happens that a woman will refuse with tears to be exchanged, but this is rare. Then the husband beats her as a punishment." (Other women may take the leading part in forcing a reluctant wife to yield. See 26:102.) "These conditions," he continues, "give rise to curious ethical ideas among the Eskimo. A man once told me that he only beat his wife when she would not receive other men. She would have nothing to do with anyone but him—and that was her only failing." (50:65.)

After these considerations, we will probably regard Amundsen as unnecessarily hard on his own race when he finds in a host's offer of the loan of his wife "another striking proof of the fact that this tribe had been in contact with 'civilized' men." (1.1:293.)

In considering the phases of Eskimo morality brought out in the foregoing, the following comment by Nansen is worth noting:

"We should beware how we fix ourselves at one point of view, and unsparingly condemn ideas and practices which the experience of many generations has developed among another people, however much they may conflict with our own. There may be underlying reasons which do not at once meet the eye, and which place the whole matter in a different light. . . . Their way of thinking in these matters is less ideal and more practical than ours, and their point of view entirely different. Their habit of exchanging wives, for example, and their treatment of barren women, seems to us wanton and immoral; but when we remember that the production of offspring is the great end and aim of their conduct, and reflect what an all-important matter this is for them, we may perhaps pass a somewhat milder judgment."

He remarks that to the Eskimo the exhortation to increase and multiply seems to be of greater weight than the prohibition of the seventh commandment. And he adds a very important suggestion, "The reason may partly be that his race is by nature unprolific." (43:169 sq.)

Homosexual practices have been reported by several writers on the Eskimo. It has been rather prominently noted among the extreme western tribes. (For details see 32:120; 56:173, 176; 2.1:82.) It is almost entirely confined to males who play the rôle of the opposite sex. No cases have been reported from other sections. Some references in folk-lore may, however, be of significance. A tale from Cumberland Sound tells of a woman who transformed herself into a man and married her adopted daughter. (6:248.) In another from the same region, one man took another for wife. (6:325.) Still a third, from Greenland, deals with a woman who disguised herself as a man, and took her daughter-in-law for wife. Her son killed his "despicable mother." (53.)

23. POSITION AND TREATMENT OF WOMEN

Several writers speak of the Eskimo women as the "property" of their husbands (48:60; 43:121, 147; 50:62); others of their life as one of "slavery." (2.1:65; 16.1:151.) But such expressions cannot be taken in a literal or legalistic sense. Indeed, some of the authors referred to above would be among the first to deny implications which such statements might convey.

We have already shown that in the matter of contracting marriage, the choice or consent of the female is not an altogether unknown factor. As to divorce, her rights are the same as those of the man. The personal property she brings with her at marriage remains hers inviolate during and after the union.

As to the husband's power over her person, Rink says "the husband had the right of punishing his wife by striking her in the face with just sufficient force to leave visible traces." (53:25.) Boas, to the contrary, speaking of the Central Eskimo, holds that "the husband is not allowed to maltreat or punish his wife." (5:579.) The real state of affairs is probably that there are no "rights" one way or the other. Wife-beating is often indulged in (6:298, 538; 42:414; 20:123, 195; 30:102; 1.1:307; 50:55) and as we shall see presently, she reciprocates if she can. If either party doesn't like the treatment he or she is free to leave. There certainly is no legal machinery by which either sex can enforce its "rights." It is a principle among the Eskimo not to interfere in domestic broils (50:56; 30:102), except in cases where relatives may side with the wife. (50:61.) But they too may stand idly by, like the man, who, when Rasmussen appealed to him to help his own sister, replied that "women must be punished occasionally to make them obedient." (50:56.)

But, as has been already hinted, the story is not all on one side. A case reported by Murdoch is not unique: "a stalwart wife turned the tables on her husband who attempted to abuse her, giving him a thorough beating and then leaving his house." (42:414.) Peary speaks of a woman who "proved her right to independence by blackening the old man's eye." (48:60.) Amundsen tells of a couple, the female partner of which was "the biggest and strongest lady of the tribe." "This was a typical 'happy marriage,' she reigned absolute and he obeyed blindly." (1.1:307-8.) Rasmussen witnessed a battle between a man and his wife. "Women's whims! It is quite amusing to cure them of them!" shouted the man. "Like a flash of lightning she sprang at him and struck him such a violent blow, that he fell down with a howl." This caused exceeding merriment all through the village. "The strong man has been knocked down by a woman. Fancy! Eré was thrown by his wife—pfui, by a woman!" (50:58; cf. 30:97.)

Such incidents as these seem to make unnecessary Petitot's theory that the one line of the Eskimo's ancestry came of a conquered race, which the victors assimilated by marrying and subjecting their women. "I can explain in no other way the complete servility of the fair sex." (49:104.)

But such domestic unpleasantnesses need not be supposed to be common occurrences among the Eskimo. Like similar happenings among ourselves, they are of course more likely to get "in print" than the even tenor of the average home life. Nearly all who are familiar with the Eskimo would agree with Holm when he says that "the men as a rule treat their wives well." (30:96.) Petitot, in the passage referred to above, compares the general treatment of women by the Eskimo and by the Indians among whom he worked much to the credit of the former. Nansen, after describing some turbulent episode, adds, "Scenes of this sort, however, are rare among this peaceable people." (43:121, 148.) Murdoch declares "there often appeared to be a warm attachment between married people." (42:410; cf. 1.1:308.) Several writers describe scenes of demonstrative affection. According to Holm, "it is a usual thing to see married people caressing each other with extraordinary intimacy." (30:96; cf. 110; also 50:59.) Rasmussen writes: "On the whole I have retained the pleasantest impression of the mutual relations between man and woman. . . . We are quick to judge the men, because they strike; and we are sorry for the women, who get a black eye now and again as the result of a little temper. But we forget that we civilized men, by a poisoned word, can often strike harder and more brutally than the Eskimo with his fist." (50: 63 sqq.)

The mutual affection of married people grows with age. To quote Dalager, "the longer a married couple live together, the more closely are they united in affection, until at last they pass their old age together like innocent children." (43:148; cf. 30:97.) Murdoch points out that marital troubles are chiefly among young couples. (42:414.)

As to the position of woman in the community, we have very divergent testimony. Holm, for instance, remarks that "the women have social importance only in as far as they give occasion for disagreement among men. Their position can nearest be regarded as that of servants." (30:87.) But there are many more witnesses which take a quite different view of "woman's sphere." Thus Murdoch says:

"The women appear to stand on a footing of perfect equality with the men both in the family and in the community. The wife is the constant and trusted companion of the man in everything except the hunt, and her opinion is sought in every bargain or other important undertaking." (See also 46, 1: 449; 4: 387, 391; 32: 119; 50: 64.)

Nansen affirms that, if

"the social position occupied by its women affords the best criterion of a people's place in the scale of civilization (a view which he does not accept; cf. 71, 1: 646) the Eskimo must be allowed to have reached a pretty high level of development. For the Eskimo woman plays no insignificant a part in the life of the community." (43: 121; see also 133.)

The facts of the division of labor between the sexes shed light on this problem, and merit some consideration. Writers to speak of women's life as "slavery" use that term primarily, I think, as synonymous with *drudgery*, although inferiority and subjection may also be implied. Now no one denies that the Eskimo woman has a hard task to perform. But are the men idlers? The principle of division of labor is fundamental to an understanding of Eskimo social and economic life. As Nansen puts it, "The employments of the sexes are entirely distinct," and he goes on to say:

"The Eskimo have not yet attained to the conception that there is little or no difference between the men and women. They hold that there are, among other things, certain essential physical differences." (43: 122.)

For an excellent detailed treatment of this subject we refer to this author's chapter on "The Position and Work of Women." Without going into detail here, we quote the following from Nansen, which is typical of the Eskimo everywhere:

"To the man's share falls the laborious life at sea, as hunter and food-provider; but when he reaches the shore with his booty, he has fulfilled the most important part of his social function. He is received by his womenfolk, who help him ashore; and while he has nothing to do but to look after his kayak and his weapons, it is the part of the women to drag the booty up to the house. The women flay the seal and cut it up according to fixed rules, and the mother of the house presides at the division of it. Further, it is the women's duty to cook the food, to prepare the skins, to cover the kayaks and woman-boats, to make clothes, and to attend to all other domestic tasks. In addition to this they build the houses, pitch the tents, and row the woman-boats." (43: 123; cf. 26: 178; 30: 88; 19: 62; 16. 1: 154.)

It is also common, on overland journeys, for a woman to act as leader and guide of the dog-team. (42:274, 359; 26:138, 215, 1.1:175.) In East Greenland the men share in work otherwise performed only by women, such as flensing the seal, putting up the tent, and dragging the game to the house. (30:97.)

The following words of Westermarck are perfectly applicable to the Eskimo:

"It is obvious that this strict division of labor is apt to mislead the travelling stranger. He sees the women hard at work, and the men looking idly on; and it escapes him that the latter will have to be busy in their turn, within their own sphere of action. . . . The wife is pronounced to be an abject slave of her husband, destitute of all right. And yet the strong differentiation of work, however burdensome it may be to the wife, is itself a source of rights, giving her authority within a circle which is exclusively her own." (71, 1: 637.)

This division of labor, based on physical and social conditions, has become fixed by custom, so that departure from it is regarded as a disgrace. As Nansen says, "it was beneath the dignity of the hunter to lend a hand" in any work peculiar to women. (43:123; cf. 69:434.) But it should be added, for this is liable to be overlooked, that even more disgraceful than for a man to do a woman's, it is for a man *not* to do a *man's* work. To the point is Crantz' statement that "those unable to catch seals are held in the greatest contempt." (16.1:151.) Recall the importance of ability as a hunter as a qualification for marriage.

A certain distinction between the sexes is seen on some social occasions. For instance, at meals and banquets, the women do not eat with the men. They eat either afterwards, or at the same time by themselves. (19:76; 5:563; 1.1:122; 43:134.) We must be careful not to read too much significance into such a custom. Certainly, there is no evidence that the Eskimo women regard this as a sign of social inferiority, as some of the authorities do. Indeed they may prefer this arrangement. Dalager relates that the men sit in their place and discuss their hunting adventures, past and future (a subject more interesting to them than to the women), while "the women too have in the meantime formed a little party by themselves in another corner." (Quoted 43:134.) We know that women take part, equally with the men, in important events, like the

singing contests and the festivals for the dead. Also women, even little girls, may be angakoks. (43:29; 63:281, 299.)

In concluding this survey of the life of the Eskimo woman it is well to consider thoughts like these by Rasmussen:

"A superficial consideration of the position of women in Eskimo society might induce one mistakenly to believe that she leads exclusively a cowed and unhappy existence. But certainly no one would be more astonished than herself if any one came to the Eskimo woman and pitied her. . . . She herself has no consciousness whatever of being man's drudge. . . . That they are indispensable to the maintenance of the social fabric they know quite well and are proud of it." (50: 62 sqq.)

24. CONCLUSION

In closing this study, the writer is keenly aware of its incompleteness and inadequacy. Doubtless, errors of interpretation are not wanting. No one could more eagerly welcome criticism and correction of any such. He realizes also how doubtful, in the present state of our knowledge, are many points of fact. Numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the available evidence remain unresolved. To accomplish this, as well as arrive at a safe interpretation of the older observed data, recourse must be had to further "careful field work," as Boas has emphasized. (8:805.) I think a study of this kind impresses one with the uncertain and fragmentary nature of our information even about a people of whom so much has been written; and the caution necessary in weighing conclusions based on "comparative" studies of great numbers of peoples, about most of whom our accurate knowledge is painfully meager. Further, this humble effort, I believe, brings out the importance of studying ethnological phenomena in the proper relations to the total cultural complex of which they are a part. Without a knowledge of such relations, many features of Eskimo morality would be even less comprehensible than they now are.

Finally, I may say, that one must be impressed with the intense humanness of this people—that "a man's a man for a' that"—even an Eskimo. And, while it is the business of the ethnologist to describe and explain, not to praise or censure, I cannot but express a profound admiration for these "neighbors of the north pole." To study their life and character has been a genuine pleasure. Of those things in their morality

which may jar our civilized sensibilities, I can but say with Osaquaq, the Smith Sound Eskimo,

“Our tales are of men’s experiences, and the things one hears of are not always lovely things. But one cannot deck a tale to make it pleasant, if at the same time it shall be true. The tongue must echo the event and cannot adapt itself to taste or caprice.”

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THE ADOLESCENT GIRL AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

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VI. NATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF PUBERTY-CUSTOMS

It is a singular fact that of all the theories of the significance of puberty-ceremonies, such as those of Frobenius, Frazer, Crawley, Schurtz, Webster, etc., none is based mainly on the explanations of primitive peoples themselves, the assumption being, apparently, that of the Freudian theory of consciousness; i. e., these statements do not say what they mean, and the true reason must be sought elsewhere. Difficulties in the method of using native explanations are enormous; in many cases, they have not been recorded, or have been "interpreted" by the recorder. In spite of this, however, it would seem that here, as in the fields of totemism and myth, nothing can be gained until foundations are laid in the facts of primitive life. If then we fail, by this method, to reduce puberty-customs to the dimensions of a theory, we may at least obtain insight into the healthy diversity of the problem.

Westermarck (95:170), noting that the explanation often given for savage decoration is a religious one, remarks: "But such tales are not of much importance, as any usage practiced from time immemorial may easily be ascribed to the command of a god." Arbitrary religious sanction, however, may well serve to indicate the secondary and fortuitous nature of the custom. Wundt (in his *Ethik*), on the contrary, holds that the religious idea is the true source of the custom. This is the view of Tylor, later adopted by Frazer and Crawley. The present use of native explanations of puberty-customs, however, is not concerned with the problem of the origin and development of these customs, but with their *meaning* to the people who use them. The aim is to discover the content, not the interpretation.

In a recent article on "The Sociological Significance of

Myth" (*Folklore*, 1912, XXIII, pp. 307-331), Rivers points out that the service of myths in providing *clear evidence of social conditions* has been largely overlooked (p. 328). It is upon this function of native explanation that the present method relies.

In the material studied, native explanations have been furnished in 219 instances. To attempt to group these reasons into certain categories is to enter a maze of conflicting motives as varied as life itself. Yet it will be apparent that typical ideas emerge, exhibiting features which are mainly physical, esthetic, pedagogical, religious or social; we cannot gain complete disposal, however, of each individual explanation by grouping it under one of these heads. For instance, the custom found among the Shuswap Indians of setting lice adrift at puberty is given a purely physical reason, *i. e.*, that the adolescents may be free from vermin in the future. But it is performed also for a magico-religious reason, founded on express belief that everything done at this period has a pre-determining effect upon the after-life of the individual (89:587). In order to show the complexity of the problem, it may be well to treat separately two very common and widespread modes of treatment,—tattooing and circumcision.

A. Tattooing

To a greater or less extent tattooing is performed on the adolescent girl in Asia, Oceania, and North and South America; not at all in Australia, and rarely in Africa. None of the puberty-rites studied show evidences of simple tattooing of the girl in Africa. As to Australia, Westermarek (85:177) says that either or both sexes are tattooed at puberty. Waitz (*Anthrop. d. Naturv.*, Lpzg., 1872, Vol. VI, p. 739, p. 785, p. 787) mentions tattooing and scarification at puberty among the Australians without distinguishing them. Spencer and Gillen (85:42) note the prevalence of cicatrices, first made at puberty.

The physical extent of tattooing includes every part of the body,—“no visible part of the human body, except the eyeball, has escaped this practice.” (95:169.)

Miss Fletcher states that, in general, tattooing for men in North America, “marked personal achievement, some special office, symbolized a vision from the supernatural powers, or

served some practical purpose," as measuring, tallying and the like; while among women "the tattooing was more social in its significance." (38.II:700.)

With few exceptions, this is true elsewhere. Tattooing a line from the edge of the lower lip to the point of the chin, among the Eskimo, announced that the girl had arrived at puberty. Three lines (or more) indicated marriage. This was, perhaps, the most general form and meaning of tattooing applied to girls, throughout the American continent, as pointed out by Swanton.

Among the Nagas of Upper Assam matrimony was not permitted to the untattooed girls (Dalton, *Descript. Ethnol. Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 39). Tattooing is necessary before marriage among some of the pagan races of the Malay Peninsula, and in many parts of Oceania (76:493-494, 741, 264-2; Hose, *Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, Lond., 1912, Vol. I, pp. 166-171).

Similarly, the Makalaka girls, of South Africa, undergo the severe ordeal of having about four thousand stitches made in the skin of the chest and stomach, and a black fluid rubbed into the wounds. This occurs at puberty, and is necessary for marriage (Mauch, cited by Westermarck, 95:178). The Baffin's Bay Eskimo say that they tattoo girls in order to distinguish the sexes, since both dress in similar fashion (2:481). The Hudson Bay Eskimo give a highly suggestive social reason. At puberty girls are tattooed by old women, who insist on doing this in order to make the girls "look old" (2:481). Here we have a custom imposed by a social class, whose interests are remotest from adolescence. This artificial or fortuitous stimulus to pubertal custom is found in numerous instances, and is often recognized in the primitive explanation.

Tattooing as class mark, or sign of distinction, is frequent. The Omaha and some of their cognates place a round mark on the girl's forehead to indicate the achievements of her father, though she herself must fulfil conditions of chastity, strength and industry before he can receive the honor which accompanies this ceremony. The design is called "The Mark of Honor," and insures to the girl fertility, and a fortunate marriage. (25)

This custom may be compared to scarring the chest of a girl when her brother spears his first *dugong*, as is done in New Guinea (Haddon). We may compare also tattooing the

mouth of the Eskimo wife whose husband is a great whaler (Fletcher, in 38.II:700).

The Takelma tattoo girls at puberty as a sex mark, "to prevent them being derided as boys" (71:273). Among the Ahoms (Shans of the Tai branch), tattooing is a mark of social distinction granted only to members of the priestly clan (Gurdon, P. R., in 22.I:235). While among the Tangkhuls of Manipur tattooing is a tribal identification, as well as means of protection; all women who bear this sign are unmolested when abroad, since other peoples respect Tangkhul vengeance (Hodson). So with the Haida tribes of Queen Charlotte Islands, designs which have reached the highest esthetic quality of tattooing in North America, north of Mexico, are imprinted upon both men and women as tribal marks of distinction (Fletcher, in 38.II:700).

Esthetic and purely physical reasons are rare for this practice. The Melanesians of British New Guinea and the Massim tattoo solely as a means of personal adornment, and give no other explanation. (76:489, 492.)

Among the Naga Tribes of Manipur tattooing is said to have originated at the suggestion of a foreign monarch who pitied the poverty-stricken Naga who had no ornaments. (Hodson, p. 30.) Here should be mentioned the interesting fact that tattooing designs of the middle Atlantic coast peoples and those of many of the Western tribes of North America represented pottery and basket designs, showing their relation to woman's art and industry. (Fletcher, in 38.II:700; compare Wissler, "Dec. Art of the Sioux Indians," in *Bull. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, N. Y., Vol. XVIII, 1904, pp. 231-278.) Westermarck, in his chapter, "Means of Attraction," gives other examples which may have purely esthetic interpretation. (95:179 et seq.) See also tattooing and noseboring of the Melanesians (Massim), "to attract the opposite sex." (76:492.)

The chief physical explanations given are: for the sake of fertility (Omaha); for the cure of toothache (Chippewa, many beliefs were attached to the way in which the patient endured the pain). The therapeutic value of tattooing performed by a pubescent girl upon a delicate youth has already been mentioned; for the purpose of stimulating sex-passion in the girl preparatory to marriage (Thompson, B., *Fiji*, London, 1908, p. 219).

The relation of tattooing to sex-passion has been noted in Samoa by Turner (*Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 90). In Tahiti this connection is also indicated, and given a religious explanation. The daughter of Taaroa and Apouvaru, their chief deities, was secluded at puberty, in order to preserve her chastity. "Intent on her seduction, the brothers invented tattooing, and marked each other with the figure called Taomaro. Thus ornamented, they appeared before their sister, who admired the figures, and in order to be tattooed herself . . . broke the enclosure that had been erected for her preservation, was tattooed, and became also the victim to the designs of her brothers." These two sons became the gods of tattooing, and men imitated their example. It is significant, however, that the chiefs of Tahiti later prohibited it altogether. (Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, Vol. I:262, 266.)

Joest attributes tattooing to desire to attract and stimulate the opposite sex. (*Tätowiren, Narbenzeichnen und Körperbemalen*. Berlin, 1887, p. 56; compare 95:131.)

Other religious reasons for tattooing are in the main bound up with the welfare of the girl in the future world. With the Greenland Eskimo and those of the Aleutian Islands, if the operation is omitted girls in the future world will be turned into tubs, and placed under lamps in heaven (12). Among the Fijians, tattooing was appointed by the god Dengei, and its neglect punished by indignities in the other world. (Thompson, *Op. cit.*, p. 218.) With the Cochin Oddens, girls were tattooed as proof of their life on earth when they should die. (42.II.391.) Similarly the Chamars tattoo their girls, so as to "secure identification in the next world." (Lillingston, in 22.III:354.) The highest religious feeling, as exhibited by tattooing the pubescent girl, is shown by the Omaha and some of their cognates. Here the four-pointed star on back and breast signified life-processes and spiritual forces in nature. Male and female, light and dark, sun, moon, water, earth, sky, and the four life-giving winds were all expressed in this outward symbol of the union of the girl with the cosmos (25).

B. Circumcision

In dealing with native reasons for circumcision of girls all analogous operations on the sexual organs, such as infibulation, introcision, piercing or cutting the hymen or ovary, gashes,

mutilations, etc., will be included. These practices on girls are found frequently in Africa and Australia, somewhat in Oceania and South America, rarely in North America, and occasionally in Asia.

Although it will be impossible to pass in review the numerous theories of the origin and significance of circumcision, those of Westermarck and Spencer may fittingly be compared with theories offered by primitive peoples. Westermarck holds, as we have seen, that circumcision and all mutilations of the body arose as means of sex-attraction, through the need of variety, stimulus, decoration, etc. Later religious interpretation was given, or the custom became mechanical. (95:201-206.) According to Spencer, circumcision is a sacrificial offering to the gods. (*Descript. Sociol.*, Vol. II, p. 67..) This theory with certain modifications is widely held. (Frazer, Crawley, etc.)

Later, as in the case of the Jews, the custom is sometimes held to have developed social and legal features, becoming a mark of identification with a privileged class. According to this view circumcision is extended to women in the course of struggle for higher social status, and equality with men; it is then for women, a sort of by-product of freedom.

Primitive peoples express to a certain extent these types of explanation, but with a wider range, and as will be seen, a closer reference to the human aspect.

A common physical explanation of the circumcision of girls is to secure or promote chastity, though here it must be recognized that social, hygienic and religious factors may be involved. (Bamangwato, and peoples of Galla lands, Kordofan, Nubia, and Somali, in Africa; the Asiatic Kamchadals; and some of the tribes of South America.)

In the Somali lands, among the Asiatic Pegu, and in some other parts of Africa, as well as with certain peoples in Arabia and Egypt, infibulation occurs, sometimes together with circumcision, though not always performed at puberty, and is given a similar explanation. (87:548; Gray, in 22.III:667-669; Littmann, in *ibid.*, I:58; 61.I:379.)

Other physical explanations are: to check sexual desire before marriage, natives of the Alfurese Archipelago, and the Mandingo of West Africa (Gray, in 22.III:667) to avert hysteria (Peuhls and some cognates, Gray, P. H., *loc. cit.*; 61.II:220-235), to promote fertility (Masai, Bambuk, natives of Old Calabar), while some of the Australians are said

by Ploss to pierce the ovary to prevent fertility. (61.II:235, citing MacGillivray.)

In one of the Masai native texts we read, "When Masai girls wish to marry they are circumcised." (Hollis, *The Masai*. Oxford, 1905, p. 299.) Although in the ceremony itself there is much to indicate that the rite has a ceremonial and civil purpose as well, the chief reason here given, points to the operation as a physical preparation for marriage. This reason is stated by the Bechuanas, and some of the other Bantus. (Joyce, *Ency. Brit.*, 1911, Vol. IV, p. 604.) So, among some tribes of the Malay Archipelago and of South America, circumcision is absolutely essential as preparation for marriage. (Gray, in 22.III:667; 62.I:438; see also 1884 edition.) In the Sudan and some other parts of Africa, no girl who is not infibulated can obtain a husband. (95:124; citing Escayrac de Lauture.) Egypt furnishes another illustration. (Gray, *loc. cit.*; Joyce, in *Ency. Brit.*, 1911, Vol. XIX, pp. 99-100.)

As preparatory to marriage too, are the Australian rites of perforation of the hymen (*Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, Vol. XXIV, p. 169). This custom occurs in many other parts of the world. (95:123-125.) It ends the Zulu girl's seclusion, and admits her to freedom, and later to marriage. (*Journ. Anthropol. Inst.*, Vol. XX, pp. 117-118). As preparatory to marriage, too, are the Australian rites of perforation of the hymen, the rite of Atna-Ariltha, introcision, etc. Crawley supposes that, in accord with his general theory, these operations are for the purpose of "removing the first and therefore most virulent part of female contagion, as the West African, 'takes off the fetish,' from a strange liquor by getting some one to 'handsel' it." (14:190-191.) As regards the practice of introcision, however, and, possibly, some others, the Australians are said to consider that the rite of subincision for men necessitates an analogous operation for women. This purely physiological explanation obviates the contagion theory.

Finally we have the physical conception of circumcision as securing the health and well-being of girls. (Quechuas of Peru.) This conception may be compared with the theory of the now obsolete gynecology, with its widespread reliance on the general therapeutic value of ovariectomy. Rather than presence of ideas of sacrifice, etc., we seem more frequently to detect crude prototypes of the modern hygienic removal of vestigial organs, lymphoid tissue growth and the like.

Some of the native reasons are pedagogical, for example: "to make the girl more skilful and capable in her daily work" (Pano of South America; Gray, in 22.III:667); to keep her from weariness or laziness (Indonesia, 87: 523; Gray, in 22.III: 667), or, as among the Nandi of East Africa, circumcision and ordeals are for the purpose of making the girl "courageous and strong." (Hollis, *Nandi*, pp. 57-82.) Among the Australians, cutting the ovary is said to exist as a punishment (62.II:235); so, punishment of girls in certain parts of India, includes mutilation of the sex-organs.

A religious turn is given to this practice by the Tecuna of Western Brazil who circumcise their girls, "to remove uncleanness." (Gray, in 22.III:668.) The religious nature is seen further among some of the Uaupès tribes of South America, among whom the rite may be reduced to a mere gash cut in the vulva, for ceremonial purposes, or "to banish evil." In Abyssinia, circumcision of girls is under the influence of the cult of the Virgin, fused with that of a pagan goddess who was protector of chastity. Littmann, in 22.I:58.) The religious significance may be indicated as among the Suk, by use of the circumcision song and dances in the religious thanksgiving for grass in time of rain. (Beech, *The Suk*, p. 34.)

Among the A-Kikuyu all members of the tribe must be circumcised; "none otherwise can take part in any of the religious rites." (Routledge, W. S., *With a Prehistoric People*, London, 1910, p. 151.

By far the most numerous explanations are those which are social, such as admission to the nation, or sign that property may be inherited, etc. (A-Kikuyu: Bantu: Masai: Egyptians: Indonesia, etc.) Circumcision occurs with the Bantus frequently as a "civil rite," permitting boys to govern the country, and girls to associate on equal terms with mature members of the tribe. Both sexes form fraternities with all members of their own sex circumcised at the same time, and this bond is as enduring as kinship. (*Theol. Hist. and Ethnogr. of Syria*, London, 1907, Vol. I, pp. 112-117.)

This civil aspect has analogies in the very different custom of requiring evidence of the girl's virginity as a legal safeguard to her rights. Thus, among the Jews, "the tokens of the damsel's virginity" must be given to her parents to protect her in case of later accusation. (Deut., XXII:15-17.)

Similar badges of social status are preserved in China, Arabia, and among the Chuvashes. (95, p. 124.) Circumcision, as "a sign of maturity," is performed by the many African peoples (63.I:37), the Indians of North East Peru (Gray, T. H., 22.III:667), as a means of identifying the girl with the tribe (Nandi). With this may be compared the statement of the Bawenda, circumcision "has come to us from other tribes." (Wassmann, *The Bawenda*, 1908, pp. 61-62.) Not only is the custom of circumcision borrowed, but it may recede under foreign influence, thus showing its dependent and secondary character. The Suk, near the Turkana, do not circumcise as do their tribesmen who live elsewhere; the operation has been abandoned for both sexes, so that in time of war they may not be distinguished from their enemies. (Beech, *Op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.) So, in Madagascar the ceremony of circumcision has been obscured and abbreviated in recent years through contact with other peoples. Here the only part played by girls in the ceremony is the circumcision dance performed by those arrived at puberty. (See *Anthropos*, 1912.) Many peoples of Africa circumcise the girl at puberty in order to preserve the life of the child who will be born of her in the future. (Gray, in 22.III:667.) Some of the Naga tribes of Manipur (61.II: 220-235) practice infibulation so that parents of adolescents may be relieved from necessity of providing property, gifts, etc., in case of an early marriage, the amount to be given by the parents being fixed by law. (Hodson, p. 199.) We have here two extreme types of social explanation; in one instance the pubertal custom is determined by the future generation, in the other by the past. In neither is there direct relation to adolescence itself.

C. Other Puberty-Customs

The remaining primitive reasons for customs relating to the adolescent girl may be roughly grouped under the following heads: esthetic, physical, pedagogical, religious and social.

1. *Esthetic.*

Although the vast majority of puberty-rites have esthetic features, ranging from personal decoration and use of cosmetics to the highest forms of primitive art, as seen in adolescent games, songs, dances, pantomime, pageants and dramas, story-

telling, arts and crafts, and the various forms of pictorial art, painting, carving and the like, it is interesting to note that an esthetic reason for these rites is given only very rarely. The reasons themselves are usually equivocal. The Fijians and Tasmanians practised cicatrization solely for decoration. Also "rows of wart-like spots are burned along the arms and backs" of girls, for ornament. (Williams and Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, p. 137.) Cicatrices of the Australians have no meaning but ornament, though Spencer and Gillen note their relation to puberty and scars cut in mourning. (85:42. See also Curr, E. M., *The Australian Race*, 4 vols. Melbourne and London, 1886-1887, Vol. II, p. 475.) Some tribes of Madagascar make incisions simply for ornament. (Sibree, J., *The Great African Island*. London, 1880, p. 210.) The Kadars chip the teeth of girls at puberty, "to prevent ugliness," though this is the only tribe or caste in India to practice this custom (42:I:24-25). In some parts of the Malay Archipelago, teeth are filed and blackened, white teeth being "like dogs'." (95:174.) Burmans stain the teeth black as decoration. (Temple, in 22.III:32.) Some of the Makalaka tribes, north of the Zambesi, "break out their top incisor teeth from sheerest vanity. Their women say that it is only horses that eat with all their teeth, and that men ought not to eat like horses." (Holub, *Seven Years in South Africa*, 1881, Vol. II, p. 259.) Other African tribes and some Australians knock out the teeth of girls, so they will "not be refused on account of ugliness." (Humboldt, cited by Westermarek, p. 174.) Although Westermarek holds that painting the girl at the first menstruation, assumption of labrets, nose and lip rings, etc., are due solely to desire for attracting the opposite sex, explanations as stated by primitive peoples appear usually more complex. (Westermarek, p. 172.)

The Jicarilla ceremony (Athapascan) representing dramatically by girl and boy, the racial origin of the people, contains, in the native text, some apparently purely esthetic elements. (31:266-268.)

2. *Physical.*

These reasons may be divided into those which relate to the girl's personal welfare, and those which relate to society. Examples of the first type are: knocking out teeth

to assist in breathing (Pepos, 61.II:424); use of scratch-stick to prevent baldness, grayness, and marks on the body (Lillooet, 89:264); use of drinking-tube, to prevent stomach trouble (Tahltan, Emmons, G. T., Univ. Penn. Anthrop. Pub., 1911, p. 165); headbiting to cause heavy growth of hair (Australian Arunta, 85); eating the pounded flesh of a black hen, having laid for the first time, in order to make the back and waist strong (Cochin Oddens, 42.II:391); painting, to preserve health or comfort,—thus, the ancient Egyptians painted a rim of green color around the eyes to moderate the glare of the sun, and green malachite paint is today used in Central Africa as a disinfectant, or we find paint used to keep flies away. (Spearing, *The Childhood of Art*, London, 1912, p. 381.) Paint is not only a medicine, but a sign, sometimes of maturity (thus among some Tapuyas of Brazil, if the girl, “be marriageable, and yet not courted by any, the mother paints her with some red colour about the eyes.” Nieuhoff, “Voyages and Travels into Brazil”; Pinkerton, “Collection of Voyages,” XVI:878). The Maidu, however, erase paint from the girl, in order to show that her first menstruation is over. Tooth filing also serves as a sign; thus, in the Malay Archipelago the common way of saying the girl has arrived at puberty is to say, “she has had her teeth filed.” (Crawford, *Hist. of the Indian Archipelago*, 3 vols., Edinburgh, 1820, Vol. I, pp. 215 *et seq.*) So, too, the various taboos are explained: the Kafir girl must not see the sun, “lest she shrivel up (Kidd); the same is true of sun and fire among the Déné; among the Yaraikanna, if struck by the sun, her nose will be diseased; she must eat nothing that lives in the salt water, or a snake will kill her; she must not wear a buckskin headdress, or the deer will be displeased, and, in later years, give her headache (Lillooet); so among the Tarahumares of Mexico, she must not touch deer antlers, or her breasts will fall off (Lumholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, New York, 1902, p. 274). She must not eat the uterus, head or feet of any animal, to prevent abscess in the ear (Tahltan). Among the Assiniboine there is strict taboo that no menstruating girl step over anyone, or see the sick, or approach a medicine bundle, in order to prevent her from menstruating indefinitely. (Lowie); the Shoshone give the same reason for restricting the girl to a vegetable diet (Lowie):

the Maidu carefully guard her from sight of blood, lest she be very ill (Dixon).

Explanations of the Australian Arunta and Ilfirra tribes are similarly explicit. If food restrictions are violated a series of evil physical consequences will follow, non-development of the breasts, malformation of the genitals, continued flow of the menses, premature age, abnormal sex desire, etc. Girls are allowed to eat only young nestlings otherwise she will not be able to nurse her child. (85:472-473.) Customs of the second type have to do usually with childbirth, and rearing. Thus the Diegueños, and the Mission Indians, "roast" the girl, and throw seeds over her to influence the organ of generation, and to make her prolific. This ceremony has also a religious meaning. The new hair arrangement of the Hopi, imitating the mature squash, while the former coiffure has suggested the blossom, is explained as a sign of maturity, "and to promote fertility." Among the Zuñi, at the ceremony of the Rabbit Hunt of the Gods, the first rabbit is killed, and the blood allowed to trickle down the girl's legs for the sake of her fecundity. Among the Lkuñgen, the head of any fish is tabooed, so that she may "secure good luck in marriage." The Shuswap girl goes through a regular course of physical training to insure the strength of her child. She undergoes burning, etc., to enable her to withstand the pain of childbirth. Similar ordeals are common in Africa and elsewhere. Many taboos relate to the child. If the Tahltan girl ate the feet of the mountain-goat, the child would be lazy, and a poor traveler. The girl, among the Tarahumares, will not eat the pancreas, for fear of childlessness. So, long periods of fasting are performed for the good of offspring. The Tlingit girl fasts, and eats sparingly for eight months in order to insure the rebirth of her dead relative. The most conspicuous example is the fast of the girls and boys in the Andaman Islands, as a "test for fitness for marriage, and endurance and self-denial requisite to support a family" (51). Throughout the other types of reasons there are constant references to the future generation, on the social and religious side, as well as the physical.

3. *Pedagogical.*

Here, too, we find motives readily separated into those which concern personal training of the girl, and those which relate

to her preparation for life in the group. Both vary in degree from the mere song among the Maidu, enumerating all kinds of agricultural work and food products expected of the girl in future, to the four year period of education among some of the Indians of British Columbia, and the elaborate training of girls in great seminaries among the ancient Mexicans. (Mason.)*

It is no accident that these examples have been chosen from America; whatever the modern educational status of the American girl may be, it is a fact that, among the American Indians, she received the highest degree of attention to be found among any primitive people.

The following modes of personal training are common: walking, running, leaping, digging, climbing, swimming, to obtain tirelessness and lightness of foot (Shuswap, Lillooet, etc.); carrying pots of water, "that she may be strong" (Kafir); hard labor at the home of her future mother-in-law during the first day of the first menstruation, "to promote industry and fertility" (Hopi Indians); vigils for long periods so that she will not be lazy (Cheyenne Indians). Among the Haida the same purpose is served by sleeping on rocks (Swanton). The Thompson Indians ceremonially flog both sexes at adolescence to prevent laziness (Teit). The African Bawenda beat girls, and chill them for hours in the river, "to harden them" (Wassmann.) Other forms of hard usage are prescribed to "prepare them for future tasks as wives and mothers." Beating, as preparation for matrimony, also occurs at Torres Straits. Among the Shekani the girl submits to hard treatment, undergoes long fasting and gazing at the sun till a swoon is produced, "to break the will of the candidate, and provide secrecy"; also "to produce submission and bravery." The A-Kikuyu sing a special song to preserve the courage of the girl during circumcision. (Routledge.) Among the Akamba,

* NOTE: Some of the education of the girl in ancient Mexico was given by the mother, as is shown on ancient inscriptions, the girl was taught cooking, meal preparation, weaving, pottery, and decoration. Her food allowance and punishments were the same as those of the boy. At eight punishment was with thorns, at ten with clubs, at eleven with fire. (Tozzer, Alfred M., "The Value of Ancient Mexican Manuscripts in the study of the General Development of Writing," *Ann. Report of the Smithsonian Inst.*, Washington, 1911 [1912], pp. 493-506).

elaborate precautions are taken to test the girl's courage during this operation; two balls of goat's dung are balanced on toe and knee, and, if one of them falls to the ground, the girl is disgraced and must throw away the warrior's garments with which she has been clad. (Hobley.) Vomiting is resorted to among the Luiseño, to free from badness, or to detect badness. (Kroeber.) Girls among the Indians of North Carolina were formerly secluded in the dark, "to harden them." (Ploss.) The Haida practiced seclusion, fasting and vigils, so that the girl might avoid garrulousness or excessive hilarity in later life (Swanton.). During the severe trials of the Queensland tribes, advice is given, "to soften the heart"; while the Kurnai knead the stomach, "to drive out selfishness and greed." The Vuntakutchin Indians give the naïve reason for seclusion, careful guarding, intermittent fasting and taboos extending over a year, that this will prevent a second year of seclusion as a punishment. The "roasting" ceremony common to the Luiseño, Diegueños, and other Mission Indians, contains features of gift-giving, exhortation, etc., to teach the girls to be generous and to give to the poor and needy. (Rust.) Property and gifts are distributed by the Assiniboine, "to honor the girl" (Lowie). So, the dramatic presentation of culture-history of the South West Athapascans, is for the purpose of securing for the girl "a happy, useful and honorable life."

Thus, the modes of education are not always severe. The Maidu have a good woman breathe or whistle into the mouth of the girl, so that she will be brave and good natured (Dixon). During the seclusion and fast of some of the Brazilian Indians, the father sings at dawn to encourage the girl, and to enumerate the kinds of food she soon may eat. So, the father of the girl of some of the peoples of Torres Straits, weeps when she returns from her month long-seclusion, to express his sorrow for her absence. (Yam and Tutu Islands.) The Korean capping-ceremony emphasized the pedagogic value of assumption of garments of maturity: "In this fortunate moon and on this lucky day an addition is made to your dress. You must now discard all childish thoughts, and obey, so that you may attain perfect virtue. May you live long and attain much happiness by the aid of this blessing."

Occasionally we find no education given. Among the Masai, "prior to marriage the young girls do nothing of a menial

nature. They spend their time in dancing, singing, and adorning themselves; and though they live with the warriors they are exempted from all work. More usually they do not even cook the food they eat." (Hinde, S. L., and H., *The Last of the Masai*, London, 1901, p. 67.)

Customs to train the girl for social duties are especially numerous. The "Greegree Bush," of the Väi of Liberia, gives extensive training in manners, morals, industry, and the wisdom and folk-lore of the tribe. The A-Kamba have sticks, carved with riddles containing tribal secrets, and wisdom, which must first be constructed and then solved by the girls before they are released. The A-Kamba combine both symbolism and systematic instruction. As the candidates arrive for the initiation ceremony they are met by an elder, an old man for the boys, an old woman for the girls. Each is given a sip of native beer, and ushered into the hut. Here they are seized by an elder and thrust through a back door, where a freshly built door leads into the woods. The girls must gather firewood and the boys must hunt. When they return to the village they must use the new door and new road, and thenceforth during the ceremony. The young people stay in the hut eight days, and are lectured to daily. Boys sleep on one side, girls on the other. Boys are taught to make bows and arrows; the girls learn basket making. Tutors (Mubwiki), are responsible for their conduct. (39:74.) The Baganda give special instruction and hold a ceremony, so that the girl may "be a successful manager of a plantain grove and to be an expert cook." (Rosecoe.) Thus the Yaos have ceremonial performance of agriculture to train them for the future (Werner); while their supreme duty is indicated by groups of girls carrying about for some time a miniature house, or skeleton roof on their shoulders, as "symbolical of their position as pillars of the home." Although this symbolical method of education is very common, and is found everywhere, as well as that consisting solely of imitation, systematic instruction is by no means lacking, as is seen among the Shuswap, where girls practice, under instruction of parent or attendant, arts and crafts for years that they "might be fitted to fill a useful place in the family."

Sex-pedagogy for the adolescent girl is rarely neglected among primitive peoples. Among methods used are, direct instruction by the mother, or old women, physical practices and

operations, songs and dances, ceremonies, acts of initiation, courtship, sexual intercourse, nakedness, examinations for virginity (Pedi-Bantu), ceremonies employing objects of nature as symbols and modes of imagery, religious rites performed with reference to generation, legends and tales illustrating the cosmic process as among the Omaha (Fletcher), guarding, seclusion, taboos, exhortations, as contrasted with the girl's admission to complete freedom in many different areas of the world, and finally the method of direct observation. This appears among the Bontoc Igorot, where the young child is admitted to the Olag, or club house of the unmarried women, and observes the concourse of lovers from her early years. (Jenks.) Similarly, Nordenskiöld reports of some Rio Pilcomayo Indians that girls have nothing to learn of sex-life after puberty, though unchastity is extremely rare. So Powers remarks of the California Achomâwi, one of the most primitive tribes of North America:

"An Achomawi mother seldom teaches her daughters any of the arts of barbaric housekeeping before their marriage. They learn them by imitation and experiment after they have grown old enough to perceive the necessity thereof. . . . As children are taught nothing, so they are never punished . . . it is a wonder that they grow up with any virtue whatever, for the conversation of their elders in their presence is often of the filthiest description. But the children of savages far less often make wreck of body and soul than do those of the civilized, because when the great mystery of maturity confronts them they know what it means and how to meet it." (64: 271.)

4. *Religious and Magical.*

Miss Fletcher has best described the attitude of the American Indian to the period of puberty, in its religious significance: "The maturity of the sexes is a period of serious and religious experiences which are preparatory by their character for the entrance of the youth or maiden into the religious and secular responsibilities of life, both individual and tribal. Among the tribes which hold especial public ceremonies announcing the maturity of a girl, these rites are held not far from the actual time of puberty, and indicate the close of childhood and entrance of the person into the social status of womanhood. The public festival has, however, been preceded by private religious rites." (*Smithsonian Report*, 1889-1890, p. 484.) Among the Omaha and their cognates, this conception was expressed by

the rite of *Nozhizho*, not obligatory for girls, but open to them. The term "*Nozhizho*" is "to stand sleeping," "meaning that during the rite the person stands as if oblivious of the outward world and conscious only of what transpires in his own mind. He enters into personal relation with the mysterious power that permeates and controls all nature." The mind is now said "to become white"; "in native symbolism night is the mother of day, so the mind of the newborn child is dark, like the night of its birth; gradually it begins to discern and remember things, as objects seen in the early dawn; finally it is able to remember and observe discriminatingly, then the mind is said to be 'white,' as with the clear light of day. . . . He is on the verge of his conscious individual life. He is 'old enough to know sorrow.' " Thus, the rite is performed in the spring. Clay is put on the head. Some of the Indians explain it as meaning "humility"; others say that it refers to "soft clay or mud brought up by the diving animals, out of which the earth was created." After long fast the adolescent gains a vision of animal or plant, which must be procured, and becomes a trophy or visible sign of the vision, "the union with the unseen." (25:128-133.) A very important element in the rite is the fact that the adolescent, in dreaming of the moon, may see a burden strap, or a bundle of arrows held out. Thus if a youth receives the burden strap, emblem of the woman's life, he must pursue her avocations, use her language and dress; while the same is the case with the maiden. Here, the fundamental nature of the life-rôle is determined at puberty, by means of the secret consciousness and inclination of the individual. A similar conception and practice is found among the Shuswap, Lillooet, and others; the change must be made, always at puberty, or at the end of training. (Teit.) Bearing of this custom on the problems of the modern adolescent, will be apparent when we turn to compare the primitive with the present-day treatment of delinquency in girls.

The above account has been given in detail because it illustrates concretely two significant points, first, that the simplest rite may have profound religious significance, often lost to a less highly trained observer than Miss Fletcher; second, the exact meaning of primitive ritual and symbolism may be differently explained by members of the same tribe, and hence we should draw up no adamant scheme of conclusions.

Religious and magical explanations of puberty-customs often turn on guarding the girl from evil. Thus the Lillooet and the Maidu (Dixon) use a deer-hoof rattle to "protect from evil influences and to keep off ghosts." (Teit.) Among the Ts'et-s'aut, a special hat and amulets are worn constantly, and the face is blackened, "to protect from evil." (Boas.) Beating, sometimes causing death, cicatrization, stinging with poison plants and insects are used, "to banish evil." (Caribs, some Uaupès, some African tribes.) The milder form is seen among the Mission Indians, who wave branches, "to keep off spirits." (Rust.) Seclusion serves the same purpose: "to guard against 'mystery'" (Tlingit), to guard against supernatural power (Salinan), to keep away evil spirits (Väi, Gola-Mendi, etc.). Other means of warding off demons, such as offerings, juggling, exorcism, torches, songs, lustration, anointing, etc., have already been mentioned among the Cochin tribes and castes. The Anyanya rename the girl, "to deceive evil spirits"; the Pima Indians consider the name during puberty as taboo, if spoken, the girl will have "bad luck." (Russell.) The numerous taboos often keep the girl from evil. Thus the sun and fire taboo among the Ahts is explained. (Sproat.) This conception reaches its most elaborate form among the Shasta Indians, where all taboos of food, sleep, sun, moon, fire, clear water are to "keep off evil spirits and dreams," further precautions being taken by sleeping with the head in a basket, the opening of which has been guarded with a magic stick, burned and renewed each morning. (Dixon.)

Other explanations deal with guarding the community from evil. Among the Shastas, if all expedients failed to keep dreams of public calamity from the girl, she was burnt as sacrifice. So, in New Caledonia, she is severely whipped, to drive illness from the chief. Among many peoples she is secluded, "to prevent loss of game supply" (Déné); "to protect the animals," or so that "the luck of the hunter will not disappear." (Tlingit, Malemut, etc., etc.)

Many customs are explained as consecratory or purifying in function. The Wintun of California gave the girl the sacred broth, or drink of "khlup" or buckeye, in order to consecrate them; it served also as a preparation for skilful dancing. (Powers.) We have considered the rite of circumcision from this point of view. Fire, tests, ordeals, isolation, and fasts are

used for purification among many peoples. Disappearance into the mountains (Thompson Indians), "smoking" the girl over sweet grass and burning coals, gifts, dieting and purging are means of purification among American tribes. (Cheyenne, Mission, Pawnee, etc.) Sexual intercourse, both before and after puberty is sometimes held necessary for purification. Instances among Asiatic peoples have already been given, in the section on primitive theories of menstruation. If this custom is omitted among the Nayars (Cochin), the girl is considered religiously impure, and is prohibited from entering temples. (Iver.)

Means taken to insure spiritual welfare for the girl are: prayers (Lillooet, Thompson, Shuswap, etc., and many African tribes), offerings, to obtain blessings, or guardian spirit, to become liberal, or to secure spiritual insight, and the ability to detect witchcraft, etc. (Mission, Omaha, Yokuts, etc.), drawings and paintings on rocks (Thompson, and other tribes of British Columbia, some of Mission tribes, etc.), preservation of the first blood (Australians), and divination by means of blood of the first menstruation (Kaniyans and others).

Other customs are explained as done in obedience to a divine command. Illustrations were seen in the treatment of tattooing. The Pelew Islanders believe that perforation of the nasal septum is necessary for winning eternal bliss. Tooth-knocking among the Dieyerie of Australia is due to the command of a good spirit, Muramura, who did so to the first human child, and was so pleased with the result that he commanded all others to do the same.

The religious conception of the sanctity of puberty is occasionally found, as has already been apparent. Among the Ceram Laut, "only a virgin arrived at puberty and a young boy are permitted to mix the holy oil used in ceremonial." So, with the Zuñi, the adolescent girl, though not necessarily virgin, is the central figure in the corn rites of the sacred Corn Maidens. (Stevenson.) The Athapascan drama-ceremony has also strongly religious features. (Goddard.) In the Tusayan Snake Ceremonies, a girl and a boy are chosen to represent the sacred characters. (Fewkes, *Sixteenth Ann. Report of Bur. of Amer. Ethnol.*, 1894-1896.) The Dravidians used formerly to sacrifice a young girl, and allow her blood to drip to the ploughed fields to insure the stability and fertility of the earth.

For additional references to the religious significance of puberty for both sexes, see also Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples* (New York, 1898, pp. 197-200).

5. Social.

The following explanations emphasize the relation of the adolescent girl to society, although many of the reasons already given are also determined more or less by social factors.

Puberty, as a period of socialization, is recognized by entrance of the girl into various groups and secret societies. The *Olag* of the Bontoc Igorot, numerous girls' houses in Africa, traces of a kind of freemasonry among women of certain of the Melanesians (Seligmann) suggest this. More definite is the society formed by the Mpongwe, to which girls are admitted at puberty, "to protect them from harsh treatment by the men. Girls circumcised together, among some of the Bantu form a fraternity. Girls among the Navaho undergo the rite of flagellation as admission to a secret society. So, too, the Zuñi girls may enter various fraternal organizations. Among the Australian Central tribes, there exists now no elaborate social initiation for girls as with boys. Formerly, however, such rites are said by the Australians themselves to have existed for girls. (Spencer and Gillen.)

Social aspects of seclusion, taboos, mutilations, etc., have been neglected by most writers. Thus the Baganda mother sometimes produces deep scarification upon her daughters at puberty, "so they would not be chosen as wives of the king." (Roscoe.) Among some of the Australians, the little finger is mutilated and eaten off by ants, as a distinguishing mark of the tribe. Among the Australian Arunta and Ilfirra tribes failure on the part of the girl to perform the sand-winnowing ceremony, and to undergo the operation of noseboring would be regarded as a grave offense against her mother. (85:459.) A very human social reason for depilation is given by the Bontoc Igorot, "they pull out the pelvic hair in order that they will not be noticeable when they work or travel naked, they wish to appear like the children, they say." (Jenks.) So, with seclusion, flogging and hard usage of the girl among some of the Algonkian tribes; it is done that the girl may become a healer and bringer of good fortune to the community, and that she may insure safe childbirth to women. Thus the

Jicarilla ceremony is performed, "to bring good fortune to the whole community." The Seri *jacal*, in which the girl resides for a year in complete freedom, is for the purpose of establishing the probation of her future husband. (McGee.) So the gambling-stick practice of the girl among the Shuswap is intended to secure luck for the man who will marry her. (Teit.) Similarly with taboos, although a large portion are designed to keep the girl from evil, or to educate her, it is evident that many are conceived entirely from the social point of view. In the Torres Straits all have reference to the protection of the food supply. Can we not envisage this sort of taboo as a primitive system of taxation levied by society on the girl, at a period when her social instinct is beginning to expand?

It has been, of course, impossible to enumerate the entire list of 219 native explanations of puberty customs. In the material studied, their distribution in the above groups has been as follows: esthetic, 9; physical, 29; pedagogical, 29; religious, 70; social, 82.

VII. SEX-DISCRIMINATION

The ancient problem of sex-discrimination, involving natural sex-differences, economic and social conditions, religion, pre-marital status, etc., strikes at the root of the problem of adolescence. The degree of sex-discrimination is well indicated in puberty-ceremonies, since these are merely crystallized expressions of a fairly permanent attitude. Discrimination may be against the girl, as shown in the data collected by Webster and Schurtz. It may be in favor of the girl, as with the Maidu, Shasta and Seri tribes of North America.

A. *Absence of Discrimination*

The following peoples, however, seem to have no sex-discrimination in their puberty-ceremonies, or if it occurs it is of minimum degree:

AFRICA: A-Kamba; A-Kikuyu; Bamangwato (here the "girls flog boys of the same age to prove if they are men"); Bantu (some tribes); Basuto; Bawenda; Cross River Natives; ancient Egyptians (apparently none); Gola; Kafir; Masai; Mendi; Nandi; Shekani; Suk; Väi; Yaos.

ASIA: Aboms; Alfurese; Andamanese; ancient Brahmans (among modern Brahmans restrictions required of girls are common also to students, ascetics, mourners, or the sick); Burmans; Cambodians (same customs for

boys, if they are to be educated; discrimination exists between different social classes of girls); Chamars; Kadars; Koreans; Lolos of Kientchang; Lushei-Kuki clans, of Tibeto-Burman stock; Nicobarese; pagan races of the Malay Peninsula (some tribes); ancient Semites (both youths and girls offered as sacred prostitutes); ancient Syrians (both sexes offered hair as puberty sacrifice); Forest and Rock Veddass.

INDONESIA, AUSTRALASIA, POLYNESIA: Australia (some of the Central tribes; Queensland tribes); Bontoe Igorot; Borneo (some tribes, including the Kayan); Ceram Laut: Land Dyaks (while the Sea Dyaks of same race and culture practise much discrimination); Easter Island; Koita; Massim; Melanesians (some tribes); Muralag; Papuans (some tribes); Saibai of Torres Straits; Sabanuns of Sindangan Bay; Tasmanians; Tutu of Torres Straits; Tubetube; Yam Island natives; Yule Island (some tribes).

NORTH AMERICA: Eskimo (some tribes); Athapascan or Déné (some tribes); Hopi; Lillooet of Salishan stock; Miwok; Navaho; Omaha and cognates (some tribes); Pawnee; Pima; Shuswap and Thompson, of Salishan stock; Yuchi; Zuffi.

SOUTH AMERICA: Arawak (some tribes); Ashuslays; Bolivia (some tribes); Chorotis (apparently); Coroados (according to Ploss); Quechuas; Goajiros; Karajá; Onas; Peru (some tribes); Uaupés (some tribes apparently); Yahgans.

B. Discriminations Common to Other Social Groups

In addition to this list, there are numerous peoples who give to each sex an equal degree of attention, but the mode of treatment is fundamentally different. Again, among some peoples the girl at puberty merely enters into a situation, analogous to that of other groups in the community, such as warriors, shamen, adolescent boys, hunters, sowers and reapers, mourners, pregnant women, husbands, fathers, etc., who are occasionally or permanently regarded as requiring special attention. In other words, this kind of discrimination is not based on what separates the sexes, but upon that which unites them, i. e., common disabilities arising from primitive conceptions of the taboo that attends a crisis. Van Gennep has sought to demonstrate a sequence of initiation ceremonies, or "rites de passage," for every important stage of life. Each stage, or crisis, is thus interdependent. Hence, according to Van Gennep, so-called "puberty-rites" cannot be understood, if the point of view of sequence is ignored. It is, however, equally true, and has been equally ignored, that customs relating to

the adolescent girl cannot be studied apart from their relation to other social groups and classes.

The following illustrations are typical of this relation. Warriors among the Déné Indians, for the first four campaigns, had to undergo the same taboos as the girl during her seclusion. Boys were required to use the scratch-stick and sinew-charms in the same manner. Boys among the Creek Indians during their twelve months of initiation also used the scratch-stick, and were prohibited from touching head or ears with the hands. (Bourke.) The Ojibwa (Algonkian) warriors, for the first three campaigns, could not touch the head with the hands. (Compare the numerous taboos relating to the head of the adolescent girl, with the widespread practice of preserving the whole, or part of the human head, particularly in the case of shamans. Dall, W. H., "On Masks, Labrets, and Certain Aboriginal Customs," *Third Ann. Report Bur. Ethnol.*, 1881, pp. 73-202; especially see p. 94.) The Pima warrior, after killing an enemy, must undergo strictest seclusion for sixteen days; he must fast four days, and for two days go without water. During this entire period his wife must not eat salt. He is not permitted to touch his head with his fingers, but must use the scratch-stick, the head being covered with plaster of mud. He must keep absolute silence, and bathe frequently in the river. For some time after his seclusion he must stand back till all others are served, when partaking of food and drink. (69:204-205; compare 7:475-476.) Similar customs for warriors and those who shed human blood are found in widely different areas. Among the Fijians, the son of a chief, after killing his first man, is rigorously secluded for three days; he is forbidden to sleep, to lie down, or to change his dress. His head is anointed with red tumeric and oil. (14:552.) Kafirs and Bechuanas practice ceremonies of purification after their fights. Bantu tribes shave their heads after killing anyone in battle. Among the Wagogo, of German East Africa, the father of a youth who has shed blood gives him a goat, "to cleanse his sword." Thus, as Westermarck also points out, a state of uncleanness is incurred by shedding human blood, but this does not necessarily involve moral guilt. Purification is necessary to free the individual and the community from the

danger of infection. Gradually, however, its cause becomes part of moral disapproval, and the state and act of purification are looked upon as a punishment. (96.I:233.) We have seen how exactly this state of affairs is approximated by the girl during her first menstruation.

So, too, the father or husband of the pubescent girl may incur a like disability. Among the Northern Maidu, the husband must live on the same food as the girl during menstruation, and he is debarred from hunting. (Dixon.) Certain Eskimo tribes restrict the youth betrothed to the girl from hunting during the period of her seclusion; this lasts one month, and meanwhile the youth undergoes a mitigated fast. There are also many other examples. Among the Thompson Indians, the father of a girl just arrived at puberty may not hunt nor trap for a month, and undergoes various restrictions. (Teit.) Similar taboos exist for the husband of the pregnant woman, as is seen to an extreme degree among the Melanesians and others who practice the "couvade." (Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 228.)

Mourners are subject to special treatment in almost all parts of the world. (See 96.I: Chapt. xxxvii.) The Bogos of Africa prescribe a three-day fast for a son after the death of his father. Among the Brazilian Paressi the fast is for six days. The new born child with the Hare Indians is not allowed food until four days after birth, in order to "accustom it to fasting in the next world." While among the Tlingit and Songish Indians the child is made to vomit. (12:147-149.) Parents among Upper Thompson River Indians abstained from fresh meat for several months after the death of a child. (Teit.) The Tlingits, and some peoples in British Columbia, regard mourners as being in a delicate condition; their faces are blackened, and they cover the head with ragged mats. They must speak little, as it is believed they would otherwise become chatterboxes. These customs find constant analogies in the primitive attitude toward the adolescent girl.

It is impossible, in the limits of this thesis to give a comprehensive list of customs common to adolescents of both sexes, among the same people. It is easy, however, as is seen in the list of "Constituent Elements of Puberty Customs," to point out identities of treatment when the whole world is considered.

*C. Some Factors of Discrimination**1. Social Class.*

Social class is scarcely less influential in producing discrimination than sex, or race. This is seen among the Siamese, Cambodians, natives of the New Britain Group, among whom the very poor mark puberty, only by donning fringes across the shoulders, while those of the middle class are "caged" for a few months or years, and the rich undergo many restrictions and "caging," from the years of early childhood, up to maturity (16:285-294); some of the Cochin tribes and castes, where, in spite of the maximum degree of attention almost universally paid to puberty of girls, those who are very poor dispense with any ceremony (42.I:156-157), Ahoms, some of the Melanesians and many others. Distinction based on class would indicate that the puberty ceremony is not so much an initiation of the girl into sexual life, as into the social status of her people. We have noted the impinging of the ideas of the old upon the ceremonies and activities of adolescence.; this is seen nowhere more clearly than in discriminations based on religion and pre-marital status.

2. Religion.

The prominence of the religious element in puberty-ceremonies suggests that religion may be a causal factor in the degree and kind of discrimination in vogue. The problem arises, is there correlation between the religious ideas of a people and their treatment of the adolescent girl? In Abyssinia the cult of the Virgin, and that of a pagan goddess of chastity, show themselves in the rite of circumcision; in certain other parts of Africa where girls, at puberty, acquire special guardian divinities, we have seen that there is minimum sex-discrimination. The larger problem now emerges as to whether the presence or absence of female deities in tribal religion exerts an influence on the mode of treatment. So vast are the dimensions of this question, that we here can do no more than to state it. Many other factors enter, particularly those of economic-social environment. Facts seem to point to the conclusion, however, that the female-deity conception does influence the girl's status in puberty-ceremonial.

Among the Zuñis, the supreme life-giving power is bisexual,

referred to as He-She, *Awonawilóna*; this conception dominates the whole of their religion and observance. In addition to this fundamental recognition of the female element there are, in Zuñi belief, numerous woman-gods, the Moon Mother, Earth Mother, giver of vegetation, Corn Mother, and the ten Corn Maidens, upon whom even the gods of war in myth depend (p. 51), Salt Mother, and finally the Mother of Game. (86: 22, 23, 90.) Parallel to this religious emphasis of the feminine we find no discrimination between the sexes at puberty; girls as well as boys may be theurgists, and through voluntary initiation enter the *Kótikili* fraternity, who personify the gods. (p. 423.) The most sacred religious festival of the Zuñi is the drama of *hlá-hewe* (when corn is foot high) or the reappearance of the corn maidens to earth. (p. 180.) It is performed by girls ornamented with cloud, sun, crescent, and star symbols. (p. 194.)

Similar observance is found in the Pawnee *Hako* ceremony, where "all the people must unite their wills" to that of the woman in capacity of the Corn Mother, who leads them forth to a state of mystic union with the cosmos. Here, as previously noted, no discrimination exists between the sexes at the period of puberty (23).

Omaha tribes and cognates furnish another conspicuous example of this parallellism (25).

So, among the Central Eskimo, as reported by Boas, the girl Sedna is regarded as a secondary deity, creator of all things having life, animal and vegetable; she is protector and monopolist of the sea and the sea animals. She is the protecting divinity of the Innuits, and most of their religious rites have reference to her. (4:583-587.) Among them also the sun is a woman (p. 598), her brother being the moon; while three sisters make lightning, thunder and rain (p. 600). Here we find minimum or no discrimination during the adolescence of the sexes. Girls may become shamans or *angakoks*. (Rink, cited in 12:322.)

The most conspicuous example is that of the Yuchi, among whom men, in honor of the Sun-mother, actually place themselves in the condition ceremonially of menstruating women through the rite of scarification. Here absolutely no discrimination exists between the sexes at puberty.

In other parts of the world, similar conditions obtain. The

Subanuns of Sindangan Bay have no puberty observance; both boys and girls may become shamans with equal privilege, but the women are said to be particularly potent with female spiritual beings. The sexes grow up in absolute equality, both being trained in industrial occupations. (13:53-73.)

In India, we see, on one hand the widespread influence of the cult of the bloodthirsty goddess *Kali*, on the other, the over-stress of puberty in girls, premature intercourse, demonology, etc., among numerous native tribes and castes. (Cochin district, etc., 42.) So with the ancient Semites the custom of religious prostitution was correlated with the worship of a supreme goddess to whom a young god was subordinate. (Hogarth, in 22.I:143.) The Bush Negroes of British Guiana in adopting certain phases of Christianity have humanized the Trinity, by including Mary; thus they speak of "God, Jesu, and Mari." (Furlong, inform'n, 1913.) For numerous other types of female deities see Asozer's *The Living God*, pp. 126-278, and 79:234-236.

Whatever the causal relation between the presence of female divinities and the amount of sex-discrimination may be, it is impossible not to assume a great pedagogic influence exerted by these divinities upon the life of the adolescent girl. Christianity (Catholicism) recognizes in its female divinity only the virtue of chastity, yet the influence of the Virgin-Cult has been enormous. (See Hirn, *The Sacred Shrine*, London, Macmillan, 1912.) Among those primitive peoples where the female deities are great racial spirits, endowed with power as creators, inventors, patrons of industry and arts, workers in magic, both good and malign, can we not conceive a profound influence exerted upon the adolescent girl taught to reverence such supernatural beings of her own sex?

3. *Pre-marital Status.*

The pre-marital status of the girl is a strong determinant of sex-discrimination. On this point the greatest variation prevails.

Among certain peoples both sexes possess absolute liberty before marriage. (96.II:422-423.) In addition to the cases here cited and those mentioned previously, we find the following: The Andaman Islanders consider the girl entirely free; intercourse is a mode of courtship, marriage almost in-

variably following pregnancy. (51:67.) Among some of the Melanesians (Koita, Motu, etc.), unmarried boys and girls are allowed to act as they please in regard to their sexual relations. "The greatest decorum is, however, observed between the sexes. . . . In spite of the prevailing license, illegitimate children are very rare." (76:134.) The same statement is made of certain African peoples. In 1778 it was noted that girls in Tahiti were nearly the equals of the men in social position and intelligence, and that they possessed complete equality in love affairs. (Forster, J. R., *Observ. Made on a Voy. Round the World*, 1778, pp. 231, 409-422.) In Samoa the girl enjoys complete liberty. Here the girl may rise to a position of dignity and authority almost as great as the chief. She becomes *taupou*, or maid of the village; she must be a chief's daughter, and she exercises control over the women and girls. (44, I:64-65.)

With all these people, the sexes are on an equality, both as regards degree of ceremonial, and as to responsibility incurred by their relations.

Westermarck has compiled a list of peoples who look on unchastity with horror and punish it severely, sometimes with death. (96.II:424-426.) To this group belong the Veddas, Igorots of Luzon, certain Australian and African tribes. The author concludes, "among primitive peoples in majority of cases where chastity is required of unmarried girls the seducer also is considered guilty of a crime," usually, he adds, against the family of the girl, for the harm done to the girl herself does not occur to the savage mind. (96.II:437.) Havelock Ellis also assumes this to be the case. (21:147-148.) This is exactly the reverse among certain peoples, for example the Bontoc Igorot.

Here the custom is to bonus the unmarried mother, or at least to endow her with certain rights. No woman in the Bontoc pueblo fails to enter into the trial union of the Òlag, where the only instruction she receives is "the necessity for maternity." (43:67-68.) "A girl is almost invariably faithful to her temporary lover"; usually marriage follows pregnancy. If, however, the youth deserts the girl, his father must give her a rice sementera which enables her to support herself and gives her certain rights in the community. (43:67.) It has been pointed out that ancient Egypt was among the first

to express the dignity of motherhood; a woman's child was never illegitimate, not even the child of a slave. (Amélineau cited, 21:394.) The Wanyamwezi of Eastern Africa leave their property to their illegitimate children, even to the exclusion of the offspring of their wives, because those of unmarried mothers require more assistance. (Burton.) Among the Wanyoro, if a girl dies in childbirth, her seducer is also condemned to die. Among some of the Sea Dyaks (Sibuyans), it is held that an unmarried girl-mother is an offense to the gods, but instead of chastising the individual these punish the community with misfortune. Tribal authorities then collect a fine from the lovers to assist in making the necessary sacrifice. In this practice we see entire absence of sex-discrimination, and even recognition that the tribe is responsible for a young girl's delinquency, though she may aid in the removal of the penalty.

The pre-marital status of women in colonial New England may, in some respects be compared to that of certain primitive peoples. "*Bundling*," as a mode of courtship, occurring in the New England colonies (lasting till 1845 in some quarters, 40:182), and in New York and Pennsylvania, is analogous to the freedom accorded youth for intimate premarital acquaintance among peoples previously cited. (40:181-187.) On the other hand the attitude of New England Puritanism to women guilty of sexual immorality presents striking contrast to primitive conditions. Discrimination in treatment against the woman was present in severe form. (40:174-175.)

Many people, as the Zuñi and the Omaha, favor chastity, but are not harsh in treatment of the unmarried mother. With the Omaha, girls and youths were socially on a moral equality. A man was responsible for all his children, while blame was equally shared. "If a girl committed indiscretions and later led a moral life her acts were not held against her, or her husband or children, *though they were remembered*." She was permitted to win back by subsequent conduct her lost status. (25:324-325.) Thus the Zuñi dealt with the problem. The unmarried mother is kindly treated. Deep regret is expressed at her conduct, but all consideration is shown her and her child. None of the ceremonies at birth are omitted. (86:302.)

Quite otherwise was it among the ancient Hebrews and many others, ancient and modern. Sexual irregularity was forbidden to women, but not to men. (Leviticus, XIX:29; Deut.,

XXIII:18.) In Persia an unmarried girl who gave birth to a child would be killed. (96:II:428.) A priest's daughter among the Jews could profane him by her unchastity, and was doomed to be burned. (Leviticus, XXI:9.) Death is still the penalty with many African tribes. In the above instances, only the girl is held responsible (as with the Iroquois, for the different reason that woman's social position and therefore her control of the situation is deemed superior to the man's); and among these peoples the degree of pre-marital discrimination is closely correlated with discrimination of social status in general.

Schurtz maintains as a general law that, whenever the free union of adolescents is impeded, under conditions in which early marriage is also rendered difficult, prostitution must certainly arise. (74:190.) Havelock Ellis agrees to this and notes cases of the introduction of prostitution among primitive peoples, indirectly by missionaries, and others who disturb the customary relations of the sexes. As examples he cites the Bantu Bambola, and the natives of the South Sea island of Rotuma. (21:235.)

The tenor of the work of Jane Addams (*A New Conscience and An Ancient Evil*, New York, 1912), is clearly to establish the relation of economic pressure upon youth in causing late marriage, and prostitution. It is important to note, however, that the evil is ancient, but not primitive, in the sense of existing among the most uncultured. Even so scientific a writer as Jane Addams has not made this distinction. (See pp. 3-4, 218. See also p. 208, where Forel is quoted against the view of the primitive origin of prostitution.)

4. *Inversion.*

Closely allied to the question of pre-marital status is the problem of homosexuality. We have seen how this is met by Indians of British Columbia and the Omaha. Westermarck asserts "It probably occurs, at least sporadically among every race of mankind." (96:II:456.) We have little data as to relative frequency of distribution among the sexes with primitive peoples. Havelock Ellis sums up the chief data, noting that in certain tribes of Brazilian Indians women frequently adopt all the ways of men. (22:80 et seqq.) Dr. Holder, who has made special study of the *bote* among the American In-

dians, states that he has met no corresponding phenomenon in women. (*N. Y. Med. Journ.*, Dec. 7, 1889.) It is evident, however, among some of the American Indians of the Pacific Coast, the Omaha, and the Kamchadals of Northern Asia. All evidence goes to show, however, that the mode of treatment exhibits no sex-discrimination. This problem is of special importance in relation to modern delinquency and abnormality. Among primitive peoples, a useful and appropriate life-rôle is commonly furnished the inverted individual. It is quite possible that modern policy could profitably go to school to the primitive in this regard.

VIII. *Some Suggestions as to Modern Application*

When we seek to compare data of this study with that relating to modern conditions we find a dearth of analogous material. Modern literature on the adolescent girl falls into two classes, first, a great wealth of anthropometric and biological studies dealing with every aspect of growth, nutrition, sex-phenomena and disease; second, treatises, half psychological, half pedagogical, presenting generic phases of the problem, with much stress on the abnormal. While on the physical side, a large body of fact is fairly well established, and on the mental side a beginning has been made in experimental studies of adolescent imagery, volition, suggestion, *aussage*, and some of the higher mental processes, on the social side the meagreness of definite knowledge is very apparent. Havelock Ellis, commenting on the primitive treatment of the adolescent, regrets the loss of primitive puberty initiations, and would advocate their revision in modern form. (21:89-90.) However one may regard the wisdom of a course that would artificially reconstruct the spontaneous creations of other peoples and cultures, we must surely agree with Marro, that in modern life "we neglect the puberty of the mind" (52). A comprehensive study of the treatment and reaction of the adolescent girl in modern life is therefore much needed.

The aspects of adolescence which have recently received most attention are those which concern defectives and delinquents. Almost the entire energy of scientific study of delinquency of adolescent girls has been absorbed in the pathological problem. Dating from the work of the Lombrosan school the chief aim has been to detect correlation between anatomical and neuro-

logical abnormality and the commission of crime. Scant attention has been given to the girl in relation to her social environment. (An exception is the work of Jane Addams, *A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil*.) Recently Manouvrier, member of the International Congress of Criminal Anthropology, has set forth the case histories of seven delinquents, from the Paris courts. (52:297-315, 420-438.) He emphasizes his divergence from the standpoint of Lombroso, finding in the genetic view of the formation of criminals the prime influence of sociological, rather than physiological factors. (p. 423.)

He concludes:

“La moralité consiste en une certaine orientation, une certaine systématisation dans le sens de l'honnêteté. Elle n'est point héritée parce que les tendances héritées sont purement physiologiques et que les tendances physiologiques les plus normales poussent simplement à la satisfaction des besoins par les moyens quelconques à la portée de l'individu. Les tendances pousseront à des actes contraires aux lois sociales sans être biologiquement anormales, et un état social troublé, morbide, pourra résulter d'actes qui, pour être socialement nuisibles, n'en seront pas moins réguliers et normaux du côté biologique.” (52: 425.)

Detailed study, however, of a number of life histories of delinquents remains to be undertaken.*

The point of view of the “new school” of anthropology regarding race has suggestive applicability to the individual. Thus Boas attributes racial retardation, not to innate inferior capacity, but to historical experience and vicissitudes encountered in the social environment. (5:9-10.) So with social and moral retardation in the delinquent, may we not assume this inferiority explained better by reference to social experience than to inherited anatomical stigma? We must not interpret the influence of environment in mechanical fashion. As Boas points out for the race, the essential thing is the reaction. The environment is influential in so far as it tends to develop special forms of customs and beliefs. “These are, however, based primarily on cultural conditions.” (5:163.) Thus it would seem that researches of modern anthropology could furnish a

* NOTE: The practical methods of the Juvenile Court and Psychological Clinic tend in this direction, but intensive individual studies have not yet been forthcoming. Work of the Bedford laboratories promises much in this rich field.

new method to criminology as distinct from the Lombrosan method, as modern anthropology is from the older studies of "race psychology."

The essential thing in this anthropological method applied to study of delinquency, would be then, to collect complete life histories of the individual, in relation to social environment. This method was attempted by the writer in a fragmentary and preliminary study.

In co-operation with prison officials of Oregon, and the head of the Woman's Department of the Municipal police of the city of Portland, Oregon, a survey was begun in the three summer months of 1912. Twenty-five cases of delinquency among adolescent girls were personally investigated. In doubtful cases, the Binet-Simon tests for intelligence were used. As means of control, statistics were compiled of 300 court cases, extending over the years 1908-1911, of adolescent girl delinquents in charge of Mrs. L. G. Baldwin, head of the Woman's Police Department of Portland. In this the exceedingly careful records of the above department were of greatest service. In limited space of this thesis no adequate treatment can be made of the results, but the aim may be briefly illustrated. No correlation between physical defect and delinquency was apparent. Of cases personally investigated less than 2% were feeble-minded. It is important to note that in no case were these individuals under long sentence in a strictly penal institution; hence their reactions may be assumed to be more normal than would have been the case had their social tendencies been rendered artificial by prison repression.

The following cases have been selected for their relation to the treatment of the girl among primitive peoples.

Case I

Age: 30.

Present offense: Charge of vagrancy: Serving 60 days in the City Jail.
Criminal record: Arrested in Seattle, April, 1900, on vagrancy charge; petty larceny. Acquitted. Arrested 1909: Selling liquor to the Indians; for consorting with thieves; held as pickpocket: Two young girls reported to have killed themselves on account of her: Acquitted after serving minor jail sentence. Seattle, 1. 26, '09. Girl committed suicide, blame placed on H. A., Portland, 1. 8. '12. Arrested on white slave charge. Acquitted, but held as vagrant.

Case history: Obtained July, 1912: Verified by letters from girl's mother, evidence of jailors and police records.

Born: Indiana, 1882.

Nationality: Both parents born in America.

Parents: Mother married at age of 20: Age at birth of H. A. was 27; father's age 42. Both parents had common education. Occupation of father: laborer, later a small farmer. Both parents and grandparents free from disease or poverty. No criminal record for any other member of family. Age of first menses of mother: 13 years. Age of first menses of grandmother: 13 years. Labor of mother at birth of H. A. difficult. In physical appearance H. A. resembles father.

Childhood: Spent on farm. As baby acted in boyish manner. In early childhood excelled in games of skill and strength. Tractable, even disposition. Preferred out of door work, did plowing, general farm work. Had no sickness, nor children's diseases.

Brothers: 1.

Sisters: 1. Age of first menstruation, 13 years.

Education: Through grades of common school.

Age of first menstruation: 15 years. Mother noticed no change in her boyish disposition at this time. Health continued good. Shortly after puberty, H. A. married a man several years older. There was a child born, a boy now 13 years of age, in sound health. Boy lives with H. A.'s mother. Is now pubescent.

Soon after birth of this child, the father either died or deserted. H. A. was forced to contribute to child's support. She left home, endeavored to find work, but could earn only small sum as domestic servant, waitress, etc.

She then put on man's attire, and did a man's work in farms, lumber camps, freight depots, stables, dock yards, and cattle ranches, earning a man's full wage. When her sex was discovered, she was arrested, and forced to move on. In those cities where it is not a criminal offense to wear clothing of the opposite sex, she was watched by the police, continually arrested on petty charges, which in every case were dismissed. She served sentences as vagrant in these cases. In the Portland police court when sentenced to 60 days as vagrant, she said to the judge: "You call me vagrant; let me out for one hour in the yards or docks, and I'll get a job that will prove I am no vag." Though this privilege is accorded to men and boys so situated it was refused H. A. Hence her criminal record appears to be result of discrimination. She steadfastly refuses to wear woman's clothes, declaring that it is impossible for her to earn an honest and adequate living while dressed as a woman.

She possesses unusual musical ability, can play several musical instruments, and has a baritone voice of pleasing quality. She has been offered engagements with vaudeville companies. These she refuses because of her love of open air work. While she remains in the country, she is unmolested by the police, but when she comes to the cities, detectives soon find her out. Both matrons of jails where she

has served Portland sentences speak highly of her character. She is a favorite among the prisoners, but does not exhibit homo-sexual tendencies.

Charge that she ruins girls with whom she comes in contact, and is in fact a "white slaver," is not supported by evidence; several cases exist where H. A. has taken to her room at night girls unable to find work, girls evicted from their rooms by landlords, and girls found drunk in saloons, or soliciting on the streets in such an amateur manner as to assure her that they were new to prostitution. She has returned two girls to their homes from brothels. Of the truth of the charge that two girls committed suicide because of their infatuation with her, I have been able to discover nothing.

One girl committed suicide on the date given above; there is evidence that she was in an advanced stage of syphilis, was evicted from a sporting house in utter destitution, and was cared for by H. A.

At the time of latest arrest, H. A. was in company of a young woman who had left husband and two children in Seattle, and was living in a rooming house with H. A. It was impossible to discover their relations; the woman was seeking a divorce from her husband.

To sum up criminal record: Arrests since adolescence seem to have been due to attitude of society to her non-conformity to conventions, rather than to criminal tendencies. Associations with common criminals in city jails, prostitutes, petty thieves, drug users, alcoholics—have given her experience of lower class social conditions, and a certain insight into adolescent phases of delinquency, which may prove helpful to the investigator.

Personal traits: Tall (roughly 5 ft. 9 in.). Weight (in normal condition), 160 lbs. In jail about 130. Dark hair, fine quality, cut short, slightly thick. Dark eyes; regular features; clear olive skin. Looks younger than years, is usually thought to be about 23 or 24 years old. Wears masculine clothes with ease; muscles of hips and shoulders well developed. Breasts slightly under normal development, but rounded. No growth of hair on face—lip and chin normal in this respect. Hands and feet large, but well shaped. Nails of fingers delicate. General muscular development greater than average youth of 20.

Mental development: So far as hasty use of Binet test (revised) shows, is a normal adult. Attention good: Memory span normal: Comprehension normal or above. Has alert, forceful manner of speaking, gesturing, etc., but shows few secondary masculine characteristics. Has well developed aesthetic sense. Reads Browning as favorite poet; reads rather widely in fiction. Does not appear over developed emotionally; lacks the excitability of the usual homosexual type.

Remarks: The problem of the psychic sex-phenomena of H. A. is unsolved. Physically a preliminary examination fails to reveal marked abnormality. It is clear that she has been discriminated against socially, in her endeavor to escape economic pressure. She prefers society of women to men, but has friends of both sexes. It is clear that she has

sympathy and insight for the women of the underworld, and has done something for their welfare.

What significance should be attached to the fact that she arrived at the age of puberty two years later than the other members of her family, whose ages have been available, is undetermined. If life in the open favors the prolongation of infancy, we might discover some correlation here.

Compare treatment of this case with primitive treatment of the socially or physically inverted adolescent. (25:88; 58.)

Case II

Age: 20.

Present offense: Charge of murder in first degree: Convicted Sept., 1912, of manslaughter. No previous criminal record.

Details of crime: Girl, while living with a chauffeur in a cheap rooming house, lured to their room a young man, keeper of a cigar store and restaurant. The girl had planned to rob him of money which he freely had displayed. To this end she had purchased sleeping powders to put in his glass of beer. At midnight he came into her room at her invitation, but refused to drink. In the meantime X., the chauffeur, was concealed in the closet to watch the affair. The visitor became violent, and was in the act of throwing the girl to the floor, when X., seizing a bolt of iron, wrapped it in some clothes, rushed from the closet and struck the man a blow on the skull. He died instantly.

The girl then took the keys from his pocket and went into the street to rob the till. Only a handful of change was found. X. and the girl, after spending the night in the room, left the next morning and escaped from the city. Later they were apprehended in another city.

When arrested B. confessed the crime in all details, and assumed the entire blame. She attempted to shield X., and indeed rendered her own case hopeless from the outset.

While being held for trial in the county jail she gave the investigator the following data; later these data were proved correct by evidence in the trial, and by independent investigation.

Case history:

Nationality: Born in America: Parents both of German descent, one at least, born in Germany.

Family: B., youngest daughter in family of 8 children. All healthy. All girls matured before age of 14. Mother at age of 12. At birth of B. mother was 35; father was 42.(?) No criminal record for any other member of family. No other child either delinquent or dependent. Occupation of father: Unskilled laborer, later artisan. Family environment was good; no poverty. Associations of family were good; many members of German church and clubs.

Education: Parents: Common school. B: Common school: Three years of High School. School record extremely good.

Occupation: Cash girl in department store: Waiter: Sales-girl in department store: Chorus girl in Dance Hall.

Physical traits: Height: 5 ft. 3 in. (roughly). Weight: 120 lbs. Fair hair and skin. Eyes, light blue. Pretty, but with firm and resolute expression. Mouth, hard. Manner, direct and alert, without boldness.

General appearance as regards dress and bearing: simple, in good taste, unaffected, refined, immaculately neat: Nails, delicately manicured, and well formed. Hair, worn in simplest manner. No trace of use of rouge. Appear about 18 years of age.

General mental traits: Intelligence above average. Passed Binet test. Showed unusual comprehension of general topics, of abstractions, and of causes and consequences of her own condition. Showed traits of obstinacy and violent temper. Reserved, but believe this to be due to her abnormal situation and worry rather than usual characteristic.

Non-emotional, and free from any trace of hysteria, or nervous excitement; but fully aware of seriousness of her crime. Endeavored to commit suicide by jumping from the roof of the County Jail, when taken there for exercise; but this done from conviction of hers that sentence would be the death penalty, rather than from nervous or mental breakdown. B. apparently mentally and physically normal, or above average. Influence of menstrual period seems insignificant; at time of murder was in the 14th day of the monthly cycle. Has never been ill sexually.

In order to obtain her personal record it was necessary to explain that this investigation hoped to collect material useful in keeping such a young girl, as she herself had been five years before, from the track which she had taken. It was pointed out to her that she was in possession of facts about the world which no one else could possibly know, and that the only "square thing" to do for the other girl, was to disclose this information, before she passed out of the world. (In other cases, the personal appeal to individual advantage was sufficient to obtain all data, but B. responded only to this social stimulus.) In various interviews the following information was obtained.

B. had a healthy and normal childhood. Children's diseases: Scarlet fever, easy recovery; measles, not severe. Age of first menstruation, 12.

On the day she was 16, she was overpowered by her cousin, a boy two years older, a favorite, who lived in her father's house. This affair was due to no attachment of romantic nature on either side; nor was there any passion in the girl. Up to this time her sex-knowledge was confined to the most elementary facts of periodicity and birth. There was no conception.

B. disclosed the facts to no one, because of love borne her cousin by the family. She became moody, sullen, ill-tempered; as she expressed it, "I could think of nothing else, I dreamed of it, and was horribly afraid; it was impossible to go to school, or to meet new people." Her family in the meantime became hostile to her changed attitude; they began criticism and rebukes.

In this crisis B. met young people of a fast set. She craved excitement,

diversion, stimulants. She was induced to leave home, and having obtained work in a department store lived in a city room with girl friends.

She received \$4 a week; although the girls pooled their funds they were unable to pay their bills. There were offers of domestic service, but these were refused, "as none of the girls had come from a servant class." All of them went to the wall.

B. accepted offer of a man to accompany him to San Francisco. Later he fell in love with her and wished to marry her. She consented. Before marriage a young girl was discovered by B. to be pregnant as result of intimacy with the man she was about to marry.

"I let him go. I urged him to marry the other girl, for though I have no passion myself, I recognize it in others. He married her. I had little to lose—only my living—while she had a baby perhaps. Afterwards I regretted it, for I nearly starved in San Francisco. I could get nothing to do, even street work. Twice I worked in families; once they paid me no wages, and once they discharged me for being so poorly trained that I could not satisfy them. Then I went absolutely to the bad. I didn't go into a crib and I did not work the streets, but I worked in a dance hall on the Barbary Coast in San Francisco."

Minute evidence of the truth of these facts was obtained at the trial, and by letters, etc.

In this dance hall B. met with X., an ex-soldier and sporting man. He worked as chauffeur. B. fell in love with him; the only man who had reached her need. With him she came to Portland; at her request they delayed marriage until they could save enough to build a home. They came to Portland at the incident of the labor troubles of the winter of 1912. X. could find no work.

"I believe now that he could have found work; but I didn't think so then. He tried, but he didn't hunt for the right kind. He, too, had never had training in anything. I got work in a department store; a sales-girl at \$8.00 a week. Out of this sum I had to wear a fresh laundered shirt waist every morning. We had little to eat, and before we did for W., we had had nothing for several hours, and the landlord had given us notice to quit. He told us to get out and hustle. This W. was a cad who had hung around me for some time, trying to make a date, and showing off his money. I invited him up to the room. But he wouldn't drink; we had no idea he would be killed; when I screamed for help, X. rushed up and hit him."

"In reality the whole thing was my fault, because if I had opposed it it never would have happened; my will was always the stronger; X. always did what I said in the end."

These cases clearly illustrate the operation of social environment and the lack of adequate safeguard and outlet at the period of puberty. In both, the essential traits manifested are energy, activity, independence. This normal character of adolescence imperatively requires outlet and expression. (8: 181, 193.) It is sufficient to recall the treatment of adolescents

among primitive peoples to see how adequately under primitive conditions this provision is made.

IX. *Conclusions*

From the facts presented in this limited survey of an exceedingly widespread field, it becomes evident that no general theory of the origin and function of primitive modes of treatment of the adolescent girl can be maintained. An inclusive theory seems impossible because of extreme variation. Much of these data belong, as we have discovered, to such different aspects of thought and feeling that it cannot easily be compared. To group these facts together without context, would do violence to the conditions of primitive life. Recognition then, of the diversity of the problem, is the first needful conclusion.

As we have seen, this variation is of four kinds: (1) in ethnological distribution of attention to the onset of puberty in girls; here we encounter such extremes as exist between the Veddas and Australians within the same range of culture, or as among the native tribes of California, where peoples of identical cultural and somatic type, inhabiting the same region, show one group who do not observe puberty in any way, between two groups where the girls' puberty ceremonial is the supreme social event. Therefore we find no correlation between race and culture and attention to puberty. (2) Variation exists in the mode of treatment. This ranges from the merest objective mark to the most profound social and religious implication. (3) The time at which the "puberty" ceremonial is held varies greatly. Just as physical puberty varies in its time of onset, with climate, nutrition, race, heredity, occupation and social class, etc., so the social rite may occur at different periods, owing to wealth or poverty of the parents, convenience, social rank, weather, etc., or may be delayed until a sufficient number of girls have matured. Cases of physical precocity have their social analogues in ceremonies of rebirth that may take place at the age of three or four. (A-Kikuyu, Routledge, p. 151.) Retardation is also present, but more rarely. Puberty, however, may be merely an approximate sign that certain years of training must begin. We conclude that the term "puberty," as applied to a physical stage, can be extended only by convention, to the ceremonies that attend such

diverse events as social or religious maturity. (4) Great variation is displayed in the explanations of the function of "puberty"-ceremonies. Thoughts and interests of every social class are represented. Certainly we cannot ascribe this complexity of motives to any one principle, such as totemism, animism, sex-attraction, solidarity and the like.

In spite of this variation, when we seek to reduce the facts to their simplest general terms, three tendencies seem to immerge. These may be described as factors which emphasize periodicity, individuation, and "*symbiosis*."

A. *Periodicity.*

This is apparent in two ways, first in care taken to establish a cycle of alternate activity and rest. The cycle is marked in numerous ways, such as seclusion, change of food habits, freedom from work, release from social intercourse, and in various primitive hygienic devices. Here much is obscure and crude, and there are many exceptions; it cannot be doubted, however, that a tendency exists in primitive treatment of the adolescent girl to secure and stress normal periodicity. The second element in this tendency is psychological. Periodicity in adolescent mental development is indicated in many primitive rites. We need not assume this recognition as fully conscious and deliberate. It has been noted that the girl is treated now like a child, washed, fed, cradled, breathed upon, guarded, punished, now like an adult, admitted to responsibilities and privileges sometimes determining as with the Seri and Shasta, the destiny of others. This range of treatment may occur with the same people. Thus there is emphasized the alternating levels of adolescent mental growth, with all its disharmonies, periods of latency and intermediate stages. Modern studies have recognized this inequality of growth in both ethical and psychological aspects (53; compare also 35), but primitive peoples have apparently succeeded in giving the conception symbolic and concrete expression.

Closely related to the emphasis given normal physical and mental periodicity is primitive recognition of the abnormal. The psychoses of puberty receive much attention. Yet we must not fail to discriminate the meaning of the fact that no observance of puberty occurs as a unique rite, detached from all other ceremonial events in the life of the individual. Hence

when the abnormal aspects of puberty are evident, they appear as "rites de passage," in the sense of van Gennep. In this, primitive thought does not lag far behind the modern conception of the subordinate rôle of puberty as the *cause* of neurosis. For example, Janet notes that, "The neuroses appear almost always at the ages in which the organic and mental transformation is the most accentuated, at puberty, marriage, the death of intimate relatives or friends, the changes of career or of position."

B. *Individuation.*

The tendency of primitive observance of puberty to mark and set forth the individuality of the girl is very apparent. Isolation from the group, seclusion, living in separate dwelling, eating separate meals, etc., find at least one root of explanation in the arrival of the girl at independent personal status. More explicit is the freedom granted, sometimes in complete measure. Decorations, badges, mutilations serve also as individual devices to mark out the girl from common humanity and other groups and generations (29). So, too, disappearance from usual activities, setting forth into forest on mountains, leaving home, etc., are similar in function. This has been recognized for the boy by many writers, but overlooked in case of girls. The acquisition of a guardian spirit, the importance conceded to visions, moods and dreams, are other conspicuous examples of emphasis placed upon the personal life of this period. Ordeals, tests of personal skill and endurance, chance for demonstration of ability in diverse fields, all furnish to the girl among primitive peoples, outlet for the great access of energy and individuality so characteristic of adolescence (8).

C. *Symbiosis.**

By this term is meant that tendency which unites the individual with all elements of the environment as a whole.

This tendency is everywhere present in primitive treatment of the adolescent girl. In spite of extreme variation it is the one element to universally emerge. Assimilation of the girl

* Symbiosis is thus used by Dr. A. F. Chamberlain to illustrate processes of socialization in the group, and of affiliation of the human group with the animal and cosmic world. Clark University Lectures in Anthropology, 1912.

to the generic life of her people is brought about first by her entrance to the social life of her sex, next by her initiation into sexual life, in its physical, social and spiritual significance, and finally she is brought into relation with the forces of nature. Under one of these three forms of symbiosis the vast majority of primitive modes of treatment have their function.

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LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

The psychology of religious sects; a comparison of types. By HENRY C. MCCOMAS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., c. 1912. Pp. 235.

The titles of chapters—types, religions and religions, sects, their making, classes and nature, types of human nature, action, experimental and intellectual, the individual and his sect, leveling forces, possibilities and impossibilities of church union—give little idea of the content or value of this book. The author insists very much upon the physical basis of differences in temperaments and therefore in religion, but he warns us that we must not lose sight thereby of the spirit of religion itself. Religion cannot be analyzed in terms of nerve action. The author believes that the Holy Spirit is an actual working reality in the world of man. Again, this book is not a close-woven argument that breaks if any one link in the chain is destroyed. Nor is it a text-book. God never made a sect, but every group of worshipers has been drawn together by influences that may be naturally explained. The author lays great stress on the action, emotional and intellectual types. In the first Catholics and colored lead, while the Unitarians are most intellectual. The work is certainly suggestive and interesting and it is to be hoped will open a field of work to which we shall have further contributions.

Youth and Sex. Dangers and Safeguards for Girls and Boys. By MARY SCHARLIEB, M. D., M. S., and F. ARTHUR SIBLY, M. A. LL.D. London: T. C. & E. C. Jack; New York: Dodge Publishing Co., 1913. Pp. vi, 92.

This is one of the series of "The People's Books," selling at 6d. net, and covering all sorts of topics, from "The Science of Light" to "The Oxford Movement," and from "The Care of the Teeth" to "The Teaching of Plato." The first part (pp. 7-43) of the present volume, which is No. 20, treats briefly of changes observable during puberty and adolescence in girls; our duties toward adolescent girls; care of the adolescent girl in sickness; mental and moral training; the final aim of education. The section on boys (pp. 44-92) considers prevalence of impurity among boys (the author's own experience, the opinions of Canon Lyttleton, Dr. Dukes and others); causes of the prevalence of impurity among boys; results of youthful impurity; sex-knowledge is compatible with perfect refinement and innocence; conditions under which purity teaching is best given, remedial and curative measures. As compared with some American books on the subject, "Youth and Sex" may be classed as conservative, particularly as concerns Dr. Sibly's views on the significance of night-emissions (p. 47), etc. He published last year a pamphlet, entitled *Private Knowledge for Boys*, "embodying just what, in my opinion, should be said to an intelligent child," and this "has, in my own hands, proved effective for many years past." For younger children, oral teaching must suffice. And,

for girls, wise telling, and reverent statement, of the truth about motherhood, etc., are better than "silly and untrue stories as to the origin of the kitten and the fledgeling." Religion here has a master-task to perform for the young.

A. F. C.

Comparative Religion, its Origin and Outlook.. A Lecture. By LOUIS HENRY JORDAN, B. D. Oxford: University Press, 1913. Pp. 16.

Mr. Jordan has already published two other pamphlets, treating respectively, of *Comparative Religion, its Method and Scope* and *Modernism in Italy, its Origin and Aims*, and the one under review discusses briefly the literature of the new science of "Comparative religion" in England in particular, with chief attention to the works of Carpenter and Jevons. The author is of opinion (p. 13) that "the dividing line between Anthropology and Comparative Religion must be drawn much more firmly and sharply than has been the custom hitherto." He also thinks that "these latest expositions of Comparative Religion have not proved as helpful as was generally anticipated." According to Mr. Jordan both the books of Dr. Carpenter and Professor Jevons "end before one arrives at a genuine exposition of their theme."

A. F. C.

The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature. Ancient Babylonia. By C. H. W. JOHNS, Litt. D. Cambridge: University Press; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. Pp. vii, 148.

This handy volume, with brief bibliography and an excellent index, sums up the history of ancient Babylonia, new interest in which was aroused a few years ago by the discovery of the now famous "Laws of Hammurabi," a king who flourished about 2100 B. C. The modernity of certain aspects and problems of city life in ancient Babylonia is very striking. The author considers that the pre-Semitic "Sumerians" spoke "an agglutinative language," and that the Kassites may have been a branch of the Hittites. Interesting are the local city gods of this region. The rôle played by irrigation was of the highest importance, and furnishes bases of comparison with certain other parts of the globe.

A. F. C.

Die Volkskundliche Literatur des Jahres 1911. Ein Wegweiser im Auftrage des Hessischen Vereinigung für Volkskunde und mit Unterstützung der dem Verband Deutscher Vereine für Volkskunde angehörenden Vereine herausgegeben von A. ABT. Leipzig u. Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1913. Pp. vi, 134.

This résumé the folk-lore bibliographical activities of the Hessian Folk-Lore Society, formerly represented by its valuable *Zeitschriftenschau*, the publication of which ceased some six years ago. The new form, which is to be heartily welcomed, appears under the editorship of A. Abt, and among the collaborators are Dr. Bächtold of Basel, Dr. Hellwig of Berlin, Dr. Helm of Giessen, Prof. von Sydow of Lund, Dr. Voss of Königsberg i. Pr., etc. There is a list of periodicals indexed (pp. 116-119); also indexes of authors, and of places and peoples. There are 2,259 entries, representing 224 journals, etc. The only American periodicals cited are the following: *American Journal of Philology*, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*,

Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology,—a few others being indirectly referred to through reviews, as two articles by Boas and Bingham, noticed in *Ymer*. This side of the Bibliography will, doubtless, be improved in future issues. As it is, in the list of places, "Nordamerika" has just one entry, and "Südamerika" but two. Of the 2,259 items, Nos. 1-81 relate to the bibliography, the history and the method of folk-lore; Nos. 82-238 to matters of a general nature, such as folk-lore in general, anthropology and ethnography, geography, archeology, history, culture-history, history of religion, philology; Nos. 239-410 to dwellings, furniture, etc.; Nos. 411-420 to food; Nos. 421-457 to clothing, ornament, etc.; Nos. 458-1027 to customs and usages, including periods of human life, festivals of years and days, social life, industry and economy; Nos. 1058-1358 to folk-beliefs of various sorts; Nos. 1359-1860 to folk-literature; Nos. 1860a-2259 to dialects, etc.

A. F. C.

Jesu Persönlichkeit. Eine Charakterstudie von Dr. KARL WEIDEL. Zweite stark vermehrte Auflage. Halle, a S.: Carl Marhold, 1913. Pp. 128.

This little book, which has reached a second edition, is intended to serve educated laymen, who desire to understand the personality of Jesus without getting lost in the maze of theological discussions. The author has, therefore, refrained from needless polemics against other opinions. He uses the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus himself to show that "we have in them no mere collection of the moral and religious verbal wisdom of the end of antiquity, from Jewish and Grecian sources, but something from which speaks a unitary spirit, a sharply defined personality." The contrasts of character in Jesus are all the more remarkable, considering the brevity of his life; an ordinary man would have been quite shipwrecked by them. Jesus does not belong with spirits like Schopenhauer, who believe they see the right way, but are too weak of will to follow it. Jesus possessed in eminent degree what Buddha so notoriously lacked, viz., power of will. In virtue of this he became the great, creative personality that has moved the whole world. The author has set forth his views in clear and pleasing fashion.

A. F. C.

Collection de Contes et de Chansons Populaires. Contes du Sénégal et du Niger recueillis par FR. DE ZELTNER. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1913. Pp. iv, 252. Price, 5 fr.

This little book contains the French texts of 44 brief tales and a few proverbs (pp. 209-211), collected by the author in the Colony of the Upper Senegal-Niger and in the military territory of French West Africa, while on a government mission in 1904-1912,—of an archeological-anthropological nature. They were obtained in part from natives of various races and occupations, and in part from the *griots*, or professional story-tellers, from whom, on better acquaintance and further pressure, he obtained a complete version in lieu of the *editio expurgata* given him at first. In the case of the story of Sundiata, it took two months to obtain the real legend,—this (pp. 1-36) with its continuation (pp. 37-45) is the longest story in the book. Besides historical tales, there are animal-stories (in which figure

the crocodile, hare, hyena, lion, hippopotamus, elephant, serpent, partridge, cow, horse, goat, etc.), legends of giants, *djinns*, etc., a few tales of the first men, and some stories of ordinary human beings. The Wassulanké and Peulh legend of the first men (pp. 165-166) tells of the origin of fire,—the primitive blacksmith appears also in some other tales. The languages spoken by the informants of the author were the Kassonké and Sarakolé, but the native texts, unfortunately, were not obtained. They would have been particularly useful here, where the stories often show Arab and Berber influence,—indeed some have been borrowed altogether or in part from such sources. Nevertheless this very carefully recorded collection of West African folk-lore will be of great value for comparative purposes. It will also furnish some pleasant reading. A. F. C.

Répertoire de l'Art Quaternaire. Par SALOMON REINACH, Conservateur des Musées Nationaux, Membre de l'Institut. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1913. Pp. xxxviii, 205. Price, 5 fr.

It was a happy idea that led the distinguished French archeologist and student of the history of religions to compose this book, dedicated to Émile Cartailhac, to whom prehistoric anthropology owes so much. After a historical introduction (pp. vii-xxxviii) treating of the art-finds of quaternary age in various parts of western Europe, follows an alphabetical list of places where such objects have been discovered (pp. 1-189), with bibliographical references and reproductions of the more important specimens. There is an index of subjects, places, and abbreviations (pp. 191-205), two columns to the page. One cannot welcome too heartily this handy and useful little volume, which enables one to tell at a glance the artistic situation in any of the caverns, etc., explored or investigated up to the date of publication. One finds recorded: Alphabetiform signs, anthropoids and human figures, antelopes, bisons, bovidae, canidae, capridae, cervidae, chamois, hunters, swans, elks, elephants, equidae, arrows, hands, birds, phalli, seals, branches of trees, foxes, reindeer, rhinoceroses, serpents, suidae, etc. Among the most interesting specimens of quaternary art, from the point of view of the study of the history of religion are the groups of dancers, etc., from Alpera (Spain), Cogul (Spain), etc. Some of the figures of women have been thought to have religious or mythological significance; so, perhaps, also some of the signs, etc. A. F. C.

Worship in the Sunday School. A Study in the Theory and Practice of Worship. By HUGH HARTSHORNE, B. D., Ph. D., Instructor in Religious Education in Union Theological Seminary, and Principal of the Union School of Religion. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1913. Pp. ix, 210. Price, \$1.50.

This is an attempt "to define the purpose of Sunday-school worship in terms of social relationships and attitudes," and to show that "with a well-defined purpose, and with due attention to the nature of feeling, the service of worship in the Sunday school can really be made both an efficient educational instrument and a means of training in the experience of worship itself, which is so necessary to the vitality of the religious life." The eight chapters, beside the Introduction, treat of the following topics:

The social function of worship, The neglect of worship in the Sunday school, The purpose of worship in the Sunday school, The nature of feeling and the place of feeling in education, The place of feeling in worship, An experiment in Sunday-school worship, Evidences of the results of worship, Guiding principles for the planning and conduct of Sunday-school worship. The "experiment in Sunday-school worship," of which an account is given in Chapter VII (pages 133-159), was made in the Union School of Religion, with the year divided into five periods, each devoted to one of attitudes described in Chapter IV, viz., gratitude, goodwill or love, reverence, faith, loyalty. The services embraced: Processional hymn, the Lord's Prayer, Doxology or Psalm, Sentence sung by the choir, the common prayer, hymn, story or talk or organ selection, Prayer by the leader, Recessional hymn. In Chapter VIII is given evidence of what these services accomplished for the pupils. While public worship and mysticism are "similar in the psychological processes involved," they differ in certain ways: "Public worship is social; mysticism tends to be individualistic;" again, "public worship attempts to bring the individual to the freedom of rational self-control and divine coöperation; mysticism seeks freedom through submission to external control and divine authority" (p. 203). This book is a useful contribution to the literature of constructive religious pedagogy. There is a bibliography (theory and practice of education, religious education and the Sunday school, psychology and philosophy of religion, feeling and emotion), occupying pages 204-210, but no index. A. F. C.

Sādhana. The Realisation of Life. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE, Author of "Gitanjali." New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. xi, 164. Price, \$1.25.

The author of this book has become world-known since he received the Nobel prize for literature, when the authorities having its award in custody happily went outside the genius of Europe and America, recognizing, for the first time, human greatness in other parts of the globe. Tagore, however, is Aryan,—sometime the bounds of race, as well as of Indo-European culture will be passed, and the great yellow peoples recognized as rightful participants, through their men and women of genius, in the arts of peace and of learning, upon which the future of mankind is to rest. This book treats of the following topics: The relation of the individual to the universe, Soul consciousness, The problem of evil, The problem of self, Realization in love, Realization in action, The Realization of beauty, The realization of the infinite. The intention of the writer is not to treat the subject-matter philosophically or merely from the scholar's point of view, but to give western readers "an opportunity of coming into touch with the ancient spirit of India as revealed in our sacred texts and manifested in the life of to-day." And such purpose it well serves. As the author says, "all the great utterances of man have to be judged not by the letter but by the spirit,—the spirit which unfolds itself with the growth of life in history," and for him, "the verses of the Upanishads and the teachings of Buddha have ever been things of the spirit, and therefore endowed with boundless vital growth." A fundamental difference between ancient classical culture and that in India is pointed out: "The civilization of

ancient Greece was nurtured within city walls" (p. 3), while "in India it was in the forests that our civilization had its birth, and it took a distinct character from this origin and environment," for "it was surrounded by the vast life of nature, was fed and clothed by her, and had the closest and most constant intercourse with her varying aspects." The warring of man and his subjection of the hostile world from which everything has to be wrested is a cardinal mark of the pride of Western thought, a sentiment born of "the city-wall habit and training of mind." In India "all emphasis was put on the harmony that exists between the individual and the universal." Indeed, "the fundamental unity of creation was not simply a philosophical speculation for India; it was her life-object to realize this great harmony in feeling and in action." Tagore thinks (p. 11) that "the first invasion of India [by the Aryans] has its exact parallel in the invasion of America by the European settlers,"—they also "were confronted with primeval forests and a fierce struggle with aboriginal races." While not suggesting that things should, or even could, have been otherwise, for "civilization is a kind of mould that each nation is busy making for itself to shape its men and women according to its best ideal," he ventures this most interesting comparison:

"But this struggle between man and man, and man and nature, lasted till the very end; they never came to any terms. In India, the forests which were the habitation of barbarians became the sanctuary of sages, but in America these great living cathedrals of nature had no deeper significance to man. They brought wealth and power to him, and perhaps at times they ministered to his enjoyment of beauty, and inspired a solitary poet. They never acquired a sacred association in the hearts of men as the site of some great spiritual reconciliation where man's soul had its meeting-place with the soul of the world." It behooves every European Aryan to read this book, and hope for the day, hinted in the award of the Nobel prize to Tagore, when Occident and Orient shall come together again and out of the generically human create the master-thought for all the race.

A. F. C.

Systematische Theologie nach religionspsychologischer Methode. Erster Band. Die Religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie. Von. GEORG WOBBERMIN, Dr. phil. et theol., Professor an der Universität Breslau. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1913. Pp. xii, 475.

In this book, dedicated to the Theological Faculty of the University of Berlin, Prof. Wobbermin, who in 1907 published a translation into German of the late William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, discusses, with polemics necessarily bound up with the subject, the religio-psychological method in the science of religion and in theology, the monograph being the first volume of his *Systematic Theology according to the Religio-psychological Method*. The first half of the volume (pp. 1-242) treats of the postulates of the religio-psychological method (the position of theology in the general system of the sciences, problem and division of theology in general and of systematic theology in particular, the demand for methodic unity for the whole field of systematical theology). The second part deals

with the psychological method (the religio-psychological method as continuation of the Schleiermacher-James problem, the religio-psychological method as unitary method for systematic theology). For theology as the science of religion, Prof. Wobbermin claims "a justified, necessary and indispensable place in the general system of the sciences" (p. 32), where it ranks as "an independent culture-science." There is a good deal of polemics in this book, indeed, the author remarks (p. ix) that, "in scientific work, polemics is not only unavoidable, but it is a duty." Dilthey, Harnack, W. Herrmann, J. Kaftan, E. Troeltsch, H. Rickert, etc., come in for a good deal of criticism. In the course of his sketch of the history of the psychology of religion, the author touches upon "the Clark-University School of Psychology" (pp. 250, 400), noting the recent turn toward ethnological research apparent everywhere in the field of religious psychology to-day. In certain American studies Prof. Wobbermin notes a danger of "relapse into a psychological materialism" this being even more marked in Ames' *The Psychology of Religious Experience* than in Starbuck's earlier work, *The Psychology of Religion*. For the author, "the great German theologian, Schleiermacher, and the great American psychologist, James, agree in setting the same problem for the psychology of religion." In his book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, James "gave the study of this problem new life." This interesting book has a good index.

A. F. C.

The Making of Character. Some Educational Aspects of Ethics. By JOHN MACCUNN, M. A., LL.D., Balliol College, Oxford, Professor of Philosophy in University College, Liverpool. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1913. Pp. vii, 226. Price, \$1.25.

This is a new printing of a book published originally in 1900, and reprinted three times since then. The topics treated are: Congenital endowment, its nature and treatment (heredity, vital energy, temperament, capacities, instincts, desires, development and repression, habit and its limitations), educative influences (bodily health, Mr. Spencer's doctrine of natural reactions, Wordsworthian education of nature, family, school, friendship, livelihood, citizenship, the religious organization, social influences and unity of character, educational value of moral ideals, example, precept, casuistry), sound judgment (sound moral judgment, the education of the moral judgment, growth of the individual's ideal, practical value of a theory of the moral ideal), self-development and self-control. Prof. MacCunn's work, as reprinted, deserves the welcome it received, when it first appeared.

A. F. C.

French Prophets of Yesterday. A Study of Religious Thought under the Second Empire. By ALBERT LÉON GUÉRARD, Agrégé de l'Université, Assistant Professor of French in The Leland Stanford Junior University, California. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1913. Pp. 288.

This is the sort of book one likes to have come from America. Scholarly, interesting, and rather satisfying, as an attempt to throw some light upon the question, "Is France, the land of the Crusaders, the eldest daughter of the Church, irrevocably lost to Christianity." After an Introduction

(pp. 9-23), at the close of which the author offers his work as "a tribute of his love for France, the land of his birth, for England, where he grew to conscious manhood, and for America, the home of his choice," he discusses in succession: Catholicism (character and evolution of Catholicism from 1840 to 1870; estheticism in religion; the Satanic school; the gospel of authority: Barbey d'Aubreville and Veuillot; the liberal Catholics; philosophers: Mgr. Maret and Father Gratry; Ernest Hello, etc.); Protestantism (the struggle between orthodoxy and liberalism; Guizot; Scherer; Quinet); Voltairianism (decline and revival of Voltairianism; Spiritual nihilism: Mérimée); Romantic Humanitarianism (formation of romantic humanitarianism, before 1848; Michelet; Victor Hugo); The New Spirit, Background and Influences (characteristics; Saint-Simon, Comte, Littré; P.-J. Proudhon); The Poets of Science and Despair (Alfred de Vigny; Leconte de Lisle); Critics and Historians (Sainte-Beuve; Taine), Ernest Renan (influences, 1823-1848; Renan's life and works from 1848-1870; Renan's religious philosophy, 1848-1870). The Conclusion (pp. 256-281) is concerned with: A retrospect and a forecast, a return to Christianity: Protestantism and Catholicism, new churches and new religions, supernaturalism and naturalism. In summing up his sketch of Catholicism, Prof. Guérard observes (p. 69): "Rome would admit no alternative but theocracy and free thought: France did not choose theocracy." As to French Protestantism, "it is a survival," of which it may well be said "Requiescat in pace" (p. 100). Of Voltairianism we are told (p. 117): "Unchecked Voltairianism, starting innocently enough with the praise of common sense, leads nowhither but to the universal and incurable cynicism of Mérimée." Of Michelet, the author says (p. 141): "If ever France dares once more to believe in her own destiny, Michelet's books, which now irritate or sadden her like a sarcasm or a dirge, will be again a source of inspiration." The greatest French Romanticist, Victor Hugo, "was a Manichean" (p. 150). In the religious field, he "was great in three different ways,"—as the poet of conscience, as the poet of love (or rather, of pity), and as a passionate seeker after God, "in a nation which had not yet fully disowned King Voltaire, in an age when philosophy and religion had alike become materialistic, against the full tide of Positivism and Ultramontanism," and "with all his contradictions and his exaggerations, he succeeded in communicating to his readers something of his own intense yearning, something of his shuddering ecstasy before the inevitable" (p. 158). Saint-Simon was "a mystic Bohemian" (p. 167) and his doctrines "with a few men, a sincere and genuine, although insufficient, form of religion." From Comte, Taine, "a Positivist in everything but in name," learned less than from the Englishman John Stuart Mill (p. 171). Littré "was neither a great philosopher, nor a great writer" (p. 171). Proudhon was, in religion, "the most outspoken representative of antitheism, and many persons know nothing more about him than the two oft-quoted apothegms: 'Property is theft,' and 'God is Evil'" (p. 173). He really took pride in being a *theophobist*, "God's personal enemy." He was, nevertheless, "an original thinker, a blazer of trails; but this quality is too often paid for by

iconoclasm and love of paradox." He was neither a nihilist nor a pessimist, but "an independent Positivist, a self-taught Hegelian and Comtist" (p. 175), and "with the Romanticists and Utopian Socialists, he believed in progress and in humanity." Proudhon's *Justice* is, in reality, our *God* (p. 177). In Alfred de Vigny's spiritual make-up were "three elements,—pessimism, stoicism, intellectualism" (p. 190) and of his pessimism we are told that it was "inborn,—darkest, perhaps, when his life was happiest." Leconte de Lisle was "a greater artist than de Vigny" (p. 191), and "although he aspired to scientific impossibility, he was bound to fail in the attempt, as he was a genuine and a great poet" (p. 193). He was "a misanthropist, as well as an antitheist and a contemner of Nature," an illogical position, as the author notes (p. 198). Sainte-Beuve progressed "from Epicurean stoicism to scientific stoicism" (p. 212), something that "atoned for many weaknesses in his character," and "explained, almost justified, the words of reverent admiration," written by Amiel in his *Journal*, when the great critic died. Taine, Prof. Guérard thinks (p. 212), "is the best representative of French thought under the Second Empire." But, in William James' terminology, he was a "sick soul" (p. 221), suffering from *le mal du siècle*, a disease that "began with Rousseau's *Saint-Preux* and Goethe's *Werner*, and was not cured at the time of the Second Empire, only it was stoically concealed: 'Suffer and die without a word.' " Of Taine it may be said (p. 223): "Heterogeneous elements,—French rationalism, German metaphysics, English conservatism and prudence, romantic pessimism, were in him, not harmonized, but forcibly brought together." Concerning Renan, Prof. Guérard says, in concluding his account of that remarkable man (p. 255): "Democratic France, whom he criticized unsparingly, and, we believe, unjustly, understands him better than the cultured few he tried so hard to please. She instinctively reveres him as one of her spiritual masters." It is a curious fact that "the two most famous adepts of Renanism," viz., Jules Lemaitre and Anatole France, "took opposite sides in the Dreyfus case, but with equal energy." Also (p. 256): "The study of Renan brings our survey to a fitting close. A Catholic by birth, education and temperament, a Protestant in his conservative and reverent freedom of thought, a Rationalist after Descartes and Malebranche, a Positivist with Littré, Taine and Berthelot, a sceptic like Montaigne, a metaphysician of the Hegelian school, a Voltairian in his irony, a disciple of Chateaubriand in his esthetic emotionalism,—he was the living synthesis of his nation and of his time."

As to the future. French Protestantism "missed its opportunity in the sixteenth century" (p. 261), and now "it represents neither the past nor the future," and is unable to compete with either Catholicism or secular philosophy. According to Prof. Guérard "a Catholic reformation, a national conversion" are equally impossible. Since the last forty years "a quiet revolution has taken place." It is now clear that the Church is not all: "Catholicism has a future in France, as everywhere else in the world; but it will never be again the leading factor in the religious evolution of the country. The oldest daughter of the Church is now

emancipated" (p. 267). France may yet be saved by the new humanness of the age, by those things that "strike deeper than Clericalism, deeper than Catholicism, to the very roots of Christianity and of religion itself." France "is drifting—or growing—away from Rome," but she may yet find religion and hold it fast. It should be repeated,—this is a remarkably interesting book.

A. F. C.

Essays on Questions connected with the Old English Poem of Beowulf. By KNUT STJERNA, Ph. D., Sometime Reader in Archaeology to the University of Upsala. Translated and Edited by JOHN R. CLARK HALL, M. A., Ph. D., Author of "Beowulf and the Finnsburg Fragment, a Translation into Modern English Prose." Coventry (Published for the Viking Club), 1912. Pp. xxxv, 284. Ill.

In the essays here translated, the late Dr. Knut Martin Stjerna (d. 1909) "collected all the material bearing on the poem of *Beowulf* which archeological research has yielded in the three Scandinavian countries up to the present time." Hence the book is very useful for English students and readers of the famous poem. The subjects treated are as follows: Helmets and swords in *Beowulf*, archeological notes on Beowulf, Vendel and the Vendel cross, Swedes and Geats during the migration period, Scyld's funeral obsequies, the dragon's hoard in *Beowulf*, the double burial in *Beowulf*, Beowulf's funeral obsequies. There is an Index of things (pp. 241-264), besides a general Index (pp. 273-284, 2 cols. to page); also lists of authorities (pp. 267-268), of passages in *Beowulf* referred to or cited (pp. 269-271), and a Bibliography of Dr. Stjernas' publications (23 titles), pages 265-266. This work, which forms Vol. III of the Viking Club's "Extra Series," has 128 illustrations and 2 maps. Of the poem of *Beowulf* in general Dr. Stjerna observes (p. 236): "In that poem, heathen conceptions and practices are either suppressed altogether, or supplanted by Christian matter, which sometimes presents a striking contrast to them."

A. F. C.

Buile Suibhne (The Frenzy of Suibhne), being the Adventures of Suibhne Geilt. A Middle Irish Romance. Edited, with Translation, Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, by J. G. O'KEEFE. London (Published for the Irish Texts Society): David Nutt, 1913. Pp. xxxviii, 198.

The *Buile Suibhne*, here edited and translated for the first time, is concerned with the adventures of Suibhne, surnamed Geilt, King of Dal Araidhe (North Antrim), after his flight from the battle of Magh Rath, "a stark madman." Most of his time is spent wandering about, sometimes in company with other madmen; part, however, at Glen Bolcain, a place sacred to the madmen of Ireland,—to Glen Bolcain, the tale informs us, the madmen of Ireland went, "when their year of madness was complete." The tale has considerable psychological interest. The battle of Magh Rath occurred in 637 A. D., but the date of the *Buile Suibhne* is much later, probably taking form, in so far as the association of the madness, etc., of Suibhne, perhaps, by the ninth century or before then. The *Buile Suibhne* forms, with two other tales, the *Banquet of Dun na nGedh*, and the *Battle of Magh Rath*, a story-cycle, whose origin dates

from about the same period. Interesting is the "levitation" figuring rather prominently in the development of the tale,—it takes the form of "Suibhne imagining himself as flying about from place to place, imagining, too, that feathers have grown on." In connection with this, the editor notes (p. xxxv) that, "until quite recent times it was the general belief in Ireland that madmen were as light as feathers, and could climb steeps and precipices." Mr. O'Keefe is also of opinion that "the account of Suibhne madness seems to bear some resemblance to the widely dispersed story of the Wild Man of the Woods, of which the Merlin legend is perhaps the most conspicuous offshoot." On the whole, the Suibhne story "seems to be made up of a small folk-element, probably deriving from the same source as the Merlin legends, and a historical element, with the battle of Magh Rath for a back-ground." In the *Speculum regale*, an old Norse book, written about 1250 A. D., is an interesting reference to the *geilt* or madmen of Ireland, which suggests a knowledge of the tale of Suibhne. The tale of Suibhne is written in alternate prose and verse, but there is much more of the latter than of the former.

A. F. C.

Les Hain-Teny merinas. Poésies populaires malgaches, recueillies et traduites par JEAN PAULHAN. Paris: P. Geuthner, 1913. Pp. 461.

The *hain-teny*, "science of words," known also as *ohatra*, "examples," and *ohabalana*, "example-words," are folk-poetry of the Merinas, as the Malagasy peoples (Hova, Andevo, Andriana, etc.) of Madagascar call themselves. Other names for them are *ankamanatatia*, "riddles," *fampanononana*, "enigmatic questions demanding an answer." According to the author, *hain-teny* is the best and least confusing term. Few, if any, *hain-teny* have been published, except, of course, in Malagasy text. The author spent two years, more or less, among the Merinas, making many visits with families, etc., and collected, during that time, "about 800 *hain-teny*, of which 160 are given in this volume,"—Malagasy original with French translation, explanatory notes, etc. On pages 73-401 are given 153 *hain-teny*, classified according to the themes of which they treat: Declaration of love, consent, refusal, hesitation and rivals, separation and abandonment, regrets and reproaches, pride, *raillerie*. The *hain-teny* may be regarded as anonymous, but in an Appendix (pp. 405-431) the author gives the texts of 12 variants of No. xvi of the abandonment theme, obtained from 11 individuals of various places and ages. A second Appendix (pp. 435-449) contains the texts of three *hain-teny* comprising respectively 88, 109, and 112 lines,—such lengthy ones are very rare. The *hain-teny* are a sort of "poetic competition," in which often a man begins and a woman replies, or vice-versa. Ordinarily the *hain-teny* are playful, rather than really contentious or quarrelsome, the recitation only artificially presenting the outward appearance of dispute. In the words of the author (p. 11): "At Ambatomena, a village of 20 or 30 houses, near Tsinjoarivo, a Merina, 50 years old, named Rakotobe, playfully discusses every evening with his sisters (Razay and Rasoa) in *hain-teny*, and children of the village come to listen. Before beginning Rakotobe tells briefly those present the motives of the dispute he has just imagined: one of his slaves has run

away, and his sister Razay has consented to speak for the guilty man. Another evening, it is a rival, who has met Rakotobe in some amorous enterprise, or a sorcerer, who has sought to bewitch the rice. We have here only the imagination of a quarrel."

Little attention has hitherto been paid by Europeans, who have written about the Malagasy, to the recitation of *hain-teny*. Moreover, the Christian Merinas have come to consider as "inspirations of the Devil," all *hain-teny* based on other than moral principles. As the somewhat rapid evolution of the Malagasy tongue during the last 50 years has gone on quite outside the folk-poetry and against it, the result has been that "to the educated euna, who has studied in the European schools, even if he is not a Christian, the language of the *hain-teny* is obscure and seems like a dead language." The *hain-teny* to-day are recited only in Emyrna regions, where the European influences have not yet penetrated. In the villages where the Hova and Andriana population is Christian, only the Andevo remember them. On pages 15-41 is given a specimen (series of 7) *hain-teny* discussion, recorded at Tananarivo,—the matter treated is an imagined love-quarrel. Following is the beginning of the series of *hain-teny* on the theme of the declaration of love:

"You are the fruit desired,
The precious banana.
Even if the butterfly touches you,
They will not leave you.
He who dies for the one he loves
Is a little crocodile swallowed by its mother:
He is eaten by the belly that sheltered him."

By the butterfly is meant a certain black butterfly, the appearance of which is an omen of death. In the series concerned with *raillerie*, the following brief item occurs:

"Love that does not measure up to the heart,
Water that does not fill the jug,
—Half is lost on the road."

Mr. Paulhan has furnished a very interesting collection of folk-poetry, from a part of the world, where the Malayo-Polynesian race still exists in large numbers. There is room for a good psychological study of the effects of European intrusion upon the folk-mind of this extra-African people.

A. F. C.

Body and Mind. A History and a Defense of Animism. By WILLIAM McDOUGALL, M. B., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford. With thirteen Diagrams. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911. Pp. xix, 384. Price, \$2.75 net.

The topics treated in the twenty-five chapters of this book, outside of the Conclusion, are as follows: Animism in the ancient world; animism in the Middle Ages; animism at the time of the renaissance of learning; animism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries; modern developments of

physical science adverse to animism; the use of the mechanistic physiology and of the "psychology without a soul"; the influence of the Darwinian theory; current philosophical arguments against animism; the automaton theories; examination of the automaton-theories and of the special arguments in their favor; Is there any way of escape from the dilemma,—animism or parallelism? argumenta ad hominem; examination of the arguments against animism from epistemology, "inconceivability," and the law of conservation of energy; examination of the arguments against animism drawn from physiology and general biology; the inadequacy of mechanical conceptions in physiology; inadequacy of mechanical principles to explain organic evolution; inadequacy of mechanical conceptions to explain animal and human behavior; the argument to psychophysical interaction from the "distribution of consciousness"; the unity of consciousness; the psycho-physics of "meaning," pleasure, pain, and conation; memory; the bearing of the results of "psychical research" on the psycho-physical problem. The "animism," defended by Professor McDougall, is not the "primitive animism," or "primitive anthropomorphism" of savage and barbarous peoples, although "the Animism of civilized men, which has been and is the foundation of every religious system, except the more rigid Pantheisms, is historically continuous with the primitive doctrine." The author holds by the view (p. viii): "The essential notion, which forms the common foundation of all varieties of Animism, is that all, or some, of those manifestations of life and mind which distinguish the living man from the corpse and from inorganic bodies are due to the operation within him of something, which is of a nature different from that of the body, an animating principle generally, but not necessarily or always, conceived as an immaterial and individual being or soul." Prof. McDougall is aware that "to many minds it must appear nothing short of a scandal that anyone occupying a position in an academy of learning, other than a Roman Catholic Seminary, should, in this twentieth century, defend the old-world notion of the soul of man." With the fate of animism, he believes, "the future of religion is intimately bound up." Indeed, he goes so far as to say (p. xiii) that "if science should continue to maintain the mechanistic dogma, and, consequently, to repudiate Animism, the belief in any form of life after the death of the body will continue rapidly to decline among all civilized peoples, and will, before many generations have passed away, become a negligible quantity." And he, himself, is no religious dogmatist or selfish partisan of a theory of immortality. Calamitous for our civilization, he thinks, would be the disappearance of the belief that "human personality is not wholly destroyed by death," for "every vigorous nation seems to have possessed this belief, and the loss of it has accompanied the decay of national vigor in many instances." Also, "apart from any hope of rewards, or fear of punishment after death, the belief must have, it seems to me, a moralizing influence upon our thought and conduct that we can ill afford to dispense with." An epitome of most of what can be ranged in support of such views will be found in this book.

A. F. C.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

By ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN.

1. *Bacteria as crime-material.* In detective-stories of the present hour murder by means of infection through bacteria, etc., plays a considerable rôle, reflecting, apparently, actual occurrences in the criminal world. In a recent article, "Die Kriminelle Bedeutung der Krankheitserregenden Bakterien," in the *Archiv f. Kriminalanthropologie und Kriminalistik* (1913, vol. 53), A. Abels discusses this topic, which has assumed considerable importance in criminology. To-day murder by the introduction into the system of the victim of germs of typhoid, cholera, etc., is one of the evidences that crime in a way keeps pace with the discoveries of science. Abels, however, points out that since the 14th century there have been many cases of intentional transferences of diseases,—a whole chapter of history here relates to the "plague." The deliberate infection of primitive peoples by white men, with small-pox, etc., is another thing that antedates the individual bacterial-crime of the 20th century. The folk-lore of these diseases has also many interesting facts and fancies of record and of explanation.
2. *Belief that women have power to leave their bodies by night.* This is among the superstitions noted by O. Ebermann, in the course of his article "Zur Aberglaubenliste in Vintlers Pluemen der Tugent," in the *Ztschr. d. Ver. f. Volkskunde* (1913, vol. 23, pp. 1-18, 115-136. See p. 118). The *Pluemen der Tugent* is based upon an Italian Ms. (15th cent.) *Fiori di virtù*. This ancient superstition, according to Ebermann, is not yet quite extinct in Germany. The Masures, *e. g.*, believe that women do not do such a thing out of their own wickedness, but through misfortune and the guilt of others. It is caused when the godparents during baptism think of night-mares, etc.; or when they say the "Ja" indistinctly, so that it sounds like "Ma." To get rid of the misfortune one must be baptized again. This idea that women can leave their bodies by night, and visit other houses to disturb sleeping persons, as spirits, night-mares, etc., seems to be rather widespread.
3. "*Catholic renaissance*" in France, etc. In his article "Renaissance catholique," in the *Mercure de France* (1913, vol. 105, pp. 484-506), R. d'Humières discusses the question of a "Catholic renaissance in France, from the point of view of one who holds that the great forces of the past now decadent can never be galvanized into lasting life. Among the Catholics of France the author distinguishes in general

three classes,—the old believers (a survival to be pitied), orthodox atheists, fervent heretics. None of these is really capable of renewing the church. H. sees in art, perhaps, a cult of the future. For an understanding of Catholicism in France, one should read the book of Prof. Guérard reviewed elsewhere in this number of the JOURNAL.

4. *Christian elements in the Mahābhārata.* In his article in the *Archiv f. Religionswissenschaft* (1913, vol. 16, pp. 516-546), R. Garbe discusses "Christliches und angeblich Christliches im Mahābhārata, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Entstehung des Krischnaismus,"—treating the question of "Christian elements" in the *Mahābhārata*, with special reference to the origin of Krishnaism. It is now known that the Hindu epic, *Mahābhārata*, gradually grew up in the main all the way from the 4th century B. C. to the 4th century A. D. But it also contains items belonging previous to that period and some that are of later origin or insertion. As we have it now its form was fixed in the 6th or 7th century, and this fact makes possible the existence of Christian influences. There is, however, but a single section concerning which it may be reasonably maintained that it indicates an acquaintance with Christian life and Christian religion. This is the legend of the Svetadvīpa, the "White Island," or "Island (*i. e.*, land) of the Whites" (*Mbh.* XII, Cap. 337, 338, Ed. Calc.). This is among the last insertions in the great epic and belongs, according to Garbe, to the 6th century A. D. This legend is full of fancies, "behind which, however, seems to lie a real knowledge of some Christian country. The "sea of milk" of the Hindu epic, in the section relating to Svetadvīpa, is probably, Dr. Garbe thinks, Lake Balkash,—its Kirghiz name to-day is *Ak-Dengis*, or "white sea." In the region south of L. Balkash large communities of Nestorian Christians still existed in the 13th and 14th centuries, and they must have been well represented there at a much earlier date. It may therefore be that it was the Nestorian settlements of the 6th century in the region of L. Balkash that furnished the basis for the Svetadvīpa legend in the *Mahābhārata*. The presence of numerous Brahmans in Bactria in the beginning of the 3d century A. D., makes the transmission of the knowledge in question a matter of little difficulty. Certain other alleged "Christian elements" argued for by Hopkins and others, are, according to Dr. Garbe, not of such origin,—some of these relate in particular to the Krishna legend. The Krishna-child, *e. g.*, "does not appear suddenly in India *ca.* 500 A. D., but was known there at least 700 years before, and that too in his peculiar relation to shepherd-life; his worship is therefore of genuine Indian origin" (p. 543). Traits of Krishna that already appear in the *Bhagavadgītā* cannot be explained from Christian sources. Dr. Garbe concludes by reasserting his opinion that "the fanciful account of the Svetadvīpa, in the 12th book of the *Mahābhārata* is the only part of the epic in which may be found some dim knowledge of Christianity." See also an article by Dr. Garbe in the *Deutsche Rundschau* for August, 1913.

5. *Criminal characteristics.* Before the Anthropological Society of Washington, on October 15, 1912, Major R. Sylvester, Superintendent of Police for the District of Columbia, read a paper on "Criminal Characteristics," of which a brief abstract is given in the *American Anthropologist* (1913, N. S., vol. 15, pp. 347-348). Among other things the erroneous nature of the popular impression of the criminal as "a hungry, shifty individual," was pointed out, the truth being that "the average man who makes crime a business in large cities is a fairly prosperous individual with no fear of arrest. Politics has an evil influence in preventing the police of some large cities from bringing criminals to justice. It would appear that "some special kinds of crime call for physical peculiarities and develop them, with these exceptions, the criminal does not usually have a different aspect from that of other people, though both criminal and non-criminal persons of the police classification differ among themselves." Maj. Sylvester emphasized "conditions, as largely determining the category to which a man would belong." He thought that "measurements in general would give racial characteristics rather than criminal." We are learning also that "many cases of apparent criminality are only cases of mental defect or disease." In the discussion on this paper, Dr. Hrdlicka and Dr. Frank Baker "chiefly emphasized the unreliability of external peculiarities relied on by Lombroso, and of every sort of test which has been devised for general distinctions." According to Dr. Hrdlicka "crime is a matter of the nerves and brain or the mentality, and criminal characteristics may be due more to organs and parts which are hidden than to the obvious and chiefly irrelevant ones which Lombroso depended on for his diagnosis." Dr. Glueck laid stress on the need for "learning all about a man's past and conditions and his behavior at every stage of his life rather than trusting to his behavior or condition at the time of any one act as a proof of criminality."

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MYTHOLOGY*

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CONTENTS

- I. Introductory.
 - 1. Definition of Myths.
 - 2. Myths and Language.
 - 3. Divisions of Myths.
 - 4. Myth and Poetry.
- II. Primitive Man and His Mind.
 - 1. Development of Man.
 - 2. The one-pair-origin Theory.
 - 3. The Oneness of Human Mind.
- III. Nature Myths, Their Origin and Import.
 - A. Natural Object Myths.
 - 1. The Tree.
 - 2. The Sun, Moon, and Stars.
 - B. Natural Phenomena Myths.
 - 1. Eclipses.
 - 2. Winds.
 - 3. Thunder and Lightning.
 - 4. Creation, Vegetation, Reproduction.
 - C. Notes on Nature Myths.
- IV. Hero Myths, or Culture Myths.
 - 1. Sexual Emotions: The Child vs. the Parents.
 - 2. Development of Moral Ideas: The Individual vs. Society.
 - 3. The Freudian Conception of Consciousness.
 - 4. The Influence and Expression of the Subconscious.
- V. Summary.

I. INTRODUCTORY

In recent years particular interest in myths and mythmaking has been aroused by Anthropology, Social Psychology, as well

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as by the Freudian school. Boas and Ehrenreich have paid special attention to the problem. Wundt has devoted a great deal of energy and time to expound the *Völker-Psychologie*. And the Freudian school has busied itself with a certain phase of the problem. Everybody seems to have begun to look at primitive man and his culture in a quite different way from what was formerly the custom. All this has caused modern man to consider his ancestors more sympathetically and regard primitive man with all his faults and defects really human. This paper is a preliminary study and purposes to treat the mental products of primitive man, and "near" primitive man, from a psychological point of view, in order to discover what mental processes were involved in the formation of the myth as well as folklore in general.

1. *Definition of Myths.*

First of all let us ask: What is a myth? Gennep (26) says that it is a legend localized in time and space outside human reach but within that of divine personages. A legend he defines as being a story in which "the place is indicated with precision and the personages some determined individuals whose acts have a foundation which seems historic and heroic." And "one can understand by myth a legend in relation to the supernatural world and explain it indeed from the rites." In this respect he differs radically from Brinton (11) who maintains that no myth ever rose from the rite, but that the rite always arose from the myth, whether we are able to explain it or not; the old myth which gave rise to the rite, may be lost. Boas (9) on the other hand believes "that the tale as such is older than its mythological significance."

John Fiske (23) undoubtedly tries to bring in and apply the generic or evolutionary idea into mythology for he defines a myth as

"in its origin an explanation, by the uncivilized mind, of some natural phenomena, not an allegory, not an esoteric symbol,—for the ingenuity is wasted which strives to detect in myths the remnants of a refined primeval science,—but an explanation."

Tylor (79) maintains that

"myth is sham history, the fictitious narrative of events that never happened."

Ruskin (67a) remarks:

"A myth, in its simplest definition, is a story with a meaning attached to it other than that which it seems to have at first, and the fact that it has such a meaning is generally marked by some of its circumstances being extraordinary."

Ruskin seems to be radically at variance with John Fiske who maintained that a myth *was* an explanation and he that it *needs* one.

Max Müller (54) holds that

"mythology which was the bane of the ancient world, is, in truth, a disease of language." "The origin of mythological phraseology is always the same; it is language forgetting herself." "It is in fact the dark shadow which language throws on thought and which never disappears till language becomes commensurate with thought which it never will." "Mythology in the highest sense is the power exerted by language upon thought in every possible sphere of mental activity, and I do not hesitate to call the whole history of philosophy, from Thales down to Hegel, an uninterrupted battle against mythology, a constant protest of thought against language."

I have given this rather lengthy quotation from Max Müller to show his trend of thought. He has had perhaps more to do with the "Sacred Books of the East" than any other Westerner and thus has had a good opportunity to form his opinion about their subject-matter. But it is strange how mind can lose itself in the narrow paths of thought unguided by any psychological insight.

Forlong (24) regards myths as

"history which we have not yet been able to read." "Zeuses and Ios, Europas and Helenas, Titans and Toths and gods are all history in the process of incubation; we must unravel the skein and see the real actors, their acts, principles and faiths."

Abraham (1) says that

"myth is a piece of overcome infantile mental life of a people. It contains (in a curtailed form) the infantile wish of a people."

In regard to the origin of the myths Wundt (88) writes that "the last source of all myth formation, of all religious feelings and ideas is the individual fantasy-activity; even those structures which have been developed under the condition of communal life possess entirely the character of a creation of fancy. In myth the folk-fantasy connects the event with reality. In religion it creates from the contents of these events its ideas concerning the cause and purpose of the human existence."

Definitions could be multiplied but the above cited may be

enough to show what divergence of opinions exists among those who have studied this subject. Interesting to be sure they are, for they show what other persons have thought about the myths and also reflect the special interest by which they were guided. In Max Müller's definition the philologist appears plainly, in John Fiske's the historian and so on.

The Greek word *mythos*, which has been transplanted into almost every language, means simply "a word" or "a saying," and the definitions that make myths history which we are not yet able to read coincide fairly well with this. Myth is then a word, a saying, an expression by primitive man of his thoughts and ideas about himself and the world in which he lives. As John Fiske (23) says: "They are the earliest recorded utterances of men concerning the visible phenomena of the world into which they were born." Myth is thus history, obscured to be sure by the many transformations which everything human has to go through from time to time, but history, nevertheless, recording what primitive man thought and felt in the first stages of his existence as man, be it either as a race or as an individual.

2. *Myth and Language*

Max Müller's degeneration theory, as Wundt (88) calls it, could never be wholly true, if at all. Bacon's theory, later taken up by Gladstone and others, that the myths are glimpses of an old civilization, is not worth considering except in so far as it has any bearing on Max Müller's. But to build up a system entirely on the remnants of the names of the gods by tracing them back from one language to another is not far from nonsense. Who knows whether the original language, if such there be, is still in existence, dead or alive, for language can exist though dead? The further back one goes the greater do the gaps become in the mythological ideas which finally disappear completely. Moreover, it can not be concluded from this procedure that the ideas are simpler and purer the further back one goes, nor that conformity of names means the same thing in different languages and at different periods, since the mythological ideas as well as all other ideas are dependent upon both subjective and objective conditions which constantly change as well as being subject to changes themselves.

But even if languages were stable, fixed, *i. e.*, did not change in any respect during endless times; even if words spelled the same way everywhere and always and had the same meaning among all nations at all times; and even if the ideas conveyed by the words and the sentences all the time and everywhere were the same, we should nevertheless have myths to explain and mythological ideas to expound and elucidate, because, as Schleiermacher (39) said, there is a deeper common principle underlying it all which must be taken into consideration, and that we must always reason from what the religious consciousness *says* to what it *means*. And if this is true of the religious consciousness, it is also true of consciousness in general.

But now since language is not stable, either, but undergoes changes together with the human race, so that a word may utterly lose its original meaning and take on a wholly different one even in the same language, not to speak of the meaning of the same word in different languages, the case is even more complicated. Thus, in order to find the right meaning of the words and be able to read the history of primitive man and see what he thought, believed, worshipped and feared, and at the same time find out his mental ability and procedure, it is not only necessary to inversely unfold the changes which the languages have gone through in their development but also to unravel the mysteries of the soul and see what he really thought and felt. By these means a fair accuracy may be reached.

That words will change meaning when passing from one language to another is too well known to be reiterated, but an illustration of Max Müller's procedure and conclusion may be given by referring to his and his followers' explanation of Zeus and the Trojan war, remembering, however, that some of the etymologies have been seriously attacked by Mahaffy (52). In the Greek a large number of names, especially of the gods and heroes, have no meaning, but if traced back to Sanskrit a meaning may be found in them. Thus Zeus or Jupiter is Dyaus pitar and means in the Veda "sky" and Hermes or Sarameias "the breeze of the summer morning." Athene or Ahana means "the light of daybreak," which causes John Fiske to write: "Thus we are enabled to understand why the Greeks described her as sprung from the forehead of Zeus." Helena or Sarama

means "the fickle twilight," whom the Panis, or nightdemons, the prototype of the Hellenic Paris, strive to seduce from her allegiance to the solar monarch. In Greek all these meanings were lost and their origin completely forgotten. In the Vedas the Trojan war was carried on in the sky between the bright deities and the nightdemons, but in Greek it was located on the shores of the Hellespont, perhaps on account of some historical event that might have happened there. A later development of the Trojan war is to be sure plain from the great difference in the characters of those taking part.

Kuhn (49) and after him Abraham (1) have tried to show the very same thing in regard to the Prometheus myth, tracing it back to the Hindu Pramantha which has a wholly different meaning from the Greek derivative Prometheus. When the origin of the word was lost, the original meaning was also lost and a new attached to the new word, to fit the new environment and the new thought. But this changing of words and with them a new meaning and a new explanation must have been a slow process and taken place unconsciously, especially if Boas is right, who maintains that language arose unconsciously and was unconsciously applied to the objects in which the people had special interest.

3. *Divisions of Myths*

The theory that myth is an explanation by primitive man of the objects, events and happenings around him does not contain the whole truth. This theory applies directly only to the so-called nature myths which treat of the natural objects and phenomena surrounding man in his primeval habitat. These myths which apparently are the oldest and to be understood simply as explanations, ought to be divided into two groups: those that deal with the natural objects proper, and those that deal with the natural phenomena. To be sure these are not clearly divided and often overlap one another. There is no symbolism in them, at least not at first. The sun was the sun and nothing else, a living being, either the greatest god, a god among the gods, a messenger of the god, or an attribute of a god, carried over the heavens. The same is true of most if not all the natural objects and phenomena.

In course of time there grew up another kind of myths which has been more troublesome than the nature myths: the so-called

Hero myths or, as they ought to be designated, Social myths or Culture myths. These originated in a wholly different way and for a wholly different purpose, although they contain a sort of explanation, too, but not in the same sense as the nature myths. The social myths are the outgrowth of man's feelings and emotions stored away down in the deep recesses of the human psyche and for whose expression a totally different mental procedure must be resorted to. The nature myths have primitive science that is reasoning as their foundation; the social myths have feelings and emotions as their foundation. They have therefore taken wholly different paths in their further development. The nature myths have developed into sciences of all kinds and descriptions, while the social myths have developed into poetry, art, religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. Both of them blend and overlap here and there, because it is impossible to keep two streams of thought that originate in the same or identical psyche and led by the same human hands entirely free from intermixture, even if one be purer than the other, and the natural sciences contain less of feelings and emotions than the normative and literary, and the normative and literary sciences contain less of cold reason and scientific accuracy than the natural. But both are generically human.

Symbolism is closely connected with myths. One kind of it arose when the gods began to be separated from the natural objects, hewn out of them, so to speak, and the Greeks got their Zeus, and the Scandinavians their Odin, etc., with all the gods and goddesses who no longer dwelt among them but had to be represented in some way. Another kind arose when some affections were to be presented and could not be so in their real nature, owing to the fact that society had fixed a certain custom which prescribed the procedure approved of in a given instance. These two, a mental and a social phenomena, are responsible for all symbolism that has later developed.

Thus, when the significance or right meaning of an object or a phenomenon begins to become conscious, it begins also to lose its anthropomorphic character, and in the transitory stage which begins symbolism appears and takes the place of anthropomorphization of the inorganic world. Animals and other objects become symbols of the powers in nature and worshipped and revered as representatives of these powers. But as man

risers in his mental ability and activity, for function precedes, his gods become more and more abstract until there is hardly anything more left than the mere thought in Bostrom's sense. The symbols continue to be used even in this period, and it is a question whether they will ever be wholly discarded.

4. *Myth and Poetry*

The relationship between myth and poetry and literary fiction is in reality very close, closer even than one at first is ready to admit. But that their general features are more alike than different is seen at a hasty glance. Indeed, the poet still lives, moves, and has his being in the myth-making age. Says Tylor (79):

"Poetry has so far kept alive in our minds the old animative theory of nature, that it is no great effort to us to fancy the water-spout a huge giant or a sea-monster, and to depict in what we call appropriate metaphor its march across the fields of ocean."

And Quantz (62) maintains that

"the poets have never lost sight of the thought that man is only an essential part of the great unity of nature, and to them the trees, the flowers, and the streams have ever been living things of thought and feeling, desire and will."

Zeller (89) places poetry, mythology and religion on the same level and holds that we get them all from such sources as the feelings which arise in our consciousness when we in the spring morning take a walk in the country, by the sea, under the stars, from such instinctive needs as we feel in the thunderstorms, floods, battles, famines, or sickness and from the experience of common family and social life, and that they interpret these needs and feelings and preserve a faithful record of the wishes, fears and hopes of the prehistoric people; indeed the poets are the old theologians. And Wundt (88) says that

"the myth-forming and the poetic imaginations do not differ in their inner essence but only from their external and internal conditions to which they are subjected at a given time and within a given community."

Poetry is not a voluntary invention and myth an involuntary or unconscious product of the soul but both are the result of the same mental activities and belong to the same sphere. So fundamental factors of mental life as will and consciousness can not possibly be lacking in mythological thought and present in poetry. They are either lacking in both or present in both.

To be sure poetry may be on a higher level than many of the loosely connected myths, but even these have a purpose and an association of ideas, since they connect external phenomena with the wishes, hopes, and fears of the people. The teleological factor is not originally contained in poetry as is seen by the impossibility to distinguish between poetry and myth in many cases.

What we generally call poetry has more of a personal character than the myths, but this difference disappears gradually the more one approaches the real poetry and is entirely lost in the epics or folk-poetry which have perhaps been built up during long ages. The folksoul has here asserted itself, expressed itself, and taken possession of the material through some individuals who are totally lost to the world, perhaps because they so skillfully pluck the strings of the human soul-harp that the tunes became so melodious and intense that they themselves were forgotten. The same is the case in myth; there is indeed no difference between the folk-poetry and the myth. "It is myth," says Wundt. The individual character that may linger with some of them is of a secondary sort; the folk-soul that is laid down in them is the primary. This union between myth, folklore, and folk-soul must have deep psychic roots, penetrating down into the recesses of the soul and from there afford an outlet for the hidden psychic powers and emotions that rule supreme in the human being, otherwise they could not have so much in common, as they really have. If this were not the case, they could not exert such a tremendous influence upon mankind as now is the case. There really seems to have been and still is a psychic need or call for this kind of literary production, a hunger so strong that ages of reflection have not been able to obliterate or even satisfy it.

Furthermore, that the psychic factors which produce poetry also produce myth is seen in the fact that poetry never changes the general feature of the myth, and yet it often takes its raw material and clothes it in a rich and beautiful garb and presents it to the world thus transformed. Indeed poetry begins here. The many versions of the various folk-tales depend upon the environmental conditions and upon the personal equation of the several authors. In substance and in purpose they are all the same. The poetic working over of the raw material

makes the myths richer and fuller in content. One completes the other. Thus the poetic expression and form of the Eddas, the Niebelungen Lied, the Kalevala, not to speak of the Iliad and the Odyssey, makes them much more attractive and immortal than were the bare mythological records which underlie these beautiful and aesthetic poems alone presented.

Association of ideas and general experience play a great rôle in the formation and development of myths, but says Wundt (88)

“as long as the association of mythological ideas remains connected with the phenomena which form their substrate the mythformation keeps the character of pure myth, not yet essentially changed by individual, poetic additions, even if they are interwoven with many associations.”

To be sure the individual imagination sometimes individualizes the mythic pictures and transforms them from being general into individual, concrete experiences taken place at a certain time and place. The old general ideation, clothed in a poetic garb, becomes very concrete and individual. The characters of Niebelungen Lied are very corporeal and realistic, almost human in their behavior, and perform their deeds at definite places in a generically human way. But when the individual poetic addition becomes too prominent, then the myth loses its special character and the formation becomes poetry pure and simple, but having lost its character of folk-poetry it is soon lost for the world and generations to come will not know very much about it.

II. PRIMITIVE MAN AND HIS MIND

1. *Development of Man*

Wachter (84) remarks: “Der Mensch ist geworden und nicht erschaffen” and even if DeVries’ theory of mutation be true, and man sprang into existence as man with a sudden leap, this “geworden” must of necessity have been a very slow process and ages passed through before he found himself and awoke consciously as man. It makes quite a difference in regard to his mental attitude toward and grasp of the external world whether his becoming man was a slow process or happened with a sudden leap, for in the former case he was gradually being acquainted with and accustomed to the world around him while in the latter he was placed in his position unexpectedly

and so rather unaccustomed to it. His relation to the world behind him would also be quite different if he suddenly became man, for in this respect he would be more cut off from the ancestral world and his inheritance of what had passed before him be diminished if not altogether nullified. Therefore in order to save man from being disinherited we must assume that his becoming was a slow process with perhaps small sudden leaps here and there in his mental and physical makeup as the flicker of a burning light that has just been lighted until it reaches its full capacity. In this case his mentality would be stored up during ages that passed before him layer by layer for him to use in his new position.

A sudden leap into prominence, so to speak, would also have produced in him a wholly different reaction and mental attitude toward the world around him. The effect of this might have been lasting and detrimental to his further development, for when an impression or idea enters mind they leave traces after them. This is true the more so the lower man stands on the upward plane of mental evolution, because the lower he stands the less there is in his mind and experience to counterbalance the impressions and ideas that force themselves upon him. Just as in early life impressions received remain fixed in the mind and may cause great disturbances in the mental activity, while impressions received later on, when there is a better orientation and a more perfect understanding, may not have any disturbing effect at all, although they may not be entirely lost.

Thus man's becoming man might not have been so very sudden after all, and his orientation might have been somewhat gradual. In this case the magnificence of the phenomena around him slowly became conscious to him, *i. e.*, had some meaning to him. Then, he strengthened the external impressions by inward meditation and thought, warmed by the wonder and grandeur of a distant spectacle, such as a thunderstorm, a calm evening after sunset, when the streaks of lightning illuminated the dark firmament as they passed from one cloud to another.

Primitive man must necessarily have been strongly emotional, because there was very little in his experience to counterbalance and keep in check, when stirred up, the feelings and emotions which are at the bottom of every human soul, although, judging from primitive people of to-day, he could very well control

them if occasion demanded it. And the ability to repress the feelings and emotions must have been an important factor in evolution, for only those who could master themselves in strange and trying circumstances would have any chance of survival in the struggle for existence which has always been waged.

2. *The One-pair Origin Theory.*

The question of the unity of the human races as they exist to-day may be looked at from two different points of view: The unity of descent and the unity of development. The former has to do with the single pair origin of mankind and the second with the developments along similar lines and according to similar laws. These are two quite different problems and must be settled in quite different ways, and still they amount to the very same thing.

Boas (9) maintains that this question was settled by the thoroughgoing inquiries made into this subject by Waitz (85) who asserts

“that the question of the unity of the species and the nature of man especially belongs to those branches of knowledge which treat of the intellect,”

so that whether there are any physical differences or not does not belong to the subject. The notion that there must be a dominant white race which shall be served by all others and which may treat them as it sees fit he repudiates strongly. Agassiz (85) maintained that there were as many original types of man as there are typically different peoples on earth. He based his conclusions on analogies drawn from bees and other social animals and wanted to show that the descent from one pair was highly improbable; but it is difficult to see how this analogy could be carried out in all cases.

The attempt that has been made to show that descent from one pair is preferable, since it is not advisable to multiply causes and one miracle is more acceptable than many, Waitz meets by the assertion that

“it is clear that a multiplication of agents is something different from a great complication of acting causes and that as regards miracles science can not concern itself about the degree of admissibility but about the suspension of the natural laws which are in conflict with science, for a miracle as such has no degree.”

He also maintained that the "probably unsolvable problem of descent from one pair or several pairs" is of minor importance. To be sure, the positive proofs of descent from one pair are very scanty and the theory is very improbable, since nature would not in this case perhaps more than in any other hang the existence and preservation of a species on so slender a thread as a single pair. Nature works always toward an end and it knows of no parsimony in obtaining it. The developmental factors which caused one pair to spring into existence must have been the same everywhere, if the environment and circumstances were the same, and these could not have changed so quickly and so radically in the same place so as to preclude the production of any more pairs, and if they did, this pair, just produced, would not have been able to survive or produce offspring that would have been able to survive. Thus, it is difficult to see why just one pair should have been developed in one place and no more. It is, however, easy to see that environment might have been, and in all probability was, more favorable in one region than in another. But, according to Weisman, environment does not play any great rôle in bringing about changes, either in the individual or in the species. If we thus have to rule out environment, too, the problem becomes even more difficult, because environment has always been the dumping ground for our ignorance, for we have there deposited what we have been unable to explain otherwise. DeVries' theory of mutation would possibly help us some, but the conclusion would necessarily be that, when nature had produced one pair of *homo sapiens*, it could do no more, for it took all its human-making strength and energy to produce this one pair.

The objection might be raised that, if there were more than one pair, how can the human race be one, but this objection may be met simply by saying that in producing man nature produced a certain species according to well established laws and nothing could get into this hierarchy or be recognised as belonging to it which had not the essential qualifications. It is thus not necessary to assume, as Agassiz did, as many original types of man as there are typically different peoples to-day, even if we assume that more than one pair sprang into existence at one or several places, because the intermixture that

takes place between races will ultimately change the original types that interchange and produce a new type perhaps wholly different from either of the original, depending upon the dominant characteristics and the circumstances under which the intermixture takes place.

Thus, whether we assume the origin of one single pair or several the result will be the same. In either case we must also assume a considerable degree of mutability of the type as well as intermixture, although we do not know whether intermixture has taken place at all in some cases and how far it has progressed in others.

Consequently, whether man has developed slowly or come into existence with a sudden leap; whether he is monogenous or polygenous does not make so much difference, for the moment he was pronounced *man*, he was forever separated from his progenitors as far as the type is concerned and endowed with all the mental and physical attributes and possessions which belong to him as man. He may change physically and mentally and develop along somewhat different lines according to the circumstances under which he lives, but he will always remain fundamentally the same as long as he remains man.

3. *The Oneness of Human Mind*

That no two races are exactly alike in physical or mental development and characteristics is a too well-known fact to be reiterated. If all were alike we should not have different races. And still the assertion is made and maintained that man is fundamentally one, and that this unity depends more on intellectual ability than physical development. To be sure one race may be foremost in one kind of human activity and another in another, but seldom is anyone behind in all. And Boas (9) says: "The weight of evidence is on the whole in favor of an essential similarity of mental development in the different races with the probability of variations in the type of mental characteristics." Heredity and environment may of course cause different people to react differently to the same stimuli, but where these are the same and the stimuli not strongly different the same reaction will take place from similar stimuli. These two factors, heredity and environment, or the personal experi-

ence, play a great rôle in the development of mind, especially how and in what direction it shall develop. They present also two different problems. Says Boas:

"It may be that the minds of different races show differences of organization; that is to say, the laws of mental activity may not be the same for all minds. But it may also be that the organization of mind is practically identical among all races of men, but that its manifestations depend upon the character of the individual experience that is subjected to the action of these laws."

Thus a man may run away when he hears a dog bark, because he has been bitten by a dog, or he may rejoice, because he is lost and now expects to find someone, or else he may take it as the first greeting from his home which he is nearing. The differences in these mental manifestations surely depend upon the individual experience and not upon the mental organization as such.

Experimental psychology has taught us that man is thinking and acting according to definite laws and that these laws are frightfully rigid. Mind seems to work like a machine: Given the same material and it will infallibly grind out the same result, all things being equal. Post (10) was so struck by this fact that he said: "We do not think; thinking merely goes on within us." Maybe it is not so simple as that but there is nevertheless some truth in it. Psychology has also taught us that ideas originate from impressions on the sensory nerves by association according to definite laws.

Brinton (10) calls this the most startling discovery in recent times.

But if man's mind developed in practically the same way and according to the same laws everywhere, and if consequently the organization of mind is the same in all races, the differences, which exist between the races, in mental development are of degree and not of kind. The question remains open, however, according to Boas (9) which "characteristics of primitive man are causes of his low culture and which are caused by it." Abstract thought *e. g.* occurs only in a comparatively high stage of mental development and is said certainly not to exist in children and primitive men. These are bound down to concrete objects and handle them as if they were flesh of their flesh and bones of their bones, endowed with the same characteristics and

properties as they are themselves. The external world is a part of themselves or at least made up of the same elements as they are and as such they treat it. The dividing line between the animate and inanimate world is not clear, and the distinction between animals and man is not sharply drawn. The abstractness, the condition, and the attribute of the object are not comprehended and therefore must be expressed in concrete forms. Sickness and health are regarded as independent realities which can be taken out and put into the body as the case might require. The child has still to go through the same stage of development and the adult is not quite free from it. But whether this condition is a necessary one or brought about by circumstances are two different questions. That there was a time when abstract thought was impossible may be quite certain but whether this can be prolonged by environment is another thing. It certainly seems so, for Boas found that the Indians were capable of abstract thought whenever there was any occasion for it and could very readily learn to use it, but that it was needless in that kind of society in which they live. This is quite natural for when grammatical constructions began to develop and have some meaning, abstract thought began also to develop and enable man to carry on his reasoning and form his concepts about the world in which he is a member.

Concepts and distinct types of association must have originated unconsciously, as it oftentimes still does, in the customs and habits which primitive man was gradually forming during his early existence. If these were ever to become conscious it must happen by incidentally or accidentally breaking them off, which occurs as soon and as often as a new factor enters into experience and demands recognition. When this takes place he wakes up to the fact that there is a large content in his mind for which he can give no adequate account except that it is there. Man has always acted more or less customarily and not always for any conscious motive, but primitive man seldom stopped there but proceeded to explain his own acts or desires. But

“the desire to understand one’s own actions (as soon as they become conscious) and to get a clear insight into the secrets of the world, manifests itself at a very early time and it is therefore not surprising that

man in all stages of culture begins to speculate on the motives of his own actions,"

says Boas. And again, this

"secondary explanation has nothing to do with the historical origin, but is based upon the general knowledge possessed by the people."

Therefore, the explanation of the same phenomena may be quite different among different peoples depending upon the knowledge of those that make the explanation. Thus when he was confronted by a particular cosmic event or phenomenon he ransacked his whole mental storehouse to find something that fitted the occasion and gave an explanation of the same satisfactory to his mind. He applied his individual and social life as he saw it to the natural and cosmic events and interpreted them in this way. Thus did the nature myths arise.

The existence of the same myth, or at least of a similar myth, in various parts of the world presents another phase of this problem. The general theory has been and is still held in certain quarters that these myths had a central origin and then spread to or were borrowed by the different peoples who now possess them. Bastian (5) held that they were due to elementary ideas and so inexplicable. Others (Weule, Graebner) believed that they have their origin in the time when mankind was still one before any dispersion had taken place. And still others (Ritter, Guyot, Ratzel) thought that they were caused by the influence of geographical environment upon the life of man. Let us give one example of these myths, the legend of Wilhelm Tell. Fiske (23) has shown that it existed not only in Switzerland where it has been especially immortalized but also in Denmark, Norway, England, Iceland, Finland, Russia, Persia, and supposedly also in India. Dasent (17) observes that it is common to the Turks and Mongolians,

"and a legend of the wild Samojeds, who never heard of Tell or saw a book in their lives, relates it, chapter and verse, of one of their marksmen."

And John Fiske remarks:

"In all these stories names and motives of course differ; but all contain the same essential incident. It is always an unerring archer who, at the capricious command of a tyrant, shoots from the head of some one dear to him a small object, be it an apple, a nut, or a piece of coin. The

archer always provides himself with a second arrow and, when questioned as to the use he intended to make of this extra weapon, the invariable reply is: To kill thee, tyrant, had I slain my son."

Dasent thinks

"that the story of this bold mastershot was primeval among many tribes and races and that it only crystalized itself around the great name of Tell by that process of attraction which invariably leads a grateful people to throw such mythic wreaths, such garlands of bold deeds of precious memory around the brow of its darling champion."

And John Fiske thinks

"that when a marvelous occurrence is said to have happened everywhere, we may feel sure that it never happened anywhere. Popular fancies propagate themselves indefinitely, but historical events, especially the striking and dramatic ones, are rarely repeated. The facts here collected lead inevitably to the conclusion that the Tell myth was known, in its general features, to our Aryan ancestors, before they ever left their primitive dwelling-place in central Asia."

Stories like that of Tell may be multiplied many times and all show that they existed in places simultaneously with such differences as were absolutely necessary in order to fit the particular place and people. But whether they all originated among one people and then spread to others, or grew up independently in various places is not so easily settled. The philologists and historical mythologists as well as some anthropologists favor necessarily a central origin. It can certainly not be denied that there exists a large amount of material that seems to favor such a theory, as for instance the foreign words in the story and the possibility of tracing them back to their origin. But in that case all Aryan languages can be traced back to their supposed mother tongue, more or less. To be sure some of the stories themselves can be traced back to other people and races, from whom they have thus been transmitted as a whole or in part.

But with the Asiatic cradle of the Aryan race still more disputed to-day than it ever was, as is shown by Taylor (78), Much (53), Richards (66) and others, it seems foolish to try to seek the origin of all our myths in Asia. Some of them may have originated there, for, as Petrie (59) has shown, the civilization and culture of southern and southeastern Asia seem undoubtedly to have developed earlier than those of any other region and so presuppose an earlier development of the people

living there, owing to more favorable circumstances. But this does not mean that all our myths originated there. Leaving, therefore, John Fiske to "shed tears profusely" over the grave of Gellert while he is busy tracing out his Sanskrit origin we will proceed to call attention to another theory, according to which at any rate some of the myths and legends may have originated independently at different places and among different peoples.

As has been shown before, the natural laws engaged in mental development are the same everywhere and make the mind react in the same way when furnished with the same stimuli. It reacts correspondingly even if the stimulus-object is somewhat different and so one may take the place of another. For instance in the Tell myth at one place it is an apple, at another a nut, and at still another a coin that is shot off from the head of a dear person who in one case is a son, in another a servant, and in still another a relative. But in all cases the bow and arrow are used. Now, could not this myth have originated independently in places where archery was a well-known art and much time spent in perfecting it? Or take the case of Gellert. The dog has been man's faithful companion from time immemorial. He has watched over him diligently night and day, and man has learned to appreciate and even love him. Would it be necessary under such circumstances to trace the origin of this myth to Sanskrit in order to find an explanation for it? Would it not be just as feasible to assume that it originated independently among different peoples who had much to do with this faithful companion? It seems that if mind works according to definite laws in the same way everywhere, the myths could easily arise everywhere there the conditions and environment allowed it. But where the external conditions and circumstances did not favor it, or where the mental level was not adequate for such a response the result was not obtained. That is to say where the stimulus could not be given or where it could not be responded to for lack of appreciation on the mental side, the myth could not arise. That this is true in other mental fields is a well-known fact and there is no adequate reason why it could not be true in the formation of myths also.

The objection may be raised that this theory excludes the possibility of transmitting traditions and folklore from one

people to another by means of intercommunication and contact, and that it necessarily separates one race from another, while it can be shown that races have had intercommunication and taken over mental products from one another to a greater or lesser degree. This may be granted, but contact and intercourse themselves are no guarantee for the transmission of traditions, because those who should adopt the mental products of another people, must have all the paraphernalia necessary for such a transaction *e. g.* their mental and physical conditions must be favorable. They must have what Herbart calls the apperceptive mass, otherwise the adoption would be impossible. But with this granted there is only one step to the independent development, namely, that the right kind of stimulus be given, just as there is only one step in the transmission, namely, that the material be presented for adoption, although this step may be somewhat shorter and easier to take. Therefore, an outright borrowing is not considered very ingenious by students of mythology to-day. Says Brinton (10):

“I have already referred to the strange similarity in the myths of savage nations far asunder in space and kinship. The explanation of this is not to be found in borrowing or in recollection from a common, remote unity; but in the laws of human mind. The same myths are found all over the world, with the same symbolism and imagery, woven into cycles dealing with the same great question of human thought. This is because they arise from identical psychic sources, and find expressions under obligatory forms, depending on the relation of man to his environment, and on the unity of the mental processes throughout the race.”

And John Fiske (23) writes, although he seems to favor the theory of central origin:

“The religious myths of antiquity and the fireside legends of ancient and modern times have their common root in the mental habits of primeval humanity. They are the earliest recorded utterances of men concerning the visible phenomena of the world into which they are born” . . . “In primitive society the consideration of the same phenomena leads to a number of typical associations which differ from our own, but which occur with remarkable regularity among tribes living in the remotest parts of the world.”

These typical associations differ from our own, because the amount of knowledge which underlies them is not the same in both cases, but their regularity assures us that if the same stimulus be given and if the mental development be along

similar lines the result will be the same. Therefore wherever the bow and arrow were known, and wherever the dog associated with man there was a possibility for the Tell myth and the Gellert myth to arise, if the mental development was adequate for such a response.

That two so widely separated peoples as the Brahmans and the Mexicans should have borrowed from one another the story of the fish-god that sows the seed of man, seems incredible. Furthermore, primitive people did not migrate as much as they are supposed to have done, for, as Brinton (11) says:

“It is proved by the distribution of the oldest stone implements that primitive tribes were not generally migratory and had little intercourse with their neighbours.”

III. NATURE MYTHS, THEIR ORIGIN AND IMPORT

As soon as man began to reflect upon what happened around him, he began also to form his own explanation and opinion of these phenomena, as he saw them. That he did not come to the same conclusion as modern man may well be expected. Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton had not yet expounded the revolutions of the heavenly orbs and formulated the laws of nature; Linneus, Harvey, and Darwin had not yet classified, described, and explained the natural world; philosophy had not yet begun to raise any doubts, and man was left undisturbed to ponder upon the problems that demanded solution around him. Consequently he gave his own explanation of the natural objects and the natural phenomena as he saw them.

A. *Natural Objects*

1. *The Tree.* Among those objects which early attracted man's attention the tree seems to have occupied a very prominent place. This would be quite natural, for, if the Simian ancestors took to the trees after having emerged from the primeval ocean, these played a great rôle in the sustenance and further development of the species. Seemingly from the support which the trees gave man in his early existence, even if he never lived in trees, as seems to be the present tendency to believe, he developed elaborate theories about life-trees and world-trees of which the Scandinavian world-ash Yggdrasil is the most prominent and minutely worked out. This world-ash

has three roots, all in the underworld. Near the fountain of Mimer lay the germ of Yggdrasil. From here it grew up and sent out its roots, one towards the North, to the fountain of Hwergelmir in Nifelhel, the second towards the South, to the fountain of Urd, and the third to the fountain of Mimer in the middle of Ginnungagap. From these fountains the tree received nourishment and strength, and it grew to an enormous height and spread its branches far and wide. Upon the network woven of the fine threads from the three roots, lay the foundation of the underworld; in the first cluster of branches was Midgard, the home of man, located, and in the second Asgard, the home of the gods. The top of Yggdrasil overshadowed Odin's hall, while the branches towered far and wide over all the worlds. The tree was ever green, its leaves never withered, and it supplied gods and men with many useful and indispensable things.

But all good things have their enemies, and so Yggdrasil. Close by the wondrous tree, near the fountain of Hwergelmir, there lived a dragon, Nidhug, which ceaselessly gnawed the roots, assisted by countless worms. They knew that when the tree died, the downfall of the gods was at hand. But the Norns or Fates who are the servants of the gods, sprinkle daily the tree with holy water from the Urdar fountain and thus maintain its healthy condition.

The tree is a creation of the gods who endowed it with many characteristics. It contains the elements of all past, present and future generations; the primordial elements of each individual man budding and maturing upon its branches are carried away by the storks which are Lodi's birds to those who yearn for a new being.

The Babylonians developed a somewhat similar idea of a world-tree which, according to Sayce (69), was at first the cedar but subsequently the palm. This tree rested on the earth with its roots far down into the abysmal deep, where Ea, the god of wisdom, presided, and nourished the earth with the springs and streams which forced their way upwards from the roots to the surface of the ground. Zikum, the primordial heaven, rested, as it were, upon the overshadowing branches of the mighty stem. Within it was the holy house of Davkina, the great mother, and of Tammuz, her son, "a temple too sacred

and far hidden in the recesses of the earth for mortal man to enter."

Thus, the poets of the Eddas and the Eridu portray the same mythological fancies and draw pictures which in many cases resemble one another. But the sacred tree of the Babylonians was more than a world-tree. It was also employed, says Sayce

"in incantations and magic rites which were intended to restore strength and life to the human frame. It was thus essentially a tree of life and the prototype and original of those conventional trees of life with which the walls of the Assyrian palaces were adorned."

In the religion of Zarathustra the tree of life is called Horn and grows, according to Zend-Avesta, by a spring upon a mountain. It is king of all trees. Ferwerdin, who is the door-keeper of paradise, like Riswan in the Moslem saga, and his followers guard it against the attack of Ahriman who wants to possess it. This tree assures resurrection to those who die in faith and has the power to reveal thieves and murderers before they do any harm.

Kalevala, the Finnish national poem, tells of a mighty oak which sprang from an acorn planted by Wainamoinen and which

"raised itself above the stormclouds dimming the sunlight, hiding the moonbeams and causing the stars to die in the sky until a hero alarmed at its growth appealed to the mother, the windspirit, who sent forth a dwarf grown into a giant whose strength overcomes the oak. It falls and its power to bestow good is only then discovered."

Unlike Yggdrasil this world-tree is overcome by its enemies, but this is for the good of mankind. Like the Babylonian cedar or palm it is used in incantations and magic rites to bestow power and happiness.

That man originated from trees was the belief not only of the ancient Scandinavians where Ask and Embla were turned into human beings by the gods and where the elements of each individual buds upon the branches of Yggdrasil, but also of many other people. Hesiod (42) tells us that Zeus made a brazen race of ash trees and Virgil (82) writes:

"These woods were first the seat of sylvan powers
Of nymphs and fauns and savage man who took
Their birth from trunks of trees and stubborn oaks."

Ormuzd gave soul to a plant which had first grown up single but afterwards divided into two, Moschia and Moschiana, who became the parents of the race. And the Mexicans believed that their ancestors had come from the seeds of the sacred *Mariche* palm.

Closely related to the world-tree is the belief in the possibility of climbing to heaven in a tree. If the heaven, the land of the gods, were located in the upper branches of that tree upon whose lower ones the earth had its place, why was it not possible to climb to that place of happiness and bliss in a tree? Many races far separated in time, space and culture said it was, and their answer has reached the nursery tales of our own times.

That trees were alive, have spirit, sensations, and feelings, was the belief of almost all ancient peoples. Frazer (25) has shown that many tribes even to this day believe that to cut down a tree is to dispossess a soul and commit matricide. The Fiji Islanders will never eat a cocoanut without asking: "May I eat thee, my chief?" And the young among the Thompson Indians of British Columbia prayed to the sunflower root before eating it.

Prayers of all kinds were offered to the trees. Their worship ranges from the mere adoration till an intimate life-connection with them like that of the Dryads of Greek and Roman mythology and the Druids of Celtic who would suffer even unto death, if their trees were cut down.

Almost every nation seems to have developed a special cult around a special tree aside from regarding all trees more or less sacred. This singling out of a particular tree is, however, of a much later date than the general belief in the spirituality of all trees which is more generic.

2. *The Sun, Moon, and Stars.* The important place which the sun, moon and the stars have occupied in man's life from the very earliest time, is seen in the early development of astronomy and astrology. The sun has dominated the day, the moon the night, and every being has had his star which directed his life from the cradle to the grave; and the Magi followed such a star from the far East to the manger at Bethlehem to pay homage to the new-born babe. The temples from gray

antiquity, in Egypt, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome, down to the cathedrals in the Middle Ages were built according to astronomical considerations, and the very word orientation is derived from the custom of looking at the sun-rise.

The relation between the sun and the moon has always been regarded very close but not by any means fixed all over the world. Primitive man's idea of sexualizing everything was carried out here, too, but not uniformly, for among one people the sun is regarded as masculine and the moon as feminine, while among others the opposite holds true. Max Müller (54), loyal to his language idea of mythology, traces the word moon back to Sanskrit and finds that *Mas* is masculine, and Harley (41) concludes that "the very word moon is masculine and like Wordsworth's child father of the man." For our purpose it matters not whether the word sun or moon is masculine or feminine as such, for the gender of a word will often change in the same language. It is the idea that underlies the conception that is of psychic importance, and this idea is fundamentally the same whether the word moon or sun is masculine in one and feminine in another language, for they are never of the same gender in the same language.

"In early philosophy throughout the world," says Tylor (79), "the sun and moon are alive and as it were human in their nature." The Egyptian Osiris and Isis were brother and sister but also husband and wife and identified with the sun and moon. In the Northern mythology the sun and moon are two beings, daughter and son of Lodur and Mimer's daughter Natt (Night) and chosen by the gods to drive the golden chars which the artisans of the underworld had made to light the world. The ancient Mexicans believed that when the old sun burnt out and left the world in darkness a hero sprang into a huge fire, descended into the shades below and arose deified and glorious in the East as the sun (Tonatiuh). After him another hero sprang into the fire but it had now grown dim and he arose only in milder radiance as the moon (Metztli).

When the Greek philosophers and astronomers maintained that the sun was only a hot ball swinging around in the sky, they caused great outcry and disturbance in the minds of both the aristocracy and the populace. And Tacitus (77) tells of

a German chief who, when the Romans prepared to drive the people from the land, turned to the sun and invoked it to look upon the vacant soil.

The native races of the Americas give more or less veneration to the sun, bring their sacrifice and smoke their pipes in its honor. The Delawares regarded it as second in rank to the twelve great Manitus. The Sioux Indians regarded it in appearance the maker and preserver of all things. The Natchez of Louisiana had a complete sun-worship in accordance with which the whole state was modelled. The priest was the chief called the sun or the sun's brother. The sun was both the ancestor and the founder of the dynasty of the Incas of Peru who reigned as its representatives and almost in its person. They took wives from the virgins of the sun's convent and their descendants were the solar race and the ruling aristocracy.

Although the sun occupies a very prominent place in the minds of primitive man, its worship is by no means universal, as some authors want us to believe. It seems to be somewhat restricted to the regions where its beneficial influence was mostly felt and where the changes occurring in nature with its departure and arrival were most manifest. The feelings of the Massogetae of Tartary who sacrificed their horses to the sun that freed them from the dreadful miseries of the long winter must have been quite different from those of the people of central Africa who dreaded the rise of the morning sun. The ancient Scandinavians did not include the sun and moon as such among their deities and their worship is quite unknown. But where the sun was less worshipped the moon seems to have had a greater place in the people's mind. The savages of Brazil regulated their time and their festivals and drew their omens by the moon. The tribes of the south central part of Africa watch for the new moon, hail it and hold their festival day. The Congo people fell on their knees at the first glimpse of it and exclaimed: "So may I renew my life, as thou art renewed." And the Hottentots used to dance and sing all night at the new and full moon addressing all their desires for prosperity to it.

As the ruler of night when the influence of gloom and quietness, aided by leisure and emotional events, could exert itself to the utmost, the moon may well be expected to have had a greater effect upon man's ideas than the sun. The moon could

be looked at, meditated upon in special way and observed in all its changes. In Greece it fell in love as Selene with a beautiful youth, Endymion, who was taken up with it and afterwards became the man in the moon for the Greeks. Here we have the prototype of that mysterious face which has caused so much speculation and which is met with in all parts of the world, in some form or other. Baring-Gould (6) thinks that the "Jack and Jill" jingle owes its origin to the old Norse tale of two children who carried a bucket of water on a pole and who were taken up by the moon. The same idea goes through the old German story of the man who gathered wood on Sunday and as penalty was transferred to the moon where he stands as a fair warning. Similar legends are found in many other places and are plainly of Jewish or Christian origin.

But there are not only human beings in that heavenly orb. Some people have seen other things there. In India the story runs that a hare in a famine offered to give up his flesh to a Brahman who in return for his willingness immortalized him by drawing his face in the moon. A similar legend is found in China, and a modified form of it among the Hottentots where the moon sent a hare to tell the people on earth that just as it wanes and waxes so the people shall die but rise again. But the messenger forgot the last and most important clause for which the moon got very angry and tried to kill the hare with a hatchet. It missed him but split his lip and in return got its face scratched by the hare.

The stars are not only personified but personal action is ascribed to them. They are even declared to have lived on earth. The aborigines of Australia consider the Orion as young men dancing corroboree and believe that an ancient race was transplanted to heaven before the present race came upon earth. The Eskimo held that all stars were in olden time men and animals transplanted into the sky. The Pleiades was called the dancers and the morning star the day-bringer with more than a superficial meaning. An Iowan told of a man who gazed at a star until it came down, talked to him and directed him to a place where there was much game.

The belief in the influence of the heavenly orbs upon man's life is as strong as it is universal. The stars guide his destinies and the moon affects his mental and physical make-up from the

cradle to the grave. But not only man is affected. The moon corrupts the flesh, destroys the wood, grain and vegetables, causes the changes in the weather and influences the crops.

B. *Natural Phenomena*

1. *Eclipses.* Eclipses had a terrifying effect upon the mind of primitive man and caused many to us peculiar stories to be invented as an explanation of the dreadful phenomenon. Thus the Chiquitas thought that the moon was hunted across the sky by a huge dog, caught and torn until the blood dyed its face red. In order to drive away the monster the people used to raise a frightful howl and lamentation and shoot across the sky. The Caribs thought that Maboya, hater of all light, sought to devour the sun and the moon and therefore danced and howled in concert all day or all night to drive him away. And the Peruvians imagined an evil spirit in form of a beast eating the moon and therefore raised a frightful din and beat the dogs to join in the concert.

The same idea is also found on the South Sea Islands where the sun and the moon are supposed to be swallowed by an offended deity but who was induced by offerings to eject them again. In Sumatra the one eats the other but the inhabitants are able to prevent it by a tremendous noise. In Hindu mythology two demons Rahn and Ketu devour the sun and the moon respectively. These are also described in conformity with the phenomena: Rahn is black and Ketu is red, and the usual din is raised to drive them off. But as they are only heads, their prey slips out as soon as swallowed. Another version of the myth says that Indra pursuing Rahn with his thunderbolt, rips open his abdomen so that the heavenly body gets out again. Ancient Mongols and Chinese make the same kind of clamor of rough music, gongs, and bells to drive off the monster. And the Siamese said in regard to the Europeans' ability to predict the time and extent of an eclipse that they knew the monster's mealtimes and could tell how hungry he would be.

The Romans flung firebrands into the air, blew trumpets and clanged brazen pots and pans in order to save the moon. And when the soldiers made a mutiny against Tiberius, their plans were frustrated by the moon which suddenly languished in the sky. In vain did they try to rescue it for clouds came up and

hid it and the mutineers saw that the gods had turned away from their plot.

But not only external influences or causes were considered as effecting an eclipse. Internal causes or changes in the sun or moon themselves were also believed to bring about this phenomenon. The Caribs thought that the moon was sick, hungry, or dying. The Peruvians imagined the sun angry and so hid her face in total darkness to bring the world to an end. The Hurons fancied the moon sick and arranged a rather boisterous concert in which men and dogs participated in order to bring about its recovery. In Cumana it was believed that the sun and the moon married but because they had a will of their own they began to quarrel and fight with the result that one of them was wounded. In such a quarrel the Ojibwa endeavored to distract their attention from one another by a tumultuous noise and so stop the quarrel and fight.

The changes of day and night, summer and winter, spring and fall—light and darkness, heat and cold are very closely connected with the eclipse-belief. The one is overcome by the other only to return with renewed strength to conquer the oppressor and to free and gladden the heart of trembling humanity, once more asserting the power of light, truth, righteousness, and life.

2. *Winds.* The winds that break the forest, shake the rocks, and penetrate man have also caused much wonder and speculation. Æolus of old held the winds imprisoned in his dungeon cave and tuned his harp after them, and when the winds rustled among the leaves of the trees, people heard Æolus play his harp. The Mani of New Zealand ride upon the winds and imprison them in their caves, but the West wind is too strong and too cunning, for he escapes, hides himself in his own cave and dies away. In India the Maruts, the storm-gods, assume after their wont the form of newborn babes and perform the mythic feats of the child of Hermes, tossing the clouds over the surging sea. Boreas, born of Astraios and Eos, causes the people to tremble with chills and hurry to their shelter. He chases the birds from their summer haunts to other regions and ties in asbestine bonds the soil and the waters.

The Polynesian believed that the wind-gods lived near the great rock which serves as a foundation for the world. They

held within themselves hurricanes, tempests, and all destructive winds and employed them to punish such persons as neglected their worship, wherefore in stormy weather large offerings and liberal presents were brought them by penitent devotees who were either in danger themselves or had friends in danger. The four winds caused a great mythic development among the natives of America in which they are personified as four brothers, or mythic ancestors, or divine parents of mankind.

3. *Thunder and Lightning.* The strong effect of thunder and lightning upon the mind of primitive man is seen in the myths all over the world. Rig-Veda sings Indra's glory and ascribes to him the "feats of the thunderbolt." He is also called Indra of the thunderbolt. He smote Ahi and poured forth water upon the earth. When he hurls his thunderbolt men believe in the brilliant god and pay him homage. Twashtar made his glorious bolt. The North American Indians had much to tell about the thunder-bird, as had the ancient Greeks of the eagle of Zeus and the Scandinavians of the hammer of Thor. The Assiniboinis have seen this wondrous bird and the Dakotas could show his footprints, the thunder tracks, twenty-five miles apart, near the source of St. Peter's river. The Ahts of Vancouver talked about the mighty bird Tootooch dwelling far off in the sky, the flap of whose wings caused thunder and whose forked tongue is seen in the lightning. The Mandans heard in the thunder and saw in the lightning the flapping wings and flashing eyes of that awful bird which belongs to or even is Manitu, the Great, himself. The Ahts say that there were originally four of these great birds but Quawteaht, the great deity, entered a whale on which they fed and enticed one after the other to swoop down when he seized them and plunging into the sea drowned them. The last of them was, however, too strong so he spread his wings and flew to a distant height where he still remains, though he sometimes visits the earth. The Dakotas spoke about an old, large bird which begins the thunder and whose velocity is great. He is wise and kind and never does any harm. But the thunder is imitated and carried on by smaller, young birds which cause the rumbling noise and the duration of the peals. These are mischievous and will not listen to good counsel and therefore do some harm sometimes but as a rule the Indians are not afraid of them.

This explanation of the thunder and lightning which is so prominent among the Indians, especially of North America, is found also in other places. Thunder and lightning may be the messenger of the god who lives far on high and so needs a messenger, or else the god itself as in the Finnish poetry where he speaks through the clouds and shoots his fiery darts. When it is dark in his lofty abode he strikes fire and we hear the noise and call it thunder and see the sparks and call them lightning. The Hindu Indra hurls the thunderbolt with his bow, the rainbow, just as Uko in the Finnish saga and both smite their enemies with these arrows.

Closely connected with the thunder and lightning is the rainbow, as we might expect. It constitutes, as we have seen, the bow of Uko and Indra. The Israelites called it the bow of Jahwe, the Hindus the bow of Rama, and the Lapps the bow of Tiermas, the thunderer, who slays with it the sorcerers that hunt for men. Zeus stretched it down from heaven as a sign of war and tempest, or it was Iris, the messenger between gods and men, that came down. In Scandinavia it was a bridge for the gods to travel upon and in Germany the souls of the just go over it to paradise.

4. *Creation, Vegetation, Reproduction.* A beginning of things has probably not been conceived of by all races in their primitive state. But quite many have had at least some conception of it, and these seem to have keenly appreciated the dilemma of postulating an absolute creation. The law of causality exerted early its power upon mind and primitive man solved the problem in his way.

Among those elements which man postulated as primeval was water the most prominent and universal. The primeval ocean with its boundless extension and its necessity for the maintenance of all life appealed early and powerfully to man's power of imagination. In the water all possibilities were present. But this boundless extension was sterile, until a creative power acted upon it and fructified it. In Genesis the spirit of Elohim brooded over the face of the waters. In Kalevala the eagle floated over the water and hatched land. And in the Eddas the fountain of creative Wisdom mingled its contents with the streams of the two other primeval fountains and produced the primordial elements.

Some Athapascans held that a mighty bird descended to the ocean and instantly the earth arose and remained on the surface of the waters. The same bird called forth all animals and man. The Quiches believed that there was in the beginning nothing but water, quiet water, in which the mothers and the fathers slept until Hurikan, the mighty wind, passed over it and called forth the earth. And the Zunis supposed that the great All-father impregnated the water and from this union everything came into existence.

The Hebrews postulated a god who existed and in the beginning created heaven and earth, and all things with them by the power of his word. So easily could not the ancient Scandinavians dispose of the problem. For them there was in the beginning Ginnunga-gap, a yawning gulf whose depth no eye could fathom and three elements or powers, the cold, the warmth, and the creative wisdom. This Ginnunga-gap or chaos is the empty space in which the world was created. Hindu, Greek, and Teutonic mythology agree in making this the first postulate. They also agree in making water the primordial element. The cold waves from the North, the world of mist and darkness, flowed into this chaos and formed the primeval ocean out of which the world has arisen. The life-giving principle which was necessary for the production of this world was the warmth and came from the South. This met the cold waves in the chaos and partly melted their icy element and formed thereby the vital drops out of which the world was made, the seed of Yggdrasil, the world-ash, and the like. The creative wisdom shaped and guided this first formation as well as the following. The three fountains, Hwergelmir, Urd, and Mimer, contain the vital sap necessary for the world-tree to grow and develop.

When the cold and the warmth met in the chaos there originated, also, from this fusion the primeval cow, in Teutonic mythology called Audumla. By her actions she brought forth, also from the watery element, the world-giant, Ymer, and the progenitor of gods and men, Buri (Gayomant), who seems to be the personification of the wind, the father of all the other storm gods. Of Ymer's body is the visible world made.

The idea in Greek mythology is somewhat similar. In the fathomless chaos Erebus, mist, water, and Night, darkness, and

Earth were produced. Earth gives birth to Uranus, heaven, which envelops her and gives birth to Oceanus, the Titans, etc.

In Hindu mythology a later version makes the Brahma lay the mundane egg in the bottomless chaos, hatch it himself and then come from the very same egg himself and of its contents make the visible world. In the Upanishads (80) Sat (=that which is) is made the source of all things. Sat produces progressively heat, (heat leads to) water, (water leads to) earth, and by a mixture of these everything else is produced. There is an intimation that Brahma is identical with Sat as well as with Atman.

Whatever may have been the primitive notion of the Hindus their thoughts soon centered around a trinity, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, but these are in modern Hinduism only three forms or characters of the same deity. Brahma is the creator, Vishnu the preserver, and Siva the destroyer. They are sometimes represented singly with their special emblems, sometimes jointly in one body with three heads. Their origin is rather nebulous. In some Parunas they are represented as sprung from a female source *Adi-Sakti* (the original powers). In other that *Adi-Sakti* produced a seed from which Siva was born and he became the father of Vishnu, and in still other that a flower of the *Tamarosa* plant (water lily) sprung from the navel of Vishnu gave birth to Brahma who laid the mundane egg mentioned above.

There seems to be both in Hindu, Teutonic, and other mythologies a dim conception of an all-father who was uncreated and by whose influence the world was created, but this conception was so vague that more tangible means was resorted to for an explanation of the visible world.

The god or the creator is often referred to as the father more or less literary of all things and as such associated with one or more feminine beings. Exceptions to this occur, however, and the god brings forth offspring without the help of a mate, as for instance the *Satapatha Brahmana's* story of Mani, the Phœnician ancestor of the race, and the first Zoroastrian being, split up later by *Ahura Mazda*.

All primitive creation myths abound in sexualities. Uranus and Gaea had marital relations which Cronus, their son, once prevented and by his awful deed caused the birth of the beau-

tiful Afrodite. Cronus married his sister Rhea and swallowed all his children except Zeus who punished his father for his crime. Zeus indulged in so many love-affairs with goddesses and mortal maidens that his reputation has become quite bad. Hera's jealousy caused him to conduct his courtships often secretly and in disguise.

The same loose family idea goes through the Teutonic mythology. The gods and goddesses intermarry not once only but many times and produce a large number of offspring. And the Hindu deities are still worse as far as their morals are concerned. Brahma seduced Parvati, the wife of Siva who avenged himself by striking off one of his heads. He married his own daughter, Sarasvati, but not daring to satisfy his incestuous passion under human forms, he changed himself to a stag and her to a hind. Again, as Prajapati, he offers violence to his own child.

In Teutonic mythology Odin, Vile, and Ve participated in creating man by transforming two trees Ask and Embla into human beings. The trees grew up from seeds which Yggdrasil had dropped into the earth. What took place at the creation of the first man takes place at the creation of every man. The fundamental part of every being buds, blossoms, and ripens into fruit on the branches of the world-overshadowing ash whence it is carried to women who want to be caressed by children. Vile, the lord of the fire-drill and the inflamer, places it in the bosom of the mothers.

One of the most remarkable creations of mythic fancy is the world-mill Grotti which the primeval artisans built in the underworld. The upper mill-stone is turned around by nine giantesses who walk along the edge of the earth and push a monstrous beam. With the mill-stone the firmament is also moved around.

By the friction of the mill-stone the holy fire was originated and with it the god Heimdall who thus is the holy fire impersonated. He was born in the image of a child by the nine giantesses who turn the world-mill by pushing the beam which is thus the first fire-drill. Vile, the inflamer and the supervisor of the world-mill, gives the same fire-drill to man after his creation.

C. Notes on Nature Myths

With this cursory perusal of the objects and phenomena of nature which interested primitive man and which irresistibly attracted his attention and called for some kind of explanation we may have gained a background on which to base an interpretation and conclusion as to his procedure and method in dealing with the external world. Let it not be understood, however, that the foregoing includes all the objects of interest and wonder to primitive man, nor that it arranges them in order of importance, because that is not so, since everything under the sun has, at some time or other, been the cause of speculation and interest. But those things enumerated may serve as examples of what busied his mind and therefore represent the trend of thought he usually followed in dealing with the world around him. That the explanations which he made do not concur with those given in modern time or that he did not follow the same kind of procedure in reaching his conclusions, ought not to cause any surprise or make us reject them, because the different conditions can not be compared. To deny originality and power of invention to primitive man would be to give ourselves away completely, for if anybody was original and inventive he was. But it is very difficult for modern man to divest himself of the preconceived idea of superiority and very easy for him to look down upon preceding ages as inferior. Inferior they may be but only relatively not absolutely; for if we judge each period or age in the light of the one just preceding, as we must do in order to be just and fair to all concerned, the conclusion to which we come, may be quite different, and the age of primitive man stand forth as the most remarkable and progressive of all. The historical setting must never be overlooked in judging the merits of a certain age. To compare twentieth century B. C. with twentieth century A. D. and then exult over the enlightenment of the latter at the expense of the former would be exceedingly unfair. Neither can we compare the people of each period with one another without taking the social standing as well as the personal character into consideration. A university president and a woodland farmer of to-day belong both to the twentieth century but to two different classes of people both in regard to social stand-

ing and mental development; but both are men and both may be Aryan.

That the influence of natural phenomena upon the mind of primitive man was great is certain, but still we might over-estimate this influence or emphasize one at the expense of another, perhaps equally important, in our attempts to unearth the different opinions that have come down to us, presumably from gray antiquity. No doubt many of the interpretations imposed upon our remote ancestors and ascribed to them are wrong and products of the imagination of comparatively modern times. Have we not in our endeavor to grasp the meaning of the records of primitive man's thought made them more intricate, complex, and too one-sided than they really are? There was a time and that time has hardly passed yet when almost every myth was considered a solar myth and almost every hero a solar hero just as if nothing but the sun existed for primitive man. Why all other phenomena and objects, and many of them concerned man more closely than the sun, were left unnoticed nobody seems to offer an explanation for, and still Mahaffy (52) remarks:

"I do not suppose that any ancient Aryan possessed with good digestive powers and endowed with sound common-sense ever lay awake half of the night wondering whether the sun would come back again."

And when Sir George Gray (quoted by Tylor, 79) told some of the Australian natives about countries where the sun never sets during part of the year

"their astonishment knew no bounds, and an old man said 'Ah that must be another sun, not the same as the one we see here;' and in spite of all my argument to the contrary the other adopted this opinion."

According to this theory Tell is a solar hero; Oedipus is the sun himself who slays his father Laios, the Night-demon, and in the evening is united to Jokasta, the Dawn, who gave birth to him in the morning, just as the Vedic Indra, the sun, born of Dahana (Daphne), the Dawn, whom he afterwards marries. To this Vedic story the Greeks, says Cox (14), added the rest "in order to satisfy a moral feeling." Thus Oedipus is exposed like Paris upon Ida, the earth which in this case is Caetheron,

"because the sunlight in the morning lies upon the hillside. The Sphinx is the storm-demon who sits on the cloud-rock and imprisons the rain.

. . . The omniscient sun comprehends the sense of her dark utterings and destroys her, as Indra slays Vitra bringing rain upon the parched earth."

The Erinyes are the personification of daylight

"which reveals the evil deeds done under the shadows of night. The grove of the Erinyes is the fairy net-work of clouds which are the first to receive and the last to lose the light of the sun in the mornings and evenings; hence although Oedipus dies in a thunderstorm yet the Eumenides are kind to him and his last hour is one of deep peace and tranquillity."

With all due respect for the sun and its influence upon the mind of primitive man, as well as for all curious interpretations of primitive legends that have come down to us, this solar interpretation seems nevertheless too narrow to be accepted. It leaves too many other phenomena out of account, although they may have been just as striking and mysterious to man in his early habitat as the sun. We have shown in the foregoing that the moon, although perhaps lesser in glory, has had a greater influence upon man's mind and career than the sun. The moon-lore is more prominent than the sun-lore in all parts of the world.

The tree seems to have been a very interesting object for primitive man, for all over the world we find temple groves, sacred groves, trees actually worshipped, world trees, sacred trees, life trees, etc., beside a great tree-lore. Quantz (62) makes an attempt to correlate all this with the theory that man or man's progenitors once upon a time lived in trees which therefore play such a great rôle in his life. Whether this is so or not the fact remains that the tree has occupied a very prominent place in man's thought from the earliest time.

If it is permissible to judge from present day data to past experiences the returns to President Hall's (38) Questionnaire on Fear show a very interesting fact. The objects most feared at present time are the lightning and, next in order, the serpents. Why lightning and serpents should be feared so out of proportion to their real danger is a very interesting question and President Hall suggests, and Quantz takes up the suggestion, that this may be atavistic and due to the arboreal condition of primitive man, because in that kind of life he was more liable to injury both by lightning and snakes, since light-

ning strikes more often the trees than the open ground and serpents were among the few enemies that could follow him up into his primitive habitat. This may be only theories and attempts at an explanation and as such have little value, but the fact remains that lightning and thunder have exerted a tremendous influence upon man's mind during all times. The peculiar rôle that the serpent plays in man's life from primitive time to to-day is intelligible only as a relic of preceding animal or early human stages. Chamberlain maintains (48) that "man's attention to him is a reflex of the great pre-human struggle between mammals and reptiles, in which the ancestors of our human races won their lasting victory."

Then, take water, that magic fluid which made the dry ground fruitful and which quenched the thirst after the long journey and refreshed the wearied had a wonderful power over primitive mind. Almost all primitive races derived everything from water long before Thales began to philosophize upon the origin of all things. The creation myths show that in the beginning there was water as one of the most important elements if not the only one. Rivers of life and living waters are found all over the world. But neither Thales nor anybody else in ancient time conceived of water as the medium in which everything originated in the same sense as does modern science. When we say that, or try to read modern evolution and scientific thought into their systems, we simply impose ourselves upon them and make them say what they never meant to say or even imply in their sayings. That modern discoveries have corroborated some of their thoughts is purely accidental as far as their explanation of the phenomena is concerned. The fact that this happened to be right has put them in a place where they will be remembered and praised for their ingenuity and foresight, while things which were perhaps just as ingenious have been forgotten or mentioned as fancies and follies of primitive time.

Let us once for all strongly emphasize that every myth is human in its origin and import whatever may have been its development and application in later times. Man, as the generic human being, is the basis of all myths, he who in himself is a microcosmos not only of speculative thought from the Greek thinkers to modern time but of primitive man as well. He was the basis of his deductions, for deduction was the kind of logic

he used long before Aristotle formulated his; he was the key to the universe with which all the mysteries could be opened and explained. Thus long before Protagoras formulated his maxim *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* and made that the cornerstone of the Sophistic philosophy primitive man had applied the same principle to the world around him. His own make-up in body and mind with all the physical and psychical attributes and properties which belonged to him served as a measure which he unhesitatingly applied to everything around him. And what else could he do? His mind cried for an explanation, an answer to the questions which forcibly presented themselves. He was himself nearest, and nothing was more natural than to reason from analogy to himself. The same procedure has been followed during all ages and is prevalent to-day. Quantz's assertion: "We *must* judge others by ourselves; there is no other way," has a wide application and was utilized by primitive man to the utmost. The physical and mental properties which he knows to be his own he applies to the rest of the world and makes everything like himself in this respect. If he errs in his application and hence in his interpretation it is not the fault of his desire to understand, nor of his standard of measurement, but of his knowledge. The Sophists made the same mistake when they assumed that man individually was the measure of all things. The same fallacy is committed by all people of all ages who judge everything and everybody by themselves without taking the individual or racial differences into consideration. Man, as man, the generic being, no doubt is the measure of all things but in a quite different way from what both Protagoras, the Sophists, and primitive man understood. His endowment, his attainment, his position makes him as man worthy of that distinguished rank but not as an individual.

When a phenomenon first became conscious to primitive man, he, as Boas so aptly says, "ransacked all his store of knowledge to find something that would fit the peculiar situation" and explain it satisfactorily to his mind. He might have seen the same phenomenon before but it never occurred to him to explain it. He was unconscious of the significance and bearing it had upon his own life and in what relation it stood to him and therefore did not see it. In this way both the thing

explained and the thing explaining are older than their new interrelation, their mythological significance.

But as soon as he became conscious of the fact that something grew just as he did he drew the conclusion that it must have life as he had, or be as he was, with the same sensations and feelings as he had; when he became conscious of the fact that something moved he inferred that it must have the same power of locomotion as he had; and when he consciously saw that something acted in the same way as he, purposely, he concluded that volition and purpose guided the action as it did his own. Primitive man did not need to have more than these three factors growth, motion, and purposive action, in order to explain the whole universe after his fashion. From those cases in which these were manifest he inferred that everything else must be in the same way endowed with the same properties with which he and other objects were endowed. Therefore, when a tree grew, a river flowed, and an animal acted, they were prompted by the same powers that made him grow, move, and act. Says Hewitt (43): "By primitive man all motions and all activities were interpreted as manifestations of life and will." That some things did neither grow, nor move, nor make any other sign of life did not cause him to doubt his own interpretation. For, says Hewitt, "things animate and things inanimate were comprised in one heterogeneous class, sharing a common nature." He, as Baldwin (4) says of the child, projected himself into the external world and strictly interpreted it in terms of himself. For this reason he understood the winds as either personifications of some individuals nearly related as in the myths of some of the Indians, but more often they were the breath of a mighty being who was sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, as among the Australians. The noise which the birds make when they rise from the ground resembles somewhat a distant thunder, especially if they are large, and primitive man seized the opportunity and said that the thunder was the flapping of the wings of a large thunder-bird. Thus he explains one phenomenon with the help of another.

In this way the natural objects were personified or endowed with the same powers and attributes as man. Behind the natural phenomena were placed powerful beings who acted in them. Sometimes the natural objects were handled by powerful

individuals as the sun and the moon in the Norse mythology. All natural phenomena were at some time or other attributed to somebody, although this does not appear plainly in all cases, and all natural objects were sometime endowed with human faculties. Or, as Klaatsch (48) maintains, the mental process was the other way around and persons were elementarised, instead of the elements being personified. In this way there is a difference between the natural objects and the natural phenomena.

Everything had thus a soul of its own or perhaps better shared in the soul common to all and was prompted by the same motives. Everything was subject to the same feelings and emotions. Friendship and hostility existed among the different entities or beings that bepeopled the universe. The sun pursued the moon and the moon the sun, somewhere in a pleasant, somewhere in an unpleasant mood. Everything was subject to the same weaknesses and could be helped by concerted action. When adversities or accidents happened to man in his business, when something went wrong or contrary to his plans, the cause was always sought in the hostile feelings of some beings who had to be warded off either by friendly action or by force of arms. The antagonists must either be placated or conquered in some way. For this reason sacrifices were offered, tricks were played, and the best results obtained in the best way possible.

Thus we see that the interpretations which man made of the phenomena around him were derived from his own life. Activities which he was engaged in were attributed to things around him, the heavenly bodies above him, and, later on, to the more specific gods. What he did others must do, as he felt others must feel, and in the same circumstances he lived others must also live. So completely analogous was his reasoning, so completely deductive was his logic that it took him a long time to think of anything different from himself. Says Hewitt (43):

“All things, therefore, were thought to have life and to exercise will, whose behests were accomplished through orenda—that is through magic power, reputed to be inherent in all things. Thus all phenomena, all changes, and all activities were interpreted as result of magic power directed by some controlling mind.”

This mind was considered the ultimate source of all things

and consequently inhabited all things and made them powerful agencies for good and for evil. We find the same tendency in the child of to-day. The stone that breaks the doll, the door that hits the head, or the chair that tumbles over are all living agencies, conscious of what they are doing, and a certain satisfaction is felt in seeing them punished. But whether this is a remnant of primitive thought or caused by the surroundings is a question difficult to settle.

The idea that this supersensuous agent, the soul, was a separate entity which could leave the body and journey to lands far off and return with wonderful tidings originated in all probability in the dreams. In these dream-excursions the soul met other souls, conversed with them and came back to tell the story. That this phenomenon had a remarkable effect upon the plastic mind of primitive man is certain. To it may be traced not only the belief in a soul as a separate entity, but also the belief in spirits with whom man could communicate and who could inspire and influence him as well as reveal the unknown.

The idea of immortality may also have got a strong impetus from the same source but it may have grown out of the struggle for existence unconsciously. The mysterious is always a great notion-producer and when reality is not known most everything is mysterious.

These facts given there is but one step to the formation of gods who were also made by primitive man in his own image, with attributes and characteristics like himself. This step was taken when man felt his inability to cope with a given situation and perceived stronger and more mysterious powers than his own. That the gods were or became greater than he was a necessary result of his inability to master a given situation, and of the feeling of dependence which man got during his long infancy and which Schleiermacher (39) defines as religion, as well as from the idea of co-operation developed later in life. It was necessary to anthropomorphize the gods in order to understand them, and this tendency is clearly illustrated in all ancient as well as in the more modern religions. And we are not yet able to divest our gods of the human attributes which our ancestors gave them. Perhaps it is impossible, for we may not be able to conceive of any gods except in anthropomorphic terms.

Therefore, the personal is the most important part in primitive religion and without this there could be no religion, and the relation between man and his gods was purely personal. Fear which has played and still does such a large rôle in the explanation of the origin of religion and the creation of the gods, is surely only a secondary factor and at best only one among several. Fear of the gods could not have created the gods, as Brinton (10) rightly says, but conscious volition and purposive acting is the foundation upon which the gods are reared. They could not have been feared before they had been conceived of even if the Lange-James theory of emotions be applied to them. We must not confuse the origin of religion with the origin or first conception of the gods. It might therefore very well be a strong factor in the origin of religion but have nothing to do with the origin of the gods. And as Klaatsch says, "the fear of the influence of a powerful dead man, especially a shaman, is the embryonal stage of fear of god present in the highest religious system." There is thus the personal element present in the beginnings of all religions and in the first conception of the gods. And Robertson Smith (72) has shown that fear did not enter into the primitive religions to any great extent. This is a comparatively modern idea and belongs especially to Christianity. The idea of sin was not clearly developed in primitive times, and punishment could consequently not be conceived of. The gods were feared mostly for their own sake because they were capable of both good and evil. With the endowment of conscious volition given, fear certainly entered in as a factor in the development of religion as well as of worship.

There is still another factor which played a great rôle in the origin of the gods and their worship, namely *desire*, purely selfish and generically human. This desire was manifest in man's wanting to get away from an enemy, to reach safety and to satisfy his own wants and pleasures. For instance, when he was down on the ground and an enemy appeared, is it too much to assume that he manifested a distinct desire to get back to the tree where he felt more at home and where he could ward off the enemies more easily? This is not purely conjectures either for in the primitive religions the tree occupies so large a place which is difficult to explain without recourse

to some such theory as this. Even if man's progenitors took to the ground before he became man, he might nevertheless have resorted to the tree in times of danger habitually and thus begin to worship it first of all objects that afterwards entered into his religious consciousness and became a part thereof. This desire was of course not limited to the idea of reaching the tree but extended to other fields and activities as well. It prompted man to obedience and submission and gave him a powerful stimulus to try to obtain whatever his desire led him to.

But when primitive man had his gods ready, they felt as he did, but in a greater measure; the same motives that prompted him, prompted also them; and the same desire that stimulated him, stimulated them. Nothing that man felt, did, or was, or was stimulated by, was too low or too high for the gods. Furthermore, man's social organisations and institutions were also ascribed to them. As he was born into this world, so were they. Each god had his father and his mother, just as man, although there was some difficulty in accounting for all of them, because they were so many and their pedigrees somewhat uncertain. How the first one came into existence was a difficult problem to solve. The Hebrews assumed that they were eternal; the Scandinavians that the creating principle was eternal and that the gods sprung from that in due course of time. Almost invariably man was created by his gods in some way or other. The gods were married, had families, and were led by sexual desire to commit horrible things which we must not call crimes, because they were committed by the gods. That all these conceptions were derived from man's own domain is certain. Such as he was, such were also his gods, and as he lived, so did they also live. They were a mere copy on a large scale of himself. They were real and entirely human but belonged to the realm of the unknown and consequently gave room for the play of the human imagination.

If man was mortal, his gods were mortal and doomed to die, if nothing intervened. But to prevent their growing old and subsequent death a remedy was discovered. Thus the Scandinavian gods ate of Iduna's apples, the Hindu gods drank the immortal Soma, and the Greek gods partook of the divine nectar to gain this prerogative. When this elixir was denied them they grew old and feeble. But in the long run this elixir

was not strong enough to maintain them. They died, anyway, died a natural death, not only Pan, the great, whose death was publicly announced and greatly lamented, but the rest of them, Zeus, Odin, Hera, Freya, and those left are in the process of dying. This terrible catastrophe could not take place at once but was brought about by a slow process which kept pace somewhat with the development of man's thinking and reasoning power, for when man begins to think and reason the gods tremble in the jaws of death.

In this process we may distinguish three or four different stages more or less clearly marked out. In the first conception of the gods the object was the god and the god was the object. Later on the gods were imminent in the object or phenomenon which thus came to represent them. Still later the gods disappeared entirely from the object and took up their abodes far off in the cloudy heavens or on the lofty mountains from where they still visited man now and then and still acted in the phenomena. At this stage most of the more carefully worked out theogonies were shaped and preserved. But what brought about this change? Simply the fact that man began to doubt his first inference and became more conscious of the significance and right meaning of the objects and phenomena. And since the god-idea was so strongly associated with his own self that he could not get rid of it, the only thing to do was to remove the gods to a place where his present knowledge could not reach them. As a result of this removal of the gods they became dimmer, and again as a result of this symbolism arose, since man could not live without some visible or tangible representation of his gods. An object of some kind was chosen to represent the gods or symbolize them. Thus animals, trees, stones, etc., were chosen as symbols of the gods and worshipped and revered as such.

That this change was slow, slower in some people than in other, is certain. But the human mind which always yearns for more light but reluctantly accepts it when it comes, was set agoing and could not be stopped in its onward march. Fetichism, the gods of the individual as contrasted with the gods of the race, had to give away for the gods of the community or race as soon as the individual became subordinate to the society and his actions permissible only in so far as they

served the common good, although both may have originated from the same idea. In the struggle for existence which not even the gods escape, the weaker gods had to give away for the stronger, that is to say for those of the stronger society, and in themselves absorbed the characteristics of the weaker which were closely related to theirs. In this way they became a condensation of characteristics and a differentiation of these as well as of functions. A particular field of action was assigned to each one. This process continued till the monotheistic stage was reached in the human culture and the evil gods degraded to demons or evil spirits.

The unity of the godhead, says Jevons (44), was logically implied from the beginning in the conception of personal power, greater and higher than man. This may be so, but it may also be regarded as a natural development in the struggle for existence, or as Nietzsche has more aptly expressed it: "The Will to Power," which is a far better expression for the same idea. This includes not only a mere existence with which no normal being is content; not only a will to live in Schopenhauer's sense, but to live abundantly, to power. And as soon as and in the same degree as this will to power becomes conscious in the human race the downfall of the gods is certain. One by one they are eliminated and the remaining become an abstraction too far away for the human being to reach.

IV. HERO MYTHS, OR CULTURE MYTHS

As has been said before no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between the nature myths and the culture myths because they overlap somewhat, as for instance in the Mexican theory of the present sun. But there is a large number of distinct culture myths, and it is to these that the Freudian method of psycho-analysis has been especially applied. Thus Freud himself has analyzed the Oedipus myth and given the clue to the Prometheus and Hamlet myths later worked out by Abraham (1) and Jones, respectively. Rank (63) has analyzed a large number of hero-myths and gives a "Durchschnittssage" of all the hero-myths as follows:

"The hero is the child of prominent parents, mostly the son of a king. Difficulties precede his birth as abstinence or long infertility or secret intercourse of the parents in consequence of prohibition or obstacles.

During the pregnancy or even before comes a prediction (dream, oracle) which warns for his birth and threatens mostly the father with injury. As a result of this it is decided to expose the new-born child mostly upon the request of the father or a person who represents him. As a rule he is given over to the water in a small casket. Then he is rescued either by animals or poor people (shepherds) and nourished by a female animal or a simple woman. Grown up he finds his prominent parents in a very circumscribed way, avenges himself on his father, is recognized and becomes great and famous."

Not all hero-myths correspond to this description in all particulars but in general the fundamental traits in all of them conform to this. This universality of general features has led to the assumption that they must spring from a general source and develop in a certain way, and that the same psychic forces are at work in all of them.

But not only have the culture myths as such been invaded by the Freudians. The same process has been applied to literature in general and to poetry in special, as well as fine and plastic arts. Thus Freud has analyzed Jensen's *Gradiva* (33) and Leonardo da Vinci (34); Graf has analyzed Wagner's *Der Fliegende Holländer* (35); Rank, the *Lohengrin* saga (64); Abraham, Giovanni Segantini (2); Phister, Ludwig von Zinzen-dorf (60) and so forth, so that this kind of literature is steadily increasing.

It would perhaps be well to give the outlines of the analysis of the Oedipus myth as given by Freud (28) as an example of both the subject matter of the sagas and the factors at work in the formation of them, according to the Freudian psycho-analysis. To be sure not all culture myths seem to correspond to this one in particulars but that depends mostly upon the fact that certain parts of the myths may in some cases be better concealed than in others and therefore not so easily seen.

"Oedipus, son of Laios, king of Thebes, and of Jocasta, is exposed as infant, because an oracle had told the father that the still unborn child should be his murderer. But he is rescued and grows up as son of the king of another country (Corinth). Being uncertain as to his parents he asked the oracle and received the answer to shun his home, because he was destined to murder his father and marry his mother. On the way from his supposed home he met king Laios and killed him in a precipitated strife. He came then to Thebes where he solved the riddle of the Sphinx who blocked the way and as a reward was elected king by the Thebans and given Jocasta as wife. He ruled a long time with peace and dignity and had with his wife two sons and two daughters.

But a plague broke out which caused the Thebans to resort to the oracle again and received the answer that the plague would cease when the murderer of Laios was banished from the country."

"The treatment of the case consists now in an unfolding step by step—comparable of the work of a psycho-analysis—that Oedipus himself is the murderer of Laios and son of the murdered and Jocasta. Grieved by his act, unknowingly committed, he blinds himself and leaves his country."

Judging from the fascinating influence which this tragedy and others similar to it has exerted upon the human mind during all ages Freud concludes that they must contain something which calls up a related feeling in all of us. This he finds in the sexual emotions which he judges from their universality and strength to exert the strongest influence and to take often unassumed directions. Moreover, he concludes that "it was decreed for all of us perhaps to direct our first sexual emotions to the mother and the first hatred and violent wish to the father." And Abraham (1) remarks that "the tragedy contains the realization of two intimately connected childhood- or dream-fancies: the fancy of the death of the father and of the love relationship to the mother." Abraham leaves out one very important component of this constellation which is very closely related to it, namely, the wish to become great which is manifest in all culture myths. The sagas contain thus a wish-fulfilment, as Riklin (67) has so amply shown, acted out in fancy. This wish may persist into adult life and animate all endeavors to acquire new positions and make new expansions, and take expression in dreams and reveries. That neither the Oedipus myth nor anyone else of the culture myths are actual occurrences, nobody will contend, I presume. But, if they are not real in reality, they are nevertheless real in the fancy which has constructed them, and as such they portray the innermost feelings and emotions of the soul.

As is seen from the above and from other myths analyzed by the Freudians as well as from the culture myths in general, this kind of myths is a comparatively late upshoot in the human history. In the following we will trace their origin and development in the individual and society. That all culture myths are strongly emotional is a self-evident fact. They must therefore originate in strong emotions which take expressions in them. To my mind it does not make so much difference of

what kind these emotions are, only they fill the requirements and are adequate to the purpose. They thrive to be sure best in neurotic persons because they are more emotional.

1. *Sexual Emotions: the Child vs. the Parents*

If we go back far enough on the phyletic scale we come to a time when there were only two motive powers in the world: Nutrition and Reproduction, and to these all other activities owe their origin. Of these two factors hunger may be said to be the most primitive, because it appeared first on the phyletic scale. But as soon as there was nutrition there must also be reproduction of some kind or other and thus sex in the wider sense is almost if not quite as old as nutrition. As to the relative strength of these primordeal impulses there can be no question. The sexual impulse as exemplified in life is by far the strongest. Among the animals where the impulses have a greater freedom to exert their influence than in man we have many illustrious examples of this fact. The male spider which carefully watches for hours every move the female makes in order to catch the most opportune moment seldom survives the successful execution of his intentions and if he does escape minus a leg or something else he is just as eager and daring the next time. Other animals will watch without food even at the point of starvation, prompted by their sexual impulses, for an opportune moment to enjoy their gratification often at the expense of life. In man the sexual emotions are so checked that they no longer exert their real strength but even there they sometimes take on tremendous proportions. Says Ribot (65):

“Sexual instinct remains the center around which everything evolves, nothing exists but through it. Character, imagination, vanity, imitation, fashion, time, place, and many other individual circumstances or social influences give to love—as emotion or passion—an unlimited plasticity.”

And again:

“The sexual impulse is fatal, blind, not acquired, anterior to all experience,”

and Spencer remarks (74):

“This passion which unites the sexes . . . is habitually spoken of as though it were a simple feeling whereas it is the most compound and therefore the most powerful of all feelings.”

The age of puberty is the natural time for these impulses. At this time new ideas are formed and new associations of previously existing ideas are brought about. The individual self begins more than before to exert its rights and demand recognition. The opposition between the individual self and the social self becomes more marked and it is apparent that a great revolution is going on. The importance of this period is recognized by different races in the very elaborate tribal initiations into manhood and womanhood, that take place at this time. A conscious awakening of the self is taking place. But says Ribot:

“observation seems to show that, at a much earlier age, in the fifth and sixth year there are apt to occur (quoting Dallemagne) ‘unconscious genital impulses provoking association of ideas which frequently serve, in later years, as a *substratum* to our sentiments and volitions.’ ”

Bell (7) goes further than this and shows that what he calls sex love exists between boys and girls of three years of age and upwards. And Freud (29) maintains that

“a newborn child brings with it the germs of sexual feelings which continue to develop for some time and then succumb to progressive suppression which in turn is broken through by the proper advance of the sexual development and which can be checked by individual idiosyncrasies. Nothing is known about the lawfulness and periodicity of this oscillating course of development. It seems, however, that the sexual life of the child mostly manifests itself in the third or fourth year in some form accessible to observation.”

This period comes out prominently in der kleine Hans who at the age of three developed a strong sexual interest which manifested itself in various ways. Jung (46) has also given some illustrations of this, especially the Anna case.

The objects of the emotions of tenderness and love are in the first place the parents themselves. Then it may branch out to other persons, especially brothers and sisters or play-mates. It is a striking fact that the sexual feeling or love is generally directed to the opposite sex, although there can be no conscious appreciation of the anatomical differences between the sexes. Bell has shown this very plainly and Freud strongly maintains that the first object of our love was the parent of the opposite sex. Der kleine Hans showed a strong predisposition for his mother just as Elizabeth von R. and Anna did for their fathers. The same thing is seen in mythology. A male

child mutilates his father when he is going to embrace his mother, as for instance Cronus and Zeus. Schidlof found that the aborigines of Australia believed the child to be jealous of the father if not placed in a certain position with the mother (70).

This predisposition can not, of course, consciously materialize itself owing to several circumstances. In the first place the cause of attraction is unknown; and in the second place it goes against other feelings which manifest themselves 'and demand recognition. To postulate any moral consciousness at this age would be absurd. The children have their own moral standard as far as they have any at all and can therefore not be judged by the social code.

But this feeling of aversion toward the same and attraction toward opposite sex takes nevertheless some definite form in the child's mind. It may be clothed in symbols and concealed in words but shown in acts with a distinct meaning. The meaning of the symbols which are often very striking, may be vague, forgotten, or perhaps unknown and must be suggested in order to be recognized and remembered, but if this is done produce a feeling of certainty which reality alone can produce.

This phenomenon is perfectly normal, says Freud. It may take on abnormal development in neurotic and mentally weak children but in normal children there is no danger. It is an expression of the great psychic forces which are formed and transformed in the soul. After a while these forces subside, in a word are suppressed, and another period in the child's life begins. This period which Freud calls the "latency period" is of prime importance for the child's mental development. The sexual life and emotions are as it were latent, hence its name, but

"it is during this period of total or at least partial latency that the psychic forces develop which later act as inhibition on the sexual life and narrow its directions like dams. These psychic forces are loathing, shame, and moral and aesthetic ideation masses. . . . Surely education contributes much to it. In reality, however, this development is organically determined and can occasionally be produced without the help of education."

"These constructions so significant for later personal culture and normality are apparently brought about at the cost of the infantile

sexual emotions themselves, whose influx has not ceased even in the latency period, but whose energy, wholly or partly, has been switched off from sexual utilization and applied for other purposes."

This process is called sublimation and furnishes powerful components for all cultural accomplishments. The mechanism of this sublimation is built up by the fact that

"the sexual feelings of these infantile years were on the one hand not utilized, since the functions of procreation are postponed, which is the chief character of the latency period, and on the other hand they were in themselves perverse, i.e., emanated from erogenous zones and born of impulses which could only call forth sensations of unpleasantness in the course of the development of the individual. They call therefore up psychic forces which counteract them and which build up the above mentioned psychic dams: Loathing, Shame, and Morality, in order to suppress effectively the feelings of unpleasantness."

Binet (29) was the first to point out that the persistent influence of a sexual impression mostly received in early childhood often shows itself in selection of a fetich which may be of very diverse kind. And Freud points out that the sexual symbolism which uses the hand, foot, mouth, etc., as sexual objects "seems often to depend upon sexual experiences in childhood." These symbols were used in the same sense in ancient times.

The sexual impulses have played a great rôle in man's life from the very earliest times, as is seen in the myths of various peoples. A hasty reference to the religious life and ideas of primitive man, and even highly civilized peoples, will suffice to show this fact. Even if no pure phallic worship ever existed, which is doubtful, the part sex played in primitive religions is so prominent that it can not be overlooked.

Having thus shown the prevalence, strength, and direction of the sexual emotions in the child and primitive peoples and touched upon the forces which work for morality in the individual, the next step will be to show the forces at work in the suppression of these impulses and the result thereof.

2. *Development of Moral Ideas: The Individual vs. the Society*

Waitz (85) has very properly said:

"Whosoever would arrive at a just conception of man must not consider him exclusively as an individual being, for man is, as was well observed by Aristotle, a social being; as an individual he cannot be fully understood."

And Storfer (75) says:

"The individual—if we can at all imagine the splendid isolation of such a fictitious presocial being—creates no ethics and for him is no ethics created. He has, however, in the experience of pleasantness and unpleasantness, within certain limits, a more or less reliable leader for his behavior, a damper on his impulses, but first the living together creates the values good and bad."

Thus, as soon as two or more individuals began to live together the freedom of each was necessarily restricted by the rights of the other which must be respected and honored if the communion was going to be of mutual benefit. For this reason there was established some rules of conduct, perhaps unconsciously at first, which later developed into the written and unwritten codes which constitute the standard of behavior in a given community. What the society as such has come to regard as right or wrong the individuals have had to submit to and their behavior has been judged accordingly.

There has, however, always been certain individuals or classes of individuals who have been as it were immune and who have had privileges, either on account of their position or on account of their profession, which have not been accorded other individuals, for instance the dancing girls and temple prostitutes connected with religious observance whose business has always been regarded as proper by the society in which it has flourished.

In the evolution of ethical ideas pleasantness and unpleasantness, modesty and shame have played a great rôle, indeed are their very roots. We find them even in the animal world where the female coyness must be regarded as a kind of modesty which however is overcome when the sexual emotions prevail. This shows that modesty and sexual emotions are very closely related and that the former is the offspring of the latter which arise simultaneously with consciousness of true sexual life. The facts certainly point this way at least in the human being. The child has no modesty except in so far as he has been taught by his elder associates, until the time of puberty when the sexual emotions with their accompaniments begin to assert themselves. Perez (57) has shown that modesty may appear very early if the sexual desire appears early. And Hall and Allin (40) think that

“it is hard to find all the causes of modesty and shame, but it is certain that very much of what is best in religion, art, and life owes its charm to the progressively widening irradiation of the sexual feelings.”

It seems therefore fair to assume that modesty began to arise when consciousness of sex began to develop an awareness of that anatomical and physiological difference between the individuals which is necessary for the propagation of the species and the complete happiness of the individuals.

The idea maintained by Sergi (71) and others that the feeling of modesty and shame is the result of clothing, does not differentiate between the physiological and the anatomical modesty, the former of which is by far the earlier, and is not substantiated by the facts, for people like the Guanches, Puris, South Sea Islanders, etc., go about absolutely naked or nearly so and still possess a highly developed sense of modesty. And Waitz relates that “some Indians on the Orinoco where both men and women go about naked, were at first ashamed to wear clothes as it seemed to them indecent to appear before strangers unpainted.”

That clothing has an intimate relation to the feeling of sex is beyond question. The dress is often regarded as a strong sexual stimulant. Westermarck (86) has emphasized this side of the concealment idea and regards modesty as the result rather than the cause of clothing, which was adopted, he thinks, to give prominence to the sexual organs, not primarily to conceal them, for “savage men and women in various ways endeavoured to make themselves attractive to the opposite sex:—by ornamenting, mutilating, painting and tattooing themselves,” and the time especially chosen for this purpose is the age of puberty.

The custom to clothe or conceal any part of the body and especially the primary and secondary sexual characteristics had in all probability a psychic origin in the sexual emotions. It must be remembered that physiological modesty precedes anatomical and that its primary factors existed and were discovered long before any ornamentation and clothing were invented. Furthermore, the clothing of primitive peoples in most instances does not fulfil the idea of concealment and consequently can not serve as a factor averting shame. It is probable that this, like ornaments which indeed it is, had only a sexual signifi-

cance in the first place and served as an attraction and thus came to be propagated as a powerful factor in the attainment of a specific end. Then when and where other circumstances as environment and climate as well as social conditions made clothing necessary and its adoption to the full extent imperative, this feeling of modesty was transferred to and suffused with clothing, which although a secondary development has played an important rôle in the evolution of moral ideas, a rôle which must not be underestimated, only recognized as secondary.

The place which sympathy has taken in the development of moral instincts has been emphasized by Sutherland (76) who maintains that parental care is the well-spring of the same from which they have risen with all "accompanying accessories, the sense of duty, the feeling of self-respect, the enthusiasm of both the tender and the manly ideal of ethic beauty." Ferenczi (22) has pointed out the psychic components of sympathy when he says

"that an unconscious sexual disposition constitutes the foundation of every sympathetic feeling and that when two persons meet (either of the same or opposite sex) the unconscious makes always the attempt of transference. If the unconscious succeeds in making this transference pleasant to the conscious either in purely sexual (erotic) or in sublimated, concealed form (respect, gratitude, friendship, esthetic satisfaction), then sympathy arises between the two. If the foreconscious replies with a negative to the always positive unconscious pleasure there originates antipathy which is, in relation to the strength of the two factors, of different degrees up to disgust."

Freud's (31) Dora case is a typical example of this but no exception.

Some emphasis has been laid upon the feeling of disgust as a powerful factor in the development of modesty, shame and moral ideas. Richet (19) came to the conclusion that disgust arose from the sense that something was useless and dangerous. And Crawley (15) has shown that eating in public came to be looked upon by primitive man with the same kind of feeling, and consequently was forbidden among certain tribes. This prohibition "occurs at puberty" which "serve to bring into relief the idea that danger from the other sex is apprehended at this period." Havelock Ellis (19) maintains also that "the fear of

arousing disgust is the ultimate and most fundamental element in modesty."

The moral concepts which are based on the emotions of approval of the good and disapproval of the bad or wrong, pleasantness and unpleasantness, have developed according to natural selection and are states of mind useful, as a rule, to the organism which accepts them. Wrong implies pain and good assures pleasure and benefit to the same organism. Consequently what furthered and helped him along in the struggle for existence came to be looked upon as good and had the approval of this same organism while that which caused him pain or was a hindrance in his development was looked upon as bad and wrong and disapproved of. The feeling of pleasantness and unpleasantness, of help and hindrance, lies thus at the bottom of all moral concepts which could not, however, arise before the individual with his pleasantness and unpleasantness became subordinate to that of the group or society.

Those who regard the intellect as the source of moral concepts, hold that moral emotions arise only in consequence of moral judgment and that the character of the emotion is determined by the predicate of the judgment. To this Westermarck replies: "moral emotions cannot be ascribed as resentment or retributive kindness called forth by moral judgments" and "moral judgments could never have been pronounced unless there had been moral emotions antecedent to them." The moral judgment does not involve any self-interest, at least not openly, which shows that it is a characteristic of moral concepts as such, from which we may conclude that the emotions are felt disinterestedly. But the moral judgments are only apparently impartial, not fundamentally so, because we have greater obligations to some people than to others. They aim, however, at impartiality as well as at generality at least within a given group of people or a tribe, but they can never lay claim on universality, because one group may have developed along wholly different lines from another and therefore have wholly different moral concepts.

In early society as well as in smaller societies of to-day there is practical unanimity in regard to what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong. For this reason such a solidarity has come about that each member considers all others

like himself and regards any harm or good done them as done to himself. The pleasantness and unpleasantness is the same for the individual and the group. In larger societies where the membership and the complexity in organization is greater this solidarity and oneness is not so conspicuous and perhaps not so necessary in the struggle for existence but it is there nevertheless and at an adequate stimulus is ready to assert itself.

Therefore, whether an act shall be approved of or not depends upon the moral concepts and these again depend upon the lines along which a given society has developed. If the society has said that a certain kind of clothing is necessary in order to conform to the standards of modesty and morality, the casting off of that kind of apparel will be stigmatized as wrong and treated accordingly. The act may be harmless in itself but nevertheless cause disgust and disapproval and make the society inflict punishment upon the agent. The liking and disliking of the neighbours affect man easily, especially if he is of an emotional nature. Thus society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness, and the tribal customs are the earliest rulers of duty and can therefore not be regardlessly interfered with. This is seen in both primitive and modern society. The Greenlanders conceived of the idea of virtue as something pleasing to the Europeans when they tried to acquaint them with their own moral conceptions. And Westermarck (86) remarks: "The Bedouins of the Euphrates make no appeal to conscience or the will of the gods in their distinction between right and wrong but appeal only to custom." In the lower stages of civilization, especially, custom is a tyrant that binds man in adamantine fetters and threatens the transgressor with public disgrace and bodily suffering. "Custom," says Westermarck, "is fixed once for all and takes no notice of the preference of the individuals." Customs do change, to be sure, but by recognizing them I recognize their binding force and make myself one of their supporters. But since not all persons are alike there is sure to be some opposition in the individual against some custom which interferes with his feelings and personal interests. As a result these must be disregarded if the custom exerts the stronger influence, as is generally the case. The stronger the feelings and interests are and the more powerful the customs and traditions are the more intense will the conflict be that

takes place in the person's mind between the personal feelings and interests and the social customs and traditions, and the more far-reaching the results. And so powerful is the influence of moral approval or disapproval exerted by society in its customs and traditions that under ordinary circumstances the personal feelings and interests will have to give away without regard for the consequences. These may not even be taken into consideration at all. The whole process may be infra-conscious or only partly conscious, but even if the conflict is fully conscious and the struggle between the individual's emotions and the opinions of society is carried on with a full meaning of its import, the individual generally follows the ordinary course of events and regards customs and traditions the superior masters and the indignation and resentment felt by society toward such an act as he is inclined to commit too powerful to cope with. The import and far-reaching consequences of this conflict, from which we can infer the strength of both the individual emotion and the custom and opinion of society as well as the seriousness of the struggle, are seen in the torments of the conscientious soul who has yielded to his emotions and committed an act disapproved of by society. In extreme cases sanity is in the balance, life is not worth living, and not even death is a perfect consoler. The feeling of public resentment and disapproval is much more potent and conspicuous than that of approval. The latter is always taken as a matter of course and very seldom publicly recognized while the former occupies a very prominent place in every society. The individual merely disappears in the steadily flowing stream until he commits an act that obstructs the smooth flow and sets society aghast. Then he is at once noticed and the proper consequences follow.

The fact that a man who transgresses the customs and traditions of a given society is punished even to the extent of being excluded from the society or tribe and even put to death undoubtedly impressed itself upon the mind of the individual with all the might and rigour possible. Westermarck (86) and Steinmetz (quoted by Westermarck) have related many instances where expulsion was meted out to those who committed a sexual offence. Van Wrede (quoted by Westermarck) states that after a period of three days which was given the offender by the Bedouins of Hadhramaut in which to escape, any man could

kill him wherever he found him. Spencer and Gillen (73), and Frazer (25) tell the same story in regard to the Australians except in their cases a special board of executioners was generally appointed by the elders. And many cases are recorded in which the sense of duty and allegiance to the opinion of society was so strong that the offenders gave themselves up to justice and if sentenced to death but let go free till the day of execution on that day presented themselves ready to pay the penalty for the offence. That this would be impossible without a strong sense of guilt and an unshaken belief in the infallibility of the customs and traditions of the society is clear. Even those who, in a well-meant effort to raise society to a higher level and inject new ideas into the old forms, have disregarded public opinion, have often fallen prey for the same unlimited and never-to-be-forgotten or disregarded power. This shows the influence which society has had over the individual's life and thought, especially the more emotional ones who are always apt to take the customs and traditions more seriously than others. They adhere strictly to what is publicly regarded as right and avoid conscientiously everything regarded as wrong. But it is just these emotional beings who most frequently come into conflict with the standards of society. Their emotions are strong and therefore difficult to control and the channels approved of by society in which they can find an outlet very narrow. Moreover, those who have a strong emotional nature have also a strong imagination and these two supply them with impulses and ideas which not seldom come at variance with society. As a result they have to choose between either acting out their impulses contrary to the customs and traditions and take the consequences, or else suppress them. In the first case it might mean death, expulsion from society, or at best disgrace for life; in the second it might mean a cramped soul with all its consequences. It is needless to say that both courses have been taken; and it depends upon the individual and the circumstances at the moment which course will be chosen in each particular case. If the public disapproval and the moral consciousness of the individual are strongly developed and other circumstances favor it he chooses to inhibit his impulses, but if the public disapproval and the moral consciousness

are weak and other circumstances favor it he acts them out. The result in each case depends upon his own make-up as well as upon the circumstances under which the act was committed. As a rule, however, the impulses are not acted out but struggled with and suppressed, merely because it would cause greater pain to act them out. The whole question falls thus back upon the idea of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. In this way a great deal of our emotional and intellectual life is suppressed and never allowed to take form in our daily life. How much of our mental life shares this fate is of course impossible to say. It depends upon the individual himself and the society in which he lives. But what is thus suppressed soon leaves the field of consciousness. In course of time perhaps the struggle between the emotions and public standards, the process of suppression, becomes unconscious and takes place as a matter of course, on account of the continued allegiance to the prevailing custom. In most cases there may however remain a fleeting experience of something coming up in consciousness but as strange and unconventional is forthwith thrust back into the subconscious again and is soon forgotten. Freud and his school have repeatedly pointed out that we forget sooner a painful experience than a pleasant and this is corroborated by Peters (58) and others. Our daily life is full of the same thing. We try to expel from our consciousness all unconventional thoughts and unpleasant experiences and exhort others to do so too. If we otherwise mean anything by all this there must be something in it.

This process of expelling and forgetting the unpleasant and unconventional can also be explained on physiological and evolutionary grounds. A stimulus that has caused pleasant reactions tends to be repeated while one that has caused unpleasant tends to be avoided. This causes in the case of a pleasant reaction more and closer associations as well as easier passage along the lines laid out, while an unpleasant experience which does not tend to be repeated must necessarily cause fewer associations and have a more difficult passage along the nervous paths, and are consequently crowded out of consciousness faster and more easily than the pleasant ones. Moreover, the organism as a whole reacts more favorably to pleasant stimuli than to

unpleasant and therefore makes them predominant in consciousness. As a result they are more easily recalled. Jung (46) has shown that the reaction time of the unpleasant stimuli is either longer or wholly absent which shows the predominance of pleasant associations. This holds true both in regard to physical and moral unpleasantness because, as Ribot says, there is no difference between moral and physical pain as such, moral pain being

"the beginning of mental disorganization just as physical pain is the beginning of physical disorganization. . . . Everything that suppresses or impedes them (the needs, appetites, the physical or psychic tendencies) is translated into pain,"

and treated as such.

Prince (61) and Chase (13) seem to think that we associate the unpleasant feelings with something in order to drain them and so rid ourselves of them. If that were the case there could not be any question of suppression because they were drawn out and not suppressed. But this can hardly be so because we do not as a rule associate a painful experience or thought with anything for by so doing we strengthen the pain and not drain it. If we think of something else after a painful experience it is not because we want to connect the pain with it but because we want to crowd the painful experience out of our minds, of consciousness, suppress it, if you please, by more readily formed associations. Furthermore, the experiments by Aschaffenburg (3), Jung and Riklin (67) which seem to show that the closer we get to the margin of consciousness the more associations are there of form and less of content, show also that our association of the unpleasant with something else is the content kind and not of form, because we are never more conscious than when an unpleasant experience occurs to us. If therefore we tried to get rid of our unpleasant experiences by associating them with something else, that something would strengthen the same experiences and keep them longer in consciousness and more vividly as well as tend to call them up whenever this something occurred to consciousness again. That this happens is one thing and may be recognized but whether it is the general mode of procedure is another, and it certainly seems not to be.

3. *The Freudian Conception of Consciousness.*

The foregoing discussion will necessarily turn our attention to the Freudian conception of consciousness and especially to that part of it which is called the "subconscious" or "unconscious" which is, of course, not strictly a Freudian term. Freud includes in the mechanism of the subconscious 1, traces of past experiences which may be recalled to consciousness at will; 2, processes like the conscious but unconscious to the subject, and 3, complexes which have sunk so far below the threshold of consciousness as to be incapable of recall to consciousness at will. But instead of dividing the subconscious into three parts or layers Freud includes the first two under a common head, the *Vorbewusste*, the foreconscious, because consciousness in both of them is an exception and not a rule, but they are capable of being recalled, and gives the third the name *Unbewusste*, unconscious proper, or preconscious, as it is also called, because its contents have sunk beyond voluntary recall and are made up of complexes foreign to our immediate customs and habits of thinking.

The ideas and complexes of the preconscious or unconscious proper are the background of our mental life. They do not penetrate into consciousness, however strong they may become, but since they have a certain dynamic character, and grow active at the least provocation, they always exert their influence upon consciousness which manifests itself in various ways, as for instance in the execution at a prescribed time of a suggestion made in a hypnotic state, and the errors in memory and speech, forgetting names, etc., and hundreds of cases in abnormal and hysterical persons.

The foreconscious which is made up of recent pleasurable experiences in conformity with our customs and habits of thinking and in which most of our thinking goes on, serves as a censor upon the preconscious ideas and complexes and suppresses them as soon as they try to enter consciousness. The ideas contained in the foreconscious may become conscious either by voluntary recall or by adequate stimulation, but the foreconscious admits only that to consciousness which is in conformity with its contents. All the rest is thrown back into the preconscious from whence it came, that is to say, is suppressed. But the preconscious ideas are dynamic and hence active and

can not very readily be gotten rid of. They try to get into consciousness indirectly, take on another form, disguise themselves in some way or other in order to escape the censoring action of the foreconscious.

Freud thus looks at the psyche dynamically and postulates two systems of energy representing the preconscious and the foreconscious. The first system is sensory and is discharged by a sort of blind impulse which he calls wish and which is seen everywhere in the effort to seek pleasure and avoid pain. It tries to represent pleasure as vividly as possible and sometimes reaches the level of hallucinations by a retrograde process which tends to dramatize the complex. The second system of energy is quite different and develops slowly with the individual. It seeks satisfaction in motor discharges which function automatically in a simple situation but in a more complex develop thought as a substitute of activity. It takes account of both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli but an idea which would cause too much unpleasantness the foreconscious represses into the preconscious.

These two systems of energy which, as Freud thinks, constitute our real psyche, produce all psychic phenomena. The energy tends always to discharge and such ideas and complexes as possess a high degree of tension "tend to press through and become material for the perception of consciousness" (28). But since some ideas and impulses have been suppressed into the preconscious because they were accompanied by pain the foreconscious will not allow them to pass through or to discharge their energy for the same reason for which they were suppressed in the first place. They can not be suppressed continually, however, because they are dynamic. Their energy is therefore transferred to other ideas or complexes which in some way resemble them and which thus symbolize them without having their painful aspect. These are not recognized on their face value as carriers of the forbidden energy and escape therefore the foreconscious censor. In this act of *Verschiebung* the emphasis is laid on something quite different from that to which it really belongs. The emotional value is thus retained but the process takes time and the surrogate does not appear until some time afterwards.

In the effort to present the contents of the unconscious to

consciousness several ideas or traumas are condensed into one, the so-called act of *Verdichtung*, which is thereby "überdeterminiert." It may contain for instance in a dream one part of the body of one person and another part of another person, with the head of a third, the voice of the fourth, and the manners of a fifth, etc., until the necessary components of the picture are presented.

This theory holds necessarily to the conservation as well as summation of energy, and that no psychic process is ever lost in our neural mechanism. There are nervous stimuli which are too weak to overcome the synapses but still are able to cause same neural changes. These reinforced or allied to some stronger stimuli will ultimately cause some effects on the mental life. It makes consequently no difference how strong the foreconscious censor is the energy from the psychic effects stored up in the preconscious will in some way influence our mental life. In normal cases this is done by way of sublimation and diversion to all fields of mental activity. But in abnormal cases the energy breaks through more easily and therefore influences the mental life more directly. In neurotics whose bringing up has given them some ideas and conceptions which conform to the social status, the foreconscious objects so strongly to the preconscious energy that the whole mental make-up becomes unbalanced.

The Freudian conception of consciousness seems very mechanical and highly artificial but lays claims to be demonstrated every day, for who would write on a public blackboard all the "freisteigende Einfälle," all the thoughts and ideas, that come to consciousness a single day, and which are not allowed to remain there a single minute unless we are moral and intellectual imbeciles but are immediately suppressed? The partly conscious foreconscious got a glimpse of them but straightway they went down to the place from where they came unless we are degenerates in which case we harbor them and take pleasure in so doing, but then they cause no longer pain but pleasure.

4. The Influence and Expression of the Subconscious

The suppressed ideas, complexes, and emotions are not for ever inactive or dead. They are present in some form or other and always more or less active. Ideas which are apparently

forgotten and unconscious are for instance in the hysterics not unconscious in the sense of only disposably present—as everything which one does not think of—but they are only unadmitted. The hysterics are in regard to them in a peculiar position of knowing and not-knowing which in reality is only a more or less conscious not-want-to-know, as Freud puts it (T. 235), and the feeling of opposition between this knowing and not-want-to-know must be overcome. Their admittance into consciousness is sure to bring relief to the patient and restore his normal life. Sometimes these emotional ideas are so far down in the recesses of the psyche that it takes hard work and long searching to find them but they nevertheless influence the mental life and a decided relief is experienced as soon as they are let out. All psycho-analytic therapy shows this.

These suppressed feelings and emotions sometimes find their outlet in bodily symptoms into which the mental or psychic pain is transferred or converted.

The root of the neurosis, says Freud (30), is in the childhood when man is more emotional and plastic than at any other period. But if the affective life of the child is sublimated into other lines of activity, there is little danger that later experiences will have their emotional tone strengthened so as to cause injury. The energy is being used up for other purposes. This is what usually happens in all normal beings. When the emotions reappear in consciousness they have put on another garb and are used for other purposes than first intended for. This sublimation of the suppressed emotions and their application to other ends is a drainage upon their energy which is thus made useful in all walks of life, for it is impossible to say how much of our poetry, our fine and plastic arts, of our religious, sociological, philanthropic, and philosophical conceptions is due to these suppressed emotions. But it is a well-known fact that all poetic, literary, artistic, religious geniuses are of a more or less emotional nature. As a result their imaginary powers are strong and the preconscious has a greater chance to exert its influence because more provocation is likely to occur in them. Then, under certain conditions as in childhood, in sleep and reverie or in special emotional outbreaks, when the power of the foreconscious is lowered, the preconscious is able to discharge its energy more freely. In the

day-dreams and reveries the emotional tone is always present and colors the whole situation. The dream and the poem are in their external appearances very different but both conceal their real significance behind the manifest content. Goethe's "Heideröslein" and "Gefunden" show a very insignificant and harmless patent content, but in them, says Voigtländer (83), "have the two fundamental forms which a man's relation to a woman can assume, found expression most wonderfully precise." And the same author remarks that the real poems are diary pieces of feelings, reports from the subconscious, and remain on the transition between the expression and repression, nature and art; their anchorage in the latent experiences is mostly still too plain. The analysis of Goethe's latent experiences and the above mentioned poems would in all probability lead to his relations to Friederike and Christine.

But not only poetical expressions are stimulated by the subconscious. Nietzsche (56) remarks that "the conscious thought of a philosopher is secretly led and escorted by his instinct," by which he means nothing else than the influence of the subconscious. Leonardo da Vinci (34) shows plainly how the subconscious dominates his whole life. He is very unstable in his habits and complains over a lost life in which he had not accomplished what he ought to. The same is true of Giovano Segantini (2). Says Voigtländer (83):

"All flashes, all conceptions come from the subconscious,—the conscious is not creative, only arranging, sifting, presenting. The material for the thought comes from the unconscious, the wishes, instinct, experience. . . . Not what one says or writes is the essential—the logical connection is loose and only apparent—behind stand wishes, interests, the whole past, and generally the whole concrete personality of the individual,"

and these are the powerful factors in man's life. The laws of association which are so convenient and useful in explaining certain phenomena, are at bottom not able to explain anything. Beyond the ideas on the surface of consciousness there lies the all-determining past of human experience, feelings and emotions, stored up in the human soul. The energy behaves like itself wherever it is found. Nothing happens anywhere without a cause, and if the whole story were known from beginning to end, cause and effect would undoubtedly connect the procedure like links in a chain. The mental impressions will remain like splinters in the flesh until they are removed or made harmless.

Of special interest in this connection is the relation between dreams, day-dreams, and myths. Abraham's (1) assumption that myth is nothing but an overcome infantile soul-life and the collective dream of the race, was somewhat anticipated by Laistner (quoted by Havelock Ellis, 20) who said:

"If we bear in mind how intimately poetry and religion are connected with myth, we encounter the surprising fact that the first germ of these highly important vital manifestations is not to be found in any action of waking mind, but in sleep and that the chief and oldest teacher of productive imagination is not to be found in the experiences of life but in the phantasies of dreams."

And it is a well-known fact that the Greeks who were such excellent myth-makers wasted much time in waiting for dreams. Truly has Jewell (45) spoken when he said: "Dreams have had a great effect upon the history of the world."

The argument of the Freudian school that the laws of myth-formation and of the formation of fairy tales are identical with those in accordance with which the dreams are formed, Havelock Ellis (20) interprets to mean "that the waking psychic life itself is capable of acting in a way resembling that of the sleeping psychic life and of evolving conceptions similar to dreams." Civilized man of to-day does not draw any inspiration from his dreams but primitive man and children do. Among them the laws of the waking life "are not yet sharply differentiated from the laws of the sleeping world and they often find illumination for the problems of one world in the phenomena of the other" (20). Gross (36) refers to cases in which children brought criminal charges which were apparently based on dreams. It is noteworthy that the day-dreams and reveries center around the time of puberty and may lead directly to literary activity. The celebrated day-dreams of George Sand developed around the central figure of Corombé, first seen in a real dream.

The so-called "continued story" shows the psychic material in the process of mythformation. Leoroyd (51) maintains that these stories may begin early in life, in the fourth year and continue for several years. They are most pronounced in early adolescence and especially in girls and may not be dropped until late in life. The characters are mostly from real life and often the author himself plays a very prominent part. Havelock Ellis (19) maintains that these stories are often tinged

strongly with sexual emotions which are frequently their real motive. This may, however, be so skillfully concealed that it may be difficult to detect it.

All these psychic phenomena are strictly private and intimate experiences which the subjects harbor for themselves. They are strongly emotional and contain a wish realized in them. They form an outlet for the suppressed wishes and emotions which have not been otherwise realized.

The hero-myths or sagas belong to the same class of mental phenomena. They are the fulfilment of wishes which for some reason or other could not be fulfilled in any other way. Thus the Oedipus saga is nothing but the fancy formation of an adolescent youth who in his childhood had been estranged from his father, because he separated him from his mother. His wishes developed into a fancy of the death of the father and the marriage of the mother. That the creator of the myth realizes that the whole thing is an outrageous wrong is seen in the later development of the saga. The whole affair is condemned by the hero himself and as punishment blinds himself. The only thing that is put up as an excuse is that in "dreams men often see themselves united to their mothers," but this is put in the mouth of somebody else.

May be there is a genetic significance in this. In ancient time, and in modern times too, it often happened that the father was a strange person, a despot in the family. He ruled over the family as a chief over his tribe and in many cases exercised his power in a not altogether friendly way. This may have aroused an unconscious wish, and perhaps even conscious, to remove him, and to take his position. This often happened. May not this attitude be transmitted and may it not have taken expression in some mental activity such as dreams, day-dreams, and reveries? That the children and primitive man do not consciously realize what death means is pointed out by Abraham (1) and seen in the behavior of every child. To them it means nothing but being away, or not present at the time being. Therefore when it is said that the child wishes his father dead he does not include in this idea the same thing as older people do. But the real cause for the wish is unknown. The child has no idea of the import of his immediate thought. Der kleine Hans often surprised his father by saying: "The thought

occurred to me," "I happened to think of . . . ," as if he himself had had nothing to do with the thought. And the Oedipus saga shows that when he realized the import of his dreamery, a wholly different mental procedure started.

Riklin (67) has called attention to the two different ways in which the wish structure appears in fairy tales, both of which have a more or less clear teleological significance. The first are those cases in which someone has lost a relative or friend whom he mourns bitterly and who, after days of sorrow and grief, appears to him and asks him not to weep any more, because his tears and mourning disturb him in his rest. This fanciful belief has become a psychic cure for the living although it was apparently meant for the dead.

The second and more common form of this kind of wish structure is the one in which the so-called "Ellenbogenkinder," or the slow, stupid, good-for-nothing children who are always treated with ridicule and made to do what nobody else wants to do, come out triumphant over their more favored associates. The fulfilment of a wish is so plain here that it is impossible to mistake it. It is the same psychic activity as we meet in the hero-myths in general. The poor boy or girl becomes the son or daughter of a rich and beautiful king in a very circumstantial way and afterwards marries into a rich family and becomes very famous to the great dismay of his former oppressors. That difficulties encounter them in their attempt to realize their wish in their fancy makes the whole situation more romantic and fascinating and shows that mind does not always run the straight and easy path to a desired goal but often indulges in the most trying and perplexing circumstances with an ease and unconcern that is almost appalling.

But in many cases the troubles which the heroes have to contend with start at birth and sometimes even before. As children they have been rejected and exposed but rescued and brought up by brutes or low people. We meet the same thing in the maxim "*Nemo propheta in patria*," which has no other meaning than that a man whose parents, brothers, sisters, games, etc., are well known, must renounce these at least for a time if he wishes to be recognized as great. This breaking away of the children from the parents is an evolutionary necessity but to be sure a painful experience.

In the development of the child there is a time when the parents are everything for him. His most intense wish is to become like them. But he soon learns to know other people who appear to him greater. Small events in his life call forth unsatisfactory feelings. The glory of other people and the disregard shown by his own parents give rise to the wish of belonging to them and perhaps he goes so far as to imagine himself child of other people. This idea comes out strongly in the psycho-neurotics who have exaggerated the infantile fancies in a high degree from lack of any controlling elements. But the fictitious father of the hero has often the most pronounced characteristics of the real father and is therefore not a substitution but a transference for the purpose of fulfilling the wish. The whole thing is an expression of the longing for those happy days when the father was the noblest man and the mother the most lovely woman on earth.

The hero of the saga echoes in this way the egoistic feelings of the child, which are counteracted by other interests and so suppressed,

V. SUMMARY

Myth is the expression of primitive man's thoughts and feelings concerning himself and the external world and the gods. It has to be sure some connection with the changes of language, but it is more intimately bound up with the human psyche which tends to express itself in some way peculiarly its own. This accounts for the fact that the mythologizing idea has never left man but still lingers and finds expression in the folk-poetry and folk-tales of different people. The myth and poetry are very closely connected, and the more poetry resembles myth the more universal it becomes and loses its individual character.

Whether man has developed slowly, by sudden partial leaps, or by a sudden leap in toto, or whether he has originated from one pair in one place only or from several, does not make so much difference after all, for in either case the evolutionary laws must have been the same that brought about the development which resulted in the being we now call man. But if the leap was in toto and too sudden the effect might have been detrimental because of the sudden separation from the preceding stage into the new environment which he was not accustomed to.

Mind has developed along similar lines according to similar laws everywhere which makes mind one and makes it possible for one man to understand another. They both have a human mind. In this development we find the reason for the similarity of so many myths which could not have been borrowed by one people from another. Moreover, the theory of borrowing does not explain anything and is in reality very superficial.

The myths may be divided into two large groups; Nature myths and Hero myths or Culture myths. The nature myths may again be divided into such that have sprung up around natural objects and such that have sprung up around natural phenomena. There is hardly any object or any phenomenon which has not at some time or other been subject for a myth. All groups of natural objects and all kinds of natural phenomena have attracted primitive man's attention and caused him to wonder and speculate. The tendency that has been current to exalt one object at the expense of another must be rejected. The moon for instance has exerted a greater influence upon man than the sun, although the sun has been regarded as superior. Superior it may be but not in its effect upon man's behavior. The reason for this may be found in the natural phenomenon itself as well as in the environment and mental attitude of man. At night man could look at and meditate upon the moon. He had leisure to do so, and the surroundings were more favorable for an emotional impression.

If any object has played a greater rôle in man's life than the other, it is the tree. World-trees are found all over the world, sacred trees are common, and trees and groves actually worshipped, found all over the world. A great tree-lore has sprung up around these which still exerts a profound influence. The reason for this has been sought in the intimate relationship which is thought to have existed between man and the tree. From the tree man is supposed to have gathered his food, in the tree he is supposed to have lived, and to the tree he is supposed to have fled in times of danger. The theory of his arboreal life has, however, lately been disputed. Be that as it may, one thing is sure, man and the tree have been very closely connected.

Man projected himself into the objects and phenomena; he personified them or perhaps better he elementarized himself.

He ascribed the same attributes and qualities which he possessed to the world around him. He used himself as a measure and explanation of all things. His gods were also formed in his own image because he was the object of his conceptions. They were the natural outgrowth of his inability to cope with a given situation, and of his feeling of dependency developed during his long infancy. Where man considered himself immortal his gods were also immortal. They shared the common fate of man. Among some people they were maintained in vigor and youth by a special prerogative which was denied man. In the other world gods and men are again going to live together in peace and harmony pursuing their various occupations. In a word, the gods were men more and more magnified, with human desires and human wants.

The hero myths are also the expression of the human psyche but in a different way from the nature myths. In them the emotions on the one hand and the customs and traditions on the other play the dominant part. The underlying factor is the question of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. The soul is a great center of psychic force which endeavors to express itself according to its own nature. Most primordial are the nutritive and sexual emotions which therefore play the greater rôle. Of these the sexual emotion is the strongest and lies at the bottom of shame, modesty, and morality. Even the child is not free from this emotion and his first sexual object is the parent of the opposite sex, according to Freud. When the emotions want to discharge the energy, or when the psyche wants to act out its impulses, it finds that society has established a certain standard according to which they are to be acted out. But this standard has not taken all the possibility into consideration and many of the emotional impulses are not provided for. They can not be provided for either, for the individual must be subordinate to the society in which he lives. As a result the emotional impulses find themselves at variance with the standards of society and must either disregard the custom and traditions and act them out or else suppress them. If they are suppressed, they can nevertheless not be gotten rid of, because they are dynamic. The energy can not be lost. Below the threshold of consciousness, in what Freud calls the subconscious, these emotional impulses are still active and in-

fluence the conscious life indirectly. They are waiting for an opportunity to express themselves. But since the organism has learned to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and since they were suppressed in the first place because they caused more pain than pleasure, they can not enter consciousness or express themselves in their real garb. Therefore they must find some way in which they can escape the censor which the customs and traditions have built up. This they find in transferring their energy to other objects which thus symbolize them but have not their painful character. The suppressed emotions and wishes find the easiest expression when the conscious life is lowered as in dreams, day-dreams, and reveries. The hero myths are the fancy-realisation of the suppressed emotions and wishes which could not be fulfilled in any other way. They are the dreams of the childhood of the race in which the individuals imagined themselves in the positions described in the sagas.

But not only the sagas are the expressions of these suppressed wishes and emotional impulses. Much of what is worth while in arts, literature, and religion, is an expression of the same psychic energy which was once forbidden. Traces of them are found everywhere in painting, sculpture, drama, and poetry. The energy of these suppressed emotions and wishes thus finds expression sublimated, on a higher plane, and colors the life of every being. Emotional individuals are affected more than other, but their imagination is also more creative and full of ideas.

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THE PROBLEMS AND PRESENT STATUS OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

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Religion represents a double paradox. In the first place the student of 'human nature' who approaches the study of religion is confronted with the problem of explaining the rise, somewhere in the dim past and the maintenance down into our own sophisticated age, of doctrines and beliefs which are not only underived from any experience possible to man, but which, like the belief in miracles, in transubstantiation, in virgin births and the like, are distinctly at variance with and even antagonistic to the experience of man and to the known laws of nature.

This is the problem which religion presents on its experiential side as a phase of human mentality.

On its sociological aspects, religion reveals a similar paradox. It shows the development of complex rituals, the establishment of costly monuments and luxurious edifices by people barely subsisting in misery and want while building these and supporting also a large and prosperous clergy. Indeed, the greatest architectural wonders of the East and of medieval Europe are the places of worship built by people who, for the greater part, enjoyed fewer material comforts than wild beasts share in the jungle.

That, then, is the paradox which religion presents on its sociological side: magnificent palaces built for the housing of clergy or of wooden gods and graven images and saintly relics by people living in huts or without even a roof over their heads! Gold and precious stones and jewels, everything of value, in fact, lavished upon altars by people in rags or practically naked! People, periodically the victims of famine and through their physical misery and their ignorance exposed to the ravages of epidemics, maintaining nevertheless costly churches and taxing themselves for the support of a large priesthood in comforts and in luxuries such as, even on ecclesiastic theory alone (aside of any ethical theories involved), had no right to exist!

The motivations for this paradoxical situation upon the sociologic field must be sought in the organization and processes

of the human mind. The persistent beliefs in the impossible which religion largely embodies, the adherence to notions unwarranted by the experience of man or natural law, is also a problem of mental structure and organization. Thus both problems, the individual as well as the sociological, belong ultimately to psychology.

But psychology is the youngest among the established sciences and the phenomena of religion have been subjected to a scientific analysis on the basis of a recognized scientific technique only recently so that the account which I propose to give herein of the status of religious psychology will be very simple.

Previous to the period of psychological inquiry in the midst of which we are living, the subject of religion was divided between metaphysics, philosophy and theology. Metaphysics speculates abstractly about the probable basis and function of religion; similar speculations make up also the province of the philosophy of religion. As to theology, it consists, broadly speaking, of a mass of doctrines, possessing some historic background but defended dogmatically. Theology does not inquire into the nature of religious experience. It accepts such experience without questioning either its source or its validity, and appeals to that experience for the verification of its particular doctrine and theories. Dogmatism is its ruling spirit.

To President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University, belongs the credit of having inaugurated in this country, the psychological study of religion. His own studies on childhood and adolescence furnished the inspiration for the first scientific attempts in this field, notably the paper he published in 1891 on the moral and religious training of children.¹ Some revival preachers had previously gathered statistics concerning the age at which most conversions take place and strictly speaking, this may be said to represent the first attempt to obtain some scientific data upon a subject of religion; but the revivalists' interest in the matter was limited, of course, to practical ends. They desired merely to find out how they may increase their efficiency in the work of proselyting. They established no particular technique of inquiry nor were they interested in the broader implications of the data which they obtained. The first scien-

¹ *Pedagogical Seminary*, vol. I, p. 196.

tific studies of broader import upon the field of religion on the basis of a well defined technique were carried out under President Hall's guidance and inspiration by several of his pupils, among them Starbuck and Leuba, who thereafter devoted themselves largely to the study of this subject.

The first work of Starbuck's and the monograph of Coe were among the first to appear devoted wholly to religious psychology. The method used by these and other psychologists is the questionnaire.

A number of objections, some of them quite serious, have been raised against the questionnaire method of psychological inquiry.

It has been pointed out, for instance, that in the absence of specific training for self-analysis the average person is unable to testify concerning those mental processes which constitute religious experience on its inner side.

As to the external incidents of religious growth, while persons of intelligence may be thought to be able to give an accurate account of them, experience and observation have shown that this is by no means always the case. Unintentional errors may creep into all sorts of statements concerning our past experience. It is a well established psychological fact that memory has peculiar ways of falsely representing our past.

Moreover in a psychological study of religious experience the external data are not the most significant; and when the inner history of one's religious development is in question information obtained at random through the questionnaire method is liable to be particularly vitiated by numerous self-deceptions. Without some means of checking the subjective sources of error the data obtained may prove entirely misleading.

But as those who have used the method were generally students trained in psychology and aware of these shortcomings of the questionnaire it is only reasonable to presume that they possessed the necessary foresight and psychological perspicacity to avoid its pitfalls.

Besides the necessity for caution against possible errors in the material obtainable through the questionnaire it is necessary that the serious student guard against errors of his own. Above all, the psychologist who presumes to subject religion to a critical investigation must clear his own mind from any preconceptions

about or undue emotional attachment to religion. At the outset the psychologist must make certain that his incentive to this work and his interest in its results are wholly those of the scientist willing to follow the drift of his facts no matter to what conclusion he may thus be led. Attention to this possible source of error is as important as counterchecking the subjective errors in the questionnaire testimony.

It so happens however, that neither Starbuck nor Coe were prompted by scientific interest alone. Both writers distinctly state that their investigations were inspired as much by religious interests and needs as by the psychologic interest. In a review of the present status of religious psychology it is necessary to point out this significant admission; the conclusions at which these writers have arrived and the scientific worth of their labors will be better appreciated in its light.

The practical nature and religious import of the motive which inspired the labors of Starbuck, Coe (and it may be added, of most of the other pioneer students in this line as will be shown later), is further illustrated by the particular problems in religious psychology which engaged their attention. They concerned themselves chiefly with the phenomena of conversion. As the making of converts is conceived by the Church to be its chief task, its supporters must become interested in any information concerning the process of conversion with a view to turning such information to practical account, in religious work. Ames, another student of the psychology of religion, states the matter as follows: "The question of method in religious work turns upon the psychology of religious experience. The relative value of revivalism, and of religious education, depends upon the comparative significance of the different types of conversion and upon the means by which they are occasioned. The demand of the Church, under an increasing realization of tension between it and many developments of modern society, has been for a more efficient method of winning its own children and securing recruits from the 'world.' "

As has been stated our writers appear to have had this demand of the church in view as much as the scientific interest which religions present to the psychologist.

For instance, E. D. Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion" endeavors to determine the conditions, including age, tempera-

ment and surroundings, most favorable to 'religious conversion.' These matters concern the 'Church' because it endeavors to control the psychic processes of children and adults alike, for the purpose of turning them into channels that make finally, for adherence to its tenets and beliefs.

Starbuck deals wholly with such subjects as: age of conversion, experiences preceding and motives and forces leading to conversion; its conscious and subconscious elements.

Conversion is largely a phenomenon of adolescence; accordingly, Starbuck pays considerable attention to the psychic factors and processes characteristic of this period. But he does not inquire into the genetic relations of religious outbursts to the psychophysical phenomena of adolescence except in so far as the information may be useful to the religious teacher. The genetic aspects of this relationship is not his particular concern probably because his plainly evident emotional concern for the fate of religion obscures from his view the importance of the deeper genetic aspects of his problem.

Starbuck conceives religion to be "a deep rooted instinct" which he compares with hunger or the desire for exercise. He manifests his emotional attachment to religion in such statements as the following: "Psychology is to religion what the science of medicine is to health, or what the study of botany is to the appreciation of plants." This is not a statement of conditions and beliefs as found among men which he sets forth to examine critically: in these words Starbuck declares his own attitude.

He also finds that "it is in the interest of religion that it should not remain submerged in the sea of feeling; that in some degree it should be lifted up within the range of intellectual comprehension." This, he expects, psychology might do for religion, just as the seventeenth century deists in England and the eighteenth century deists in France hoped to 'save the cause' of religion by appeal to the 'design in nature' argument. Psychology is to be the new handmaid of religion.

The functions of religious psychology, according to Starbuck are to "lead toward greater wisdom in religious education;" and to increase "our power of appreciation of spiritual things." These are the leading thoughts which inspired this author's work and are emphasized by him with italics. He states fur-

ther: "The service of psychology to practical religion is to make possible a harvest of wiser means in moral and religious culture, and also to lift religion sufficiently out of the domain of feeling to make it appeal to the understanding, so that it may become possible, progressively, to appreciate its truth and apperceive its essential elements."

The religionist's old query: how may the church capture the allegiance of the more sharply critical element of the population is to be solved by the psychologist. This, according to Starbuck is to be the psychologist's service to practical religion.

The nature of Starbuck's conclusions may be foreseen in a general way, from the general character of his attitude towards the problem of religious psychology. Given his attitude as illustrated above, and his viewpoint that religion is of the nature of an instinct, like hunger, it could not be expected that he should inquire further into the origins and real meaning of this 'instinct.' Not only would such further inquiry serve no particular religious purpose, but it might even disturb his actual religious preconceptions. He might perchance find that religion is not an instinct after all, just as recent psychologic research has proven that many a so-called instinct like the killing of mice by cats or the pecking of chickens is entirely mythical. His studies of conversion lead to no conclusion of genetic import. He does not go beyond the surface of things in this work. He draws merely certain educational inferences. Religious education, he finds, should adopt itself to the needs and conditions of each person; only thus can the best results be obtained. The study of character groups might yield "certain standards by which to judge individual instances" and by which, to control individual growth without hastening unduly the various steps or stages. One acquires the impression that Starbuck's whole work is but an elaboration of the obvious.

On the nature of religion itself, of which conversion is a most striking phenomenon, its meaning, its function in human life, its origins, the study of Starbuck's, as already stated, throws no particular light. He does state that "Religion in its highest form may fairly be regarded as a radiation, an intermingling, a complication and a spiritualization of the impulses already present in human nature," but he does not attempt to explain the nature of that 'irradiation' nor does he

undertake to point out specifically what are those "impulses already present in human nature," of which religion is at once an irradiation and a spiritualized complication.

Prof. Coe's work on religious psychology is conceived in a similar spirit. The interest, the outlook revealed by his study of "Spiritual Life" is closely parallel to Starbuck's. He, too, employed the questionnaire method; he, too, of all the varied problems in religion, concerned himself chiefly with conversion and for a reason similar to Starbuck's.

"Every question arising in the psychology of religious experience," he states, "may be understood in this way: under what circumstances does the Divine Spirit work such or such a change in the minds of men? That the Holy Spirit does observe antecedents and wait for conditions to ripen; that he does not vouchsafe the same blessings to all individuals or to all ages of life; and that we have it in our power either to prepare the way for his revelations or to hinder them—all this is current belief among christians. Now, these are the very uniformities that need investigating. In fact, psychology can only render more precise and complete what is already recognized in a partial way in the practice of the religious life" (p. 17). Coe thus introduces a new concept into psychology, the Holy Spirit, which is not to be questioned or even examined but is only to be served by science. For Coe, psychology becomes the direct handmaid of the Holy Spirit and of the church in its proselyting efforts.

The chief value of religious psychology consists in the aids it may give to the teacher of religion; in the promise it holds out to enable the church to control the lives of the children and to reclaim "the great mass of persons who have cut loose from all forms of organized religion."

Like every other observer, even of the most superficial order, Coe was forced to recognize the strong bonds which exist between religious development and mental and physical growth, particularly the intimate relationship between the psychophysical changes of adolescence and the outbreak of religious emotions. "We could not if we would," states Coe, "disguise from ourselves how remarkably these religious feelings mirror the entire physical and mental condition during the middle years of adolescence" (p. 52). Forceful as this relationship presents

itself to his view, it fails to arouse in him the desire to follow the clue and investigate the real origin and meaning of religious emotions, possibly because he has in mind chiefly the religious educator whose interests could hardly be fostered by such an investigation. Instead of analyzing this matter to its last point he contents himself with giving the facts and figures showing the close relationship between religion and adolescence, and he draws out of them only general 'educational' inferences. "The mental condition during adolescence," he writes, "is particularly favorable to deep religious impressions. This is the time that the child becomes competent to make a deeply personal life choice; such a choice is now easier than either before or after; this, accordingly, is the time at which a wise church will expect to reap its chief harvest of members" (p. 54).

This attitude on the author's part may seem paradoxical inasmuch as the investigation is carried out apparently as a psychological problem. But even a psychologist may have his prejudices and preconceptions and the field of religion is the very last upon which man is willing to part with these. Paradoxical as the author's attitude towards his problems may seem, it is only the natural outcome of his preconceptions on the subject. According to Coe, "man is a religious animal just as surely as he is a social animal." This is not what he undertakes to prove in his work. This is what he starts with, this is what he takes for granted. Naturally he sees conversion and every other phenomenon illustrative of religious processes only in the light of this preconception. Only what squares with this notion of religion can be logical and true. All else is dross.

What a restraining force this preconception exercises upon Coe's work as a psychologist may be illustrated by the following: He finds that "three sets of factors favor the attainment of a striking religious transformation: the temperament factor, the factor of expectation, and the tendency to automatisms and passive suggestibility." Here is a suggestion that followed to the end might lead to significant results. But Coe is prevented from inquiring into the nature and meaning of conversion further by the very attitude he has assumed from the beginning towards the whole problem. Even conclusions apparently logical enough he upholds for reasons which seem unusual and strange to a mind accustomed to scientific methods and processes of

reasoning. For instance, he does not feel himself justified to conclude that conversion is an automatic performance, in spite of "the tendency to hallucinations and other automatisms" with which conversion is commonly associated. "Not" states he, "unless we first define conversion so as to ignore its profound relation to God and to the principles of a good life." Coe's God and his ethics stand above the realm of scientific analysis. They are the *nolle me tangere* region into which humble psychology may not venture to penetrate. "The substance of religious experiences as far transcends their emotional form," states Coe, "as a man transcends the clothes he wears." What may that mysterious substance be? Coe does not tell but hints mysteriously at the ethical import of religious beliefs as embodying the differential essence of religion,—a very old notion indeed! Religion sought refuge in ethics so long as the science of morals and human conduct was dominated by mysticism and fanciful transcendentalism but since ethics too, acquired a scientific foundation, and the science of human behavior became humanized and rationalized, religion has ceased to look to it for support. Prof. Coe prefers to ignore all this. His ethics is still mystical and transcendental, something above man's intellectual capacities, for he still believes that religion may take refuge and find safe harborage therein against the scrutinizing rays of science, and thus, preserve at least in part, its air of mystery and supernaturalism. On this point he declares: "The ultimate test of religious values . . . is nothing psychological, nothing definable in terms of the how it happens, but something ethical, definable only in terms of what is attained of loving trust toward God and brotherly kindness toward men." Without thus hitching up religion to something mysteriously supernatural, religion may incur the danger of being explained away wholly on psychologic and naturalistic grounds and Coe, even more markedly than Starbuck, is anxious throughout his work to preserve for religion some residuum, be it ever so slight, of transcendentalism. Whenever his facts seem to point to some broad generalisation antagonistic to the theory of supernaturalism in religion Coe stops short and wherever possible mends what doubts concerning such alleged supernaturalism the marshalling of some of his facts may have brought to alert minds by introducing *ex cathedra*, some such

dogmatic statement as the one quoted above concerning the ethical essence of religion and its transcendental nature.

Pratt's "Psychology of Religious Experience" differs in some important respects from that of his predecessors. For one thing, his conception of the psychological problem of religion is broader, perhaps because his psychologic interest therein is not overshadowed by any religious motives. He does not, like Coe, take God and the Holy Spirit and other transcendental concepts for granted but bluntly proposes to investigate "the nature of belief in a God or Gods and the basis or bases on which this belief really rests." His method, too was, partly, the questionnaire, but he also made use of the results of anthropology and the history of religion, taking up, as typical forms of early religious belief, the primitive animism of unsophisticated races, the religions of India and Israel and certain phases of Christian belief.

Pratt's analysis of these various forms of religious belief is mainly an amplification of the thesis which he establishes in a preliminary chapter, on the nature of belief. That chapter is concluded as follows: "Religious belief may be mere primitive credulity which accepts as truly divine whatever is presented to it as such; it may be based on reasoning of various sort; or it may be due to a need of the organism, or to an emotional experience or 'intuition'—an unreasoned idea springing from the background and bearing with it an irresistible force of emotional conviction."

These three phases or types of religious belief, called respectively the "Religion of Primitive Credulity," the "Religion of Thought or of the Understanding," and the "Religion of Feeling" form the central thought to Pratt's whole psychological scheme of religion. The potency of religion he ascribes to its dependence upon the broad emotional background of human experience which he calls the feeling mass and which "is wider than the other departments of psychic life, deeper than they, and more closely identified with the self."

This feeling mass is "made up of the indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences which, by their very nature, are not susceptible of communication and which, to be exactly described must be made over so as to lose their characteristic quality and cease to be what they

were," in contrast with "the definite, describable, communicable elements of consciousness; the rational, the cognitive, the representative; the material which may be made public property by means of scientific and exact description."

This emphasis upon the emotional experience as the foundation of religious belief is a doctrine which the author has absorbed from its most famous recent protagonist, William James. Like the latter, he would lift the feeling mass to a category of its own possessing a validity as great, if not greater than the intellectual in man. Just as science is the organ of the intellect so is religion the special organ of the undifferentiated feeling mass. "The feeling background," he states, "is . . . the spokesman and the mouthpiece of the organism and its instincts. It has long been a recognized fact that the instinctive and unreasoned reactions of the organism are often more certain, more swift, more appropriate than actions which are the result of conscious choice. The same kind of appropriateness, the same kind of adaptability to a present situation, in short the same kind of wisdom, belongs to the instinctive beliefs, if we may so call them, in which the feeling background voices the demands of the organism. Such a belief is hardly to be eradicated by argument. Its roots go deeper into the organic and biological part of us than do those of most things whose flowers blossom in the daylight of consciousness" (p. 43).

Pratt's particular standpoint on the subject, the point, at least, upon which he places considerable emphasis, is his sharp division of the emotional background from intellect; a division which only recalls the old Aristotelian dual classification of mind into thought and desire. The three-fold aspects of religious belief, or the division into three stages as mentioned above is a theory which he regards as his particular contribution to the subject.

His analysis of the development of religious belief in youth and in mature life is mainly, if not wholly, descriptive. He, too, makes no attempt at correlating organically religious emotions with the psychophysical changes of the period during which they are most common and with which they appear so intimately associated.

In fact, it may be said that Pratt believes he has sufficiently explained the origin of religious belief when he has

traced it to the broad emotional background of human life. What particular set of emotions are concerned in religion and, specifically, what their somatic background may be is left undecided. Perhaps the reason therefore is akin to the reason, not plainly discernible, for which he lapses at times into a defence of religion, as if the fate of religion were logically the psychologist's concern. For while it is plainly evident that Pratt has endeavored to keep himself free from any bias and has succeeded in a very great measure, there are here and there, traces of an emotional attachment to religion which cannot but prove detrimental to an investigator. He declares, for instance, in substance, that the invasion of the religious field by psychology is bound to prove beneficial to the former because it needs any help it can obtain from the sphere of the intellect to protect itself against pure intellectualism which threatens to destroy its essence (an essence that must remain emotional), and also against beliefs avowedly anti-religious. And he adds that "it is not only against external foes that religion needs protection; it must be safeguarded as well against the inherent diseases to which it is specially liable, against the deadening influence of traditional and stagnant creeds which have long since outgrown their significance and usefulness."

Offhand a person of scientific training and disposition would conceive that it is the business of reason to penetrate into religion and dispel its mysteries, just as it has successfully dispelled the misty veil which religion had held over the laws of physical nature. It is surprising therefore to find Dr. Pratt ascribe reason a minor rôle in connection with the subjective phase of religion. He states (p. 288): "In thus formulating and reformulating the conception of religion in conformity with the progress of human knowledge and reflection, reason will ever find a most useful sphere in the service of religion." Here we encounter again an echo of the seventeenth and eighteenth century deistic hope. Once more reason is to be made the handmaid and not the penetrating tool of religion.

Jas. H. Leuba's doctorate thesis at Clark University, published in 1896, was a study of christian conversion. Since then he has published over a score of papers dealing with various problems in religious psychology, some of which he has gathered together in a book recently published under the title, "A Psy-

chological Study of Religion, its Origin, Function and Future." In spite of his incessant activity and varied writings it is not easy to discern Leuba's standpoint. He discusses different phases of religion in a manner which shows a close familiarity with the literature of the subject but rarely attempts to apply a new light to any of the problems. His statements are too general to be quoted. His is mainly a descriptive psychology of religion and even when he discusses some genetic or dynamic aspects he preserves generally the eclectic attitude of the 'raconteur.' Though he discusses such interesting subjects as the mental requirements of the appearance of magic and religion, the origin of the idea of impersonal powers, the making of Gods, the origin of magical and of religious practices, it would be difficult to point out his special contribution to any of them, if we are to except from mention vague or commonplace generalisations. The great disproportion between the labor bestowed and the results derived by this author is so very striking that some fundamental cause must be responsible for it, and the present writer makes bold to assert that the cause is to be sought in Leuba's dual attitude towards religion.

In the Preface to the last mentioned work he states bluntly: "Although in the preparation of this book I have been moved by scientific interests, it would be idle for me to pretend that my concern has been purely scientific. Religion is too vital a matter to leave even the theoretically minded person altogether indifferent to its destiny. It needs as much as any other practical activity the kind of purification and guidance that science provides." However, the needed guidance and purification is not provided for religion in this work. For one thing, Dr. Leuba has been for a time a pupil of Pres. G. Stanley Hall's, whose standpoint is consistently scientific, whose grasp of the subject is broad, encyclopedic, thorough. The example of the master must have slackened the pupil's emotional zeal to the point of disabling him from saving religion from science, even if it did not inspire him with that thorough confidence in the scientific method, unalloyed with concern for the destiny of religion, which might have led to greater results. It takes faith to save religion from any dangers that may threaten it, not scientific interest, and certainly not psychology.

Irving King preconizes largely the view made famous by

Prof. Harald Höffding, the Danish philosopher and psychologist, who in his "Philosophy of Religion," contends that religious feeling is "the feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence." King is virtually in agreement with Höffding's famous declaration that "the fundamental axiom of religion, that which expresses the innermost tendency of all religions, is the axiom of the conservation of value." But he recognizes that there are "many values that are not religious, and there are consequently many value attitudes that have no religious significance."

Accordingly, in his "Development of Religion," King sets out to determine, so far as possible, the conditions which give rise to the religious attitude as differentiated from other, non-religious attitudes distinctly valuational in their import. He finds that the values specifically religious are those to which the adjective 'greatest' is applicable: the greatest good, the greatest happiness, in a word the superlative, is the religious value.

But this theory establishes between religious and other socially conceived values only a difference of degree. We are still far from any differential criterion of religion. The social group furnishes the matrix—as King expresses it, for all values, religious and non-religious alike. Here again, we find no differential essence for the one category of values as distinguished from the other. Dynamically and genetically, religious values look very much like any other kind of values, though King appreciates that some distinguishing mark must exist between them. His reference to the social medium for the origin of values while sufficiently justified is confusing because it contains but half a truth and also because the social consciousness or social mind is a concept in the midst of which, because of the present unsatisfactory status of social psychology, one is almost certain to lose one's way.

In spite of the rather amorphous state of social psychology at the present time, there is a growing tendency among students of religion to trace the religious experiences and states of individuals back to the social substratum and to conceive this to be the whole task of religious genetics. 'Social' and 'individual' being but two aspects of the same psychic processes, it is of course, easy enough to refer either one to the other; it is

even desirable to do this at frequent intervals so as to counter-check the results obtained upon one field with the data and testimony of the other. But all this instead of being the end should only serve as preparation for the genetic study of the various psychic processes and manifestations.

Pratt's three fold division of belief, for instance, is an attempt to classify genetically an essential phase of religion, but his subsuming everything under the category of 'social' leaves much to be done in the way of particularizing the origins of the various phases of belief described by him.

Edward Scribner Ames is a psychologist who seems to appreciate clearly the genetic and dynamic aspects of religious manifestations but he, too, becomes lost in the maze of the 'social' even more hopelessly than Pratt. His emphasis of the social amounts almost to a bias. The individual acquires all his religious characteristics in his quality as 'socius.' Religion itself is "the consciousness of the highest social values." The determining impulses in primitive religion must be somehow related to the objects of greatest interest to individual and society alike,—food and sex. Having adopted the genetic viewpoint Ames appreciates this very clearly. He recognizes too, that woman, through her sexually determined manner of life, becomes the center of the social group and the chief incentive to man's awakening social consciousness; as to religious consciousness, it "is a most intimate phase of the group consciousness" (p. 49).

Accordingly his psychological investigations of early customs and taboos, ceremonials and magic, spirits, sacrifice, prayer, and mythology emphasize almost exclusively the social aspect of their origin and development. He finds that the origin of all sorts of religious practices and beliefs is to be sought in the origin of social consciousness itself, of which religious consciousness is, as stated, a most intimate phase. The essence of the latter, as with King and Höffding, is valuational: "the religious consciousness is identified," he states, "with the highest values of life." Ames finds practically that man is a religious animal because he is a social animal, and because he has a sense of social values. He does not attempt however, as King endeavored, to point out what distinguishes the religious from other social values. As a matter of fact, Ames nowhere dis-

tinguishes between ordinary social values and values specifically religious, any more than he distinguishes between social consciousness as a whole and the specifically religious. One merges into the other. With the blooming forth of social consciousness at adolescence, the individual, becomes *ipse facto*, religious. It would follow that the irreligious person lacks social consciousness. This would seem a veritable *reductio ad absurdum* but it is exactly what Ames maintains in all soberness. Lack of social consciousness is what Ames finds the trouble to be with non-religious persons. The non-religious are "those who fail to enter vitally into a world of social activities and feelings. They remain unresponsive to the obligations and the incentives of the social order. They are lacking in the sense of ideal values which constitutes the social conscience."

Ames does not hesitate to follow this corollary of his concept of religious as synonymous with social consciousness, down to its wildest and most ridiculous extremes. Thus, for instance, because the defective and delinquent classes "lack the mentality or the organization of impulses necessary to enable them to share in the appreciation and effective pursuits of ideals," he sees in them "one of two or three classes of non-religious persons." And he adds very soberly: "Idiots, imbeciles, the insane, many paupers and persons suffering from hysteria and certain other diseases are of this type." Another category of non-religious is formed by the criminal classes, "whose chief psychologic characteristic is that they conceive other persons and society in such ways as to subordinate all other interests to some one or few desires which are low and narrow." The third, the only class of non-religious persons not defective or diseased, is formed of those "whose mental life is not organized in accordance with the scale of values which is recognized by the morally mature and efficient persons of the community. These are the irresponsible, inconsequential individuals who live in the present, largely controlled by their sensuous impulses, without comprehensive purposes or standards."

Lack of religion must mean absence of social consciousness, because according to his view the two are practically identical. Nowhere does he distinguish between them; nowhere does he attempt to find a differential essence by which religious consciousness may be distinguished. He leaves unexplained why

religious consciousness should give rise to beliefs paradoxical and unwarranted by, even contrary to the ordinary experience of man. He has not a word of explanation to offer concerning the numerous religious dogmas that have evolved antagonistic to man's interests,—dogmas and beliefs which threatened man's very survival chance in the past and which owe their relative innocuity only to man's unwillingness, in spite of his supposed 'innate' religiosity, to carry out literally all 'religious' commands.

Starbuck's significant acknowledgment that "in a certain sense the religious life is an irradiation of the reproductive instinct" is waved aside by Ames with the remark that "it is the social character of the sexual nature which makes it so important in religion."

What has been said thus far may serve to illustrate the condition of religious psychology as a branch of research in the United States and the status of its problems at the present time. We have seen that, thus far, either some utilitarian attitude or some emotional concern for the destiny of religion itself, manifest or implied, placed immense stumbling blocks in the path of scientific research. On the other hand, the picture must not be considered too droll. The outlook is far from discouraging. We must bear in mind that religion is the very last subject which man will learn to approach dispassionately. It is difficult to consider religious problems dispassionately when religion has been for so long and so persistently, the most prolific source of emotional dissension and partisanship and in a very large measure still continues to be so.

To the psychologists mentioned in this sketch belongs the undoubted merit of having pointed out at least the directions along which further research is necessary. They have cleared some ground, they have shown us, by their preconceptions and the error of their ways how to avoid similar errors, and handicaps. Others without the emotional concern for the destiny of religion of a Starbuck, a Coe or Ames, and disregarding totally, as beyond the interest of psychologists as such, the proselyting business of the church, may accomplish results of greater scientific value by the application of similar and other methods.

Already we are in a position to note some promising signs in this direction. In the first place, the Freudian school of

psychological analysis has turned a flood of light upon the most varied problems of individual and racial psychology. In due time the subject of religion will receive its share of attention since psychoanalytical methods are spreading rapidly unto every field of psychology.

Freud himself has contributed a brief paper to the first number of the *Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie* (1908, *Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübung*, pp. 4-12) by way of opening the path. In this contribution he draws a highly suggestive parallel between ordinary religious practices and the compulsory acts of neurotic individuals. Both forms of conduct are paradoxical, meaningless even to the subject, and yet, imperative; both rest, as Freud points out, on some suppressed erotic complexes. Moreover, the imperativeness of religious acts is of the same order as that which attaches to the uncontrollable acts in compulsion neuroses. Their emotional background is the same and subjectively they are described in terms very similar so that, Freud suggests, "compulsion neurosis may be conceived as a pathological obverse of the formation of religion, the neurosis may be described as an individual religion and religion as a universal compulsion neurosis."

Independently of the Freudian school, Theodore Schroeder has contributed some studies on religion the distinguishing feature of which, aside of their striking fundamental thesis, is that, like Freud's paper just quoted, they manifest an attitude of complete detachment from any emotional interest in the destiny of religion or church.

While studying Mormon religious documents Schroeder found that all the significant strands therein lead back to the physiology and psychopathology of sex. Important as this observation was, yet in so far as it merely implied some connection between eroticism and a particular religious system it was neither original, nor very conclusive. But by the investigation of numerous other documents Schroeder was surprised to find that a similar intimate relationship obtains between sexuality and the most varied forms of religion, ancient and modern.

Every individual religious experience if genuinely religious, appears to be associated with the sexual centers more intimately than with any other. That this has not been sufficiently emphasized heretofore, in spite of the great mass of documentary

evidence relating to phallic worship in the past will not be surprising when we consider the attitude of reserve, of concern for religion, even on the part of those who have attempted to deal with the problem scientifically. Then, too, the subject of sex is one which religious and non-religious persons alike show themselves unwilling to consider with the same indifference and thoroughness with which other subjects are treated. The surprise is, under the circumstances, that Mr. Schroeder should have been able to unearth such a vast amount of testimony clearing showing this relationship. Clergymen, physicians, psychiatrists, revivalists and lay writers have had opportunity to draw our attention to the intimate connection between religion and sex. They thought they were dealing with sporadic instances. Where the mass of evidence was too overwhelmingly in favor of the conclusion that such relationship is actually genetic attempts have been made to minimize its significance by some such dogmatic statement as that with which we have seen Ames endeavor to explain away this relationship.

But, as a scientific student of the problem, Schroeder did not find himself called upon to defend religion from any inference or conclusion that logically suggests itself. Nor did he think that the social character of sexuality is sufficient to explain the 'irradiation' of the numerous religious phenomena out of it. The matter instead of being solved by this observation only opens up new questions that need be settled. Why not carry the inquiry further! What particular features in sexuality correspond to the mystical, the transcendental in religion? How does religion, in the process of its 'irradiation' from sex, its admitted source, acquire its most characteristic features, and in what do the latter consist?

In other words, what is the nature of this process of 'irradiation' from sex, of which Starbuck speaks, which William James felt compelled to recognize, and which Ames thinks he has sufficiently explained away by pointing out the obvious truth that both, religion and sex make for social congress, relationship, union?

Next to freedom from bias, which on the subject of religion is still exceptional, Schroeder's work shows a through appreciation of the genetic aspect of religious problems. To know a religious manifestation of any kind we must understand its mode

of origin and exact source, both in the individual and in the race, and the functions it fulfills therein. To understand religion we must acquire a definite mental picture of the psychic processes responsible for its rise both socially and as an individual experience.

At the very outset Schroeder formulated a definition of religion. The definition is tentative; its details remain to be modified and improved by subsequent investigations. It differs from most other definitions in that it is not merely descriptive. His definition does not concern itself with the objective manifestations nor is it inspired by any desire to distinguish 'true' from 'false' religion. The purpose of the definition is to formulate some differential criterion by which the essentially religious, true and false alike, may be readily distinguished from the non-religious; that is, a criterion that shall differentiate between religion as such, no matter what its form may be, and mere dogmas, or even scientific convictions about a religious subject matter. Not everything is religion that is called thus; on the other hand a great deal of what is called 'false' religion has as much claim to such designation as the dogmatic body of doctrines evolved by church officialdom.

Mr. Schroeder's definition is an attempt to draw the line of distinction where it actually belongs. He finds that religion is a subjective experience, ecstatic in its nature, ascribed to the so-called 'transcendental' and interpreted as certifying to the inerrancy of some doctrine or ceremonial which through 'super-human' means serves personal ends the latter also supposed to be, wholly or in part, of a superphysical order.

By distinguishing thus, the strictly religious from the non-religious Schroeder delineates the proper field of psychologic research. Such phrases as 'the religion of science' or 'the religion of humanity' become void of logical content. One may as well claim the multiplication table as a possible foundation for and source of religion. The ultimate essence of religion is subjective,—it is a feeling experience entering consciousness by what is called the transcendental path,—variously interpreted as 'inspiration' or 'revelation' and testifying to the presence with the ego of some portion of the 'infinite' or 'divine' through which man supposedly becomes linked up to the whole universe.

Mr. Schroeder thinks that the energy at work in religious manifestations and believed by the subjects to be extraneous, mysterious, superphysical, is in reality nothing more than their corporeally determined erotic emotions and feeling complex. The 'love' or some other prevailing emotion generated by the 'love state' in accordance with the bodily conditions at puberty and other periods in life, becomes attached to some established set of ceremonials and doctrines and because of the strong, overwhelming, imperative and intimate character of the emotion back of them, the ceremonials and doctrines in question are assumed to be equally strong, overwhelming, imperative and therefore mysterious, superphysical, divine. The latter symbolize the fundamental feeling with which they have become linked up, a fact well recognized for instance, in such symbolic ceremonials as the christian Agapé and Eucharist. The more important religious doctrines and particularly the religious ceremonials answer vicariously to the psycho-physiological urge for bodily union. In spite of its fundamental nature or, perhaps, because of it, this psycho-physiological craving of sex is misunderstood, hence deemed mysterious, transcendental and from it religion derives its characteristic atmosphere of mystery and transcendentalism.

The processes by which Schroeder arrived at these significant conclusions are indicated in an essay in which he has formulated the requirements of the scientific method as applied to religious psychology.²

Mr. Schroeder has also endeavored to establish a working hypothesis on the basis of which the psychogenesis of religion may be uncovered.

We have seen that the two features of religion on which Mr. Schroeder lays particular stress are its subjectivity and its

² In this connection it should be mentioned that in this paper outlining the scientific methods of approach to the problem of religion, Schroeder has omitted to mention laboratory psychology. For some unaccountable reason, the experimental method, thus far, has been neglected entirely by nearly every student of the subject in spite of the fact that it holds out enticing prospects. See paper by George A. Dawson in *AMER. JOUR. OF RELIG. PSYCHOL.*, 1913, vol. VI., pp. 50-58, entitled: *Suggestions towards an Inductive Study of Religious Consciousness*, for highly interesting suggestions along this line. Of course what is needed is a laboratory properly equipped for the study of religious phenomena.

erotogenesis. The two are intimately connected. Its subjectivity granted, there remains but little to be done to expose the erotogenetic character of religion. That in its essence religion is wholly subjective is a scientific conclusion on which all classes of writers are coming nowadays to agree. This is one reason why all attempts to establish some criterion of religion on the basis of its objective manifestations alone have proven futile. The working basis was faulty, and could lead to no lasting results. For the elements of unification underlying the diversity of religious manifestations we must look back to their experiential, inner, psychic aspect, in a word to their subjectivity. It is its essentially subjective character that makes religion a problem primarily of the mind and the concern, chiefly, of psychology.

But while the subjective character of religion is fairly well recognized its erotogenesis is not. Not that the connection between religion and sex is a novel observation. As has been already mentioned, the connection between some form of religion and sex has been long known and recognized. Phallic worship as an early form of religion has been studied extensively. Dulaure's classic work on this subject, for instance, antedates by more than a half century psychologic interest in religion and Knight's 'Worship of Priapus' was published over a century ago. But whereas this connection has been recognized in the case of isolated, unpopular, religions, or of certain early stages of religion, Schroeder was sufficiently detached from any personal interest in, or concern for present religions to be able to see this connection holding true in all religion. He found that the universality of religion is due to the universality of sexual emotions, of which it is admittedly, an 'irradiation;' its mysticism is due to the old mystery and sacredness which still attaches to sex; its sacredness, to the sacredness of procreation as the fountain or source of the only kind of immortality with which man was acquainted in his earlier stages.

Religious conversion is largely a phenomenon of adolescence for obvious reasons. The sexual urge blooms forth during adolescence in all its mysteriousness and imperativeness. The innateness and imperativeness of religious feelings and emotions, to which all so-called religious convictions are reducible, is derived from the subjective and immediate character, the com-

plete mastery over mind and body of the fundamental sex urge particularly as it breaks forth during certain periods of life. The sexual feelings are the levers which control religious emotion and so-called religious convictions are but a cryptic, mystical, dogmatized elaboration of them. "The religious person knows because he feels and is firmly convinced because strongly agitated."

That man in the long past has ascribed to the generative powers in him a spiritual entity and a designing intelligence of its own is well known. That the attributes of his early divinities are those, fancied or real, actual or desired of his sexual powers; that his sex life represented at once his most intense pleasures, the chief incentive (alongside the food urge), to his activities and struggles, the inspiration for his fancies of paradise and life everlasting, is also beyond question. In view of the well-known psychobiotic law of the persistence of fundamental types, would it be too much to suspect that in its differential essence, in that which represents its survival value, religion must have remained the same throughout? Are we not justified in holding that at its very core, religion to-day is exactly what it was in the very beginning,—sex mysticism?

The underlying sameness of all religion in spite of its phenomenal diversity may be sufficiently explained on this basis. In the erotogenetic theory for the first time we possess a working hypothesis sufficiently broad and fundamental to give a genetic account of all manifestations that may be justly classified as religious. Undoubtedly much of the controversy in religious psychology in the future will be concerned with the erotogenetic theory of religion.

CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF GODS

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Two definitions of gods or of God are given by such authorities as Webster's International Dictionary. 1, A being conceived as possessing supernatural powers, who is to be propitiated by sacrifice and worship; a divinity. 2, The Supreme Being; the Eternal and Infinite Spirit; the Creator and Sovereign of the universe. Now the group of definitions under 1, though evidently intended to define only gods of the lower religions, really overlap definition 2. They are not, however, definite or complete definitions. We remark, also, that to liberal minds, definition 2 would include the Supreme Being as conceived in all the higher religions, from Ahura-Mazda to Allah. Max Müller defines religion as a "Mental faculty by which independent of, nay in spite of sense and reason, we apprehend the Infinite under different names and in varying guises," which results in a "love of God." This virtually, though not explicitly defines God. Réville, in defining religion as the recognition by our minds of a "Mysterious Mind" in the universe essentially, though vaguely, defines God. Tiele's definition of religion as having to do with the "Infinite, as unconsciously, partially perceived by us," in effect furnishes a definition, though very general, of God. The definitions of Müller, Réville and Tiele all come properly under the second definition given above.

The present article will be limited to a psychological consideration of the origin of ideas of gods of the first class herein defined, and in the sense of gods of the lower religions. We shall not deal with the origin of ideas of a God of the second class. That is not, the writer believes, within the province of the psychology of religion or of the history of religion with their present limitations and present results. Probably in large measure it never will be. As Du Bois Raymond expressed it in another connection, we must in this matter, inscribe *ignoramus* on our banner, and, considered as a subject for positive science to investigate, quite possibly *ignorabimus*.

We shall also observe a limitation in the matter of the factors involved in the genesis of god-ideas. Psychological investigation can deal only with the ordinary faculties and powers of mind included in the scope of that science; such as sensation, perception, memory, imagination, conception, judgment and reason, with the ordinary feelings¹ and somewhat with the will. It cannot deal with such conceptions as the religious consciousness and similar religious concepts. Now that there is a Divine Power in the world nearly all of the countless millions of men in all ages have believed, felt as they have thought. Even the cold reasoning skeptical scientists have, in crises of their lives, perhaps, felt that such a power exists, or could have so felt, had they had such crises. The "plain man" would regard all this as strong evidence of the existence of such a Power. Again, nearly all men have felt that man has in his make-up, a divine spark, a religious consciousness, or some kind of a relationship with a Divine Being or Beings. It would perhaps even make the cold, skeptical, scientist angry if we should deny the presence of such a divine spark, or whatever it may be, in him. Now, if we must perforce believe in this divine spark in civilized man, we should also believe that primitive man possessed it. He was human, with mental and moral powers much like our own, though not so highly developed. Then, if the "plain man" is correct in the belief that all men, including primitive man, have had that divine spark, would not that divine spark be a factor in his conception of ideas of gods? Would it not impel him to seek for and to propitiate those powers? Though most men must feel that such is the case, positive psychology cannot deal with it. It is beyond the province of the science. We therefore waive the question of this element being a factor in the genesis of god-ideas, and seek to study only the mental faculties involved with which psychology can deal, as factors in such genesis.

With the two limitations noted, we shall, rather briefly, attempt to maintain the following propositions: 1, Ideas of gods of the first class defined above have arisen not from the contemplation of any one class of phenomena alone, as has been

¹ Psychology may, of course analyse somewhat religious feelings. As Prof. James shows, religious feelings such as fear and love, are similar to the ordinary feelings of fear and love, but directed to a Divine Being or beings.

held by some writers, *e. g.*, from the personification of natural objects and natural forces, as the Sun and the thunder; from the personification of abstractions; from totemism; from the deification of great men; from the deification of ancestors; from Great Makers; but in the different instances from all of these sources. 2, The principal factors in the genesis of these conceptions of gods which psychology reveals have been: imagination, primitive reason and primitive credulity. 3, There has been a progressive evolution of god-ideas. 4, There has not been a universal degeneration of these ideas. 5, There has been a centralization, unifying of god-ideas and of gods.

PERSONIFICATION OF NATURAL OBJECTS AND NATURAL FORCES

As to the fact that such gods have been widely believed in, there can be no question. The Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Aryan peoples, the Greeks and other peoples worshipped the Sun, the Moon, etc. They sought to propitiate the thunder and other objects and forces. The only question is as to whether these personified natural phenomena were the sources of the ideas. The present writer fully believes that the psychology of the primitive mind supports the view that they were the sources. Now we can easily conceive that when primitive man looked out with awe upon the forky lightning and the deafening thunder, he with his childlike imagination, and employing a modicum of reason, would pronounce it a god. Primitive credulity would also be a contributing factor in his mental process.² He would observe the beneficent heat and light of the Sun, and in a similar manner conceive it as a supernatural being, a god.

In thus conceiving the Sun or the thunder as a god, the mind of primitive man operated in a like manner to the mind of a scientist, of a Newton. When Newton saw an apple fall from the tree, his creative, scientific imagination suggested to him the hypothesis that the fall of the apple from the tree was due to a universal attraction of gravitation. The mind of primitive man by his creative imagination formed his hypothesis that the conception of a god was a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon of thunder. The chief difference between the hypo-

² In the conception of god-ideas from this source and some of the following, doubtless feelings such as fear, etc., were impelling factors also to such conceptions.

theses of primitive man and of the scientist is, that while the latter goes on to verify his hypothesis suggested by the creative imagination, primitive man, lacking the critical spirit of the scientist, did not in his primitive credulity, go on so to verify his hypothesis.

PERSONIFICATION OF ABSTRACTIONS

The fact of the worship of such supposed deities as Fortune, Abundance, etc., is admitted. The Greeks, the Romans and many other peoples celebrated rites to them. Here again, the factors in the genesis of such god-ideas were imagination, perhaps a grain of reason, reinforced by primitive credulity. Primitive man observed such phenomena as abundance, fortune, etc., and in his childlike simplicity of mind pronounced them gods or goddesses to be propitiated. Here also, the creative imagination, like in the mental process of the scientific investigator, of a Newton, was employed. But the Newtonian testing of the hypothesis was not made.

TOTEMISM, OR THE WORSHIP OF ANIMALS AND PLANTS

Anthropology amply establishes the fact of the worship of animal and vegetable gods. A notable example is furnished by the religion of the Druids. The Druids venerated the spirit of the oak. Among the ancient Egyptians, the ancient Germans and among many other peoples totemism has prevailed. We may here again, as it seems to the writer, see that in imagination, including perhaps a trace of reason, with all the credulity of primitive man, we may account pretty fully for the origin of the idea. In the hunting stage, man would and did, as we may readily believe, elevate an animal to the rank of a deity. Quite possibly, the usefulness to his tribe of the particular animal deified, or some one of its striking characteristics was concerned in the mental process involved. In such instances again, as in the personification of natural objects and forces, and in the personification of abstractions we see creative imagination at work; but here also we note the lack of verification of the explanation.

DEIFIED MEN

No one will question the fact of belief in such a class of deities, demi-gods, or near-gods. Mythology and the history of religions furnish many examples of them. Among the Romans,

in the deification of the Cæsars, we see gods in the making. In many such cases the psychological process was probably something like the following: A great chief, or hero, who by his deeds had won especial renown died. The fame of his deeds in the course of time became progressively exaggerated, until finally, to the primitive credulity of the masses, the hero became a god. The important factors herein involved were imagination and credulity. Veneration for great men and for great deeds was also a factor in the process.

ANCESTOR-GODS

Ancestor worship was in many instances only reverence and worship of inferior spirits, those of dead ancestors. Yet among different peoples, ancestor spirits have been held to be gods; in some cases as Great, or Creator-Gods. The Mingoës, the Dog-Ribs, the Mandans of North America, the Zulus in South Africa and other tribes have each worshipped an ancestor as a god. Among the ancient Egyptians, the Chinese and the Japanese, though ancestor worship has prevailed, their gods have been so complicated with the different natural, totemistic and ancestor elements that the question as to whether ancestors have really been worshipped as gods is rather hazy. In the worship of ancestor-gods again, primitive imagination and primitive credulity appear to have been the principal factors in the genesis of the idea. Filial respect and love have also in these instances probably been factors in the process of conception.

GREAT MAKER-GODS

Belief in this class of gods has been of wide prevalence. We find it even among the native tribes of Australia, Melanesia, among the Negritos of Africa, as well as among many, or most, more advanced peoples. Here primitive reason was probably the principal factor in the genesis of the idea. Primitive man has seen that the tools he uses had makers, that his house had a maker, etc. On a more general observation of the phenomena of the world around him, he would naturally infer that there must be a maker of the world. Imagination also, by representing the Great Maker to him in a particular form, was, we may see, a factor. In the latter phase of the mental process, primitive credulity would also necessarily have a share.

Man in the primitive state is intellectually only a child of larger growth. He does not possess either the knowledge or the scientific discipline which would enable him critically to examine and to explain the phenomena of the world. So, like the child, his imagination and untutored reason, by perfectly normal processes, explain satisfactorily the phenomena he observes to his childlike credulity.

Child psychology furnishes analogical evidence along this line. We are informed that Helen Keller, when about ten years old, inquired "Who made the land and the seas?" Students of child psychology tell us that children from five to ten years of age begin to inquire for a maker of the world, *i. e.*, to reason about the matter. We also know how wide is the scope which the child imagination takes; we know how unbounded is child credulity. The mind of primitive man operated in quite a similar manner.

EVOLUTION OF CONCEPTIONS OF GODS

We may safely say that there has been some degree of progressive development of god-ideas. With the increasing intelligence and with elevation of the moral ideas of a people, their conceptions of their gods would necessarily be developed, elevated. No one now doubts that there has been a process of evolution in the animal and in the vegetable worlds; in the sociological and other fields. Though not yet so much investigated or so well established, it would be unreasonable for the scientific mind to deny that there has been some corresponding evolution of religious conceptions, including ideas of gods. On such a view as the latter, the law of continuity would be broken. This is unthinkable. Ideas of deities in a people, as in an individual depend, in great measure, upon their degree of culture.

The religions of the world have been composed of two principal elements. 1, Of a philosophy of the phenomena of the world. 2, Of a system of ethical regulations and taboos. Now we know that with increasing knowledge of the physical laws of the world and with the increasing of the critical spirit in man, the former would necessarily develop, evolve. We know that such has been the case. We also know that there has been an evolution of the latter, or ethical element. As an unquestionable example of moral evolution; savage peoples believe

in revenge and torture of captives, and practice torture of their victims; civilized peoples do not. This is clearly a matter of evolution. Here is evolution of the ideas of morals and of religion. It naturally involves evolution of ideas of gods, which are the central factors of religion. Many more conclusive examples of such evolution could be given.

DEGENERATION OF GOD-IDEAS

This view of Andrew Lang, not to touch upon that deducible from the tenet of an original revelation, is inconsistent with that of an intellectual and moral evolution in the race, and so cannot be regarded as a correct one. It is, moreover, repugnant to reason and to common sense, to the scientific attitude, to the latest results of researches in anthropology. We cannot admit that man, when probably just emerged from animality, could possess or conceive higher ideas of gods, or of any other objects, than can peoples with culture and some degree of science. Nor is it necessary to suppose that there was an original, universal idea of a Great-Maker among all the people of the world, as such a view would imply. This class of gods, for which Lang contends, as such, have had their rise among different peoples simply by similar mental processes. Each people and each man have had similar mental powers of reason and imagination, have perceived similar phenomena in the world, and so have naturally inferred similarly from it; similar mental reactions have resulted in their minds. That is the reasonable explanation of the matter. Such would nearly as certainly result as that similar chemical reactions should result from the employment of like reagents in a like manner. However, there has probably been a measure of degeneration of ideas of deities as they have been understood by the masses of men, from the original conceptions of those deities by religious geniuses and prophets. This is more or less true of all religions.

We may also understand in another way how there could be, and doubtless has been, in some instances, a degeneration of god-ideas. If a nation of a low order of culture, and so with a low religion, conquered a nation of a higher order of culture, and so with higher religious conceptions, we can see that the former could impose their religion on the latter; and so, in the course of time, cause a degeneration of the religion of the latter,

and thereby of their ideas of gods. But a theory of universal degeneration, for the foregoing reasons, would seem inadmissible.

CENTRALIZATION OF GOD-IDEAS AND OF GODS

In the Babylonian religion, when Hammurabi placed Marduk at the head of their pantheon, we see an example of such centralization. Ammon Ra, made the supreme god of the Egyptians by Amenophis IV, the expansionist of that country, is another instance. Many other examples could be cited. We could expect, we could expect nothing else, but that with national or kingly expansion of dominion, partly as a matter of statecraft, such centralization of religion, and of religious objects, at least in some instances, should take place. No fact or result in history would seem more natural. The annals of different countries and of different peoples abundantly furnish such facts.

To sum up this paper, all too brief in dealing with a subject not very susceptible of exact scientific treatment, or scientific statement, we conclude: 1, That ideas of gods of the class herein considered were of several origins, namely; from (a) personified natural objects and forces, (b) from personification of abstractions, (c) of totemistic origin, (d) from heroes deified, (e) from deification of ancestors, (f) as Great-Makers. 2, The principal factors in the genesis of these ideas, so far as an empirical psychology can analyse them were, imagination, primitive reason and primitive credulity. 3, That the mind of primitive man is much like that of the child; that the child conceives such phenomena by the foregoing mental processes, and so did primitive man. 4, There has been a progressive evolution of god-ideas. 5, There has not been, therefore, a universal degeneration of such ideas. 6, There can be noted a centralization, fusion of gods and of god-ideas.

THE DISPOSITION OF THE DEAD IN OLD JAPAN

By WILLIAM H. ERSKINE, *Osaka, Japan.*

In the care of the dead a people express the highest sentiments of their religious life. The sacrifice of the dead for the food supply indicates that the primitive man's first and most important want is bread. The quick disposition of the body among primitive Japanese shows forth their fear of contamination. The Buddhist in his cremation sets forth his belief in the loss of self in the Buddha. The Christian by his careful preparation of the body shows forth a faith in the physical resurrection. Believing that a study of every like subject throws light on the present customs of a people, and hoping that the investigations brought to light may help many to understand and respect the Japanese, the writer has put down in order the observations he has made from a daily mingling with the people, and from a limited research in their *Encyclopedia* and other books of reference.

The word for burial in Japanese is "hoomuru" and literally translated means "throw away." Because of the fear of contamination from contact with dead bodies, the early Japanese sought every means to dispose of the bodies of the dead as soon as possible. In the far away early days of old Japan the custom was to bury the very same day, and secretly. In most cases it was done the first evening following death, just after dark. A relic of the burial at night is seen in the lamps and lanterns used in the funerals of the present time. Among the higher classes after a time the bodies were held over for a few days and gradually then it settled into the custom of keeping the body until the third day. The upper classes then began to postpone burial for a certain longer time, the higher the official the longer his body was laid in state. In each case the aristocracy or the effort to develop respect for the aristocracy broke the old custom and started the new. In the case of the upper classes the corpse was temporarily buried in the yard and covered with earth or trees for a short time, this after grew into three years when the real burial was performed. All the time the body was thus temporarily buried it was in state.

The temporary burial may have been, at least now is, interpreted to mean the time for the preparation of the grave or mausoleum. But its original purpose was to honor the dead. The time of mourning for the death of an Emperor, according to history varies. The law now has it one year. This was strictly adhered to in the mourning of the late Emperor.

The "throwing away," as it was called in old Japan, was of five kinds, the oldest being *suiso* (*sui* meaning water and *so* meaning burial)—sea burial. Mention of this is found in the old books of Japan. In *Keiganji Engi*, the History of the Keigan Temple, we read of a priest by the name of *Shin-ami* who lived in this temple. He died July 2nd, 1440, A. D. and was buried in the lake near *Shimotoba*. His dying words were "Please give my body to the fish for food." This took place far from the sea at Kyoto. In the seaside communities we find the sea-burial long before and long after this time. At the sea-burial the words of the bearers were "Become a *tai* and lead other fish to us." *Tai* is the most eatable fish in Japan. The fishermen were buried in the sea to become food for the fish so that the catch of fish might be greater for the living. The Japanese *Encyclopedia* says that this was continued until the Tokugawa period, that is within the last three hundred years. The inmost idea was that the dead eventually became food for the gods of the temple to which were given always the best of the catch, that is, by the way of the gods the supply was increased.

The next oldest form of burial was *rinso* or forest-burial. This form of burial was kept up during the Ashikaga period, that is, until about 800 years ago. While not as old as the sea-burial, it did not last as long. During the period when the *rinso* arose, the wild animals played havoc with the people and kept the natives in mortal terror all the time. The dead bodies were given to the gods of the forest to stop the wild animals, or to appease the gods who had sent the wild animals to avenge the people's neglect of the gods. The main point in this burial to me is not the disposition of the dead so much as to make life more worth while, more peaceful. This casting of the dead bodies into the forest for the wild animals developed into casting the dead anywhere, thus getting rid of the bodies in a very rude and undignified way. During the Ashikaga

period this was prohibited by law. This law makes it plain that the bodies were thrown into the fields, the woods, the plains and other open places for the dogs and wolves to eat. One of Japan's great men arose at this crisis and went about burying the dead. The law shows also that people *about to die* were thrown away for fear of contamination after death. The casting of the old women from high places, as is known to most travelers in Japan, *Obasute Yama*, the mountain for throwing away old women is a good illustration. The history of the Hospitals in Japan shows that the first hospital was founded by the Emperor Nimmei, about 863 A. D. at Dazaifu, Kyushu, and was called "*Zokumei in*," *Zoku* meaning holding together, *mei* meaning life and *in*=institution. The purpose is to save and protest against the manner of throwing away those about to die. The record says the Emperor rescued many lives who otherwise would have been prematurely thrown away. In 893 A. D. Uda Tenno established one at Yamato (Nara) called *Seiyaku in*=giving medicine Institution. Daigo Tenno established one in 1003 A. D. called *Hidenin*=suffering field Institution. The record says that all these were protests against the casting of those about to die into the fields.

The origin of this casting of the dead and those about to die was not merely the idea of getting rid of the bodies but to keep within the bounds of religion and the customs of the community. It all had its religious significance at the time and must not be judged by the standard of the present day.

The next form of burial according to age is the *doso*. This is really the oldest and at the same time the longest continued form. The origin of this in Japan can not be easily traced as it is thought to come from China. *Doso*, or earth-burial, and the ceremonies connected with it point to the effort to appease the earth god. In China there is an earth god for the cultivation of the rice fields. In Japan the rice god is not an earth god, so that the form was introduced without the original meaning. This earth god or burial in the earth for the increase of the food supply is found in other countries also. The difference between this and the forest or open fields is the fact that this took place near the people's home and in the cultivated fields. Our present day form of burial is no doubt the outgrowth of this effort to appease the earth god to increase the supply of

food, at least the form is the same even if the content is different.

Kaso or cremation is the most used method of the disposition of the dead in Japan, at the present day. It is purely Buddhistic. An interesting point is the fact that it took one hundred and fifty years to get the first Japanese priest to be willing to be cremated. The Buddhists came to Japan in 552 and the first cremation took place according to the *History of Cremation in Japan*, March, 702 A. D., at Kurihara. The following year the Emperor, who was a very zealous and earnest Buddhist, was cremated at Asukaoka. Following this noble example many Emperors and many of the common people were cremated. Cremation came to be an affirmation of the faith in the Buddhistic doctrine of the annihilation of the self for the purpose of becoming absorbed into the godhead. It was thought to be a complete victory over the flesh.

During the reign of the Emperor Gokyomyo, the Imperial family set the precedent of burying in the earth and disapproved of cremation. It was a sort of victory of Shintoism over Buddhism. This was in 1655 A. D. The Shintoists and even some very earnest Buddhist consented to cremation because it permitted an old Japanese custom to be easily carried out, that is the dividing of the bones of the dead out among the relatives and friends. The Japanese *Encyclopedia* merely mentions this matter as one reason why the Japanese consented to cremation. The earnest Shintoist kept themselves free from the Buddhistic custom of cremation and continued to bury the body in the horizontal position as they had done from time immemorial and just as is done in the West to the present day. The Buddhists aimed to put the body in the birth position or meditation position, following out the ideas of rebirth; the praying position of man was thought to be the position of the gods or of sainted men.

On the introduction of Christianity in 1868, the Shintoist's opposition to cremation was strengthened, and in 1873, the Japanese Government prohibited cremation altogether. But in 1875, two years later, the Buddhists again prevailed and cremation was permitted by law. The greater economy of cremation appealed to the people and of course, it was done as it is to-day to a great extent from that standpoint. The crema-

tion services cost is small in comparison. A coffin is not needed, a basket being used in most cases. The size of the grave for the urn when it is attended to is practically nothing in comparison with the cost of the long grave for the horizontal body. Cremation is the cheapest form of burial, hence the popularity.

To-day in Japan there are over 35,800 crematories. Ever since 1897 the Japanese Government has cremated all who die of contagious diseases.

The fifth form of burial is known as *ikiume*, living burial or burial of the living. This can be seen in all the other forms of burial above mentioned with this distinction, that it has a social and religious significance. Besides the burial of the family of the chief or his followers there has been the following other kinds of *ikiume*. In the book called *Zoku Bummei Ki*, it is stated that near Nigata the fisherman of a certain village would select an eldest son and offer him to the gods of the sea, at the time of a storm. It was thought that the sea god was angry, hence the storm. The sacrifice of an eldest son alone would appease him and encourage him to grant a good supply of fish in the catch. Sometimes, the record says, a virgin was selected and cast into the sea for the same purpose.

There is a story that in prehistoric times the Japanese went to the Northeast to overthrow the enemies of the land. The sea was rough and so the wife of the leader asked to be cast into the sea to appease the gods and insure a smooth sea and a safe and prosperous journey of the warriors. This example has been followed by many women in seaside communities during the history of Japan from that day to this. The story is also told to women about to be married to encourage faithfulness and willingness to sacrifice herself for her husband. This *suiikiume* shows the willingness of the maritime community to sacrifice and to accept the sacrifice of the eldest son, the virgin, the wife, or the faithful servant for the good of the community.

In the *rinso* or forest-burial, the same is true. The god of the forest was thought to be angry and would thus send the lions, wolves and other wild animals to destroy the people. To appease him, the virgins of the village were from time to time selected to be offered to the gods of the forest. The young woman was placed in a box, used by the Japanese ordinarily

for clothes, about 6 feet long and 2 by 2 on the ends. Carried in this box after dark she would be left before the shrine in the midst of the forest. The men of the village would go the next morning to see if she were alive. In all cases she had disappeared. Out of this custom have grown the saviors of the villages. Strong, fearless men would volunteer to take the place of the innocent girls and would go dressed for war so as to kill the demons, animals, etc., and if the gods appeared, to find out what would appease them in place of the virgins. Thus these men would free the village from the fear of the gods, demons and wild animals, and the community would have peace and prosperity.

In the earth-burial also is found this sacrificial element. A priest or a virgin would be buried in the walls of the shrine or in the yard in front of the shrine. The offering of a living sacrifice was thought necessary to gain the favor of the gods who would otherwise destroy buildings.

In the building or rebuilding of bridges which because of the swift stream or heavy rains had been thrown down, live men were buried under the pier to give their strength to the bridge or to appease the god of the bridges and waters. This was true in the building of the Temma Bashi in Osaka. The *Encyclopedia* says that this was kept up until the opening of the country to foreign trade in 1868.

In a book called *Higuchi Buyuden*, "Brave wars of Higuchi," about 430 years ago, it is said that the Asahi river in Okayama Prefecture would frequently overthrow and cause much damage to the towns and bridges. The men of the village went to the shrine and drew straws to see who would be selected by the gods to sacrifice himself for the good of the village and the strength of the bridge. The man selected was put in a box with some food and then buried under the pier on the village side of the stream. The man on dying for the good of the village becomes the god of the village and people worship him as long as the bridge lasts.

About eighty years ago in the building of another Osaka bridge, an old woman, the wife of the head man in the village, offered to give her life and strength for the new bridge. The desire to serve the community and give it peace and prosperity so aroused her that she overcame the objections of the family

and the community and was buried with food under the pier of the bridge. From her box the record says that a tube of bamboo was placed so as to allow the free passage of air. Whether this was true in the other cases or not I can not verify. At first after her burial nothing but the sound of her prayers could be heard, but on the third day the cries were heart-rending. The people of the time interpreting these sounds to be the entering of her spirit into the bridge, the worse the sounds the stronger the bridge would be. There are not only these two instances but many such throughout Japan. The willingness to die for the good of the community was thought to be the real god spirit and was looked upon with reverence.¹

On the banks of the Edo River in Osaka there is a monument to a village head who died for the peace of the community and the safety of the dike along the river bank. The rivers had swollen and broken the dike and damaged the town so many times that the people were put to the last extremity, namely the human sacrifice. The head man called the elders of the town together and told them his desire. No one volunteered to die so that lots were to be cast to get the divine selection. The chief, in place of lots, asked that the men, himself included, should all throw their coats into the river and the owner of last one to sink should be the one to be buried for the good of the dike. This was agreed to by all and each proceeded to throw his coat into the river. One sunk after another and only one was left. Each looked in fear and trembling to see whose it was. It was soon discovered to be the chief of the village. In the good old samurai way he prepared himself for death and was buried under the dike. The monument is still standing and can be seen by passersby.

¹ From this study of the burial customs in Japan one is constrained to agree with those writers who contend that the two impulses of life are the food and sex desires. The offering of the dead for the peace and prosperity of the community, the willingness of the people to die a living death for the good of the village, the willingness to be fish to lead other fish to the fisherman, the offering of the eldest son to the waves and fishes so that the sea would give of her bounties to man,—all show the importance of the food supply of the community.

The offering of the virgins and the eldest sons to the gods reveals a willingness to give one's best, one's purest, one's greatest joy to the gods of the land and seas. Nothing could more clearly indicate the importance of the sexual life and the desire for offspring to the primitive man.

DURKHEIM'S VIEW OF RELIGION

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The contributions of the leader and founder of *L'Année Sociologique* school, certainly the most important sociological contributions yet made by any 'school,' may be said to have their climax in the author's last book, *Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse. Le Systeme Totemique en Australie.* (Paris, 1912.) The book may be said to aim at two things as of predominant importance: First, a definition of and insight into religion in general, irrespective of culture and clime; second, an analysis of religion as found in aboriginal Australia. Our concern will be primarily with method and interpretation, inasmuch as these seem the fundamental aspects of the author's treatment, and in this sense basic.

The author begins his treatment with a brief reference to the revolt usually shown by religious people as soon as an attempt is made to study their religion as a social phenomenon. So far as the author dwells on this point it is merely to bring this truth home. The attitude itself is presented merely as a social phenomenon, as an existing attitude. To us the fact raises the problem: Why this attitude of revolt when accompanying it there may be recognition of the truth of the undesired description?

If after stating with great care and concern the points one by one in an argument of great moment to myself, my opponent meets it by remarking that I have used two hundred and fifty words, sixty sentences, three questions and two exclamations, I am more or less mildly disgusted, not because he has failed to state the truth about my argument, but because he has disregarded its purpose and purport expressing a truth about what is for me a non-essential, a merely accidental attribute not inherently a part of my meaning. When the religious man makes the revolt at sociological interpretations it is not because of any absence of truth in the interpretation—at least it may be present where there is no question of the truth the correctness of the characterization merely deepening the irritation—it is because he feels a disregard of the purpose subserved by

the religious life and of the meaning which its form and perpetuation have for its devotees. He is only human in asking that the meaning of his purposes and the estimate of his life-values as incorporated in his own ideals and activity be not disregarded. The sociologist himself might, if you take him unawares and forego the familiar discourse of sociology, resent a characterization of him as merely a product of social influences, a social precipitate rather than a personal dynamic.

The author's real task begins with the interpretation of religion. Briefly his argument is as follows:

Advanced religions are so diverse in content that it is very difficult by studying them to arrive at the essential nature of religion. Its essence is much more easily determined in a simple elementary religion like that of Australia; primitive society as compared to advanced society is uniform, simple, undifferentiated. Thus, an understanding of the religion of the simplest society gives a key to the most advanced religions.

Religion is, first of all, a social phenomenon. We are just beginning to appreciate the extent to which individual psychology, so-called, is but an exhibition in the small of a more inclusive and determining social psychology. The individual is but a social microcosm. Society or the social is a reality *sui generis*, the individual deriving his reality from the social order to which he belongs. It would be folly to attempt to derive the social from the individual since this would be deriving the whole from a part, the complex from the simple. Social concepts are the outcome of an extensive and prolonged co-operation, massive both spatially and temporally. They make up the whole world of reality of which the individual is but a poor and partial reflection.

Coming now to the question of the specific nature of religion, we must rule out supernaturalism as a proper definition of the object of religion, since the supernatural itself becomes part of the natural order as society deals with this concept. Neither can we define it as having to do with the divine, since we have, as for example, in Buddhism, religions without a god. There are many religious rites the function of which is not that of uniting the worshipper with the god. Animism, again, is insufficient since religion can exist without the concept of god or

of spirit and must not be defined as characterized solely by its spiritual nature.

So much for negative criticism by way of clearing away traditional misconceptions. We come now to the positive contribution, the finding of religion in essence as it is, religion pure and undefiled.

The world is divided into two parts having nothing in common, the sacred and the profane. This division is absolute, not relative, as are distinctions between good and bad, for example, the classification in the latter case being after all but a matter of degree. Religion is concerned with what pertains to the sacred, and is expressed in the form of rites and rituals. The sacred as indeed any important phase of the sacred is the center of an organisation about which are grouped the beliefs and rites of some particular cult. Nor can that be called religion, however unified it be, that does not recognize a plurality in the sacred. Even the most idealistic and monotheistic religions exhibit this trait—in Romanism the saints, regalia, churches, etc. Religion, then, may be defined as “a solid system of beliefs and practices having to do with the sacred, that is to say, the separated, the prohibited, the beliefs and practices which are bound up in a moral community called the Church, and all that appertains thereto.”

Durkheim recognizes that magic has, like religion, its rites, traditions and dogmas, the distinction between magic and religion being in practice often difficult to make. Magic may, however, be distinguished in this way: it is opposed to religion often making the sacred profane, frequently reversing the religious forms in its own rites. Similarly, religion is opposed to magic. The essential difference between them lies in the fact that magic may be but is not necessarily social in expression, that is does not call for the co-operation of individuals, such co-operation being essential to religion; that it has no church and is not national. Magic differs from religion in being essentially a phenomenon of isolation performed by an individual as such without church or co-operating assistants.

If animism is ruled out on the ground of being merely systematised hallucination, and naturalism on the ground that religion, if it were but the expression of natural forces could not persist since it is an erroneous expression of them, and it cannot explain the distinction between the sacred and the profane,

totemism is whole-heartedly accepted. Rather is it thrust forward as *the* elementary religion. For the elucidation of elementary religion, then, Australian totemism must be reckoned valuable above all others, its primitiveness being an attribute derived from the primitiveness of Australian culture. After discussing the sacredness of the totemic name, emblems, the sacred character of the totem animal and the taboos associated with it, the mystic relationship involved between the totem and the totemite, the author concludes the account of totemic beliefs with an exposé of the totemic orientation of native life as shown, for example, in the clans, phratries and classes of various tribes, sometimes including marriage relations. Everything belonging to the totem group partakes of the nature of the totem and of its sanctity. This includes the whole of nature even the stars, sun and moon. The individual totem is rather summarily disposed of by saying that it has the same relation to the clan totem as the surname has to the cognomen, although there is a prolonged attempt to prove that in origin it must be younger than clan totemism, having arisen only after the latter came as prototype. The basic principle in totemism, namely, the concept of a mysterious pervading force and power is found in practically every culture: in Australia, *Arunkulta*; in Melanesia, *Mana*; among the Sioux, *Wakan*; with the Iroquois, *Orenda*, etc. This concept of impersonal pervading power or force is older than the different mythological personalities and basic in the concepts entertained of them by the group. More than this: the concept of a religious power is the prototype, the forerunner and generator of the concept of power in general.

Such, in brief, is the argument adduced by Durkheim. It makes certain claims and involves some presuppositions which cannot be lightly passed by with a mere challenge.

The reasons which the author gives for selecting primitive society as the fruitful soil of uncontaminated religion are not so convincing as may seem at first glance. For, whereas the material and social aspects of the life may be primitive, the religious life may be far advanced; or *vice versa*. His conception of society is, so his presuppositions show, of the order of that of Frazer as exhibited in his *Golden Bough* and of Lang as shown in his *Magic and Religion*, viz., that primitive society is constructed after the manner of a large machine so that a part of it cannot move without everything in the interconnected

system moving ahead at the same time and in the same proportionate if not absolute advance. None of them conceive of it as, like a living organism, capable of advancing in one respect without a corresponding development in other respects—much less the development of some parts at the expense of others. While Durkheim does not state any such principle nor does Lang or Frazer, it is inherent in their treatment to this extent: their arguments are meaningless unless some such principle be supposed. Its expression is not found, but the result of its directive influence is apparent. For the present we do not wish to argue the opposite of their unexpressed thesis but merely to show the gloved hand and to insist that this principle remains to be proved not assumed.

With regard to the undifferentiated, monotonous aspect of native life as described by Durkheim we are even more insistent that he has profoundly misunderstood it. The culture turns out to be highly differentiated from their point of view if not from our own, and if not from our own, this is merely because we are interested in different features of the life and content to group in a few categories what is often for the native entirely different standpoints and values. Even granting the uniformity of the culture, it does not follow that the individual psychologies of the component members are of such uniformity. To dream that this is so is merely to shut our eyes to the importance of interest as a determining factor in regard to values and activities. A fly may seriously disturb our enjoyment of a landscape if it cross the focus of vision; just so a trivial matter is heightened in proportion to the extent to which it comes within the focus of our more persistent and profound purposes. Illustrations of this applicable to any culture must be sufficiently obvious to waive amplification.

Exception might be taken to the whole view of evolutionary development in religion as represented by the author seeing that we have no guiding principle in inferring origins. Why not a dozen different lines of development rather than one uniform line of progress? Moreover, what is the real justification for preferring one type of development to another unless the principle of evolution itself? which principle is the thing to be proved not to be taken as proved in classifying the facts.

Possibly more important than any of the foregoing, however, is the spirit of the attempt, the motive principle of the method

of interpretation rather than its formal aspect. This method is throughout striving to be purely analytical and inductive. It is the best example we have of a theoretical treatment of native life of that kind. Such of its successes and failures as are peculiar to this attempt alone are of minor importance; such as are inherent in the method used irrespective of its application to this or that problem by one writer or another are of predominant importance. If, then, the possibility of success in such an attempt as Durkheim makes to be purely analytic and inductive in his treatment turns out to be false and empty we may learn not to look here for future success but to launch enterprise in other channels. In ethnological achievement it is not so important to know where you are as in what direction you are moving (not that the two are really separable). Durkheim's attempt leads one to suppose that he looks upon deductive attempts askance, in the spirit of the man who compared 'mere principles' to sign-posts that stand at the cross-roads and always point the same direction without ever getting anywhere themselves. The sinner in the seat of the scornful who made this comparison might well have reflected that it would be as silly for sign-posts to act like travelers as for travelers to act like sign-posts. If the latter went wandering off in the direction whither they point—they wouldn't be sign-posts, and fewer men would be the wiser. If sign-posts are of use only because directive and not themselves productive they are therein justified of their existence. If the analytic inductive principle is just and true and sufficient it ought to remain conspicuous; if it is none of these but in the end only as misleading as seductive it ought to be replaced by a more fitting one. We suspect that in the end it merely brings one back to the starting point, though the circuit need not be a profitless journey.

It is difficult to comprehend how any so-called purely analytic and inductive method can be really such or such in any sense productive of results so far as we deal with cultural phenomena. In the first place material must be selected for such analytic and inductive study; such material must, moreover, be selected in the light of certain criteria or of a criterion. It is foolish to suppose that we are not applying any test not creating by definition at the start the meaning which we later extract inductively. Either we take as *x* what everybody or somebody has called *x*, in which case we adopt their connotation if they have

one, or we discriminate in our material. Goldenweiser's analytic study of totemism exemplifies this in full detail. At the very beginning of that work he quotes Frazer's definition of totemism as first published, adding, that in the light of discoveries in further ethnological investigation during the half century after that definition was formulated it could be regarded as little less than prophetic. Nothing less, indeed. There is nothing mystic in the way Frazer anticipated the findings of later field workers. But isn't that looking at the thing from the wrong end? What happened was this: Frazer gave the name totemism to certain kinds of phenomena; when subsequent field-workers found similar phenomena they adopted the term in common ethnological parlance and called such phenomena totemism. Frazer's applying the term totemism to certain kind of phenomena and thereby anticipating the findings of later field workers is neither more nor less prophetic than my parents hitting upon the name by which all my fellows would call me. If the latter seems prophetic it is only because we approach it from the wrong point of view. We suddenly stand an historical development on its head and wonder how such a substantial base could ever have been built and balanced on such a slender apex!

"History," wrote Francis Bacon, "is of actions in nature as they are;" and again: "For it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment." (The Advancement of Learning.) But such history never has been and never can be written simply because it must have a psychological background in order to exist at all and this background or recording agency will always be selective, and selective from certain points of view whether or not the historian be conscious of the view-points he is applying. History as it is means always history as it is observed and, in a sense, made. It is the unconscious standard that plays us the most subtle tricks and sometimes the most treacherous just because we are unaware of its operation and so without a corrective. Of the most unbiased historian it may be said as of other mortals that

Deep in the breast of the Average Man
The passions of ages are swirled,
And the loves and the hates of the Average Man
Are old as the heart of the world.

When, therefore, Durkheim offers us purely analytic, inductive investigation of religion I find myself sceptical and inclined to challenge him with a pertinent question: Why do you bring forward for investigation these phenomena rather than some others for your analysis, and how do you know that these rather than some others are really religious phenomena? In answering this the author might hedge, but in the end he would have to say that the only way he could know the facts on which this induction is based really pertain to religion is by having his definition of religion ready at hand when they are selected. They must be selected in the light of an already formed conception, otherwise dim religions fade off into dark deeds and cannot be distinguished in the twilight where concepts of religion and of dark deeds are not yet realised. It is, after all, not by induction that Durkheim finds totemism to be religion, but by first creating a definition of religion which turns out to apply to totemism. This is not a criticism of the outcome but merely an attempt to point out that he really gets out of his inductive analytic data only so much meaning as he has put into them in making the selection. It is the only thing an earthly mortal can do when dealing with sociological phenomena: we create the concept, select our material on this basis and see what it yields. Human nature is human, however, and prone to draw out at the last with great gusto conclusions which are there only because they have been quietly and somewhat surreptitiously inserted in the beginning as part and parcel of the 'raw facts' themselves. From Durkheim's point of view he has a perfect right to call totemism religion if he can show that it possesses those attributes which he assigns religion. Giving to religion the meaning which he gives he may be said to have made a good case as regards some religious aspects of Central Australian totemism. Further, deponent saith not. The author might have profited from Lang's reiterated assertions that primitive peoples are after all the product of a long evolution with a history back of them as ancient as our own (see for example Lang's *Myth, Ritual and Religion*) and from Van Gennep's insistence that primitive Australian society is not uniform, monotonous and undifferentiated. (See his answer to Durkheim's earlier studies of Australian social life in the Introduction to *Mythes et Légendes d'Australie*.) He might certainly have profited much more from Goldenweiser's study of *Totemism*, where the various content of totemism as we go from

area to area—the difference underlying the similarity—is well brought out.

NOTE.—Durkheim's view of the origin of totemism is about as follows: The attempt to derive clan totemism from individual totemism must fail because we get the latter only in the more advanced cultures—pre-eminently in North-West North America, while practically all of primitive Australia has only clan totemism. [*Non sequitur.*] All of these, however, are but applications by the individual of some concept fundamental to the group. This is proved by the fact that we find individual totems only in those regions where clan totems have developed. The individual totem presupposes the clan totem as the species presupposes its genus. [In the nature of the case a false parallel.] For the individual totem is but a partial aspect of the clan totem. [The argument throughout takes for granted the very point which it attempts to prove. It uses its only conclusion as its hypothesis.] For these reasons the conceptional idea as the source of totemism put forth by Frazer will not suffice. Moreover, a localized totemism is not, as Frazer believed, the primitive form even in Arunta society where the descent is really through the mother. The theory of Lang that totemism is but the outcome of a name-giving to the group of outsiders, which appellation is later accepted by themselves, leaves the religious character of totemic practices unexplained and inexplicable. In short, all of the theories put forward, those of Tylor, Hill, Tout, Frazer and Lang presuppose religious concepts as existing prior to the totemic system. [Do they?]

The argument of Goldenweiser's totemism might have been considered. It must not be counted too severely against one if good thoughts are allowed to go into what is "*ne pas qu' une dissertation de la doctorat.*"

It remains, then, to ask how successful Durkheim has been in this definition of religion which is after all a concept invented by himself and used as a test in the selection of his data—however much he may insist that it is purely analytic and inductive.

In the first place we find the sacred and profane, the co-operation of individuals, the church and ritualistic phases, the plurality of the sacred, true characteristics of the traditional historical religions. In this field he has given incisive interpretations and brought prominently to the fore features which have not been commonly recognized by students of religion and has shown their importance in a true light. Herein is a valuable and positive achievement. While these aspects are truly characteristic, however, we do not believe they are entitled to be called differentia of religion since Durkheim would scarcely include as religious those fraternal and masonic orders which answer all the requirements of the sacred and profane, the church, ritual and co-operation of individuals. In a

word the description while eminently applicable is not limited to religion but is equally fitting in other fields where similar distinctions hold. Durkheim could, to be sure, include these others as also genuine religions but he shows no tendency to make the denotation so elastic.

Whether religion shall be called as he called it, both in his earlier study of it (L'An. Soc. II.) and in his *La Vie Religieuse*, simply a social phenomenon of a certain character depends ultimately solely upon the point of view. As the author's point of view seems to be always and ever that of a sociologist it is difficult to see how he could have defined religion as anything other than a social phenomenon. From his earlier writings one could have anticipated this with as much assurance as he can find it fundamental in all of his last treatment. A sociologist must find social phenomena as a physicist must find physical phenomena; he must be carried beyond the realm of individual psychology or give up his task if he hopes to continue in the pose of a sociologist. It is as true as the fact that an argument is stated in a given number of words is true, but it is truth from *a* point of view not *the* point of view. It may be more profitable than some other point or points of views—this remains to be shown. The author attempts no such justification. In fact, he seems not to appreciate that however productive of results, it is after all but one way of viewing the facts.

If one happens to be interested in psychological considerations or for that matter in almost any other consideration, the social aspect of religion may appear in a new light, as accidental rather than inherent; a mode of expression, just as thoughts are conveyed in words but after all are only a vehicle of expression, not the intent and purpose; the manifestation but not the life.

Good examples of this principle will be found among the new or so-called messianic religions of North America and other areas where the religious life has its inception in a given individual who transmits it to a group (his tribe). Here the concepts of the religious life as entertained by the individual are the larger sphere from which the tribe borrows. His is the larger mind, the social is the smaller mind so far as religious concepts are concerned. Yet, for Durkheim this is not religion until it has passed from the individual to the group, to use his terminology, has been imposed by the individual upon the group.

In this transition nothing may happen except that a larger number of individuals than hitherto share the concept. They will invent and entertain some that were not his, likewise they may fail to grasp and incorporate some that were his; while different, the social concepts may be no 'larger' than the prior individual ones. What is the real justification for calling the social concept religion and denying it to the individual concept? None, unless you premise that it is really only social phenomena with which you are concerned.

To this Durkheim might reply that the so-called individual concept turns out after all to be really social since the inspiration, even when coming from without his own tribe, was social in origin not evolved wholly from individual experience, the so-called individual initiative turning out to be really but a link in the chain of social influences the transmitter from one order of culture to another. It must be realized that such an objection is not valid for it means that the sociologist has really given up his problem. As regards the relations applying between the group and the individual there is no approach to the problem except by regarding the group as a closed system of concepts and influences. If in this case the individual creation is merely transmitting a social influence it is owing to the fact that he belongs to a different social order from that of his group. But did this social influence originate in the group from which he derived it? By no means; it had its origin in some other social influence which in turn came from a past social influence and so *ad infinitum* to the beginning of social and individual life. Having once started the infinite regress there is no justifiable motive for stopping this side of the beginning of history. If the individual is not a complete system of influences not more so is the group. It, too, has its history, its roots lie in other cultures, it carries us back ultimately into an unending history of developments. Whatever standards are applied to the group must be applied as liberally and as vigorously to the individual. If you apply them so liberally as to include all that has gone toward making them severally what they are there is beginning and progress but no end to the problem; if you apply them with such rigor as to make of both individual and his group self-complete and closed systems (although, of course, no one would maintain they are really such, that is, have no historical background representing a genetic develop-

ment of their present selves) the problem has meaning and approach.

Viewed in this light, as we believe it must be viewed, the social is not always the sole and self-complete intellectual life, the larger sphere of concepts of which individual psychology is after all only one manifestation. It is such if you posit that point of view, but why not posit the other also?

In the case of these messianic religions we find that the individual point of view plus the social point of view leads to a better comprehension of the phenomena in their entirety than either point of view taken in (unnecessary) exclusion of the other. We get a deeper insight into things, we can more consistently and prophetically account for them by considering the individual as a self-complete system of concepts and purposes acting upon another complete system, the social order, and being in turn influenced by the social, than by considering him as but an element of the social order.

It is in the success with which our points of view produce results, their value as interpretations and predictions that their ultimate justification consists. In the nature of the case neither Durkheim's nor our own are open to demonstration; for this reason: the evidence can never be had in sufficient abundance and surety to fill the gap. That is to say, you can never find in the *actual* social influence upon the individual all that is necessary to account for his being as he is. You may find most of them somewhere in the social order and adumbrations of more in his social neighborhood; but you will never be able to show that each and all of what there existed in some form did actually enter whether consciously or not, directly or indirectly into the individual's mentality. If you take the social point of view as the be-all and end-all of individual human life you can bring forward a great many relevant facts in support of your thesis, but you will never be able to supply all the data necessary for the demonstration of the argument. If, on the other hand, you insist that the individual is in small or in large part *not* the result of social influences you will again have a thesis in which you can make a case but even as to the most trivial things you can scarcely hope to demonstrate that he has not responded therein to some social influence intruded all unknown to himself. It is again a matter of how you wish to marshal your evidence and the justification for one or the other will

be in the use you make of your assumptions. The greater profundity of the problem has usually been confused with its greater obscurity.

Because of the profitable point of view which, for descriptive purposes, regards the individual as a self-complete unit capable of influencing the group and imparting to it concepts and purposes which were hitherto shared only by the individual messiah, we are not disposed to admit with Durkheim that religion is and must and can be only social. On the contrary, it may gain nothing by being incorporated in a number rather than in but one individual, or lose as much and often loses more than it gains by such transmission. The transmission is after all accidental just as gravitation is accidental to one's purposes. The social are not more persistent than physical forces—they merely condition individual capacity in another dimension. The social dimension does not include, it merely focuses on individual psychology.

There is another respect in which the definition of religion as social does not satisfy: it characterizes, from Durkheim's point of view, everything. Education, politics, everything is likewise social, so that this is not the differentia of religion. Moreover, it leaves the universality of religion unaccounted for. Why should there be in every age and clime the religious consciousness at all? A mere purposeless survival of an unmeaning organization and ceremonial is unthinkable when its distribution and long history is considered. If we cannot hope to get at remote prehistoric beginnings we may at least ask what keeps it going, to what element of our natures does it appeal? Durkheim's detailed treatment leaves out of the account the central problem where if anywhere investigation should be profitable.

We have held that the meaning given to religion must, after all, be a matter of choice, a creative definition presupposed by any selection of material on which analytic inductive results are to be based. This is in no sense of the word a matter of trivial terminology, for it does not much matter what name we use so long as we employ it consistently, it is a question of method and procedure in the use of cultural phenomena where we endeavor really to get ahead in our treatment. It does not mean, however, that our choice of definition can be arbitrary. It ought so far as possible conform to the hints of discussion

as assigned in the history of the theory of religion and to follow the lines of inquiry already laid down. It should, moreover, keep so far as possible the older denotation while reading into it a new connotation. The history of science and of the progress of liberal thought is largely an example of the creation of new connotation by the reading of new concepts into the old order of things whose denotation is seldom radically changed. History, then, should guide our choice of meaning, though in the end we find it only when we make it.

In choosing our concept of religion we should have in mind the extent to which religious feeling has been manifest in mankind practically everywhere and at all times as one of the features to be accounted for; as it appears in the individual as well as in the group we must find to what demand of his nature it answers. Finally, the proofs which are adduced by the religious consciousness and, more important still, the kind of evidence which generates religious feeling and is the bulwark of cults must be taken into consideration.

As this article makes no attempt to offer a constructive definition of religion we do not propose to treat that important question here. Suffice it to say, however, that these demands seem to be most sufficiently met by the concept of the supernatural or supernormal. It has been well expressed by Gilbert Murray in his *Four Stages of Greek Religion*. The world may be divided into two parts, the world of experience and knowledge and the realm of the untraversed. It is in the latter that religion lies whatever corner of it it may occupy. The phenomena of death where we are brought face to face with the world beyond experience is, when apprehended in this way, usually productive of the religious attitude. Nor is it accidental that practically every cult rises to an acme of activity and ritual when one of its members has been overtaken by death. If we look for evidences accepted by the cults themselves we find it usually consisting in evidences of the miraculous interposition of personalities and forces not of the world traversed by human experience. Whatever is interpreted as such phenomena is usually regarded with emotions similar to those engendered by the contemplation of the traditional miraculous evidences of the divine; if we give a psychological interpretation of religion it matters not whether they operate in individual or in social psychology. If we wish to define religion as social,

then we need merely qualify this by saying that when a group is actuated by this emotional apprehension of the supernatural, there we have religion.

That the application of this concept will lead to the classifying of many things as religious which are not currently so regarded, and the leaving out of many currently so regarded is inevitable. It would mean that certain social, ritualized functions no longer characterized by the emotional apprehension that gave them birth and potency are not properly religious but mere social perfunctory rites. They might be religious as performed by this individual, non-religious as performed by another; and so on. It follows, too, that this concept varies with the culture of the group and of the individual. Hence, the supernatural as above defined is relative to the experience and intellectual achievement of the group or individual in question. It will, indeed, be found that the extent to which a religious nature answers to the evidences of the supernatural, even though habit and social compulsion exercise a distracting influence, is largely dependent upon his intellectual grasp of the whole situation adduced in proof of such supernatural interposition. What appeals to a Blackfoot Indian fits into a different intellectual perspective when apprehended by the white man (*what* white man is a very important matter) and has an appeal depending upon its orientation there, while the evidences of divinity adduced by a Christian may or may not make a similar appeal to the Blackfoot. Presumably there are individuals who recognize no such clear-cut division of the world as above suggested. For such individuals there is no religious experience.

We believe that investigation along this line will be fruitful of results—such are the promises of tentative exploration. We are interested in what is fundamental in human nature. We obtain deepest insight into human experience by ascertaining the channels through which it finds expression, and the purposes thereby subserved. For this reason we prefer a point of view with regard to religion that cross-sections individual and social psychology, not ruling out either, but using them as mutually supplementary. We prefer to regard the individual as a self-complete entity conditioned, of course, by a thousand external influences of which the social is most intimate but is after all but another dimension comparable to gravitation and other

physical forces. We would at the same time regard the group as a self-complete entity made up of psychically interacting individuals functioning in mutual co-operation and held together by one dominant purpose that transcends purely individual purposes. The two points of view are better than either one in co-ordinating the facts of individual and social life. Any interpretation of their relative truth is, after all, merely an attempt to justify the chosen point of view on the ground that it does co-ordinate the facts and facilitates interpretations.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead. By J. G. FRAZER.
Vol. I. New York, Macmillan, 1913. Pp. xxi, 495.

This volume is the first part of another great work by the Professor of Social Anthropology in the University of Liverpool, who has given us, besides many other books, the seven volumes of "The Golden Bough" and the four volumes of "Totemism and Exogamy." The contents of the present work consist in the main of the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 1911 and 1912. The author offers the work as a study in natural theology, which is the subject of the lectures on Lord Gifford's foundation. By "natural theology" he understands "that reasoned knowledge of a God or gods which man may be supposed, whether rightly or wrongly, capable of attaining to by the exercise of his natural faculties alone." (p. 1.) He distinguishes three methods of treatment of the subject—first, the dogmatic, which consists in stating the dogmas of natural theology which appear to the particular author to be true; secondly, the philosophical, examining the validity of the grounds on which these dogmas have been or may be maintained; and lastly, the historical method, which is that followed in the present work, namely, describing the various views which have been held on the subject and tracing their origin and evolution in history. He remarks that while the results of such an investigation "may shake the confidence with which traditional beliefs have been held," yet logically "an historical enquiry into the evolution of religion prejudices neither the question of the ethical value of religious practice nor the question of the truth or falsehood of religious belief." (p. 3.) "It is perfectly possible that a belief may be true, though the reasons alleged in favour of it are false or absurd; indeed we may affirm with great probability that a multitude of human beliefs, true in themselves, have been accepted and defended by millions of people on grounds which cannot bear exact investigation for a moment." (p. 4.) A similar view of the relation of superstitious belief to social institutions is presented in another of Dr. Frazer's books, entitled "Psyche's Task."

Belief in immortality, or, more correctly, "the continued existence of conscious human personality after death," our author finds to be general among mankind, although there are dissenters even among savages. The belief, according to Dr. Frazer, is "acquired by a process of reasoning from experience," both inward experience like dreams and outward experience such as the observation of the resemblance of children to deceased kinsfolks (this being a germ of the belief in reincarnation). We are told that as a rule savages do not believe in what we call natural death. Many peoples believe that "they would never die if their lives were not cut short by sorcery." (p. 33.) Sometimes death is attributed to demons, acting on their own accord; this the author regards a moral and intellectual advance over belief in witchcraft. Some

savages have gone even further, and admit the possibility of natural death in certain cases. Attention is called to the similarity of the primitive belief in the original absence of death with the views of some eminent modern biologists, for instance, the view of A. Weismann that death is not a natural necessity, but an adaptation acquired in the course of evolution for the advantage of the race. A similar view was held by A. R. Wallace. (p. 84.) While primitive peoples generally hold that death is not "natural," they are forced by the fact of its universality to "reconcile their theory of immortality with the practice of mortality." (p. 59.) In this way arise the myths of the origin of death. Usually death is believed to have come into the world through some disastrous blunder or crime. Several types of stories detailing such events are presented. The reviewer is of the opinion that the exceptions to this prevailing conception might have been more emphasized. There are myths who account for death as on the whole a beneficent phenomenon, on decidedly Malthusian principles.

In this work Dr. Frazer used the descriptive method applied to a few peoples in a limited area, thus approaching to the method of regional study of cultures emphasized by several leading ethnologists. This is worth noting, since the "comparative" method, based on the collection of data on certain topics from all parts of the world, has formerly been used by our author to such an extent that it is sometimes called the Frazerian method. Here we are told that while the comparative method is unquestionably more attractive, it cannot be adopted without a good deal of more or less conscious theorising, since every comparison implicitly involves a theory." (p. 30.) The present work, to judge from the first volume, bids fair to be a most valuable contribution to the history of religion, worthy of the great authority to whose pen we are indebted for so many important studies of primitive culture. It may be mentioned that Dr. Frazer has recently been knighted for his services to science and letters.

A. N. GILBERTSON.

Amerika und die Religion der Zukunft. Von ADOLF HARPF. Graz, Leuschner und Lubensky, 1914. 175 p.

Harpf urges that the mixture of races, religious and sects in this country has kept religious interests alive to a remarkable degree, that it has compelled much thinking as to what is common from the different points of view, and therefore has helped to orient thoughtful people with regard to what was essential and what was unessential for the religious consciousness. He therefore believes that one of the chief missions of this country is to evolve a new religion which shall recognize the stress that modern religious psychology lays upon morals, making conduct the essential thing, which shall also represent the tendencies toward social welfare which is represented in all kinds of unions and coöperations, as distinct from competition, that shall be on the one side as hearty and on the other as practical as the Salvation Army, that shall not stress creed or dogma but life, etc. He finds some indication of a movement in this direction here.

The Layman Revato. By EDWARD P. BUFFET. New York, Douglas C. McMurtrie, 1914. 102 p.

This is a study of a restless mind in Buddhist India at the time of Greek influence. Revato had one of those morbidly desperate minds which cannot be bonded by any imposing philosophy. The ideas ascribed to him may be outgrowths from the Buddhism of his day, or it may be grafted thereon. In justice to Christianity it must be admitted that the author may have credited to an earlier day some moral prescriptions which are peculiarly its own. It certainly shows an interesting interplay between Buddhism and Hellenism like that which left a trace on the Punjab monument in the Ganges valley still earlier. The meeting of the East and West through Alexander's invasion is generally known as a rather glittering generality although archaeological research is making our knowledge in this field more definite. This writer was the Amiel representing the meeting of these two cultures. The character Revato is created by the author as a lay figure, and even the monastery in which he is represented to have lived is not historical, but generic. It is an interesting study of the human soul earnestly seeking light, uncertain where to find it, and torn between two systems. It gives the reader an admirable insight into the philosophies of two Weltanschauungen. The chapters dealing with the great renunciation, the vision of death and of life, are the most interesting. The author has here made a fascinating contribution to religious psychology, true at once to history, the philosophy of religion, and the eternal psychology of the soul in its quest for truth of life whether in ancient or modern times.

The Miracles of Jesus. A Study of the Evidence. Being the Davies Lecture for the Year 1913. By E. O. DAVIES. London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1913. 232 p.

The scope of this book can best be characterized by the chapter headings, which are: the alleged facts, face value of the narratives, the evidence for the alleged facts, the gospels, dates, writers and authorities, critical estimation of the narratives, the evidence, other miracles, theories about the facts, viz., physical impossibility, moral impossibility and possibility, antecedent probability, evidence of impossibility. The author's standpoint on these different topics is all independent and all his own. From the reviewer's standpoint he is on the whole too conservative and distrustful, and lacks psychological insight.

Comment and Criticism. A Cambridge Quarterly Paper for the Discussion of Current Religious and Theological Questions. London, Longman's Green & Co. Vol. II, No. 1. May, 1914.

In wishing this new journal, just beginning its second volume, well, THE JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY ventures to express the hope that the reviews feature of *Comment and Criticism* be not suffered to grow less, but rather more. Articles, correspondence, etc., are well in their place, but the greatest need of scholarship in the religious field is a kind of *Centralblatt* that shall name and characterize the important new publications. From what point of view the publications are regarded makes less difference.

Mind and Spirit. A Study in Psychology. By THOMAS KIRBY DAVIS. Boston, Sherman, French & Co., 1914. 115 p.

This work deals with personal reminiscences, revelation, the true psychology, the second birth and the new life, and the holy spirit of promise. Subjects like these awaken a lively curiosity on the part of the psychologist of religion to know whether on these great themes this author has seen any new light, but alas, there is no intimation that he has done so. His views are conventional, orthodox, and uninspiring. When will the orthodox clergy awaken to the great new life and light which modern psychology has found and which the world, and particularly young people, so need?

Marching men; or phases and problems of childhood, pulpit and pew. By LEONIDAS ROBINSON. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1913. 243 p.

This work is not intended to treat of psychology as a science but of some of its practical applications to religious and moral work. The author has had a large experience as lecturer, professor and pastor in the South, and puts things very effectively. He discusses habit, character, attention, childhood, dogma, religion, evolution, gates to the Old and New Testament, etc. Perhaps the best thing in his book is a lively sense of the religious needs of young people.

The psychic uplift, or the new mind cure. By MAZETTA LAIRY. London, B. F. Stevens & Brown, 4 Trafalgar Sq. (c. 1914). 283 p.

A mind cure, we are told, implies the re-education of the unconscious mind. To cure a mental sufferer the physician must turn educator and spend hours to bring his patient back to a normal attitude. This book is meant to be a guide to those who practise mental medicine. It should be noted that the mind-curists in this country have not in a single case known to the writer of this note availed themselves of the more advanced and more effective methods of Dejerine, who for many years in his hospital has appealed to the emotions with great success, nor of Dubois, who has developed what might be called a reason cure, which consists in making the patient conscious of his own right relations to others and to the world, of Marcinowski, whose appeal is to ambition to do, be something in the world and to avoid *Mindertigkeit*, nor even have the occupation cures had any adequate presentation.

The miracles of Jesus. By E. O. DAVIES. London, Hodder & Son, 1913. 240 p.

These lectures are given on the Davies Foundation made by Thomas Davies to perpetuate his father's name and whose chief interest was in the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists. The lecturer must be an ordained minister, the topic, religion. The thesis here is that miracles must be assumed to be extraordinary which on their face value do not happen in the course of nature. The argument is from analogy. No imminent cause or nexus could account for Jesus' miracles so that Hume is annihilated.

Religiöses Recht. Von Dr. MORDCHÉ W. RAPAPORT. Separatabdruck aus den Blättern für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft und Volkswirtschaftslehre. X. Jahrgang, Heft 1, 2, 3. Berlin, R. v. Decker's Verlag, 1914.

This author urges that religion is a stabilizing element in society and that it works against special interests and moods, and therefore also against disharmonies and disunions. It knits up every soul into a more compact whole. Religion ought to furnish norms for citizenship, if not for science, jurisprudence, economics, etc.

Some loose stones; being a consideration of certain tendencies in modern theology illustrated by reference to the book called "Foundations." By R. A. KNOX. New York, Longmans, Green, 1913. 233 p.

The problem of Christianity; lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston, and at Manchester College, Oxford. By JOSIAH ROYCE. Volume 1. The Christian Doctrine of Life. Volume 2. The Real World and the Christian Ideas. New York, Macmillan, 1913.

The religious instinct. By THOMAS J. HARDY. New York, Longmans, Green, 1913. 300 p.

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RELIGION AND RACE-EDUCATION A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The word missionary from the Latin and apostle from the Greek are cognate and signify one sent, or one set forth. "A missionary religion," says Max Müller, "is one in which the spreading of the truth and the conversion of unbelievers are raised to the rank of a sacred duty by the founder or by his immediate successors." (Fortnightly Review, July, 1874.) The missionary religion can transcend old local bounds and so be naturalized wherever it is disseminated. Acceptance of the missionary religion becomes for many races, the first step in civilization. Christianity was the gateway by which the pagan peoples of western Europe entered the realm of modern civilization. In studying the development of non-Christian peoples there has been no alternative than to trace their rise through the efforts of religious agencies, for until recent centuries there have been no secular educative agencies even in the most advanced nations. More and more is the world becoming a family of races, whose interests are interdependent, and the race children who are still at the school age and need development should be under institutional care. There is yet great need to protect the native races, to afford opportunity for development, and to

NOTE.—In making this study, I am under obligations to many for suggestions and assistance. I am especially indebted to Dr. Louis N. Wilson who placed much material at my disposal. To President G. Stanley Hall, I owe much in the way of inspiration and counsel.

Numbers in the text refer to references in the bibliography.

give the true message that behind the more evident materialism there is dominant a worthy idealism which has been the real rise of our civilization.

The emphasis in this study has been placed on the social and economic factors rather than on what is usually called religious. Not that I disregard the religious factor, but the rather that I enlarge the conception of the place and function of religion in the life-process. It is only through the successful adjustment of a people to its social and psychical environment, that that people can rise to a higher plane of civilization where it can appreciate the higher qualities of culture and religion. The solution of this problem lies in the blending and balancing of those forces which may be roughly classed as the industrial, political and educative. The industrial is the most primitive and basic, but the greatest in its ultimate influence is the educative. There are many forces working for the education of backward races, but among these, the spread of the missionary religion, especially Christianity, has been the chief organized agency for the engendering of the growth of the immature barbarian into maturer civilization.

II. SOCIAL AND RACIAL FACTORS

The general acceptance of the genetic view of the world has deeply modified all our conceptions of philosophy and all the sciences dealing with man and his environment. Everything is regarded as having an origin with definite states of development, and the only way to know anything with any approach to thoroughness, is to trace its genesis and development. The chief exponents of this view of life have wrought in the field of biology, but of more recent years, sociology, psychology and the various researches in religion have recognized how profoundly it has modified their principles and problems. The results of ethnology and anthropology which trace racial development, are needed not only to interpret our own complex social order, but also to solve the problem of advancing the backward races.

The two most fundamental springs to action are the food-process and the reproductive-process. From the very beginning the life-process is social for it requires the interaction of individual organisms, because of the processes involved in nutrition and reproduction. The members of a species are probably

bunched together till unfavorable conditions, especially the food supply, require separation into groups, which by co-operation secure a food supply, or by readjustment adapt themselves to new food stuffs. Groups of individuals by co-operation can best secure and control feeding grounds and hence have the best chance of survival. While the struggle for existence and the elimination of the unfit, have been generally recognized as the chief factors leading to the development of a species, more recently Kropatkin, and others have been advocating the principles of mutual aid. The former is a purely negative factor, and would, if carried to the extreme, lead to extermination; mutual aid means that in the struggle for existence, individuals of the same or even of different species work together for the mutual welfare of each party to this group.

In the ascent from the most primitive hunting stage, a variety of types developed. Some tribes hunted, some tribes fished, some tribes picked fruit and nuts, or dug roots; each followed the line of least resistance and entered upon the pathway which furnished the most abundant and stable food supply. Among the American Indians, the Pueblos were ancient agriculturists while the Indians of the plains were hunters for game and fish were abundant. In the hunting type there is a simple incoherent social order for the tribe must break up into small groups when the season changes or game becomes scarce. Hunting tribes grow by fusion, split up, and lead independent existences often quite remote from each other. The fishing tribes collect along the rivers, lakes or the coasts, and have a larger group, a relatively stable social order and a more permanent abode. Where there is pelagic fishing, the expeditions demand a leader which becomes a preparation for a higher type of social order. These villages often develop into trade centers, and start commercial activities where a surplus of goods are produced and another region produces a surplus of another kind of goods. The pastoral type has advanced to the stage of keeping and raising flocks and herds for a food supply, the getting of property and the developing of capital. The nomad type must wander from place to place with short stay in any locality, must separate when overstocked and defend themselves from the encroachments of beasts or bandits. Agricultural activities afford permanent settlement, the accumulation of wealth, the

development of industrial and commercial activities, the aggregation of large groups of people within the social order, leading to closer integration, and a more complex social organization. Pastoral pursuit will support a full score times as many souls per area as will the chase and productive agriculture will support even a greater increase over the nomadic life. Every advance towards a higher state of civilization means a decrease in the amount of land necessary for the maintenance of the individual and the increase in the benefits of civilization, releasing a portion of the energy spent for a precarious existence, for the attainment of higher wants and satisfactions.

The earliest civilizations developed along the rivers where an abundance of fertile soil gave easy and regular returns from labor, as the fertile regions of the Nile, the Euphrates and the Indus. Civilization at bottom is a product of geographical environment, both the unchangeable environment, as climate, configuration of the land, the nature of the soil; and the changeable environment, such as the changeable surface conditions, afforestation, deforestations, intercommunication, sanitation and the control of natural resources. The extremes of climate, intense cold, or debilitating heat, have hindered the advance of civilization. Where nature unaided produces abundantly for every need, she breeds a want of vigor of mind and body, and though at first she seemed so benign and friendly, she finally set a limit to further progress. The heat belt measuring some 3,600 miles between 30° north latitude and 30° south latitude, with a mean temperature of 68° Fahrenheit, includes Mexico, Central America, most of Africa, Arabia, India, Indo-China, Polynesia, and the Philippines. Outside of the Europeans in these regions, the civilization of the heat belt has remained stationary for a thousand years, and during the last five hundred years has made no contribution of the first order to art, literature, science, invention, or industrial achievement. The non-tropical regions developed a civilization very late and very crude, but a civilization based not on the accumulation of wealth, but on the energy and integrity of men. Tropical races enervated by centuries of luxury and inactivity, were crushed under the impact of a hardier race made so through centuries of battling with the unfriendly elements, which race set in and established a dominion founded upon principles not understood

by the older civilization. History shows the decadence of the tropical nations of Egypt, and Babylon, and of the Mediterranean type, of Greece and Rome, of the later countries of Spain and Portugal, and the rise of the non-tropical races of the north-land. The drift of conquest has been from north to south, and the Western European powers have taken possession of Africa, of tropical Asia, and the islands of the seas.

Scarcity of water develops the desert type of civilization as in southwestern Asia; abundance of water but scarcity of land develops another type of civilization, that of western Europe. In this latter region vegetation is abundant, and where drainage is properly regulated a stable and a varied food supply is assured. Cereals grow best in a cool wet climate for their roots being short, they cannot well withstand droughts. Root crops on the contrary require clear hot weather, and since their long roots penetrate deeply into the soils, they can endure periods of drought. Since cereals can be easily transported, and root crops cannot, cereals become the tribute money for the lords who carry the surplus to a distance, while root crops must be consumed nearby by the conquered. In the latter years of the eighteenth century the development of sheep raising, of the use of coal and iron and steam all applied to industry, enabled England to bid successfully against foreign nations and especially France (45, p. 284), "where the increase of productive power was relatively slow. The food imported by England was usually in the form of wheat—the one rare thing for which there was a general demand. It thus happened that just at the time when France wanted more wheat to raise her standard of comfort, England outbid her and took the coveted grain. To say the least, England was always first supplied, and France got what was left. In bad years England took a share of French wheat, leaving the French towns without a proper supply; and in good years, when prices were low French country people were in distress. So in either case there were suffering and discontent in France."

Not only had wheat become predominantly the staple food of the English people, but a new mode of preparation marked a stage in progress. While cooking was done only before the open fire porridges and soft foods were prepared; when the oven came into use the preparation of dry foods became possible.

Since wheat was the only cereal that could make light bread and good toast, its superiority became very marked as a food. Since every one sought to change to the wheat ration, the price of wheat rose and continued until the increase of the sugar diet brought in a new epoch. "Many of these changes are due to the fall in the price of sugar. Its cheapness has so modified the food supply that we can be said to have a sugar diet in the same sense as the eighteenth century has a bread diet. The increased cheapness of many articles of food has opened up almost unlimited possibilities for a future increase of population. The plants from which sugar is extracted are amazingly prolific. Their production requires but little labor, and as they grow in parts of the world which but little use has been made of, they do not interfere with the production of other food products as did the demand for wheat. When the people of the civilized world lived on wheat, they were confined to a narrow belt of land in the temperate zone. Now they have practically the whole world in which to expand, and there will not be a permanent shortage in the food supply until the population of the world has increased many fold. Cheap food and a sugar diet, therefore, make the conditions out of which the thought movement of the present epoch will proceed." (45, 379-380.)

The principle herein advocated is, that food supply is basic for the maintenance of a civilization, and that economics is the basis for understanding the process involved in race education. The economic conditions must be studied first for from this source flow economic ideas. From this basis, are produced the esthetic, religious and moral ideas. New regimes and ideas come from a new economic order, and from this order is developed a new civilization. While the economic conditions are most basic, nevertheless the ethical factors are the highest achievement.

We are to aim at the ethical, but to attain this latter, we must proceed from the elementary foundation found in the economic order, which in turn is dependent on food and food supply. The application of this to religious development and the education of backward races is given in another section. We now turn to a consideration of the reproductive-process and the racial factors involved in our problem.

The reproductive-process is closely related to the food-process.

Not only does the individual require a stable food supply, but reproduction does not take place save where nutrition is normal and stable. Though the reproductive-process is thus dependent upon the food-process, yet it is the former that plays the chief rôle in the development of sociality. Society originated in the sympathetic relation between the mother and her offspring. The importance of this relation is enhanced in proportion to the complexity of the group life and the prolonged period of infancy, requiring the care of both parents, and in human society, the family is protected by custom and law as the most significant and sacred institution. Long ago, Fiske pointed out, that the progress of the race and the degree of development of the child depended upon this long period of dependency and the plasticity of the physical and mental life of the child. Thus in the lower races, as many studies show, the children have shorter periods of infancy, develop physically and mentally very early, reach puberty young, but thereafter their physical and psychical natures become set and only with great difficulty can new adaptations be made. The most backward races which are known to-day are to be regarded not so much as child races as retarded races. Hence the problem of their rejuvenation and development is a far greater problem than the securing of an assent to a formulated creed of an alien religion, or submission to a foreign political system.

Recent movements show that racial readjustments are mostly social, is less largely psychical and least of all physical. Instead of a physical adaptation by means of a thick fur coat or the deposit of fats as do the animals in the polar regions, man builds him a snow hut and makes use of fats for heat production. Likewise in the arid regions, man does not develop horny coverings or armatures to withstand drought, but seeks a cave or makes a hut. Studies of ancient skull cavities indicate that there has been no appreciable increase in size in modern times. The German of to-day is probably not much different in point of brain weight from the Teuton of the time of Tacitus. The average brain weight of the different races is approximately the same; the Negro is slightly lighter and the Mongolian is a little heavier than the average Caucasian brain. There are probably greater differences between members of the same race than between the averages of the different races. Of two groups with

equal average ability, one may have a wide distribution between the extremes of genius and stupidity, and the few geniuses will far outweigh the effect of the defectives. Then, too, with the increase in the size of the group, there is the increased probability of the production of geniuses, and here it is the absolute number of geniuses that is most important. Thus civilized states with their stable food-supply and large aggregations of people have this great advantage over the sparsely settled non-civilized tribes.

From a number of studies of various races, we are led to conclude that in keenness of the senses and mental acuity, the different races are about on a par. The greatest differences will be found in the so-called higher mental traits of association, analysis, abstraction and originality. After a number of years of observation in the Torres Straits, in Egypt and the Sudan, Prof. Myers draws the following conclusions:

"1. That the mental characteristics of the majority of the peasant class of Europe are essentially the same as those of primitive communities.

"2. That such differences between them are the result of differences in environment and in individual variability.

"3. That the relation between the organism and its environment is the ultimate cause of variation.

"4. That this being admitted, the possibility of the progressive development of all primitive peoples must be concluded, if only the environment can be appropriately changed." (59, p. 73-79.) The fact that the mind of the savage is not dissimilar from that of the civilized man, indicates that progress has proceeded on other lines than the accumulation of mental capacity as such. The differences in mental activity are largely due to differences in the stimulations and opportunities calling for such responses. As Patten urges, it is the motor reactions which mark the differences of races, and peoples. He says, for example in the Armenian disasters, three nations read the same news, one was coldly indifferent, another was sympathetic, a third was ready to fight.

In general it may be stated that it is not so much to the superiority of physical and intellectual endowment that the superiority of the civilized man over the savage is due, as to the superiority of the traditions and the more intelligent choice

of laws and forms of procedure. The law of parallelism holds that one group takes pretty much the same steps in progress as another group in a similar environment, and that the basic features dominant in the lower order are the same as those in the higher. The variability of a society depends on the variability of the individual and especially on the plasticity of the infant mind; the fixity of society is due to the adult whose mind and body are set and crystalized in the mould of the old social order, and the fact that it is impossible to simultaneously bring new ideas to bear on all the group. Under these conditions then, the progress of society is largely due to the rise of a great personality and the massing of experience and knowledge. When a society has formed an accumulation of knowledge, technique and method of procedure, even aliens can work under it when it is understood, but when a society not only has not massed such materials, but has opposed such activities, there has been no display of such capacities. Western civilization owes much of its incidence to the eminent men of Ancient Greece, who organized their knowledge, formulating numbers, logic and philosophy, and a method of discovering new knowledge.

Dewey (17) shows the marked relation existing between the physical and social environment and the type of thinking of the group. In all post hunting situations, there are intermediary steps between the "stimulus and the overt act, and the overt act and the final satisfaction." These comprise such activities as seeding and harvesting, animal husbandry, and bartering for products not produced by the group. In the hunting stage, the end is mentally closely connected with the food stimulation and calls forth skill and energy as the immediate part of the food process. There is no postponement of satisfactions, for the past and the present and the future are all merged in the present situation to be met. "The animism of primitive mind is a necessary expression of the immediacy of relation existing between want and overt activity, that which affords satisfaction and the attained satisfaction itself. Only when things are treated simply as means, are marked off and held off against remote ends do they become objects." Thus with no domesticated animals or cultivated plants, the primitive man depends on the luck of the hour; he gorges to-day and hungers to-

morrow. This is not proof of stupidity, but the rather that his idea of remote ends has never developed for him to live other than in the immediate present. Boas calls it his supreme optimism. The situations call for sudden exhibition of strength and skill and hence uncertainty of the outcome leads to an intensely emotional display with extreme satisfaction when successful. The quickness and accuracy with which natives meet for the first time a complicated situation, is marked, provided they have a direct or immediate action. The usual assumption of the dullness and lack of application of the native is based on a judgment by a foreign standard, in which the ends are so remotely detached from all problems of purely personal adjustment that he has no motives for action. Thus White in writing of the Philippines says that the natives have been called lazy. "This charge presents a half truth only; those who know these people best affirm strongly and rightly that they are industrious and vigorous in the pursuit of means to satisfy real desires. But in the past those desires have been few and modest, and it is quite beyond the reach of imagination to believe that a man whose home has always been in the tropics, will expose himself to the discomfort and fatigue of physical labor in order to secure things which he does not want. When new wants assert themselves, the Filipino is as ready as the people of other races to devote himself to even the most tiring labor to satisfy these wants." (58, p. 267.)

Gulick thinks that a wrong conception has been gotten of the differences between the East and West. He says that while the West is strongly rational and the East is intuitional, the Oriental when educated in the western manner, is not devoid of great logical ability. From which he draws the conclusion that these characteristics which distinguish the East from the West are sociological rather than biological and are primarily due to the character of their civilization. The introduction of new ideas through social intercourse has had a potent influence in creating a new social order. Though unable of herself to generate these ideas, Japan proved herself able to understand and make use of them in redeeming her national life. "As I look on the history of the Orient," writes Gulick, "I find no tendency to discover the inherent worth of man or to introduce the principles of government by discussion. Left to themselves, I see

no probability that any of these nations would ever have been able to break the thrall of their customs and reach that stage of development in which the common individual could be trusted with a large measure of individual liberty. Though I can conceive that Japan might have secured a thoroughgoing political centralization under the old regime, I cannot see that that centralization would have been accompanied by growing liberty for the individual, or by such constitutional rights for the common man as he enjoys to-day. . . . By her thoroughgoing abandonment of the feudal social order and the adoption of the constitutional and representative government of Christendom, whether she has recognized it or not, she has accepted the principles of the inherent worth of manhood and womanhood as well as government by discussion. Japan has thus by imitation rather than by origination entered upon a period of endless progress." (25, p. 63.)

In the development of social life as of individual life, certain ways of doing things become fixed as habits. These may oftentimes be purely accidental and have but little value, but other co-ordinations arise from special needs and by repetition and imitation are passed on from one generation to another. Some of these habits or customs gain more recognition than others, and become more fully organized in the group, as institutions, such as property rights, government, the family and religion.

We may agree with McDougall that the formation of a mass of custom was necessary for the preservation of social groups. Not only have all those observed, had this mass of custom, but those which did not have it were eliminated in the struggle for existence. In the period of nation formation the all important thing is to build up a social unit out of the heterogenous elements; and therefore while the national type is setting it is vitally essential that there should be no disturbing factors either from within or without. Hence then isolation from other peoples and conformity within are the essentials for the attainment of this homogeneity. For this reason tribal habits are rigidly enforced in all matters pertaining to the life of the group, even to the most trivial ways of doing things. Should an independent individual arise who sees only folly in these customs, he is repressed. Whatever is done in a way different from the usual manner, this is at once branded as impious and

a sin against society. This breach of the rules of conduct brings universal disapproval and adequate punishment is meted out to the persistent offender.

It is difficult to understand how any nation, which has developed this cake of custom, burdensome and baneful, though it is, has broken through it and yet survived and progressed, for the vast majority are still custom bound, and few indeed have survived the feat of transition to a new order. The consciousness of these people seemed fully expressed in their traditions and customs. They have held that their customs were of absolute value, and when they saw other people living in open defiance of customs which they deemed essential to life, or when brought suddenly to realize that their old beliefs were groundless, they are led to the extreme reaction of casting them all aside as of no value whatsoever. Every religion has served as a means of social control, and the richer the faith the stronger has been the influence of its sanctions, but when it is weakened, disorder enters the social life lowering the moral tone of the individuals of the group thus affected. Concerning this problem of transition, King writes: "If the mental life of a people is socially related to its institutions and traditions, it is questionable whether it is right for a so-called higher race to bring strong pressure to bear upon a lower one even in the name of civilization or religion. It is much easier to destroy the hold of the old than it is to force an adjustment to the new. Hence it is that the natural races upon contact with civilization seems to be affected in the main with its vices rather than its virtues. The movement away from the old must have its chief motive from within if that movement is to result in a more adequate social system. A people should never be forced to break with their past except as this past appeals to them as inadequate. Otherwise the result can only be the destruction of their own systems of control, and with them the virtues connected therewith. If changes are not motivated by elements having organic connection with the past life, a people finds itself deprived of those regulative conditions essential to all morality whether among civilized or savage. There being no movement from within that calls for the change, there is no basis for a new system of control and hence for a new morality. The virtues of the cultural races which have caused them to break with their past, are

dependent upon their complicated social structure and are therefore incapable of being assimilated by the Barbarians." (34, p. 135.)

This principle is well illustrated in the history of colonization. Phoenicia, the great commercial power of antiquity, tolerated other rites and customs even to the extent of sacrificing her own national independence, but was very successful in assimilating other types of culture. Rome with all of her imperialism, tolerated alien customs, so long as they did not interfere with the integrity of her government. Both nations dealt with the industrial organization and left untouched the secondary social forces which were based upon the local character of the struggle for existence. We may note that in modern conquests and colonization a very different policy has usually been followed. In the Spanish conquest of South America and Mexico, in the mad rush for plunder thousands of the Indians were slain and splendid native states wiped out of existence and the conqueror's religion forced upon them; yet withal the Spaniard did not treat the Indian as greatly his inferior but mixed freely with them, intermarried and in the Southwestern colonies, gave the Indian protection and property rights not accorded them by our government. The French in Canada respected the rights of the Indians much more than did the English in the American colonies. In India the early French traders were more successful than the English in winning the allegiance of native rulers. The French in Algeria attempted to treat the natives as an integral part of France, to bestow upon the native a personal status, to break up the tribal system and the communal holdings and give them a constitutional government. This policy resulted in the natives' loss of tribal control and his ruin by shrewd persons who made him a victim for their extortion. The French in Indo-China endeavored to replace the native institutions by the entire legislative systems of continental France, but the disastrous results of immorality and the decline in the vigor of the people soon led to concessions to the native conditions. "It is a curious fact," says Dike, "that the English race has more generally destroyed the native race with which they have come in contact in their settlements than has been the case with other colonizing peoples, but have destroyed the natives only afterwards to

enter into a conflict with other dark or yellow races whose efficiency as laborers seem equal to their own. While the destruction of the native race by British races in countries where the English can labor out of doors is generally complete, it is the fact that other European races who have set to work to destroy the natives in similar countries have not succeeded, and that the English have often destroyed them while trying hard to keep them in existence." (27, Vol. 2, 711.) Kellor says that in the temperate zones, with their crude civilizations and comparatively thin populations, the native races are destroyed while the more densely populated cultural states of the Orient have remained intact. "In general wherever the white race can live and reproduce freely the integrity of the native race is fatally menaced." (31, p. 261.)

In the struggle for existence and the contact of races the weaker must be the first to suffer, but a vast and unnecessary loss has occurred through the fact "that modern nations have generally adopted the course of interference. They have started with proselytising zeal, from the standpoint of ignorant national egoism or ethno-centrism, and have utterly lost sight of the fact that all customs, institutions, etc., are logical and justifiable in the setting of their time, or else they would have ceased to exist. (31, p. 263.) Reinsch (49) concludes that this policy rested upon the old rationalistic notion that whenever an institution is judged rational, it is applicable to all peoples, in all times and places, and becomes the sole requirement for the development of civilization. Just as our civilization rests upon our western social structure, so too must the civilization of backward peoples be based upon their social structure. Underlying their social organization is a life-purpose which Western civilization has no inherent right to override or to substitute indiscriminately the features of another social order. As Orr (44) remarks, it is surprising how difficult it is for the European to understand the dangers attending the upsetting of ideas and social organization, the results of centuries of evolution. While the advanced nations have passed through the tribal period, with centuries of life in the feudalistic and monarchical stages, up into the constitutional and representative form of government, they overlook the fact that when freed too soon from tribal controls, native races perish. This is due to the great gaping

gulf between the relatively simple stage of the backward civilization with its slow rate of progress, and the complicated civilization of the advanced nations, with the momentum ever increasing with a frightfully terrific rapidity.

The following letter written in 1872 by the Reverend James Johnson, a native pastor to Governor Pope Hennessy of Sierra Leone, shows very clearly the distintegrating effect of race contact. "In the work of elevating the Africans, foreign teachers have always proceeded with their work on the assumption that the Negro or the African, is in every one of his normal susceptibilities an inferior race, and that it is needful in everything to give him a foreign model to copy; no account has been taken of our peculiarities—our language, enriched with the tradition of centuries; our parables, many of them the quintessence of family and local circumstances; our pottery and manufacture which, though rude, had their own tales to tell; our social habits and even the necessities of climate. It has been forgotten that European ideas, tastes, languages, and social habits, like those of other nations, have been influenced more or less by geographical positions and climatic peculiarities; that what is esteemed by one country as polite, may be justly esteemed by another rude and barbarous; and that God does not intend to have the races confounded, but that the Negro, or African, should be raised upon his own idiosyncrasies. The result has been that we, as a people, think more of everything that is foreign, and less of that which is purely native; have lost our self-respect and love for our race; are become a sort of nondescript people and are in many ways inferior to our brothers in the interior countries. There is evidently a fetter upon our minds even when the mind is free; mental weakness, even where there is physical strength and barrenness even where there is fertility." (10, p. 75.) Blyden held that European contact was causing the "devilization of Africa." The late Joaquin Miller put it, "the moral cannibalism where soul eats soul." Having been made conscious of the worthlessness of his possessions and culture he soon becomes conscious of his own inferiority. His wants are increased, which he can satisfy only by sacrificing that which is sacred to him, or by imposing upon those of his race more dejected than he.

In primitive society, sexual matters like all other affairs were

under tribal control. Where parentage and descent is unimportant, promiscuity may occur, and among fighting tribes every sort of feast was resorted to in order to stimulate the production of progeny. The first thought of woman was how to avoid barrenness for her position and even her very existence depended upon her fertility. Chastity becomes a dominant motive only when the economic forces had disintegrated the tribe, and made a more stable social order and a settled abode. With the increase of the power of intelligence and forethought, the parental instinct has been suppressed and hence the need of strong social sanctions to support it, and only those societies which developed sanctions co-ordinate with the development of individual intelligence, have survived, and reached an advanced stage of culture. "At the present time," says McDougall, "many savage tribes and barbarian communities are illustrating these principles; they are rapidly dying out owing to the failure of the social sanctions to give sufficient support to the parental instinct against the developing intelligence. It is largely for this reason that contact with civilization proves so fatal to so many savage peoples; for such contact stimulates their intelligence while it breaks their customs and social sanctions generally and fails to replace them by any equally efficient." (37, p. 270.) Where infant mortality is so frightfully large, and the ravages of war and disease, so ruinous, large progeny is the crying need. Morel writes "Nigeria, relatively free from sexual vice, is unconsciously striving to reproduce the species in the face of the destructive agencies of nature." (146, p. 213.) Wherever food supply was abundant and land plentiful, polygamy was practiced to replenish the earth. This was so among the ancient Hebrews and it is so among the Africans to day. Wherever the food supply is scant and uncertain, an excess of population is to be avoided, hence infanticide is practiced, and polyandry is then the form of the family group. Pagan polygamy has many ugly sores, but so has the monogamic system of Christian Europe, with its "festering uncontrolled, undiscussed, and unalleviated under the fair surface of a decorous society." (Lecky.) In Africa there are no women slaves of the underworld, with the great want, poverty and depravity, with "the miasmatic fluid which oozes out from below the foundations of the great civilizations." (Spectator, Sept. 24, 1904.)

Modern society has grown complex, and has placed restrictions upon the sex function without in any wise modifying the sex instinct. Hence the development of industrial centers with a large population of single men and women away from home, and the high cost of living forbidding the making of a home without adequate resources, makes the solving of the problem of modern home life, of divorce, of social diseases more difficult than the problem of the Harem or of polygamy. "The thing which grows upon us," writes Professor Moore, "as we think of these nations whose problems is ever more and more like our own is that there is no barbarism among them which is not also here at our own doors. There is no real heathenism among them the like of which is not illustrated in our community. There is no dark shadow of immorality and superstition among them which has not its parallel in our midst. There is no faith of men sincerely held which has not done for them something of that which our own faith has done for us. And a faith, even if it be our own, insincerely held, can hardly be expected to accomplish on the other side of the world what it cannot do on this. In the face of some things which we might mention in our present history we hesitate to call other nations uncivilized. It needs explanation to our soberer selves and to others when we make bold to call this a Christian nation. And there are some of us who have almost laid aside the appellation "heathen," or when we bring it out for service are quite as likely to apply it to the inhabitants of our avenues in our country as to the denizens of the heart of Africa or the islands of the seas." (42, p. 267.)

However humane and benign the motives, Western civilization, in whatever form its impact, commerce, government, religion or education, has been killing the slower-going native by the speed of the process in the transition, dragging him perforce unprepared and demoralizing him with a destructive individualism. In assisting the native to make this transition, for under the present conditions, make it he must or die, both government and mission have appealed too largely to secondary factors rather than preserving the social restraints and reproducing a more virile race, and modifying the social and physical environment in facilitating the struggle for existence. In race education we must start with the materialistic economic

basis and upon this build up to the higher ethical realm of self-realization for these peoples.

III. THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF RELIGION

A brief presentation is given of the development of religion and its social function, and some of the relations between the higher and lower religions. Instead of doing away with religion as many foreboded, the modern functional view of life and society has enhanced the importance of religion, for it is not regarded as *ab extra*, a something superimposed from without in its perfected form, but the rather as growing out of the needs and longings of humanity itself. The forces which aroused the religious attitude in primitive life, are still operative. With all of the marked advances in science, we are still dumb before the riddle of life. Hence human needs are no less pertinent, but they are of a higher order. Food and shelter and a social surplus of goods in civilized society give relief from immediate starvation, so the quest is towards higher satisfactions and a richer and a fuller life.

As Menzies (41, p. 424) asserts, since religion is the expression of man's needs with reference to higher powers and their ability to assist him, changes in the needs of men will modify their type of religion and religious observances. As the race advanced from a lower plane to a higher culture, it has passed through the period in which material needs are dominant, then into a period in which there is greater freedom from this pressure and higher aspirations are attained until finally the stage is reached in which the individual realizes his ideal apart from that of the state. It is only in recent years that the importance of the economic factor has been recognized as determining the rise and direction of the thought of a people. Though religion is based in a fundamental activity preceding industry, yet the form of the religion of a people can in most cases be traced directly to the prevailing industry. The citation to Dewey's study of *Savage Mind*, showed that the thought of primitive people was directly connected with the process of food getting. In such a stage animism was the necessary result since plants and animals and things were not distinguished objectively. The hunting tribes are animistic and totemistic and their myths abound in animal myths and their dances are

mimetic of the hunt, and even marriage and the treatment of disease are modified by the "hunting psychosis."

In a group where the needs are simple, there is to be found a low order of customs and activities. In the tropics where food was plentiful, there was no conception of a goddess of fertility, but rather because of the overpowering forces of nature, primitive man succumbed and made him spirits and gods which were in large part malevolent. In the northern regions, where there were no overpowering forces of nature to bring disaster, there were none of the fearful monsters of the tropics. Since he depended more on the products of the seasons, he had his goddess of fertility to whom he looked for his sustenance. "It is a law," says Barton, "which may be regarded as practically universal, that the religious conceptions of a people are expressed in forms which are modeled in a large degree on those political and social institutions which the economic conditions of their situations have produced. Thus a god could not be conceived as a father where marriage was so unstable that fatherhood was no recognized feature of the social structure, nor as king among a people into whose experience the institution of kingship had never entered." (7, p. 88.)

The History of the Hebrews presents the best illustration we have of the development of a religion, for the record shows how they passed from the tribal life to a high stage of civilization. In the earliest stage everything that excited wonder was sacred, as rivers, caves, animals and the *jinn* which inhabited every rock and bush. The religion of the desert was a poly-daemonism and the Semitic folk long worshipped the hairy monsters with which the desert was peopled. In the next stage, the ancestors of the Hebrews are nomadic shepherds, and the sheep becomes the most important animal in their experience, hence it was the most sacred and the passover feast is the oldest ceremonial survival of this stage. After a long time, perhaps several centuries, these migrating tribes, roamed westward into richer pasture lands. Here they were involved in incessant warfare with the alien tribes and the desert gods became war-gods. In this new land, cattle became more important as the staple possession, and hence the bull became sacred to the invading tribes as had the sheep in the desert land. The god of

the ancient tribes was known as Yahweh whose symbol was the bull. He was supreme though many of the natural objects were deified and deemed sacred. In the period of the settlement in the promised land, there was a long struggle between the invaders and the older inhabitants they were seeking to displace. Gradually these separate tribes were unified by the rise of great leaders "who were foremost in battle, acted as judges between their people, and were active in the maintenance of the old religion. As time produced a temporary league which later developed into a monarchy, so the tribal religion developed national aspects. "The strife between the nomadic tribes and the agriculturists was felt as a contest between the nomadic type of divinity, designated as Yahweh, and the gods of the land, known as Baalim." Ames continues, "Three classes were influential in solidifying the religious and national consciousness upon this ancient basis, the priests, the prophets, and the kings. The priests, perhaps, originally members of a tribe particularly loyal to Yahweh, scattered through the country and cared for the ritual. The prophets were at first wandering bands of half-mad enthusiasts; and later, individual statesmanlike champions of the ancient ideals. The kings through prowess and leadership, consummated the formation of the national life, and thus raised Yahweh to supremacy over the gods of the land. Priests, prophets, and kings combined in support of the ancient nomadic ideal in contrast to the customs of the Semitic peoples about them. Out of the same movement which thus produced the monarchy arose ultimately, after a long period, the monotheism of the Jews. With the monarchy a new pattern was given upon which the conception of Yahweh was remodeled. His animal shape was reduced to secondary symbolism, while he took on the anthropomorphic and kingly qualities of an oriental monarch. Among the masses of the people this refinement was of slow growth, and they still maintained in the time of David their local shrines and ancient animal symbols, and sacrifices, but every effort was made, especially by the prophets, to substitute Yahweh-worship for Baal-worship." (3, pp. 175-6.)

With this new change, personality meant more in the person of the king, and so the thought-form was created enlarging the idea of God. Thus was developed a personal relationship, in

which the interests of the nation and Yahweh were inseparably bound up together. Even after the rise of the kingdom and the building of the temple, this old conflict between the simpler desert religion and that of the agriculturalist type continued as was shown in the time of Elijah who came from a country of pasture-lands. The burden of the messages of Amos and Hosea, is that the rich fixtured and elaborate feastings have for their maintenance, impoverished and oppressed the people, and has brought calamities to the nation. The changing fortunes of the contiguous empires brought Israel and Judah into international complications, and here the prophets considered these powers as under the jurisdiction of Yahweh, who thus scourged the guilty nation. Yahweh did not need an independent nation, but rather a people who maintained the purity of faith and worship. Thus Isaiah advocated that a return to the old worship would mean that Yahweh would protect his people against the encroachments of the strongest empires, for he has proven his power by victories over Canaan, Philistia, and now over the Baal of Tyre. Then came Jeremiah who gave no consolation to Israel in its losing contest with the enemies and saw no return from exile, but he did preach the consolation which the faithful found in Yahweh. He maintained the uselessness of sacrifices and ordinances, and preached that "national independence and religious ritual are not essential to Yahweh's companionship, and aid for the individual. . . . In Jeremiah, the individualizing anthropomorphizing tendency is complete. . . . It was this individual piety of Jeremiah which constituted his contribution to the development of the ancestral religion, and this individualism of his inner experience was a natural culmination of the prophetic opposition to all the external forms of religion." (3, p. 183.) During the exile and return to the old home, the prophet Ezekiel, and the Second Isaiah, gave further expression to the idealizing tendencies in the older prophets. The former portrays the return of the tribes to their own land and the rebuilding of Jerusalem, the purification of the faith and the blessings of Yahweh on the faithful. Then came the message of the Second Isaiah that Yahweh is the only God, all others have been the product of human minds and hands, and therefore, Yahweh is really the God of other nations as well as Israel." He has chosen Israel as a means of making

himself known to other peoples, and when they witness the redemption of Yahweh's suffering Servant, the nation of Israel, they too, will bow before Yahweh and acknowledge His rule. Thus the trials of the nation lead to a comprehensive universalism within which the suffering of Israel gains an elevated and ennobling explanation." (3, p. 185.)

The next epoch in Hebrew religion was the rise of Christianity. The dominant elements were the ideals of a divine kingdom and ethical inwardness of religion which did not depend either upon the existence of a state or the observance of a formal ritualistic religion. In the early period there is the mutual relation, where the devotees give food and libations and in return the deity gives protection, and consolation. Yahweh does not need such external works, he requires faith and holiness in personal allegiance to the high ideals of the kingdom. "In Christianity the development of religion has continued and still continues, under the stress of conflicting social influences; by the formation of institutions and parties; and by means of the great democratic social awakening and the rise of the scientific spirit of inquiry. These agencies have created new types of social consciousness in terms of which the conception of personality, human and divine, is undergoing changes, and the ancient demand for more adequate social justice is being pressed with new claims. With the gradual working out of democratic ideals in society and the application of scientific methods and results to the whole round of human interests and endeavor, there are hints of the rise of a religion of science and democracy. Viewed in this way, as the expression of the profoundest social consciousness, religion must continue to advance in the future, as in the past in close relation with the concrete life of mankind." (3, p. 190.)

In the struggle for existence, the variant conditions external to the organism demand new adjustments, and in proportion to the adequacy of these adjustments will succeeding generations be profited. In the highly complex life of man, "feelings, intelligence and will, highly specialized are forever prompting the performance of acts that satisfy immediate individual wants but which do not, in fact, make for race survival." Though they may be ever so slight yet they throw these individuals out of harmony with their physical and social environ-

ment, and thus tend to their extinction. "One of the functions of religion is to curb such variation by limiting the sphere in which desire and impulse may be gratified." (20, p. 49.) "Religion, then functions for survival, first of all, as a conservator. It does this in the guise of a social bond and as a restraint upon anti-social variations." (20, p. 51.)

The conservative influence of religion is well shown by Miss Kingsley in the social structure of the West Africans, where religion and law are interrelated. Without police, or recourse to courts, the private property of the native is absolutely secure from pilfering fingers while theft of white man's goods prevails unchecked from one end of the continent to the other. Miss Kingsley writes: "as you walk along a bush path far from human habitation, you notice a little cleared space by the side of the path; it is neatly laid with plantain leaves, and on it are various little articles for sale—leaf tobacco, a few yams, and so on, and beside each article are so many stones, beans or cowries, which indicate the price of each article." (35, p. 408.) The writer adds, that after many years of intimate association in these parts, "I have never seen or been told of a case wherein a man's or woman's property had been seized or taken by another person." (35, p. 409.) The reason for this restraint is found in their fetish protecting the commerce." You will see either sitting in the middle of the things or swaying by a bit of Tie Tie from a branch above, Egba, or a relative of his—the market god—who will visit with death any theft from that shop or any cheating in price given, or any taking away of sums left by previous customers." (35, p. 408.) The native believes that there is no harm in lying if there are any so foolish as to believe him, and no dependence can be put on their word unless under oath. "I would stake my life," adds Miss Kingsley, "as I have done many times, on the word of the wildest bush cannibal in all West Africa, if that word was spoken under oath." For they implicitly believe that the spirit "will make the man who tells a lie in its presence, swell up and burst." (35, p. 414.)

Another illustration of the control of primitive religion is quoted from a letter of J. W. Robertson, a graduate of Tuskegee, and head of a school in Togo. "The people are very superstitious, and they cling to their superstition. And why not?

It is their religion. It is a great corrective power. The native who has no respect for the native superstition is usually vile and worthless, and has no respect for law and order of any kind. Take a criminal before a German court of justice here, and he will not confess his crime, because he says the white man has no way of finding out the truth. Take the same man to a fetish confessor, and he will confess forthwith, for he thinks the fetish possesses the power of finding out the truth." (16, p. 50.)

Though religion functions chiefly as a conservative force, holding in check the forces causing variability, yet it is also a progressive force for even in the lowest forms, it is the idealistic principle leading to altruism. "It is the chief mediating principle between the social is and the social yet to be, between the social wish and the social ought, between the ideal and the real." (20, p. 75.) Faith in persons and institutions has played an important rôle in the process of socializing the race. "But this faith, this belief in men, in institutions, in gods, in God, is always an idealization, a spontaneous creation of something better or stronger, higher or more enduring, than anything given in immediate experience. True, it is nearly always anthropomorphic, it is the best, the most potent that we are conscious of in self raised to its highest powers. But as such it pulls and lifts us toward its newer standards. Granted that men first think their gods, it is nevertheless true that their thoughts of god afterward make them godlike." (20, p. 76.)

A like view is presented by Ellwood for he holds that all religions of a high order foster social idealism. "This is seen not only from the character of their divinities which usually represent ideals of individual character, but also from the character of their heavens which are always pictures of ideal societies. The religious society early becomes attached to idealistic morality; and moral ideals for the mass of every civilization seem to get their chief sympathy and sanction from religion. Moreover, the higher types of religion are powerful preventives of social pessimism for they combat the idea that misery and suffering of life are without meaning and value. Religion thus becomes a powerful instrument of social control for the adult individual. It gives meaning to life, encourages hope, and strengthens loyalty to high social ideals. Thus it gives stability to character and not only makes possible stable and harmonious

co-ordinations between individuals, but also stimulates relations of a higher type." (19, 187.) This process of synthesizing these two factors, the conservative function of religion and the progressive function, on the one hand, and the individualistic and the social forces on the other, was begun in later Judaism, but was realized only in Christianity. Love to God and service to man unite both the individual and social aspects of religion.

As early Christianity spread to regions subject to famines and pestilences, where nature was unkind, material things were regarded as evil. In the East, asceticism flourished, but in the West, a milder form prevailed in monasticism. The monastic orders performed their greatest service to civilization, not on the side of religion, their chief purpose, but on the side of material development; they preserved the remnants of the old culture in a dark age, and in whatsoever land they dwelt, schools were founded, and workshops and agriculture introduced. Thus the pastoral Germans became not only a Christian, but an agricultural people as well. In the post-Reformation times, Calvinism was most congenial to clannish groups as the cities, while Lutheranism was widely accepted elsewhere. When the Reformation arose the Church controlled politics. The Protestant sects had no idea of promoting the secular control which they now champion, for lack of agreement permitted the state to gain the lead. As cities grew and became industrial centers, they developed a democracy, which demanded a cheaper and more representative religion. Modern capitalism took its rise in Calvinism, not because of its creed, but rather because of the diligence and frugality of the adherents of that sect. Thus it seems that in the regions with the highest economic development, intelligence was most advanced and religion was most liberal. Holland with its industrial leadership, was first friendly to religious toleration and the development of free thought. The Huguenots became the intellectual and industrial leaders of France. If we may trust de Lavelaye, we are led to conclude that not only are the Protestant countries more advanced than the Catholic, but that members of the same race show the same tendency for example, the Swiss cantons, the German states and the two related peoples in Ireland. Gulick (26) concludes from the various government reports, that the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and the Greek Orthodox countries

stand in this order of development. He finds that the Protestant countries are increasing in population, wealth and world power, and advancement of their people far more rapidly than the two other types of countries. The leading Protestant countries have a very much larger percentage of their children in school and the education of the people has directly influenced the national progress. It is a very significant fact that not those countries which discovered and exploited the vast wealth of the new world and dominated international politics a few centuries ago, but new nations such as Germany, Great Britain and the United States lead the nations of the world. Within recent years those nations which were predominantly Catholic have thrown off the exclusive control of the Church of Rome, and have sought greater freedom and independence.

In the mingling of races, there is the attack of the aggressive race and the response of the race to be assimilated. The nature and extent of this change depend upon the relative planes of culture, the relative mass and the relative intensity of race-consciousness of the races involved. There are two opposite methods of assimilation, the coercive method of attack marking the early periods of social growth, and the attractive method used in the period of greater maturity. The first is suited to the period of nation formation, is direct in action, uses persecution and induces response through fear, but fails when intelligence is spread through the group or where there is an intense race-consciousness. On the other hand the attractive method allows toleration in regard to language and religion, but requires uniformity in matters of government. The aristocratic social ideal demands loyalty to the king, unity of faith, class distinctions and authority, and the main assimilating agent is religion in which there must be uniformity of belief which implies that persecution will prevail. The democratic ideal emphasizes the universal brotherhood of man giving equal opportunity for the realization of individuality of opinion and the toleration of differences in religion, and the spread of enlightenment through education.

In the spread of religion, the above principle holds as true as in the political realm. Since some races have hardly left the childhood stage, and others have grown prematurely old, their religious development varies from the crudest animism to the

most abstruse Vedantic philosophy. Since religion performs such vital service to the race, then the fitting of the proper type of religious instruction to the particular stage of religious development of a particular people is one of the important problems of a science of missions. Jean du Buy (18) has worked out a classification of the great religions as best fitted for the various periods of development in the life of the individual. He concludes that Mohammedanism is the religion of childhood, Confucianism is suited to boyhood, the religion of Jesus fits well adolescence, Buddhism is for reflective manhood and Vedantic philosophy well becomes old age. The chief tenets in Mohammedanism which appeal to the childhood stage are: the belief in One God, the One that makes for righteousness, Creator of Heaven and Earth and King of men, the belief in a material heaven, the tenets of obedience and submission to authority, the prohibition of liquor and kindness to animals. The tenets of Confucianism are: the need of learning, moral training, friendship, loyalty, patriotism, propriety, etc. The religion of Jesus emphasizes; love of God the Father, belief in a future life, unselfish love and service of men and a pure and true idealism. du Buy thinks that children should be trained in religion in this order. Not that we should teach all children to be Mohammedans but something of that nature. These essentials in Mohammedanism are to be found in the Old Testament literature, while the wisdom element in the Old Testament would supply the type represented in Confucianism.

Experience has shown that Mohammedanism or something of its nature meets the needs of the simpler and stationary civilizations, as the Negroes of Africa, or the outcastes of India. Its simple creed with the strong affirmation of the One God causes polytheism to immediately disappear on its reception. Islam is able thus to raise a lower people to its plane of development but cannot carry them further and so it tends towards arrested development. Now what is needed is a diminished intensity of the monotheism and a heightening of their morality which are the very elements that are dominant in Confucianism. This would not mean that the Christian missionary should teach the various backward peoples first Mohammedanism, but something that satisfies a similar need and then to advance beyond the stage which Islam can offer, with the moral element in Christian

teaching. Bosworth Smith, who has treated Islam with the greatest sympathy, states that the religion of Jesus "contains whole fields of morality and whole realms of thought outside the religion of Mohammed. It offers humility, purity of heart, forgiveness of injuries, sacrifice of self to man's moral nature; it gives scope for toleration, development, boundless progress to his mind; its motive power is stronger, even as a friend is better than a king and love is higher than obedience." "The ideal of life is far more elevating, far more majestic, far more inspiring even as the life of the founder of Mohammedanism is below the life of the Founder of Christianity." (53, p. 293.)

du Buy also arranges the Christian denominations in order of maturity and holds that Catholicism is the most primitive and Unitarianism the most mature. Catholicism appeals to the simpler childlike traits namely the sensations in the use of pictures, symbols and ceremonies, and the deep emotions attached to mysteries and reverence for sacred things, and the complete reliance on paternal authority. Protestant religious teaching seems to rely too much on the abstract rational appeal instead of using the strongest instincts of childhood, namely the symbolic and dramatic tendencies.

In a larger sense these same principles may be noted in early missions. Prescott thus describes the comparative efficiency of the Protestant and Roman Catholic methods in reaching these primitive peoples. "The Protestant missionary seeks to enlighten the understanding of his convert by the pale light of reason. But the bolder Catholic kindling the splendor of the spectacle and by the glorious portrait of an agonized Redeemer, sweeps along his hearers in a tempest of passion that drowns everything like reflection. He has secured his convert however by the hold on his affections, an easier and more powerful hold with the untutored savage than reason." (47, vol. 1; Bk. 2, p. 360.) "The Roman Catholic communion has, it must be admitted, some advantages over the Protestant, for the purpose of proselytism. The dazzling pomp of its services and the touching appeal to the sensibilities affect the imagination of the rude child of nature much more powerfully than the cold abstractions of Protestantism, which addressed to reason, demand a degree of refinement and mental culture in the audience to comprehend

them. The respect, moreover, shown by the Catholic for the material representations of the Divinity, greatly facilitates the same object. It is true, such representations are used by him only as incentives, not as objects of worship. But the distinction is lost on the savage who finds such forms of adoration too analogous to his own to impose any great violence to his feelings. It is only required of him to transfer his homage from the image of Quetzalcoatl, the beneficent deity who walked among men, to that of the Virgin or the Redeemer; from the Cross which he worshipped as the emblem of the god of Rain, to the same Cross, the symbol of salvation." (47, vol. 1; Bk. 2, Ch. 4, pp. 291-2.)

While Roman missionaries have made greater use of native beliefs and customs and appealed far more effectively to the affective nature of the non-Christian peoples than has Protestantism, yet on the other hand, in a way similar to Mohammedanism, it raises its converts to its own plane of development and is unable to advance them further. Fairbairn (*Religion and History*, p. 176), asserts that "the father is an excellent authority when the family are children; but once the family is grown they must not be treated as infants. Papacy, making men spiritual infants, stands in the way of the realization of the highest Christian idea which is essentially the religion of manhood, and speaks to men as men." Protestant missions must recognize the value of the dramatic and emotional elements dominant in the lower religions, to simplify its own message and with this as a beginning, to give the more mature Christian teaching. Since many of the Hindu movements are essentially Unitarian the denomination which could best adapt itself to meet the situation would accomplish most for their evangelization. Since the Mohammedans revere the Human Jesus, but deny his divinity, that denomination which could overlook their aversion and supply the very urgently needed moral elements in Christianity would mean the Christianization of Islam and that too without compromising the essentials in the religion of Jesus. The Christian religion, true to the spirit of its Founder must fulfill rather than destroy the hopes of the nations and by becoming all things to all men may save the world.

IV. SYNCRETISM IN RACE AND RELIGION

In studying the evolution of social forces, one notes that the dominant forces of an older order will persist into the new order, and the more conservative the force, the greater will be that persistence. The economic factors are readily changed whenever a new source of food supply is found; the higher social factors, religion and government are conservative forces, and change slowly, and hence should be the last institutions of social control to be seriously affected. Since no movement begins *de novo* or ends abruptly, there ensues the mixing of new and old forces forming a new complex, which is called syncretism. In the education of backward races this process has particular bearing upon the interpretation of their forms of social control and the principles underlying their modification.

In pre-Christian times, many religions were contending for the supremacy, a fact readily seen in the period of the prophets of Israel when Baal worshippers were in conflict with the worshippers of Yahweh. Underlying all these faiths was the will to live, the wish for the life abundant expressed in the longing for a deliverer, a Messiah. This unfulfilled wish was dominant also in religions other than Judaism, and many Christs were adored and importuned to save from the evils of life. The men of ancient times felt the very human need for consolation amid the ever present grim facts of suffering and death, and so created in their own image, gods who should conquer death and hell and bring them redemption and immortality. The Babylonians believed Bel to be the Christ of ancient times; the Egyptians worshipped Osiris as their suffering redeemer; Greece followed the Orphic cults and the Aztecs had their Incas. The myths of Marduk, of Tammuz, of Horus, the sungod, are all pagan stories describing deep human sentiments. Carus finds in the story of Samson, a parallel to Hercules, and other solarheroes. "We will naturally look," says Carus, "with reverence upon this interesting document (referring to the story of Samson) for we know that the hero who is represented by Heracles, Izdubar, Odysseus, Siegfried, Mithra and others is a preliminary and tentative form of that great ideal which found completion in the Christian idea of the God-man, Christ the Judge, who at his second advent is to sit in judgment over the quick and the dead, the King of the world to come where there shall be

no misery, no want, no worry, no death." "The similarity of the Christian story to pagan legends does not lower Christianity to the level of paganism; but on the contrary, it raises paganism to the dignity of genuine religion. Pagan myths, in spite of their crudities, are born of the same yearnings, the same devotions, the same hopes. We do not say that paganism and Christianity are on the same level for they are marked by decided differences. Paganism belongs to the period of nature worship while Christianity belongs to the age in which an appreciation of the soul establishes a contrast between nature and spirit. As a result of these differences, the Christian version of the God-man discards all those features which are all too human and all too material and savor strongly of materialism transplanting the story into that conception of spirituality which pervades the entire religious conception of the age." (15, 81-82.)

After Rome became the center of an unprecedented mixture of races, it was but natural that there should follow a flux of religious beliefs. The most widely spread and significant of these was that of Mithra, whose worship was celebrated in most of the Empire in the early part of the Christian era. This religion embodied many of the traits common to Christianity, was monotheistic, believed in immortality, and practiced ceremonies of baptism and the sacrificial feast in a manner similar to that adopted by Christianity. Since these tendencies were prevalent in those days, it was only by the use of such rites as were common and understood that Christianity was able to commend its message to the belief of men. As Harnack puts it: "Therefore religion was intelligible and impressive owing to the fact that it offered man sacraments. Without its mysteries, people would have found it hard to understand the new religion. Had not baptism chanced to have been instituted, had not the observance of the holy supper been enjoined, . . . then some sacrament would have been created out of a parable, or a word or act of some kind or other. The age for material and certainly for bloody sacrifices was now past and gone; these were no longer made an alloy of any religion. But the age of sacraments was very far from being past; it was in its full vigor and prime. Every hand that stretched out for religion tried to grasp it in sacramental form; the eye saw sacraments where sacraments there were none, and the senses gave them body."

(28, Vol. 1, 287-S.) In the seething caldron of the nations within the Empire in the first century of our era, in the ebb and flow of races and religions it would be naïve indeed that Christianity should never have been modified by these forces. These ancient cults bridged the gap between the old beliefs and the Christian religion. Thus Christianity became the completion of the hopes in the old religions, a *pleroma*, and thus developed into the world religion.

When the Greek mind came into contact with the Semitic, there arose a Christian Neo-Platonic school. While some of the Church Fathers rejected philosophy as heathen, the larger part being compelled to learn philosophy to avert its attacks, began to use it in their apologies. Some regarded the teachings of heathen sages as divine revelations, and because of the similarities between Plato and Christian teaching, not a few believe that he had drawn from Old Testament writings. Justin Martyr, representing a large group, assumed that the Logos inspired the worthy sages of old and he believed that though Socrates and Heraclitus and other philosophers had not known Jesus, they had lived according to reason and therefore they were enjoying eternal bliss. The great spread and influence of Epicurean philosophy, the dominance of Stoicism with its great minds and popular preachers, prepared the way for Christianity by bringing men to consider in the time of great corruption, the highest questions of human destiny, as whence he came, whither he tended and his purpose in life. As religious elements from Canaan and Babylon were incorporated in Judaism, and oriental faiths entered into the Greek and Roman religions, so Christianity was rethought in terms of Greek philosophy and institutionalized through Roman law. Thus Christianity adopted and adapted the dominant principles in the thought and philosophy of the time and by reworking them, not only evolved a higher form of faith, but made itself intelligible to its votaries, its foes, and to the pagans whom it would convert.

Another kind of syncretism is noted in regard to the preservation of old structures and ceremonies. After the fourth century there arose a marked tendency to preserve old temples and other sacred materials used in worship and to reconsecrate them to the service of the Church. In many of the cathedrals

are to be found pagan objects, for example, a basalt basin in the cathedral of Naples which contains a relief showing the worship of Bacchus, now used as a baptismal font, an ancient granite tub at Tarracina, and a pagan mixing bowl in the cathedral at Syracuse. "There was in Naples," says Trede (56) "a temple of Antinous, the well known favorite of the Emperor Hadrian, who placed him among the gods, after the youth had incurred death for his sake. On the place of this temple has stood from early times the church of St. John the Baptist, who also incurred death for the sake of his master. John the Baptist then, in the simplest and most natural fashion displaced Antinous, and assumed in the eyes of the so-called Christians, the same office that Antinous had filled."

At the entrance of these pagan temples were fountains of holy water with which the votaries were to sprinkle themselves as they entered. Clouds of incense and the glitter of candles were prominent spectacles in all of these pagan temples. Jeremiah (xliv, 17), condemned the burning of incense by the Jews to the Queen of Heaven, and acting on the principle, Emperor Theodosius forbade the practice in Christian Churches, nevertheless, holy water, incense, and the glitter of candles were christened as a part of the Christian ceremony. The pagans had their sacred relics, and though the Christian Emperor Theodosius forbade the heathen worship of images, yet these too became a part of the Christian ceremony. Great pomp and processions were important pagan ceremonies, and these too became converted to Christianity. The pagans had sacred places and miraculous watering places and holy pilgrimages, which likewise became incorporated in the practice of the Church. In a similar manner the great pagan feasts were adopted into the Christian calendar. Chief among these are those of the winter solstice or Christmas, of the vernal equinox or Easter; St. John's Day or Midsummer Eve replaced the great water festival of Adonis; the festival of the Assumption of the Virgin, supplanted that of Diana. All Souls, Hallowe'en, the May festival are but a few of the many pagan feast days adopted by the Church as special Christian feast days.

"In the fourth century," writes Bury, "little trace is left of the earlier prejudice against pictures and images which was derived from the Semitic cradle of the new religion. Christians

adopted old mythological ideas and gave them an interpretation agreeing with the conceptions of their creed. The representations of Christ as the Good Shepherd, which were so common, were closely connected with the Greek type of Hermes Kriophores; and in the catacombs we find an Orpheus Christ. The nimbus that surrounds the head of a saint in Christian paintings, was derived from the pictures of heathen gods of light; the rape of Proserpine is portrayed on the tomb of Vibia. With such symbolism, we may compare the habit of dedicating churches on the sites of temples to some Christian saint who offered some similitude in name or attribute to the god who had been worshipped in the old temple. A church of St. Elias often replaced a sanctuary of Apollo, the sungod, on account of the Greek name, Helios, and the temples of Palles Athene might be converted into shrines of the Virgin. It was the same clinging to old forms that induced the Phrygians to call themselves Chrestians instead of Christians, and to speak of Chrestos instead of Christ." (14, Vol. 1, p. 40.) Leo the Great utilized the pagan art of Rome for Christian art: the statue of Jupiter was changed into that of St. Peter, and the goddess Anna Perenna became St. Anna Petrona who is still revered in Campagna. In commenting upon the conversion of Clovis Henderson remarks that "old heathen rites continue to be performed under the guise of Christian ceremonial; and saints' images were carried round as protection against dire illness and death. It was a change of name, but not of substance. Siegfried's dragon became the dragon of St. George, while the virtues of the goddesses were transferred to the Virgin Mary." (29, Vol. 1, p. 14.)

While conversion to Christianity greatly modified and softened the rude character of the Russians, the elements of paganism still persisted among the untutored, simple-minded Slavs, and colored every Christian doctrine. Leroy-Beaulieu asserts that "what Vladimir overthrew was the wooden idol with the gilt beard, not the ancient conception which they represent. The old idols, convicted of being powerless before the God of the Byzantine missionaries were succeeded by Christ and the saints of Christianity." (36, p. 28.) Thus the popular religion became a Christianized paganism of which the old polytheism furnished the substance to be moulded in Christian forms, and the old Slavonic gods, were forgotten only because they

were disguised as Christian saints. Perun their fire-god who drives the chariot of the sun through the skies, was transformed into Elijah whom the Scriptures say went into the heavens in a fiery chariot, whom the Russians now believe causes the thunder; Lodo with all of her virtues survives as the Virgin Mary, while the patron god of agriculture became the popular St. Nicholas, the friend of children. Thus the Slavonic pantheon was merged into that of the Hebrew. As Abbott has pithily put it: "Although Pan has been chased off the highways of Europe, he is not dead, as has been prematurely reported. He has only retired to a country home." (1, p. 240.) Since the Christian religion was not able to offer substitutes for the great hosts of spirits of the fields and forests and firesides, and the galaxy of fairies and elves, the peasants secretly, and sometimes publicly performed ceremonies for their propitiation. Since wizards are still believed to be powerful in averting dangers, they are paid for incantations; at times, the priest is looked upon as a great wizard, Christ as the most benevolent conjurer and God as the supreme magician. "Christianity," as Leroy-Beaulieu adds, "has indeed succeeded in obliterating from his soul the names and memory of the heathen gods, but has not been so successful in stamping on its own dogmas and beliefs. The old paganism and new teaching form two distinct layers, which are clearly distinguished to this day. It is not alone that the heathen rites have been preserved in places—the very spirit of paganism is still alive under a coating of Christianity." (36, p. 27.)

In tracing the development of early English literature, Brooke writes thus of the relation of Christian and pagan thought. "When we consider Christianity in contact with those heathen elements, so many of which, as pregnant motives of poetry, have continued in our literature, the first thing to be said is that, owing to the manner in which Christianity was propagated in England, it did not root out heathen ideas so much as change them. . . . The old battle songs were sung side by side with Christian hymns, the sagas of English heroes with the saga of Christ; the Christian Church, on the hill or by the river, saw during a varying term of years, and without any fierce religious fury, the heathen temple in the neighboring grove. There was a long mingling then, in a peaceful fashion,

of Christian and heathen thought; and through the mingling ran a special temper of tolerance and wisdom and good breeding." (12, p. 190.) "The long intermingling, the soft interchange of heathenism and Christianity, did not exile the captured deities, or utterly destroy the old habits of worship, but took them into service, gave them new names, and clothed them in Christian garments. The great nature-festivals of the heathen, Yule and Eostraride, were now bound up with the birth and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The festival of Midsummer lasts in many observances. New Christian feasts were made to fall on heathen holidays. A great part, then, of the emotions of the past, of the pleasant rustic joy, of the ancient poetic imaginations was retained in the new religion, and made more permanent by the Celtic spirit in that religion. Being retained, it became a continuous power in national sentiment, and therefore, in all our literature. Nor did the new Christianity let slip away the associations which belonged to the time honored religious customs. The Church was built where the heathen temple has been, and the people walked to the shrine of Christ by the same well-worn path by which they had sought the sacred enclosure of the god. Where the consecrated tree had stood rose now the Holy Rood. The groves, devoted to the Nature-god, became the groves of the convent. The hills, the clear wells, the eyots in the river which had been dedicated to the heathen deities of flood and field, were now called after saints and martyrs; and the old emotions were retained unimpaired, though the names were changed. The minor gods and heroes which the various wants of men had created to preside over and to satisfy those wants were replaced by saints who did precisely the same work. The personages were different, but polytheism, with all its romance remained. Even the nature myths were often continued in the legends of the saints. Moreover, 'laws and usages,' says Grimm, 'ordeals and oath-takings, beating of bounds, consecrations, image processions, spells and formulas were clothed in Christian forms, but their heathen character endured. The old was interwoven with the new.' Thus Christian stuff was heathenized, heathen stuff was Christianized." (12, p. 195.)

"Again, what was gracious and beneficent in the doings of the heathen gods was kept in the Christian thought, but it was now done, not by Freia, or by goddesses who were kind

to men, but by Jesus Christ and the Virgin. On the other hand, the dark and dreadful elements of nature, personified in giant and monster, were not lost as poetry, but added to the conception of the devil and his harmful host, among whom were now included the elves, the wood creatures, and the dwarfs; even all the gentle beings who, in the old days wished well to man, and who afterwards emerged from this devilish connection into the kindly and tricksome fairies. The Church grew sharper against the gentleness of heathendom as time went on. Up to about 800 A. D. piety was, however, not importunate. But after that time the ancient and nobler deities, in order to destroy their moral character, were all by means of the transference of their attributes to the devil, made hideous or absurd. Yet, though their moral character was destroyed, what was poetic in their history lived on in legends, in a better way, in a number of fantastic words and images in common use among the people.

Another form of transference is seen in the case of the most widespread of heathen myths. The war of Day and Night, the still greater war of Summer and Winter, of the radiant Sunny-gods and the frost-giants, of the healing and harmful powers of Nature—that war, which is one of the ever enduring roots of poetry, became now in varied forms, the war between Christ and Satan, between eternal Light and eternal Darkness, between the Church and Heathenism, between the Saint and his Tempter, between God and the Universe, and the old Dragon who claimed dominion over Earth and Air,—but whatever shape the changes took the original spirit of the myth is preserved. Its poetry—the poetry of a fierce, adventurous, unending war, various as are the fates and characters of men, shared in by all the spiritual powers beyond our world, a battle in which Earth, Heaven and Hell are mingled,—the mightiest Epic the wit and passion of men have ever conceived—was not made less but more imaginative by Christianity; and the range of the subject was extended. In this world-wide war which transcended the local wars of tribe with tribe and kingdom with kingdom, Jesus was the King, his Apostles were the King's Thengs, and so were all the saints and martyrs, nay every one who fought against the Dragon. Satan is the great foe whose seat is in the North before he falls into Hell. Hell is the dark-Burg which Christ attacks, Heaven is the light-Burg to which he returns in victory. The supper of

the Lamb is laid for his warriors in the great hall, amid the singing of the Angels who are the poets of the battle. When the Apostles are celebrated, as they are in a poem in the Vercelli book, they are heroes who go forth to war, and their work is told as if it were a Vikings expedition. 'Great proof of valour gave these Æthelings; far spread the might and glory of the King's thegns over the earth. Bold in war was Andreas; not tardy was James, nor a laggard on the journey. Daring were the adventures of Thomas in India; he endured the rush of swords.' Simon and Thaddeus, 'warriors brave in battle, valiantly sought the Persian land; not slow were they in the fight, in the play of shields.' . . . These are a few expressions out of many in which the heathen terms of war are transferred to the apostolic soldiers of Jesus. Round about them are collected their thegns, those who accompany them on missions; and all the devotion which tied the thegn to his lord in heathen war, all the disgrace which befell the thegn who was unfaithful, are transferred to the relation of the Apostles to Christ, and of their followers to the Apostles and the Saints. Nor was the war only in the present or the future, nor only since the time of Christ. All the past since the beginning of the world was filled with it. David, Moses, Noah, Adam replaced the English demi-gods, and were their national heroes. A trace of this is found in the genealogy of Æthelwulf as given in the Chronicle. He is brought back from Woden to Sceaƿ, and Sceaƿ is the son of Noah, born in the Ark, and Noah carries the line back to Adam; that is, the patriarchs become one with the ancestral heroes. Even before this time, when man was not, this war that filled their imagination had prevailed, and the battle in Heaven of Christ with Satan is described in Caedmonic poems in much the same terms as the contests of Beowulf with Grendel. Thus little of the imaginative passion of war was lost to the Christian Englishman, and nothing of heroic and divine ancestors. The field open to their warlike imagination was doubly expanded; nor was it only the noble and freemen who could join in this fight and find fame in it, but all men and all women, no matter how common their position or enslaved their work." Then followed an account of the Crucifixion, a slight treatment of the Resurrection, and a glowing account of the Harrowing of Hell

and the Doomsday with the final victory of Righteousness. (12, p. 197.)

The Eddas depict this unending struggle, in which the good principle is thwarted but again and again baffles the evil. This strife will cease in some future age when a "Lofty One" or the "Third One" shall appear in judgment on the world. In the Household of Odin was Baldur, the best and fairest of beings, doomed to death by a mysterious destiny. Odin rode to the nether regions to seek his release, and though unsuccessful, he was promised that when a new day dawned, "Baldur shall rule over the young world in its purity and there shall be no more death." Hodur, the blind brother of Baldur, king of Winter, slays Baldur in the game of the gods, and then the world was filled with woe. In the wars that followed with Loki and the giants, Odin and his hosts were vanquished and evil reigned triumphant. Nevertheless the legends breathed the fervent hope that a new day shall dawn and evil shall pass away and there shall be a new heaven and a new earth. Then Baldur shall come forth triumphant, for, as the legends say, Baldur shall come to rule over a newborn world in which there shall be no wrongdoing and no more death."

The missionaries to Iceland, where the Eddas were preserved, were not afraid of old heathen remnants. The children were not compelled to call their fathers' gods devils, but were taught to call Him with the same name that they had lisped in childhood. "Nowhere else, perhaps, in the church history of Christianity," says Anderson, "has the missionary been brought face to face with a race of gods devoutly believed by their own worshippers to be doomed to death. The missionaries had only to proclaim that Baldur was dead, that mighty Odin and Thor were dead. The people knew that these gods were to die, and the message of the One Everlasting God must have touched their ears and hearts with comfort and joy. Thus while in Germany, the priests were occupied for a long time in destroying every trace of heathenism, in condemning every ancient lay, or the oak of the devil, in felling trees and abolishing national customs, the missionaries of Iceland were able to take a more charitable view of the past and they became the keepers of those very customs and laws and precepts and Runic inscriptions which on

the continent had to be put down with inquisitional cruelty." (4, p. 49.)

In this transition, old folklore remnants were interpreted in Biblical terms, as Cadmon's poems, *The Heliand*, the passion plays, the allegories of Milton and Bunyan. So too, the Arthurian tales and the Holy Grail series were Christian settings of Teutonic myths. The Holy Grail became the type of the mystery of godliness, and none but the pure One may dare to sit in the Seat Perilous or see the Grail. The quest of this holy vessel is but the mythopoetic equivalent of the old Baldur legend. Only the Grail can heal the wounded king, and most intensely did they long for the release from the impending doom. Sir Galahad and Percival represent that infinite principle of good that shall right all wrongs and bring the boon of salvation to men. The church used these stories for instruction in righteousness as the following instances show. When Galahad rescues the wounded Sir Meleus from the attack of the two knights, he is told that these two knights are Pride and Covetousness, for Sir Meleus did not make a clean confession before his quest of the Grail. The narrative of Sir Percival and the beautiful woman is interpreted as the dalliance of the Church with deadly sin and the only safety is in the cross.

This same principle has been carried out by missionaries in non-European countries. Prescott gives the description of how the temples in Peru were rededicated to St. Francis, and the burdensome ritual of the Aztecs "prepared its votaries for the pomp and splendor of the Roman ritual. It was not difficult to pass from the feasts and festivals of the one religion to the other; to transfer their homage from the fantastic idols of their own creation to the beautiful forms in scripture and painting which decorated the Christian Cathedral." (47, vol. 3, bk. 3, ch. 2, p. 267.) The Roman missionaries used the same temples and the heathen idols gave place to the statues of the Virgin and the Savior. "It only required of him to transfer his homage from the image of Quetzalcoatl, the beneficent deity who walked among men, to that of the Virgin or the Redeemer; from the Cross which he worshipped as the emblem of the god of rain to the same Cross the symbol of salvation." (47, vol. 1, bk. 2, ch. 4, p. 291.) In all of the Catholic missions great use has been made of pictures, statues, and an elaborate ritual,

even to the extent of displaying each stage of the passion, trial and death of Jesus with all of the different groups of disciples and women standing about.

Two of the most striking exponents of this policy of accommodation and assimilation in the early Catholic missions are de Nobili and Ricci. Xavier, "The Alexander of Missions" with the assistance of the Portuguese government had secured the nominal adherence of a multitude of Hindoo converts. Robert de Nobili, a successor of Xavier, saw that the evangelization of the natives had been tied up too much with the government's business and that the "Prangui Caste" that is the Portuguese caste, was an insurmountable barrier to the propagation of the faith. Here at the very outset Nobili was confronted with the most crucial and difficult of all missionary problems. "'How can Christianity be brought within the reach of India independent of efforts after territorial aggrandizement? How can it be so presented to them that they may be in a position to examine it objectively and to accept it for its own sake?' He arrived at the theoretically correct answer; 'The missionary must be, as St. Paul said, an Indian to the Indians,' and he determined to follow this path in both directions: on the one hand he would sever all connection with the Portuguese; on the other in all concerns of life he would endeavor to appear purely and simply a native of India. In determining on this second step two facts were patent from the very outset; Christianity could only be brought within the reach of the Hindu by imitating the outward method by which they were accustomed to receive religious truth, *i. e.*, by the person recommending it himself appearing in the guise of a Brahmin; and further, he could only hope to win the people of the upper class, of the higher castes, by leaving the whole caste system unassailed and untouched." (52, p. 59-60.)

Accordingly he withdrew himself from the old mission and founded a new one in another quarter of the city. Here he fitted up his house with all of the paraphernalia of an orthodox Brahmin's house. He employed a poor but high caste Brahmin to teach him in all the learning of their sages. With indefatigable energy and ceaseless application, he mastered not only their modern tongues, but he became very proficient in the use of Sanskrit, and delved deeply into the mysteries of their phil-

osophy. In all things he conformed to the native customs. His foods were of the simplest, most meagre sorts, herbs and bitters and he abhorred the use of meats. He performed most rigidly all the rites, fasts, ablutions, penances, used the dress of the yellow-robes Sannyasi or penitent and soon claimed to be a Guru, a teacher of religion, a Brahmin from the West. "He shrouded himself in mystery, as many of them loved to do, seldom appeared in public, and he only allowed visitors of the highest castes, and Brahmins in particular, to have access to him. He adopted exclusively the Indian custom of carrying on conversation by means of learned disputations and sought to commend Christianity as the highest philosophy to the Hindus so long trained in the fineness of hairsplitting dialectics. Those who associated themselves with him as disciples he tried by means of thirty or forty days' course to lead to a fuller knowledge of Christianity—again chiefly by disputation; he would then baptize them, though he accounted baptism as by no means implying a break with caste. On the contrary, those who were baptized maintained all the forms and ceremonies of their old castes; they continued to wear the sacred thread, which Nobili himself now did, the only difference being that the Christian 'Sacred Thread' consisted of three golden strands symbolic of the Holy Trinity and two silver ones, typifying the human and divine nature of Christ." (52, pp. 60-1.)

To meet the complaints of the Parava Christians and to allay any suspicions of the Brahmins, Nobili nailed the following notice upon his house. "I am no Prangui (Portuguese). I was neither born in their country, nor am I a member of their caste. I was born in Rome. My family there holds rank corresponding to that of the most distinguished rajah over here. From my youth I have made choice of the calling of a sannyasi; I have studied philosophy and the holy spiritual law. The holy spiritual law which I proclaim obliges no man to renounce caste, or to do anything incapable with his caste honor. This law which I proclaim has been preached in this very land by other men, sannyasi and saints alike. Whoever maintains that this law is peculiar to the Prangui or the Pariahs, commits a great sin; for since God is God of all castes, his law must be observed by all." (52, p. 63.) This "spiritual law" was embodied in the fourth and lost Veda which he claimed to bring

and by which eternal life was imparted. He found the contents of this Veda interspersed among the other Vedas, and in order to strengthen his bold position, he became thoroughly acquainted with their literature, and with a wondrous tenacity of memory, he was able to pick out and hold in readiness for immediate use all passages having any bearing on his position. Concerning the use of this information he writes as follows:

“Besides my manner of life, my food and costume, and my using exclusively the services of Brahmins, there is another circumstance which aids me powerfully in making converts; it is the knowledge which I have acquired of their most sacred books. I find it stated in them that their country originally possessed four laws or Vedas; that three of these laws are those which the Brahmins still teach at the present day and that the fourth was a purely spiritual law by virtue of which it was possible to attain the salvation of the soul.

“I took occasion to point out to them that they are living in fatal error, that neither of the three Vedas which they recognize has power to save them; that in consequence all their efforts are in vain and this I prove to them by citing the very words of their sacred books. These people have an ardent desire of eternal happiness, and in order to merit it devote themselves to penance, alms, deeds, . . . and worship of idols. I profit by this disposition to tell them that if they wish to obtain salvation, they must listen to my instructions; that I have come from a remote country with this sole object of bringing salvation to them, by teaching that spiritual law which by confession of their Brahmins they have wholly lost. I thus adapt myself to their opinion after the example of the apostle who preached to the Athenians the Unknown God.” (40, vol. 1, p. 221.)

This type of mission increased and spread widely and continued for one hundred and fifty years. The discipline was so extremely rigorous that few indeed were able to become the equals of de Nobili; many left the field with ruined health, others died in the attempt while a very few were able to complete the severe training. No doubt but that de Nobili did go to an extreme in his conformity, but on the other hand, we must give him the great credit of trying to obtain the native's point of view.

At that period, not only did Portugal not have any posses-

sions in China but also her tradesmen were in ill-repute. This coupled with dread and hatred of the foreigner made residence in China a very precarious procedure. However, Mathias Ricci entered the realm and soon gained the interest of the common folk through his scientific skill. Though he made no attempt to propagate Christianity openly, he privately insinuated some Christian doctrines in his teachings, but only those which did not contradict Chinese beliefs. From the very outset, Ricci determined that his aim should be the combination, and not the conflict of beliefs. He resolved to tolerate everything tolerable and set about to discover how far he could associate Christianity with native conceptions without outraging either. "In the first place, he saw that the state religion of China recognized the existence of one god, and one only, as the supreme object of human homage; a being ruling and overruling all. It is true that the worship of this deity seemed to be partially vitiated by the worship of spirits, but on closer scrutiny Ricci found that these spirits were not called 'god,' and that they acted merely as agents of the divine will, or as intercessors with God on behalf of his worshippers,—a doctrine easily acceptable, nay, even incapable of rejection by any consistent Roman Catholic. Therefore he recognized the divinity of the Chinese creed as identical with the God of Christianity, and he adopted for the latter the name by which the former was designated, *Tien* (Heaven). The next question related to ancestral worship. If that must be called idolatry, then even at the cost of assailing a belief which had become instinctive in the Chinese race, Ricci would have no choice but to denounce it. Now, according to the ancient creed of China, the souls of the dead are not deified. They merely live as the happy inmates of heaven continuing to take an interest in mundane affairs but incapable of exercising divine power. The masses of the Roman Catholic Church for the souls of the departed, the Adoration paid to saints, may well have occurred to Ricci's mind when this problem had to be solved. He decided that the homage paid by the Chinese to the disembodied spirits could not be classed as religious worship; he saw in it merely an expression of filial piety; a civil rite in which Christians might participate without doing violence to their conscience." (11, vol. 11, p. 120.)

His great ambition was, however, to get an audience with the

Emperor and after many vicissitudes he arrived at Peking. There he used every means possible to gain the support of court officials; some he bribed by presents, others he astounded by his mechanical genius and profound scientific knowledge. His fame spread so rapidly that the Emperor desired to see him. By means of his instruments and his skill, and his vast learning in the Emperor's favorite sciences, he gained an appointment within the city with a good stipend and the privilege of opening a college. In his school he trained the youth in his learning and thus by means of lectures he explained inoffensively many Christian principles. Professor Beach says, "His topics were well chosen to attract the literati, and scarcely any foreigner has succeeded so well in clothing Christian ideas in an alluring garb." (9, p. 253.) He reconstructed the calendar, perfected a map of the world and published several scientific books besides works of moral philosophy in which he developed his Chinese catechism. He learned how to remain safely within an empire hostile to foreigners, and especially religious emissaries, and to induce the literati to regard him not as the emissary of another religion, but a great literati from the west. As Hue says, "He thought justly that the philosopher would make more impression than the priest upon minds so skeptic and so imbued with literary conceit." (59, vol. 2, p. 292.) He was successful in carrying out his aim in which he would make himself indispensable to the government through his scientific services, and by complying with the existing forms of religion, he was enabled to spread his own faith in the official class.

This policy was attempted by missionaries of the American Board to the Armenian Church, which aimed solely to instill into those churches evangelical ideas and ideals without alienating any of their members from their mother church. The instructions given to Cyrus Hamlin on the eve of his departure to Constantinople in 1831, contained these pregnant words "Our object is not to subvert them, not to pull down to build up a new. It is to reform them; to revive among them the knowledge and spirit of the Gospel." Goodell wrote about this time that "when I first came into these countries I laid hold of individuals and endeavored to pull them out of the fire; but my missionary aim is now to take whole communities and as far as possible to raise them up to sit in heavenly places in Christ

Jesus." In pursuance of this policy, Goodell and his associates steered clear of all controversy, and directed all of their energy to convey the impression that they were not in Turkey with any sectarian motive but to build up a new community by introducing better methods of instruction and subject matter in their schools. The basis of this practice was the theory that what was needed was not more controversy but more enlightenment in the elements of Christian civilization. Before many years had passed, the missionaries were compelled to abandon the original policy and establish an evangelical church. The mother church tried every one suspected of favoring the more liberal ideas of the missionaries, and imprisoned or executed the guilty and ostracized those under deep suspicion.

The chief causes for this change of policy were: (1) The pressure of the popular demand in the home churches for more tangible results influenced the missionaries to abandon the more obscure and intangible work of quietly enlightening the Oriental churches, and to adopt a method which promised results more easily tabulated; (2) The intolerance of the Oriental church of any reformation led the American Board to insert in its report for 1842 that "whenever those Oriental churches having had the Gospel fairly proposed to them, shall reject it excluding and casting out from their communion those who receive it, then it will be necessary for our missionary brethren to turn from them as apostate, to shake off the dust of their feet as testimony against them and to call all of God's children to come out from among them and not to be partakers of their plagues;" and (3) closely allied to this intolerance was the essential antagonism between Oriental orthodoxy and the missionary doctrines. These churches gave great veneration to a mass of tradition added to the Bible, while these missionaries held even more strictly than Luther that everything not expressly required by the Bible should be forbidden. Thus then the failure of this important missionary policy was due to the imperfect application of its most fundamental principles, *i. e.*, of tact in approach and time for development. (Cf. 6.)

In writing of the conditions in modern Japan, Faust, long a teacher in that land, deplores the fact that still some missionaries think they must Americanize their converts, and proceed to demolish everything that savors of the ancient creed, for-

getting that the old-cast off Judaism was a schoolmaster that led into the fullness of the new religion. "The candid person who knows what Buddhism and Confucianism are and has seen in what respects they coincide with Christianity will very gladly confess that these also are schoolmasters and the mission of Christianity here is, as it was in Christ's time, to fulfill and not to destroy." . . .

"The missionaries belonging to this class have purposely failed to make plain some connection between the lower religion of their hearers and the higher one to which they would lead them. As has often been pointed out the ethical element in Buddhism and Confucianism might easily form a splendid bridge between them and Christianity. Nothing worth mentioning has even been attempted along this line by the missionaries; and, indeed, this harmonizing must be done by the Japanese Christians themselves. Too often the relation to the past is totally ignored and a large part of the missionary work is still done in absolute disregard of all sociological principles." (21, 80.) These are strong statements, but we might add that wonderful as has been the progress of Christian missions and the greatness of the contributions made thereby to our civilization, yet as compared with the wonderful reinterpretation which Christian thought wrought in Teutonic institutions and folklore, the efforts of modern missions have little to show, so perhaps, we must now wait until the native soul of the East shall give us the fuller interpretation of the religion of Jesus.

There has recently appeared a book, which indicates what can be done in assimilating the best in non-Christian writings, "The New Testament of Higher Buddhism," being translations and notes of the New Buddhist writings by Dr. Timothy Richards for many years a missionary, and an able contributor and translator of Christian literature in China. In "the Essence of the Lotus Scripture, we find the same teaching as in the Gospel of St. John in regard to Life, Light, and Love, a teaching which forms a wonderful bridge crossing the chasm between Eastern and Western religion and civilization." (51, p. 2.) As in Judaism, there was the gradual evolution from an imperfect form of religion to a monotheism into a Trinity in Unity in Christianity, so in the New Buddhism there has been a development from a former Atheism into a Theism and on into

a monotheistic Trinity in Unity. The twelve vows are strikingly similar to the teachings of Jesus. "Thus both Christianity and Buddhism by dwelling on their respective ideals, rather than on their respective imperfections, will find themselves inspired to coöperate and exert themselves more than ever before for the salvation of their fellowmen and to study each other's most sacred books. There are dry bones in both religions. What is needed is the Creative Spirit of the Christians, called the Merciful Kwangin by the Buddhists to make these dry bones live again." (51, p. 25.)

"The time of universal intercourse dawned upon mankind with the advent of steam and electricity within the last century. With this has arisen a feeling that the next step in religious evolution is not a monopoly of any one of these competitive religions but a federation of all on a basis that acknowledges with gratitude all that is best in the past in different parts of the earth as Divine, and then finally following the one that surpasses all of the rest in authority and usefulness to the human race. There would be no difficulty in getting the most intelligent to recognize Moses and the prophets of Israel, Confucius and Mencius, the sages of China, Mohammed, God's ambassador to the Arabs, as all sent of God and the final step in religion is foreshadowed in the firm belief of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity, that the supreme Savior of men must be God Incarnate." (51, p. 34.)

McKibben, fourteen years a missionary to China, holds that we are to believe that the same God inspired Socrates, or Plato, or Confucius as Isaiah or John or Paul, and that narratives in the Old Testament pertaining to low standards of conduct, such as deceit and unchastity are to be judged with the same rigor as if they occurred in the Vedas, the Koran or the writings of Confucius. The Hebrews felt the immediate presence of God, and this thought has gradually developed from the tribal stage through the prophets to the culmination in Jesus of Nazareth. "I conceive that this evolution throughout the Scriptures, by toilsome and painful steps, from superstition to spirituality, paralleling the evolution in material nature constitutes them the world's great book of religion; yet that truth attained was wrought in Judea in the same way as in India, or China, or America, by experience and observation, by use of the mental

and spiritual faculties with which all men are endowed." (38, p. 587.) In a similar strain writes Burton from the Fijis holding that if God has spoken in divers manners, then he has not left the Hindu without witnesses. Is not the converted Hindu right when he says that the prophet who spoke of the spotless incarnation, spoke of Jesus? (13.) McKibben continues: "It is piteous to scan the list of hindrances that restrain adherents of the ethnic religions from giving adhesion to Christianity. Sometimes it is the extra-cosmic conception of God exhibited in the Genesis stories; sometimes a difficulty with the Incarnation; or a theory of the Trinity; or Redemption; or doubts about miracles. Almost all of these are traceable to false and indefensible conceptions of the meaning and nature of the Scriptures. When we can cast ourselves on the truth that religion is not adhesion to doctrine but is God's life in the human spirit, made more abundant through Jesus; and on conceptions of Scripture that give freedom of thought without imposing the sanctions of supernatural authority, obstacles will be removed that hinder the penetration of the world with the influence of Jesus Christ." (38, p. 59.)

Similarly writes Hume concerning the views of the Bible held by missionaries in India. Hinduism, Janism, Islam and even Zoroastranism are book religions with sacred writings held infallible, so the Hindu youth refuse to accept the Christian Bible as infallible as presented by the older type of mission teachings. Everywhere the Hindoo mind reverses Jesus as the incomparable man but they are repulsed by the Western garb in which He is clothed. The Bible is and always will be the most important book dealing with the moral and religious needs of men. Hume adds that the Jesus of the Gospels is certainly most significant, but the Christ ideal has grown and changed with the ages according to the needs of mankind, and the greatest demand of modern theology both at home and on the mission fields is the working out of a new view and an enlarged interpretation of the personality of Jesus. (30.)

The future religion will be born from looking for the highest and best in all religions that help to save man from the ills and sins to which he is prone. How to deliver the lower strata of society from poverty and oppression, the masses of the people from ignorance and superstition, and from the domination of

violent men, redeem all human hearts from selfishness and make them to minister to social needs, is the great problem of the coming religion. Christianity has thus far led us, but we yet look for a fuller interpretation of the religion of Jesus when the nations have known the fullness of the life abundant.

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THE DAUGHTERS AND THEIR MOTHER OR THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND HER OFFSPRING

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A paper read before the Terre Haute Literary Club, April 20, 1914.

These are the generations of Religion; and Religion begot Theology, Law, Medicine, and Literature. And Theology begot Philosophy, Astrology, and Mathematics. And Philosophy begot Physics and Ethics and Psychology and the theories of Education. And Physics begot Chemistry and Biochemistry, and Astrophysics, and Botany, and Horticulture and Forestry, and Geology, and Petrology, and Metallurgy and Engineering, and various other sons and Daughters. And Astrology begot Astronomy, Meteorology and Climatology; and Ethics begot Sociology and Economics and Finance and Philanthropies, a large and goodly progeny and Law begot Politics and Governmentology and Commerce. And Medicine begot Physiology and Zoology and Biology and Bacteriology and Dermatology and Pathology and Morphology and Anthropology and Surgery and Anatomy; and Literature begot Poetry and Prose and History and Drama and Tragedy and Theatre. And these in turn begot each numerous sons and daughters as numerous as the sands on the seashore, which if a man be able to count the sands of the seas, so shall he be able to count thy offspring, O Religion. These are the generations of Religion, and Religion walked with God, and she is thought to be no more.

The subject of The Daughters and Their Mother was suggested to me by a reading of a most valuable book, entitled The Meaning of God in Human Experience by William Ernest Hocking, Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. Something he says in the opening pages of his book gave me the idea I am now attempting to present to you. While however this paper will contain a number of quotations from that book and a number of ideas found there, it is not a resume of the book nor any presentation of his thoughts. Whatever use I make of his ideas is entirely for my own purpose of showing the relation of Mother and Daughters, or Religion and

Her Offspring. Under the following headings I shall now briefly present The Daughters and Their Mother:

- (1) Establishing a Blood Relation;
- (2) Misunderstandings between Daughters and Mother;
- (3) Discourtesy of the Daughters;
- (4) Inspiration from the Mother;
- (5) Does the Mother Know anything? Or Is Religion Idea or Reality?

It would not require much investigation to show that the various branches of human knowing are related and interrelated in such wise as almost positively to show a genealogy like the one or similar to the one given in the opening paragraph of this paper; one branch of learning begot the other, and tracing them all back, we find Religion to be the Mother of them all. From the dawn of human intellect we find many busying himself with the nature of God and His world, Theology was the natural inquisitiveness of man into reasons for the commands and demands of whatever religion was known to men. Whatever other knowledge man had was part and parcel of Religious knowledge and religious life. A mere survey, even a superficial glance at the laws of Moses makes plain the vision that all phases of activity were included in the religious life, and that many even of the most recent New Thoughts and New Divisions of Human Knowing have, not vague, but well defined beginnings in the Mosaic Religion. In other words we see the Mother Religion nourishing and shielding these tiny babes, giving them her milk to drink and her guidance for protection until such time when strong and self-relying, they might each in turn go out to found a family of their own. In Exodus chapter 20 and following we find not only the beginning of the study of Law, but a fully developed system of laws, a full grown daughter of religion. Leviticus chapter 13 and following are an indication that the science of Medicine was also a full grown daughter of the Religion of Moses. Perhaps nowhere except in modern scientific journals is a more minute diagnosis and conscientiously scientific prognosis of leprosy given as in these chapters of Leviticus. Take the 12th chapter of Leviticus and dozens of other places in the first few books of the Old Testament and you find as complete and excellent a system of hygienic

rules as few to-day know, and fewer in our modern licentious civilized life ever dream of heeding. "And when ye reap the harvest of your land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest, . . . thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger." In this we behold the smiling face of the little child Philanthropy. "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, neither put a stumbling-block before the blind, but shalt fear thy god. I am Jahveh." In this and countless others like this we recognize not any longer the child but the young lady we have to-day named, "Ethics," while in the following we cannot fail to see the modern well-bred "Etiquette" with the additional spiritual light of her mother, "Before an hoary head thou shalt rise, and honor the face of an old man, thou shalt fear God, I am Jahveh." (Lev. 19, 32.) Even the spiritual offspring of Ethics, sometimes called "Love of Humanity" was already born when the Mother still held all her children in her own home, as is evidenced by this bit of history: "If a stranger sojourn with thee in thy land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt, I am the Lord your God." (Lev. 19, 33.) These few children of Religion named at random were, as you see, already born at a time when the mother did not yet dream of ever parting with her offspring, and like every mother, happy in merely attending to her children's wants without thought that they would some day wish to leave home to add glory and lustre to her hoary head or perhaps, who knows, to bring shame and sorrow to her loving heart.

That this is not merely a dream of my own but a fact can be verified by studying any of the students of the History of Religion. Morris Jastrow, professor in the University of Pennsylvania, in his Study of Religion, says: "Medicine remains within the clutches of religious belief longer than one might be tempted to suppose, in view of the apparently materialistic basis upon which this science is grounded. To this day in the Orient, and among the lower classes in the very heart of Europe and America, magic is still resorted to as an adjunct to medicinal potions in the treatment of disease. It is accordingly, natural to find that two sciences like theology and philosophy, which

have so much in common, are not differentiated until a comparatively late stage in the course of civilization. In Babylonia and ancient Judea philosophy continued to be an integral part of theological speculation. There was no philosophy outside of theology, that is to say, beyond the limits represented by the religious interpretation of the phenomena of the universe."

And let me add by way of parenthesis that even as in Egypt and Greece, where it is claimed that Philosophy was the outcome of an opposition to religious interpretation of the universe, the blood relation which we are now considering is just as clearly established even if the daughter felt duty bound to go beyond or contrary to the teachings of her mother. It seems quite clear to me that this country and government is just as much a real child of England as she would have been had she remained under the protection of the mother, and even though it was in opposition to the mother country that the new country sprang into self-assertive manhood, or under the stress of modern demands, of woman's vote, we might say womanhood, she is blood of her blood and bone of her bone.

(2) MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN DAUGHTERS AND MOTHER, OR CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCES AND RELIGION

Misunderstandings between daughters and mother spring up everywhere and always when the daughters are spirited enough to make and cut out an independent life for themselves and have not yet grown into mature womanhood to know and appreciate the meaning of motherhood, of unselfish labor, of painful joy and self-sacrificing pleasure. It is not necessary for a mother to know every detail of every calling or profession of every one of her children in order to be an inspiration to all of them, but it is necessary for the children to know and honor and love and appreciate a mother in order to become self-respecting and worthy in his or her separate and independent life, for when all is said, the better one understands his mother and his father the better does he understand himself, the more dependently independent he can grow in and along with his natural powers and aptitudes. We are only too apt at times to feel that we know so much better than our parents ever dared to know, but as we grow wiser through age and experience we sometimes have the greatness to change our minds, to realize that with our

superior wisdom we knew not everything, indeed the very things we were so slow to understand may have been the most precious possessions of those supposedly ignorant authors of our lives and the most woeful lack in our own telescopically magnified Selfhood.

These misunderstandings, however, are a part of our self education, and happy he who discovers his real Self before it is too late to mend his ignorance and transform it into a broadened, cultural, spiritual knowledge.

The conflict between Religion and science has been often more bitter than the facts on either side would justify, but like all conflicts, it is the misunderstanding of those closest and dearest to each other that are so hard to heal, so seemingly unreconcilable, while at bottom both the contending parties may be honorable and noble in contention and the points of disputes so small that neither party could conscientiously give a logical, sensible, understandable idea of the difficulty. The wisest course often is not to dwell on the disputes, but to forget them and to return to yearning blood-relationship that calls for embrace. To rehash the trouble means often to renew the bitterness. We know all this and would indeed think it wiser not to open the disputes, were it not for the fact that so many think that Religion walks with God and is no more, that the feeling aroused can be only that of reverence for the Mother that has passed away, while the truth spoken about the dead, or the supposed dead, will not be so enviously criticized, nor so vigorously opposed.

At one time the Mother had in her charge all her daughters, and they were all unconsciously happy in her home. The Talmud, the great storehouse of Jewish learning, the text book of strict orthodoxy in Judaism, contains all human knowledge knowable or known to the wisest in the days of the doctors of the Talmud. A fine unconscious mixture of medicine, Mathematics, Astronomy, Law, Folk-lore, myth, history, hygiene, Geography, geology, in short every branch of human knowledge then known to man was known and converted into religious knowledge and so treated by the doctors of Jewish Religion. This was true among all the Europeans up to the present awakening of the sciences. The clergy were the only educated men; whatever learning there was they held and used to the best of their

ability. It is said that up to the last century a man receiving his Ph. D. degree at any of the universities was expected to embody in his dissertation every branch of human knowledge; he was expected to know and no doubt knew, whatever there was to be known. How meagre that stock of knowledge must have been we can easily picture to ourselves when we know that no one receiving that same degree to-day knows hardly the alphabet of his own limited field of study, one small arc out of the great and ever enlarging circle of knowledge. No doubt the Mother felt irritated that she could not grow along with her ever maturing children, and the children were irritated that they should forever be considered mere children and hold on to the knowledge they learnt as children. Instead of reconciliation there was conflict upon conflict, bitterness upon bitterness, until mother and daughters grew into enemies, long misunderstanding each other's motives and each other's lives.

The conflict, however, is growing less acrimonious, probably because the mother is supposed to be dead or dying, and so we hope to bring about a reconciliation for a better understanding of the noble vitality of a Mother who has produced such fine offspring.

Countless pages of human history, all written with human blood, drawn from living human bodies, record some of the bitter misunderstandings between Mother and Daughters. Yet, I shall be so bold as to condense the gist of the matter into a few short sentences, and then turn to a worth of the contending parties, not to their worthless, perhaps not altogether avoidable, misunderstandings.

Religion speaks with AUTHORITY, has always so uttered its revelations, its injunctions, its prophecies, its commands, its mysterious insights, its illumined flashes of the BEYOND, of the gazed-at but Unseen reality. Religion has spoken of the Unspeakable, the Ineffable; it has attempted to prove the Unattainable attainable, the Invisible visible, the Infinite finite; it has SEEN the mighty sun sinking behind the horizon, yonder, just out yonder, where the waters touch the sky, there, just there, and IF you only could get there in time, you could touch with the hand what you have already touched with your eye, for, after all is said, is not SEEING merely touching at a distance? So speaks Religion about the spiritually tangible, just

out yonder tangible world! We are all big boys, we want a strong hand to guide us, to command us, to point the way we might in the exuberance of youth attempt to climb. Religion as it has been conceived, let us not yet say misconceived, has attempted to speak AUTHORITATIVELY on too many subjects, and has been very diffident to permit its authority to be questioned. Religious men, feeling the power of the divine spirit, authorizing them to act, to speak, to labor, have been unwilling to listen to other spiritual men, also feeling the divine spirit within them, speaking with the same authority on subjects on which the religious men had NO authority to speak authoritatively. Religion has locked the doors of the house that the daughters might not escape, instead of realizing that these daughters are grown and should go out to found new homes with the blessings of the Mother on their heads.

This reluctancy of allowing the new revelations to usurp the old authority is a disguised blessing, making staple the flux of liquid materials of life. *When* to let go is always a question and will be both with the mother and the daughters and granddaughters. Not only did Judea sentence Jeremiah twice to death, imprison him several times, flog him and put him in the stocks for his daring divine message, not only did the Church burn Giordano Bruno in 1600 at the stake for his revelations, but every daughter has done the same thing over and over again; Law has burnt witches, Medicine has bled the weak and has repudiated her discoverers and only slowly recognized her prophets, even so material a daughter as engineering has laughed Westinghouse out of the office, and then opened her hand of welcome to him. And so on throughout the whole human life. It is self-preservation that prompts man to beware of the impostor, often building walls to keep out the false prophet and thus keeping out the true prophet at the same time and with the same protective walls.

If, on the other hand, it is true that Religion has dealt unkindly at times with her daughters and her prophets, the Daughters, by whatever names they are called, have been more dogmatically unkind to the Mother, who nourished them and raised them up and brought them to maturity. If Religion has been slow to recognize the divine qualities of the daughters, the daughters have done worse, they have refused to recognize

the divinity of their mother, and have put up FALSE GODS, gods altogether too small for reverence, circumscribed by the daily toil and daily outlook, by the circle of the earth. Making and discovering infinite heavens, they made finite and earthly their gods and their worship of gods. Unable to see the Infinite, they shut their eyes altogether, and proclaimed, Behold, there is nothing to see! They have done as Hume has showed them, he has found no Self in all his experiences! He has gone out of his house, as some one has so aptly put it, and looking in at the window, was unable to discover himself at home. They have with the spark from infinite wisdom brought to earth wonderful discoveries and blessings and then have strenuously denied that they have any mind, or self, or beholding power, or discovering power, or spiritual power, or as I have put it, they have shut their eyes, and cried, Behold, we cannot see!

All this might have been avoided, it seems to me, if Religion had realized that there is work for the mother and work for the daughters, that rearing and inspiring and loving children is the Mother's work, while the children have other work, different work at present, but not so different in kind but that a mother's love can make it richer in quality and artistic creativeness. But it is too late to speak of this now, the love which the Mother meant to give was turned into gall, and bitterness was the outcome.

(3) DISCOURTESY OF THE DAUGHTERS

Whatever the differences between Mother and Daughters, it is never proper to speak disrespectfully of her and to persist in annoying her. For after all, a Mother that has produced excellent children must have been an excellent mother, and without her life we could not have bridged from the nowhere or the somewhere to the Here and Now. And when in the quietness of thought we reflect we shall see and understand that her life and labor for us is at least as lovable and certainly as well calculated for our blessing as any other acquaintance or any other friend we have cultivated. A Mother that has had life to give must have had life, pulsating life, and it is far nobler in us to respect that life, to study its origin, its meaning, if we can, than to neglect it, or harass it, or return gall for ignorance, if ignorance it was, or disrespect instead of reverence.

(4) INSPIRATION FROM THE MOTHER

There is no question in my mind that a true man will say of his mother, even though she be dead, or he may think her dead, as so many think of Religion, at least what Cowper said of his England: "With all thy faults, I love thee still." It is impossible, in a mere outline of so vast a subject, every paragraph of which might well have served as an essay in itself, without exhausting the subject, to state even in barest outline what this religion of which we speak has meant to men, does yet mean to men and women, what it ought to mean and what it ought not to mean. Religion has been defined countless times and shall be as many times defined, but we shall leave all that mass of idea-stuff for the present, and I beg you to leave it out of your minds for the present and follow me only in a few popular, modern ideas of the so-called practical men, or perhaps of the ever increasing masses who think that they think, when they merely drift away from thinking, through a lack of interpreting their own experiences.

For the present I mean just this: The common man who speaks of his experiences in terms of his experiences without going into the labyrinth of explanations about the origin of knowing, or epistemology, without discussing the mind-stuff, or the parallelistic theory of physical and mental worlds, he probably knows intuitively, directly, unquestioningly more of his mind than the man who has gone out of his house to look in at the window to discover what he can see of himself. It is evident that he will not see himself, for he is not there, he is looking in at the window, and will never see himself inside. The man who looks at his mind is already looking at something which is NOT his mind and will probably not find it. So is the man who looks out to see God, he will probably not see Him. He sees him unconsciously, when he is not looking in at the window. But enough of this at this time; people who say they have no religion, they owe nothing to religion, have probably gone out of their house to look in at the window only to discover that they are not at home, that what they see in their home is entirely different from what they had hoped to find. Chairs, tables, books, papers, pictures, all this they see, but not a SELF. So too when we go out to find RELIGION. We find it not. We have heard people say all sorts of things as to what

their religion is. As Religion has given birth to these various arts, sciences, activities, each in turn growing strong and proud and beautiful, each one at some time or other said, This is my religion. My Physics is all I can see of God. My Ethics is my Religion. My music is my Religion. My social work is my Religion. Or another says, My religion consists in being honest in business. Making boots honestly is my religion. I am devoting my entire life to healing the sick and the healing art is my religion. But the fact is not one of these occupations, arts, or sciences is synonymous with religion. Why not? some one may ask. If these are all the children of Religion, why is it not true that in these children we see again the life of the Mother? And I would answer in the words of Prof. Hocking, "No matter which one of the offspring of Religion is most appealing at any time; religion is exhausted into none—into nothing less than the totality of her children."

I will go still further and say that not any of the sciences, or arts, or occupations, could possibly be as well developed as they are if they had not separated from the parent Religion, for it is evident that no one can do all things quite as well as he can learn to do one thing. Furthermore, we seem to see religion in its full blast only there where life is still in a way unified, that is, as Hocking says, among the peasantry, "For here," he says, "it is still the whole of men's art, the whole of their literature, their philosophy, their poetry, their music, it is still the whole integral of their higher life, and should they lose it they would lose all that distinguishes their existence." With a fine sense of the existing order of development to-day, witnessed by each one of us in our own and others' lives, he continues: "In so far and fast as they grow into possession of more individual forms of these same values they incline to let the separate practice of religion lapse."

Indeed, is it not true with you and with all of us that as we grow more interested in our special work or study, we immediately think, nay we do not think but act as if we have found a nobler form of religion, our special work, and with a fine sense of the superiority of our insight we condescend either to appear religious in order to help the lower masses of humanity, or because the unintelligent but respectable friends expect it of us. But if Religion clothes itself in the Arts, in the Sciences,

in our special Work, if Religion is synonymous with Sociology, or with philanthropy, or what-not, then is it not fair to ask, What is left to Worship? Is it merely because Religion has been the Mother of the Arts, of philosophy and her numerous progeny that we in our kindness pay her some homage, pretend to be respectful and respectable? If that is so, if religion is dead, or dying, then in the name of our manhood and womanhood, let us be merciful to her old age and suffering, and let us allow her to die in peace and at once. "Let religion vanish," says Hocking, "if it is to vanish; but know that it is impossible—in any sense sanctioned by history, or faith, or clear reason—that religion should be merged with any Art, or with all Arts. The position of Religion in the world is, and has been, unique; and with the preservation of this distinction its very nature is bound up. The very work done by religion in the course of history has depended—despite her union with the arts—on the clear eminence, above all her contact with affairs, of a summit which is No-art and touched by No-art."

At any rate we will grant this much that the inspiration that in the past has been drawn from the fountain we call Religion has been the creator of all that is beautiful in Literature, of all that is sublime in painting, of all that is lofty in architecture, of all that was holy in life, of all that was heroic in deed. I was about to change the past tense of the verb to the present and say that religion IS etc. but I will not o'erleap myself, so I shall merely ask, and answer in the next chapter, Has religion any message, has she anything to say, has all life ebbed out of her, and found a new birth in her children?

(5) DOES THE MOTHER KNOW ANYTHING? OR, IS RELIGION IDEA OR REALITY?

Thus far, you notice, I have carefully avoided any polemical reference to your religion or my religion, for I am not discussing either of the two concrete embodiments of the religious life in man, but I want to say now, without inviting argument on the point because it is not the object of this paper to narrow itself to sectarian conceptions, that on the whole Judaism and Christianity have pursued two different methods of making concrete the spiritual reality! Judaism has insisted on action, 613 commands to-do and not-to-do we have insisted on, while Chris-

tianity has always started from the other end, the creed, and then the life-activity. Now, it is my conviction that the Creed follows the life as consciousness follows brain activity. A few weeks ago I was on the train and heard a discussion about Terre Haute by two traveling men, one of whom sat on the same seat with me, the other opposite me. Their opinion was that Terre Haute is the worst city in the country, that Indiana is ashamed of this city, and that there are probably not more than twenty-five or thirty per cent of decent people here. I took out my note-book and made the following entry: "Nothing that I shall do will make that the truth, everything I shall do will give it the lie." I believe that we get our belief from action, and not our action from our belief. Let me put it baldly thus. We do not act nobly because we believe in God, but we believe in God because we have learnt to act nobly. Even the lowest sinner who turns to the nobler life, if only in feeling, already knows the presence of God, his ideas, his creed have become real to him, and he is growing into something better by virtue of his changed heart. Be that, however, as it may, I believe that the conflict between the God-Reality and the No-God-Reality is ever with each of us in some form or other, and our answer depends on our life, and then our life will depend, will draw waters of joy from our answer.

If, on the other hand, you expect me to bring God into this room bodily and show him to you, I answer, I cannot do it, any more than you can bring your mind into this room bodily and show it to us. There are some things, there are many things we can not thus handle, but we are not less, but more certain of just this and such realities than we are of physical realities, so-called. As already stated, whenever we look for our mind, we find that we are doing just what Hume did, we go out of our room, look in at the window, and confess that we do not find anybody within. Whether it be the knife that we employ in dissecting the brain, or the mind in analyzing it, we always return with empty hands, for we find no one within. It must always be thus. For, when we look with our mind at our mind, we are not looking at our mind, our mind is occupied in looking at something Not-Mind, Not-Self; the looking element, the Seeing-power, the examining power, THAT IS the Mind, and what we see, look for, analyze, is something other than the looker,

the seer, the analyzer. It is plain to me that we shall never see ourselves within the room when we look in at the window. Very philosophical is the prompt answer of one of the sons of Erin, who being asked by the judge in a trial what his friend did when he was alone in his room, said: "Sure, your honor, I don't know; I was never with him when he was alone."

What we do find when we look in at the window, is chairs, tables, books, carpets, pencils, dishes, pillows that we have arranged or disarranged, and in all these various things which we have made or merely bought and arranged or disarranged, we SEE ourselves. Our spirit has been at work, and let but the slightest paper be out of order, or a chair be on the table when we know we put it on the floor, and we at once know that there is or was a Not-Self there, another self, of whose mind we know no more than we do of our own, but we judge, nay we know, the everyday man, knows, he does not judge, that the disarrangement of the chairs, pillows and books shows the presence of a Not-Self another person or persons. The paper, the chair, and the pillow are not persons but they are the plastic materials in which mind makes itself felt, and known to Other Minds. The finish of a chair shows the Mind that was at work, the jingle of a poem shows the Mind that was at work there.

Thus we find God also. Not when we go to look directly, but when we do not look, when we LIVE. We find that we knock our head against the Spiritual reality at every turn of our day's labor, we behold the tree which we cannot create, created, shaped, formed, and we can speak to that mind of the tree in exactly the same way as we speak to the mind of any man by a spiritual process that transeends all understanding, and we have written the history of the tree, of the flower, of the potato as knowingly as we write our own history, more knowingly, and all because we have communicated with that tree-mind, with the Infinite Mind that holds us all together just as the reality we call life holds together our organs, our cells, our ideas, our ideals. We touch God with our hands, our eyes, our ears, our thoughts, and then we go out of our house to look for God. We cannot find him that way. We have already found Him when we look for him, for ideas, all ideas are bound up with experience, all the mythological characters to the contrary notwithstanding, for they are all combinations of bits of reality. No one can

dream of anything but of bits of experiences arranged and rearranged in unreal or undreamed of possibilities. When we go out to look for our mind, we have already found Mind, when we go out to look for God, we have already found Him. This thing is so simple to me that I wonder at the lack of wonder of our ability to see a flower, to smell a flower, to see the stars, and hear the thunder. How do we see a flower? What is the flower, and what is the reality that does the seeing? Yes, but someone interrupts, and says: That's all very pretty talk, and very ingenious, but where is God? You haven't proved any God with all that talk.

Very well, I say, if all that means nothing to you, if the beautiful deed does not show you a beautiful mind, if a magnificent painting does not show you a magnificent mind, if a sublime cathedral does not show you a sublime mind, if an orderly arrangement of books, figures, things, does not show you an orderly mind, if orderly workings of nature does not show you an orderly Mind, if the sublime cluster of stars does not show you a sublime Mind, if ineffable beauty of the little arc of the Universe which we have ability to comprehend does not show you an ineffable Beauty of Mind, then I have nothing more to say, and shall say nothing more, for words are meaningless where ideas lack the force of Experience. But this I know, and shall now invite your attention, I know the Reality of Religion as separate and distinct from everything she has produced, and I know the meaning of Worship, both from my own experiences, and these you cannot touch, you cannot deny, for they are not yours to deny, you can only say, "I have not had such experiences," and then I say: You can have them, if you wish.

Whatever you may think of Religion, this much you will grant that she has form, and color and tone, and shape, and methods all her own. We can literally see a certain something in a man or woman that is not to be mistaken for anything but a religious color, a spirituality that cannot be described, the intellect cannot handle it, language cannot portray it, yet there it is, a religious expression. You may look in vain for it in our modern rush of commercialized activity, but when you have found it, you know it, it is unmistakable, it is a religious expression, which very few of us ever have, and some of us only at times, at certain inspired moments. There is a religious tone of the voice, evasive

as to pitch and timbre and all that, but real, you know it, you sense it with the intuitive powers of soul. For let me say right here that the intellect is not the only avenue of information: occasionally the soul, the I breaks through the intellect and SEES deeper than the intellect, too deep even for word-painting, and when we thus see, it is prophetic vision, religious SEE-ing, authoritative knowing, and when the force be great enough, it is authoritative Pronouncement, announcement, or what you will, you do not mistake the religious *force* of an idea though you cannot always make out the *meaning* of the idea from the intellect's point of view.

Something of the authority of a religious idea as distinct from an intellectual idea may be gathered from a quotation of Tolstoy, written after seeing an execution at Paris (Hocking, p. 466):

"When I saw the head separate from the body, and how they both thumped into the box at the same moment, I understood, not with my mind, but with my whole being, that no theory of the reasonableness of any present progress can justify this deed; and that though everybody from the creation of the world on whatever theory had held it to be necessary, I knew it to be unnecessary and bad."

Perhaps Tolstoy is too far away for you to realize that he meant anything, if so, let me tell you of a religious conviction born in upon me a few weeks ago, as I beheld for the first time in my life a creature that looked like a man, that would pass as a man in our city, a real man, drunk, and in appearance to me so horrible that it were the most unpardonable insult to any dog to compare him to that most faithful of all animals. And when I saw that degraded image of our Maker, I saw the truth flashed in upon me, in spite of all the intellectual arguments that of business interests, of human liberty, of necessity, and all the rest, all of which I have most strenuously held and advocated, I saw the truth flashed in upon me that this city and all cities in this country will, must and shall be dry territory. That's a religious truth of whose certainty I am as sure as that I speak to you now as that you are listening to me. Religion is a superintellectual certainty of the presence of God in the affairs of man, in the affairs of His Universe. Without this certainty, it seems to me, life cannot renew itself, renew its creativity in the very Arts, sciences, and Walks that we sometimes

think have usurped the throne of Religion. Religion is the fountain of youth, in which each toiler must for ever bathe to find new thoughts, new power, new hope, new courage.

Intellectually what is the meaning of life? I am now addressing myself to those who say, or tacitly believe they believe, that they can and must live by the intellect alone. If you wish to be philosophical, it shall please me well, but let us go to the whole length of our logic. If your physics is your highest inspiration, or your Painting, or as so many say, Virtue is its own reward and its own Happiness, or happiness is the end of life, or energism, a mere absorption and enthusiasm in the work of the hour, is the explanation of life, then I ask, be logical, and tell me: What for? Why must you have paintings? Why happiness? Why love? And what is love? And what for? And why must we be born? And being born, what shall we do here? And why must we do what you say we shall do. And why must I not step on my brother's rights. What are rights? Why has he rights? What is the use of it all? Suppose he has a right to imprison me because I have taken his potatoes, why has he potatoes and I have none? I think there is more philosophy in the answer a theatrical manager gave a gentleman who was pleading with him to take back some of the girls he had discharged because of their fading beauty. "They are not pretty any more, and I can't use them," was the manager's argument. "But they must live," said the gentleman. "Why must they?" calmly retorted the manager. Yes, why must they? Why must we all live? What for? Isn't it a huge joke? Our intelligence, if that be the highest voice within us, if that be our God, ought to answer. Why must we live?

What answer does Sociology, the modern god, give to that one question alone? All the problems of Sociology would be solved, if we could only answer that we don't have to live. Even the command not to commit suicide is only a religious command, and as Religion is reborn in Sociology, and Sociology has too many problems now, why not help the solution of the problem by answering, We don't have to live. Let us destroy ourselves, and create no more. Intellectually, I can see no argument that would offer anything better as a solution than the suicide theory, and the non-creative theory. Intelligence has already seized on the latter theory in the Intelligent, the Upper

classes, the rich, the refined human beings, and has ceased producing children more than the fixed income will allow to support the offspring in proper style. I could bring a thousand arguments and so could you for showing that life is a silly farce, a useless misery, an unpardonable mistake. Tolstoy's answer is again here very significant, though not the whole answer that one might give (Hocking, p. 467):

"One can only go on living when one is intoxicated with life; as soon as one is sober, *it is impossible not to see that it is all a mere fraud*. Sooner or later my deeds will be forgotten, and I shall not exist. Then why go on making any effort. . . . How can men fail to see this?

"I now see that if I did not kill myself, it was due to some vague consciousness of the invalidity of my thoughts, I, my reason, has acknowledged life to be unreasonable. But how can reason, which (for me) is the creator of life, and (in reality) the child of life, deny life? There is something wrong here.

"Then I turned my gaze upon myself, on what went on within me, and I remembered that I only lived at those times when I believed in God. As it was before, so it was now: I need only be aware of God to live; I need only forget him, or disbelieve in him, and I die. 'What more do you seek?' exclaimed a voice within me. 'THIS IS HE.' He is that without which one cannot live. To know God and to live is the same thing! . . . and the light did not again abandon me."

Religion as it seems to me is the totality of life, the Whole of which life activity in its various branches of Literature, science, art is but part. It is the oxygen of life, to breathe religion is to live again a fuller life, is to be prepared to do the work of life with that suspended judgment which marks the highest intelligence in man. For Intelligence is not the only avenue of communication with the infinite. Intelligence is soul experience worked into Idea, but we must not fail to understand that all life does not start with Idea but with feeling, and when feeling becomes detached from our life and only when it so detaches itself does it become Idea, while Religion opens up avenues of experience that are not yet translatable into Ideas, while all ideas become and must become object of Religion.

An example from what seems now to be passed or passing Jewish religious life will make clear what I mean. Brief it

has to be for this paper is already longer than I had thought of making it.

The sanctification of the Sabbath in the Jewish home brings about a transformation that no Jew of modern life and certainly no Non-Jew has any conception of; it is a reality for which one has no words. You ask me what it is, I answer, very simply, it consists of blessing the Sabbath lights, blessing the bread, sanctifying the day with a blessing over a cup of wine, and a table prepared with love of Religion, the meal is not merely something to eat, it is in honor of the Sabbath, and the Sabbath is in honor of God. A hundred little courtesies to the Sabbath are observed, and this brings about a result which I cannot put into Idea, but which exists in reality, and which I assure you is Religious experience, a cleansing, an uplifting, a feeling altogether different from anything else experienced, but there it is, a Reality. Analyze it, and you find nothing. Have you ever analyzed love? To analyze it is to lose it, is to deny it, is to ridicule its unwritten observations, but it is a fact. What can a man find to say night after night that he has not already said? What can one write to a beloved person that he has not already written time and again? What is there to love when the person loved is not there? And yet I am inclined to think that no presence of the person is comparable to the remembered or dreamed of love, the idealized love. If you don't understand this, I have no words to make it plain, but it is fact, it is reality. So also is this Religious experience synonymous with Love of God. Love of God. What is it? I cannot say any more than I can say what Mind is, but I know how mind manifests itself in some ways at least, and so I know that Love of God manifests itself in that same lingering around the house of God as love expressed itself in the lingering around the house of the loved one. When my father used to remain in the synagogue hours after it was closed for services just to study the Talmud in the house of God I know now *that was love of God*. So there are a thousand expressions which you know to be expressions because of Love of God, and there is a meaning there quite different, not synonymous with, love of humanity. Love of humanity is contained IN love of God, but not vice versa.

Not only this, there is something quite distinct from any intellectual process that is the result of true prayer. No doubt you have often thought to yourselves, and do so yet, What is the

use of prayer? We surely cannot change the laws of nature with our prayer. Perhaps not that, why should we wish to change the laws of nature? Do we change the laws of nature with our thoughts? Yet we think, and love to think. All the results of thought enter into true prayer, yet the result of prayer is quite other than the result of thought. The result of prayer is not less intellectual, but I should say Superintellectual, for certainly results there are in the soul life too deep as yet for the descriptive word, not yet detached from life sufficiently to be put into words, unless it be the modern forms of prayer that can very well be put into words and only words. When I speak of prayer, I mean prayer that reveals to us the nearness of God, a nearness that no mere thought can bring. You may not understand me in this age of wordy prayer, or prayerless words, but you will not doubt me when I say that prayer is the assurance that we are comprehended by God, that we are breaking through the veil of mist more effectually than we break through by the process of thinking. Thinking is a process of discovering Reality, but the process of thinking is not the only breaking through and not the completest insight. All thinking, all results of thought must be poured into the process of prayer, and the result is a certainty quite other than mere thought certainty, it is Religious certainty, a certainty that has moved and does yet move the actions and motives of men.

The mystic does not so much say WHAT he knows but THAT he knows, that knowing is individual, it cannot be told, it can only be reknown through similar experiences. Will you permit me to be personal once more, and then close?

I had the sad experience, which is the lot of all, of losing both my parents this year. I know what we can say of life and what we know of death; I know that it is natural to die, and I know that out of this universe we came and into it we return. All that is thought, and valuable thought, but we Jews at such a time go to the house of worship and recite the prayer called "Kaddish" which is an acknowledgment of our faith in God's Wisdom and Justice. That and nothing more. When out of feelings of reverence I went every night to the orthodox synagogue in Savannah, Ga., where I visited last summer, to pray and to recite that prayer, I knew that I shall not change the laws of nature, nor in any way change the change that has taken place, yet I felt that strange peace and nearness of God

that no intellectual process can bring. It is religious experience, it is reality, it is love of God, which to me comprehends all life activity, unifies all life experience.

Stevenson has somewhere described the feelings of the boys who went out in all kinds of weather with a bull's eye beneath their coat. Men looking from without at these foolish boys who weather the storm, are drenched in the rain, cannot understand the strange psychology of such creatures, but they don't know that underneath their coat they have a bull's eye, and when gathered in the cave, alone though drenched and shivering they open their coats and display the bull's eye. Neither can we who have become tyrannized by the intellect understand the strange behavior of the religious men and women who see God and feel His presence in true prayer, they don't understand the bull's eye within.

Let me conclude, therefore, that The Mother, Religion, has much to say about Reality, only it cannot be said in terms of the other experiences for it is quite different, it is soul certainty even as thought is Mind-certainty. It is all-embracing in its influence on life, not lessening the influence of thought but strengthening it, not making light of honor, but sanctifying it, not reducing life to a syllogism but raising it to a divine trust in the ultimate Unity through all diversity, and all this through prayerful certainty that even as the cells of our body find their true explanation not in their individual activity but in the whole and especially in the consciousness which that whole makes possible, so do we individually find our satisfaction, our explanation in the relation with that incomprehensible, vaguely understandable Whole in whose Consciousness we shall find our reality and our eternity. Religion does not deny the reality which science discovers, it accepts that reality, but insists that Reality is larger than science can discover, larger than all the powers of man discover, finds true the thought, however vaguely expressed, "Knock and it shall be opened, seek and ye shall find," for the universe which we are permitted to learn is in addition to the intellectually unchangeable one also a spiritually plastic one, for very literally do we find,

"With the merciful thou wilt show thyself merciful;
With the perfect man thou wilt show thyself perfect;
With the pure thou wilt show thyself pure;
And with the perverse thou wilt show thyself froward."

THE PEDAGOGY OF MISSIONS

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I. A PRIMITIVE UNIFORMITY IN RELIGION

As to the origin of religion many different views have been and are still held. Hume thought that hope and fear lay at its basis. Man was afraid of natural forces, and that caused him to predicate gods back of them. Efforts were then made to secure the good-will of these deities.

Edward B. Tylor thought that animism was at the beginning of all religions, attributing to all objects a life similar to that which man was conscious of having within himself. He thought that all forms of culture and worship could be derived from this primitive religion.

Herbert Spencer traces religion to ancestor worship. The deities of primitive men are the spirits of their ancestors, which after death inhabit trees, stones and other objects. This presses the origin back of the animism of Tyler and the fear and hope origin of Hume. But the real source of religion is farther back yet and deeper in the soul of man. Animism and ancestor worship belong to a later stratum of human history.

Professor William James published the autobiography of two deaf mutes. One shows how curiosity was aroused and satisfied regarding the origin of things. He learned how animals were propagated, and then wondered where the first animal, first man, first plant came from. Hearing peals of thunder, he looked to his brother for an explanation, who pointed to the sky, and made motions like the zig-zag of the lightning. From this he inferred the existence of a celestial giant whose voice was the thunder.

The other autobiography shows the spontaneous evolution of the moral sense. This man had stolen small sums of money from a merchant's till. Among these he took by accident a gold coin. Regarding this last he was seized with scruples. He had taken too much. He got rid of it to his great relief, and stole no more.

Helen Keller tells us in her book "The world I live in" how she came to recognize her own personality, and then to look for an image of her own emotions and sensations in others. Groping in an uncertain way she came to see her thoughts and feelings repeated in others, and so constructed her world of men and of God. [p. 121.] Her teacher, Miss Sullivan, in the book "The Religious Education of Helen Keller," goes more fully into the development of her religious nature. She early asked such questions as, "Where did I come from and where shall I go to?" "Without any particular direction being given to her mind, it naturally sought for the cause of things." "As her observations of phenomena became more extensive and her vocabulary richer and more subtle, enabling her to express her own conceptions and ideas clearly, and also to comprehend the thoughts and experiences of others, she became acquainted with the limit of human creative power, and perceived that some power not human must have created the earth, the sun, and the thousand natural objects with which she was perfectly familiar." "Finally she one day demanded a name for the power, the existence of which she had already conceived in her own mind." ["The Religious Experience of Helen Keller," pp. 6-7.] Later she asked, "Who made God, What did God make the world out of, etc?" In a letter to Bishop Brooks she asked him to tell her something that he knew about God, and added, "I like so much to hear about my loving Father who is so good and wise." "She received the idea of God as a loving Father as naturally as the flower exhales its perfume." [Ibid 21.]

Max Müller and Tiele agree that there must be a spiritual element in early man's view of the universe that lies at the basis of religion. This is the "perception of the infinite." This comes from man's contact with the universe, where his own finiteness is contrasted with an infinity that is without him. Professor Tiele, instead of using the term "perception," prefers to say "man's original, unconscious, innate sense of infinity." "The faint perception of this infinite, so faint at first as to be merely a sense of the infinite—a weak consciousness that there is such a thing—stirs his being profoundly. It strikes a responsive chord in what, for want of a better name, we may call man's religious instinct." ["The Story of Religion" by Morris Jastrow, p. 196.] This instinct thus aroused is one of

the most powerful elements in human life. It leads to the various systems of religion which have exercised so potent an influence on the races of men.

Religion may be defined as the conscious relation of the human to the divine. The savage worships the stone, or bone, or sun, or stars as embodiments of an intelligent higher being. Our relation to this higher being is much like our relation to our fellow men. There is fear, love, hatred, gratitude. The worship may be merely an effort to placate the wrath of or even to deceive the god. Such would be called religion though of a low character. But true religion has as its center fellowship with divinity. Thus Fichte said, "Herein religion doth consist, that man in his own person, and not in that of another, with his own spiritual eye and not through that of another, should immediately behold, have and possess God." [Quoted by Mary Whiton Calkins in "A First Book in Psychology," p. 270.]

Among the lowest races there is a co-existence of the mythical and the religious. "The rational factor is visible in religion; the irrational is prominent in myth. The Australian, the Bushman, the Solomon Islander, in hours of danger and necessity, yearns after the gods, and has present in his heart the idea of a father and friend. This is the religious element. The same man when he comes to speculate on causes or to indulge his fancy for fiction, will degrade this spiritual friend and father to the level of beasts, and will make him the hero of comic or repulsive adventures. This is the mythical or irrational element. Religion in its moral aspect always traces back to a belief in a power that is benign and works for righteousness. Myth even in Homer or the Rigveda perpetually falls back on the old stock of absurd and immoral divine adventures." ["Myth, Ritual and Religion" by Andrew Lang, vol. 1, pp. 328, 329.]

The apostle Paul refers to this in the first chapter of his epistle to the Romans. He says that when man knew God and glorified him not as God, neither was thankful, he became vain in his imagination and his foolish heart was darkened. Then he made fantastic images of God, and got farther and farther from the truth. We are conscious of this possibility in ourselves. Even in advanced stages of culture the savage within man is ready to assert itself and produce the myth. On the

other hand it is evident from numerous examples that among the lowest savages, in hours of need or of danger, there are some who turn to the Father "who is not far from any one of us."

The resemblances among peoples of different races and stages of culture are much more numerous as well as deeper than are the differences. As differences in color and shape of skull do not prevent men everywhere being recognized at once as men, so the differences in intellectual and emotional reaction are small, compared with the things that we have in common. Physically, intellectually and religiously if the same stimulus is given there will be the same or a like response.

We have noticed man's impulse to turn to God in the hour of need. Here is the origin of prayer, which is found in one form or another among all peoples. There comes to all alike a feeling of discomfort or pain. There is the reaction to this with a cry of distress as natural as the lamb's call for its mother. It may be that there is little or no real knowledge of God. The lamb that never knew a mother will cry in the hour of need. But there is the sense of need and a desire for deliverance, a vague hope, it may be, of a way out and a way up. We may liken it to the hop or bean having within it an upward impulse, a need of support, a need of something on which to climb. It gropes blindly till it finds something higher than itself, and there clings and grows and triumphs over that which has no such upward impulse. Then it transmits to its successors a desire thus to climb and cling. It would not be sufficient for the hop or bean merely to find itself or an object no higher than itself on which to climb. And so man with an upward impulse seeks for God and finding there real help transmits a habit of thought and desire to those who come after him.

Among most primitive peoples the prayers are for material good. The early English had a prayer for fertility of the fields that ran thus: "Hail be thou Earth, mother of men, wax fertile in the embrace of God, be filled with fruit for the use of man." ["The Evolution of Religion" by Farnell, p. 194.] The Athenian state prayed "for the health and safety of its people, their wives and children, and all in the country." [Ibid, p. 200-201.] But there is at least an approach to prayer for spiritual blessings. Soerates commended the Laedaemonians

for not specifying any particular wants in their prayers, but praying for good things upon the good people. The Coreyraean state, weary of civic strife and massacre, asked the Dodonaean oracle, "To what god or what hero shall we pray in order to obtain concord, and to govern our city fairly and well?" There was also the prayer offered at Cos in the second century B. C. "for the wealth and virtuous behavior of the boys." Pindar prayed, "Oh God that bringest all things to pass grant me the spirit of reverence for noble things." Plutarch prayed for wealth, concord, righteousness in word and deed. Socrates prayed that God would grant him to become noble of heart. In Plato we find the words, "King Zeus, grant us the good whether we pray for it or not, but evil keep from us though we pray for it." [Ibid, 201-205.]

Notice a uniformity running through many races regarding a harvest thanksgiving festival.

The ancient Jews observed such a festival. For seven days the people lived in booths, which gave the festival the name of the feast of Tabernacles. Work was suspended while the people feasted and drank and sent portions to those who lacked. Processions and singing had a prominent place. It was a season of joy.

Among the Greeks there was the feast of Demeter, known as the Eleusinean mysteries. This was originally simply a harvest festival, though later it underwent a change. It was held during nine days in honor of Demeter the goddess of cornfields and the harvest. Sacrifices and oblations were offered consisting of fruit, wine, honey, and milk.

The Romans too as early as the founding of Rome held a harvest festival, which they called Cerelia, from Ceres, the Roman goddess corresponding to the Greek Demeter. Accompanied by music and song, processions of men and women went into the fields to offer worship and engage in rustic sports and pleasures. ["The Year's Festivals" by Helen P. Patten, p. 218.] Sacrifices were made in the temples also of the best fruits and sweetest wines. The worshippers were crowned with poppies and corn leaves.

In England the Harvest Home was observed in the days of Egbert and Alfred. When the harvest was gathered and the harvest moon was bright, there was a regular season for frolic

and feasting. Ordinary restraints were thrown off, home-brewed ale flowed. There were sports by day, story telling and bonfires at night.

The American Indians too were accustomed to hold a day of festivity during the last mild weather before winter fully set in, the time we now call the Indian summer. They kindled great bonfires, and roasted huge joints of bear and deer, which with boiled corn formed their feast. There were dancing and singing by grim warriors and dusky maids, giving a brighter aspect to the sterner and grimmer side of Indian life. The festival ended with a pow-wow.

Governor Bradford called for a day of Thanksgiving in 1621 at Plymouth, Mass., where, in addition to thanksgiving to God, there were feasting and sports, and the entertaining of King Massaoit with his ninety Indian followers. We may say that he got his idea of such a festival from either the Harvest Home of England, or the Jewish feast of Tabernacles. But clearly there is in the heart of common humanity a need which such a festival supplies, a chord which responds to the suggestion from whatever source it may come.

The northern Teutons had their infants sprinkled with water. Aristotle tells of a water ceremony with new-born infants. With adults there was also a water initiation which meant the passing of the old life and the beginning of the new. ["The Evolution of Religion," p. 57.]

Similarly we might treat of the priesthood, the altar, sacrifices, the temple, circumcision, fasting, and other institutions of religion common among widely separated peoples.

In any of these changes may be brought about without a destroying of the institution. The writer of the epistle to the Hebrews showed the Hebrews that they did not lose anything of value which existed in Judaism by accepting Christianity. Christ as a leader was greater than Moses. The Levitical priesthood passed to a greater High Priest. The tabernacle in which the new High Priest appears is greater than the old testament tabernacle. His altar has taken the place of other altars.

There is a close resemblance to the story of Abraham and Isaac in the Laconian legend of Helen who was to be sacrificed by her father in order to stay a plague. Here an eagle swooped down and held the knife which found its victim in a kid that

was near. A story remarkably like that of Jephtha's vow is told of Idomeneus, the Cretan hero, who vowed that "if he returned from the Trojan war he would sacrifice to God the first thing that he met on land. His daughter was the first that met him." [Ibid, 27-28.]

Aeneas on his famous voyage as well as the wise men from the East was guided by a miraculous star.

There was a resemblance between the temptation of our Lord and that of Zarathustra in the Zend Avesta. "Here also the evil god promises the holy prophet the kingdom of the world if he will fall down and worship him." [Ibid, 29.] We all know of very similar temptations in our own experience. They are common to the human race. Hebrews 4:15 assures us that Jesus was tempted in all points like as we are.

The Hellenes gave the name of Savior to their supreme god. The incarnation of the godhead in human form was very familiar to many peoples before the Christian era. Such was believed to be a mediator between God and man by Greeks, Egyptians and Romans. Widespread among the Mediterranean races was also a belief in the death and resurrection of their god.

The "Maiden Goddess" was very familiar to the ancient Greeks. The divine mother also, known generally as the mother of the gods, was worshipped by many races in the Greek and Roman world. [Ibid, 38.] While it is hard for minds trained in Western science to accept the doctrine of the virgin birth, it could be readily accepted by the Greek world, and many others of the ancients. A Babylonian goddess was called "mother, wife, and maid." "Many of the ancients had long cherished the ideal of a virgin goddess; most had been devotees of the divine mother. The successful propagation of Christianity may have owed much to the means which it possessed for satisfying these two sentiments and for reconciling them in a primary article of faith." [Ibid, 71.] Certainly the Mariolatry that developed in the early church owed much to this pre-Christian bias. It can readily be seen, that, with enormous advantages for the missionary teacher, there is also a danger here. Features of Christianity are likely to be exaggerated to conform to the old religion. That is what took place in the early Christian centuries, and it required the revolution of the Reformation to throw off these extravagances. But the fact that so much of our religion runs

along lines familiar to many races, shows that men grope in certain well defined directions, and also that God uses man's native consciousness in adapting His provision to our needs.

Why should there be such a remarkable uniformity running through all primitive religions, or in other words such a religious solidarity to our race? Genetic Psychology shows us that all races of men are to an incalculable degree a repetition of a far back ancestry. The intricate system of brain cells thus produced in all races, will at the same stage of development respond to the same stimulus in the same way. This is as true in religious as in social or purely intellectual things. Brinton in his "Religion of Primitive Peoples" thinks that the identity of the constitution of men is sufficient to account for a similarity in their religions. He says, "The human mind seems to be a machine; give it the same materials, and it will infallibly grind out the same products." ["Religion of Primitive Peoples," p. 6.]

Similarities may also partly be accounted for by a common tradition. As nothing is more basic in man and exercises a greater influence on his whole life, intellectual, social and moral, than his religion, so it is very tenacious of life, and will survive through innumerable generations though liable to many and great changes by the way.

II. RETAINING NATIVE TRAITS IN THE EDUCATION OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLE

In considering this subject we must distinguish between things that have evolutionary value and things that have not. There are many characteristics common to all races which are essential to a higher development. Such for example are love, a sense of sin, a desire for a higher life. On the other hand we find among all races excrescences needing to be sloughed off, such as caste and Hindoo widowhood in India, child murder in China, race suicide in America and Europe. The evolutionary characteristics belong to the kingdom of Christ. Christianity includes in its fullest definition everything that works for the welfare of man, temporal and spiritual. Its center is in the will of God, but its sweep extends over every department of life and among all the races of the world. We read of the divine "logos" who created all things, that "in Him was life and the life was

the light of men." And again that "He lighteth every man that cometh into the world." He who appeared to Abraham and others as revealed in the old testament scriptures has always had his way of revealing his will to all the peoples of the earth.

When His will as thus revealed has been followed, there has been a bettering of material and spiritual conditions, an evolution. Where, on the other hand, the light as thus revealed has not been yielded to, there has been a declension. We see this emphasized in Jewish and Christian history, as well as among peoples of non-Christian faith. There is a striking resemblance between the decline in religion, morals, and material prosperity among the ancient Hindoos and that among the Israelites, when they turned away from their earlier illuminating faiths and adopted the lower religions of the peoples among whom they mingled. The same declension from the same cause is seen in the early centuries of Christianity. When the will of Christ has been followed in any worthy manner, whether in individual lives like those of Abraham and Socrates, or among peoples like those at certain periods in Jewish history or the better periods of many races, there has been an upward progress. It is a matter of letting the living Christ into the life to work out the principles of His kingdom. He is adapted to the needs of all races, those with and without culture. The extent of true culture depends upon the extent to which the human will has been subjected to the divine.

Now the principles of God's kingdom are exceedingly broad and varied. All races have some of them manifested in their character, customs, and modes of thought. Some people are strong in one or more directions, other people are strong in entirely different directions. But the religion of Jesus Christ is very much broader than the creed or the life of any of its adherents. Certain aspects of it are emphasized by the Anglo-Saxon as seen in his devotion to education, to historical accuracy, to the study of science, to hygiene, to civil and religious liberty, to material, social and political ideals. Certain other aspects are emphasized by the Latin races, as submission to recognized authority, reverence for established institutions whether forms of worship or of government that have proved useful, teachableness that accepts much without over-critical questioning. Is it not possible that many if not most primitive peoples can con-

tribute an emphasis to aspects of Christianity that have hitherto been neglected, and so give something of real value to the Christian nations as well as get something from them?

Charles Cuthbert Hall has pointed out that while the Anglo-Saxon has a passion for things outside of himself, the people of India and many other peoples of the East have a similar passion for the things within. They are mystics. The Westerner cultivates the aesthetic for its commercial value, while the Oriental does it in the interest of his religion. The former is prone to make business efficiency crowd out religion from his life. The latter always keeps religion in the first place. That is the chief end of his life. In the West material progress is carried to extortion and unrighteous oppression, while the Easterner will pity the oppressed and have only contempt for the oppressor. Such greed of gain as passes for shrewd business acumen in the West is regarded as most unworthy in the East. While the West concentrates thought and affection on the particular, the East dwells on the universal and the ultimate, with a sense of the unreality of things seen. Surely there is in this a value for the over-practical West.

To the mystical soul of the East there is an appreciation of parts of Christ's teaching that we Westerners do not sufficiently appreciate. The criticism that looks only to rigidly scientific methods is in danger of missing much that appeals to the mystic. Christ was Himself a mystic. His beloved disciple John was a mystic. Paul was a mystic. And the mystical side of their teachings is seen by the oriental mind to have a beauty that escapes the Occidental mind. Thus the gospel by John is preferred to the synoptists by the East, and the epistles to the historical parts of the New Testament.

The metaphysical beliefs that gave dynamic to the prophets of the Old Testament and to the character of Christ and His apostles have been allowed to wane in the West, their place being taken by practical ethics and philanthropy. Yet without these beliefs there can be no permanent vigor in practical righteousness. Now it is precisely in these metaphysical beliefs that the Eastern mind is strong, to them its chief attention is given.

The East is also different from the West in regard to the use of time. The West is always in a hurry. Business and pleasure, eating and sleeping are all regulated by the watch. There is a

rush from the cradle to the grave. That was not the way with the life of Christ. He did say, "I must work the works of Him that sent me while it is day, the night cometh when no man can work;" but He was never in a hurry. He had plenty of time to talk with the humblest, and eat with the publican and the sinner. This ease regarding time is characteristic of all the people of the East, and is well nigh universal outside of the Anglo-Saxon race. There is time taken not only for religious duties, but for social and political duties. One of the dangers to the home life of America is in a lack of time devoted to the interests of the home. It will be a great gain when some of the Oriental indifference to time lays its influence on this menace to American well-being.

Professor William James said, "We have lately had a number of accomplished Hindoo visitors at Cambridge who talked freely of life and Philosophy. More than one of them has confided to me that the sight of our faces, all contracted as they are with the habitual American over-intensity and anxiety of expression, and our ungraceful and distorted attitudes when sitting, made on him a very painful impression. 'I do not see,' said one, 'how it is possible for you to live as you do, without a single minute in your day deliberately given to tranquility and meditation. It is an invariable part of our Hindoo life to retire for at least half an hour daily into silence, to relax our muscles, govern our breathing, and meditate on eternal things.' The good fruits of such a discipline were obvious in the physical repose, and lack of tension, and the wonderful smoothness and calmness of facial expression, and imperturbability of manner of these Orientals. I felt that my countrymen were depriving themselves of an essential grace of character." ["Talks to Teachers."]

Our missionaries are apt to carry with them to the foreign field the strain and ceaseless worry of their home land. They sometimes say that owing to the enervating effect of a hot climate they have to resist the tendency to idleness. Thus they make a virtue of anxious nervous strain, and are likely not only to set a wrong example to the people among whom they live but to inculcate by positive teaching that restfulness is a sin.

Indian boys are always good natured in their games, never losing their temper, and seem to realize as our boys do not, that

play is inconsistent with violent shouting and angry accusations and recriminations. A careful observer of the Indians tells us that he never saw an Indian parent strike his child. The same writer says that "in sobriety and courtesy, an Indian council is a standing rebuke to the noisy assemblies in which at times our own people debate questions of public importance." ["The Indian and His Problem" by Leupp, p. 20.]

Mrs. E. H. Conger says, "The Chinese as a class do not have severe, grieved, anxious, revengeful, unresigned or unhappy expressions on their faces. They do not grieve over their misfortunes nor do they rejoice over their successes; both the ill and the good they take as due them." ["Letters from China" by Sarah Pike Conger, p. 36.] How much unhappiness and how many cases of suicide would be eliminated in America and Europe if their people would learn the lesson so obvious among many primitive races!

The East gives a place to many of the minor virtues which are greatly lacking in the Anglo-Saxon. It shares sympathy, it has a politeness, a care for the feelings of others, where the Anglo-Saxon is apt to be rude, boorish, thoughtless of others' feelings. Of the Chinese for example we are told that they "are far too polite to laugh in one's face even when the grossest mistakes in phrase or grammar, or pronunciation tempt the risibility of the hearer." ["Missionary Methods in Manchuria," p. 56.] The missionary from the West working in the East needs to be careful regarding the feelings of those he teaches, not only that he may not prejudice them against the gospel, but also lest he destroy a virtue that is stronger among those he teaches than among his own people.

There is a danger in our treatment of Christianity of mistaking what is local and temporal for the universal and eternal. Since Christianity is intended for all races and suited to all parts of the world, and all periods in the earth's history, we may well avoid the error of thinking that our are of the circle is the whole. Christianity must be distinguished from those things that men are apt to associate with it, which are yet not of it. Such are the character of the government, both of the church and state, sectarian differences, immoralities in its nominal adherents, imperfections in its best people, and all its forms

and ceremonies which might be entirely changed and still leave Christianity itself intact.

Christian character in its completeness has not yet been seen excepting in Christ Himself. The full embodiment of His life and teaching is for coming years. The universal man must adopt the teaching of the Christ to produce His perfect likeness. We must learn to look at Him from the universally human point of view before we attain to this. Thus Paul wrote to the Romans of his wish to visit them that he and they might be mutually helped. The writer to the Hebrews, referring to the triumphs of faith by Old Testament heroes, says that they could not be made perfect without a reference to us in these later years. So we can only attain the best by learning from other races as they appropriate the salvation of Christ.

But we are prone to think of Paul with his limitations and set him up as an ideal in all his methods. We take Peter, at least after the resurrection of Christ, and regard him as a fit model for the people of all times. We forget that they were imperfect, seeing things from Jewish and very circumscribed points of vision. With great difficulty Peter could be led to view the gentile Christian with a new and wide vision. Paul found this easier; others of the apostles found it harder. What we are as Christians depends largely upon what we have been.

Another thing that the Christians of the West need to learn from the peoples of the East is to put self-sacrifice into their religion. When we speak of the West as being pre-eminently practical, we can add to that that it is practical for selfish ends. Even Christians often miss the fact that Christianity is in essence unselfish, and while they have been ready to take salvation as a result of Christ's death on Calvary, they are not willing to take the other half of Christianity which requires them to take up their crosses daily and follow Him to their Calvaries. Now the East has always made much of self-denial in its religion. Many American Indians were regular in giving to their gods a portion of all their crops, believing that He who gave to them should have a portion in return. And it was given ungrudgingly. Thus far they have caught the spirit of true religion, the very essence of the religion of Christ, though missing the fact that salvation is not by merit but by faith. Only when we

place the two halves of Christ's teaching together, do we rise to any full measure of most apparent requirements of His religion.

The place given to prayer by Mohammedans, by American Indians and very many non-Christian races may well furnish a lesson to Christian peoples. Six times a day the Mohammedan falls down to make his appeal to God. Lumbholtz says of the aborigines of Mexico, "In their religious fervor they have no equals, certainly not among Christians. Their entire life is one continuous worship of their gods, that they may gain happiness. Every act in their lives, every work undertaken is guided by religious thoughts. All that we should call ornament on their clothing and implements owes its very existence to the prayerful thoughts it expresses." [Quoted in "Adolescence," vol. 2, p. 685, 686.]

Among most Christian people prayer has no such large place as that. Business and pleasure crowd it aside till only a few minutes a day are reserved for it. With the advance of scientific teaching there is danger of prayer being more and more undervalued. The rigid working of nature's laws appears to preclude the possibility of direct answers to prayer. Men are led to think that only their own efforts can gain for them desired ends. It is probably true that in the older Christian lands prayer is declining, being given a smaller place in Christian experience.

The real cause of this lamentable fact is the same over-emphasis of the practical that we have referred to before. The cure is in giving due emphasis to the inner and spiritual as opposed to the outer and material.

The regard which parents have for their children and the reverence of children for parents in the East should be used and not destroyed by Western contact with them. These characteristics are a necessity of our best being. They may not always have been associated with the best religious beliefs. But they belong to the deepest instincts of the human soul, and form an essential factor in the evolution of higher human life.

Francis E. Leupp tells us of the respect which young people among the American Indians pay toward their seniors. Mrs. E. H. Conger, writing of the Chinese, says, "If they have no children they are poor indeed, for they have no one to mourn

over them nor to worship at their graves. Love for children is one of their greatest passions, and it seems to be a redeeming one." ["Letters from China" by Sarah Pike Conger, p. 47.] Again she says, "One of the most beautiful things I have discovered in China . . . is a great manifested love of children for their parents, I deem it a kindred of the Christ thought. You must enter their homes and witness and participate in their festivities, family gatherings, and quiet home circles to realize even to a slight extent, the respect, tenderness, honor and affection the Chinese parents receive." [Ibid, 309.]

In the West there is clearly a decline in the desire for parenthood and in the reverence of children for parents. It would be a sad thing for China if Western learning and the Western spirit were to destroy those natural instincts of the human soul, and give in their place a greed of worldly gain and a willingness to escape responsibility that involves care. Vastly better is it to have human obligations met under the stimulus of erroneous religious and scientific conceptions, than to have them ignored to gratify fleshly lusts.

Much may be said for the value of old forms in illustrating spiritual truth. The Roman Catholic church has done much in this way.

The primitive mind needs illustration at every step of development. With our Christian inheritance we are slow to recognize the many steps that our fathers took before they reached the point at which we found them. Our children do not need their slow methods of advance because they are surrounded from the cradle with the inheritance of the ages. But primitive peoples must learn tediously what our children unconsciously recognize.

The illustrative method of the Old Testament with its sacrifices, washings, festivals, is an example of how religious truth must be given to the mind untutored in spiritual conceptions. There must be "precept upon precept, here a little and there a little."

With the evolution of religion there comes an increase in its intellectual element, and a change if not a loss in the emotional element. Now a large and essential part of religion consists in emotion and if the emotional element in it should pass away, a mere philosophy remains. Ribot in speaking of such religious

evolution says, "As soon as religious thought ceases to have a worship or a ritual and indeed finds itself incompatible with such, it is a philosophical doctrine. Stripped of all external and collective character, of all social form, it ceases to be a religion, and becomes an individual and speculative belief." [Ribot, "Psychology of the Emotions," p. 318.] We may believe that the High Church ritual of which W. E. Gladstone was so fond had much to do with his retaining his religion unimpaired along with his lofty philosophic thought. Whatever may be said against the Roman Catholic method of retaining forms of idolatrous worship and incorporating them with the Christian religion, it must be admitted that their people retain the emotional element, and their religion never passes with the masses at least into a mere philosophy.

III. THE POINT OF CONTACT FOR PRESENTING RELIGIOUS TRUTH

Finding the right point of contact for the presentation of religious truth, is a much more complicated matter than is finding it for the teaching of higher hygienic and industrial methods and superior social principles. Yet it is as important in the teaching of religion as in the teaching of mathematics. We must lead by short steps from the known and appreciated to the unknown and unappreciated.

Rev. John G. Paton, speaking of the people of the New Hebrides, said that spiritual ideas had to be worked into their spiritual consciousness, but he believed that it could be done because they were men and not beasts. ["Autobiography of John G. Paton," p. 121.] Religion has been shown to be universal among men. There is always some instinct toward God, some conception of spiritual truth. There is always some religious basis with which Christianity can connect, and the missionary teacher must search that out. Rev. Dr. Chamberlain of India said, "These delicious glimmerings of light we do find by patient search in the religions of the orient, and in the existence of such we missionaries who have to combat those systems continually rejoice. We gladly use those flashes of light in bringing home the truth to the people, as did Paul at Athens. But we sadly recognize how utterly inadequate is that light to lead sinful man to peace with God." [Quoted in "Christianity and the Progress of Man," p. 166.]

Brinton has shown that the distinction between man and the lower animals turns on religion. He says, "They [the lower animals] too communicate knowledge by sounds; they have government and arts; but never do we see anywhere among them the notion of the divine. This was the spark of Promethean fire which has guided man along the dark and devious ways of his earthly pilgrimage to the supremacy he now enjoys." ["Religion of Primitive Peoples," p. 36-37.]

There is in all men a recognition of intelligence and will in themselves. Sometimes they try to shift the responsibility of it from themselves to an inscrutable fate. Nevertheless it is at bottom recognized. They also recognize an intelligence and will resembling their own that is outside of themselves, that is back of all other forms of existence. A Basuto chief said that before the missionaries came they did not know God, but had dreamed of Him.

Along with this sense of a divine being is a sense of a direct connection between the divine and the human. Brinton again says, "I shall tell you of religions so crude as to have no temples or altars, no rites or prayers, but I can tell you of none that does not teach the belief of the intercommunion of the spiritual powers and man." [Ibid, p. 50.] There is a sense of the responsibility of man to the higher powers, and of the interest of the higher powers in man. Every man has a consciousness of right and wrong. He knows that right and wrong bring their own reward. A moral government necessarily implies a moral governor.

The value of truthfulness is inherent in the heart of every man. While most primitive peoples are untruthful, yet when they find that the missionaries speak only the truth a channel is opened for the reception of their teaching. Love is another quality that all peoples appreciate. However much hatred one may bear toward his neighbor, there is always a spot in his heart which is sensitive to the appeal of love. Here then are two other foundation stones upon which the missionary may build. When he shows truthfulness and love in himself and tells about a truthful and loving God he is connecting with basal facts of the human soul.

While the lower elements in man's nature are ever trying to drag him down to a lower level, there are higher elements

trying to lift him up. "The flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh." As there were partial revelations given to the Jews and surrounding peoples in the Old Testament scriptures, so partial revelations, though less clear, have been given to the whole race. Moreover as prophet after prophet was sent to the Hebrew nation calling them to a purer faith and life, so among many other peoples there have been reformers who have sought to establish a better religion. Buddhism sprang up in India as a protest against the intolerable burden of Brahmanism. It opposed formality of worship, and taught kindness, gentleness and purity. Later, Buddhism wandered into the mazes of idolatry, substituted ceremonies for the simple and the pure, and became an oppressive formalism. The Sikh religion came in as a reform protesting against pantheism, polytheism, idolatry, formality, injustice, and caste. ["Missions from the Modern View," Hume, p. 77.]

Dr. Hume, after showing the fearful immorality of the phallic worship of the Hindus, says, "In the latter half of the fifteenth century, in the northwestern part of India, God raised up a reformer named Chaitanya, who was a contemporary of Luther. Like Luther he protested against the doctrine of salvation by meritorious deeds and austerities. He preached salvation by bhakti, that is by trustful adoration of God. Like most religious reformers in India he also protested against caste." [Ibid, 74.]

Mr. Farquhar of Calcutta says that the many religious reforms of India have been owing to the denial of true personality to the supreme being. Native human instinct has sought a God to whom real worship and prayer might be rendered. But these theisms while adding a personality to the conception of the unknowable Brahman, have added many gods from the traditional pantheism. Hinduism has never had a universal personality for God. "The positive elements in the concept of Brahman are unity, universality, reality, and intelligence; if within that rather sketchy metaphysical outline, there now appears the universal person whose will forms the moral order of the world, the old idea is in no way disturbed or weakened, but receives the high moral content necessary for its completion. God is still one, still universal, still the mind of the world, while He has become much more, for He is now the basis of the moral

as well as of the intellectual order." [World's Miss. Con., vol. 4, pp. 181, 2.] Thus the early doctrine of Hindu philosophy and the long search of Hindu reformers find their completion in the Christian's God.

The good things in heathenism should be recognized and commended as good, just as a teacher in our schools is glad to recognize good in his pupils. All religions have a unifying effect upon the tribe. A common worship strengthens social ties. It develops obedience and respect for authority. We must recognize the fact that the elements of astronomy, mathematics, botany and zoology were developed among very primitive peoples and chiefly for religious purposes. The same is true of music and oratory. "All the native American musical instruments appear to have been first invented for aiding the ritual; and tradition assigns with probability the same origin for most of those in the old world." ["Religion of Primitive Peoples," p. 240.] "Our present alphabet is traced lineally back to the sacred picture writing of ancient Egypt; and the less efficient method employed by the natives of Mexico and Central America originated in devices to preserve the liturgic songs and religious formulas." [Ibid, 241.] Architecture also received a great stimulus in the desire to build temples worthy of the gods.

There are many things partially good which need to be purified of their evil concomitants. Prayer as we have already seen is well nigh if not quite universal among men. There is thanksgiving, petition, and expression of penitence for neglect of duty. The petitions are chiefly for material good. A prayer in the Rig Veda runs, "O God prosper us in getting and in keeping." [Ibid, 105.] A higher form of prayer is found in a Dravidian tribe of Northern India. "O Lord we know not what is good for us. Thou knowest what it is. For it we pray." [Ibid, 105.] A Sioux Indian prayed that in war he might kill many enemies, but that in peace anger might not occupy his heart. [Ibid, 106.] From this it is only a short step to the Christian's prayer, and one which is readily taken.

When such people have learned to know the true God and His Son Jesus Christ they are particularly simple and devout in prayer. They will talk to God with the simplicity of a child, and remarkable answers to their prayers of faith are recorded by missionaries working among them.

There is much suggestive of Christian teaching that can be turned to good account. Worship of ancestors does not always co-exist with regard for living parents. Sometimes parents are neglected while living, but at death have sacrifices offered them lest their wrath be turned against the undutiful children. But missionaries can utilize the modicum of good in this error. Dr. McKay of Formosa says that by repeating the words, "Honor thy father and thy mother" he never failed to secure respectful attention. An old man would perhaps nod approval or say, "That is heavenly doctrine." A talk on duty to parents was followed by a talk on our Father in heaven. Thus prejudices are met and the way to the gospel opened.

Among most peoples we find a groping after higher truths. We see it in the face as well as in the riddle of the Egyptian sphinx. The philosophy of Greece was an unanswered interrogation. Paul on Mars Hill spoke of people finding God by seeking and feeling after Him. Hudson Taylor told of a man in China asking how long Christian people had known the story of Christ, and then said that his father had looked for that religion for twenty years and had died without knowing about it.

In India there was an old tradition that the ancient Aryan religion was in time to be supplanted by another faith which would come from the West. ["The Religions of the World," by Burrell, p. 116.] Here is an open door for a religion that can satisfy the intellectual and spiritual cravings of men.

Practices are seen that may be used in leading to a purer faith. The custom of offering sacrifices may be so used. Among the Battaks in order to remove a curse that had taken hold of a man there was a ceremony by which the curse was put upon a swallow and a beetle which were then allowed to fly off with the curse. From this custom it is merely a step to the story of the scape goat of the Old Testament and the antitype of the scape goat in the New Testament.

"The Kols have a legend, almost Christian, about a Son of God, who in order to redeem miserable man, became man and a leper." ["The Living Christ and Dying Heathenism," p. 209.] In the religion of ancient Egypt was a god Osiris. He was represented as having come down from heaven. He was an incarnation of God and was born of the earth and heaven. He reigned over Egypt and conferred many blessings upon

men. But Typhon slew him, and threw his body in many parts into the Nile. These were gathered up by his wife, Isis, put together, when lo! he lived. Henceforth for evermore he reigns in the invisible world. [“The Religions of the World,” pp. 43, 44.] By peoples with such traditions the story of Jesus can be readily received. The missionary who knows all such incidents of the heathen religion and can use them skilfully will have a reservoir of material which the Holy Spirit can use in restoring lost souls.

Since both the bible and Christianity originated in the East, many eastern peoples are perfectly familiar with customs set forth in the Old and New Testaments. Even as far from Palestine as Korea many bible customs prevail to-day. The salutations of “Peace,” “Go in peace,” etc., the marriage customs with the “Behold the bridegroom, come ye forth to meet him,” methods of dressing, such as “girt about the breast with a girdle,” and the use of sandals, the use of sackcloth and ashes to express sorrow, bring the people in close touch with bible scenes. Demon possession is a commonly accepted belief in Korea, and methods are used to cast the evil spirits out. The law of sacrifice closely resembles that of the ancient Jews, and the vicarious sufferings of Christ are readily understood by all the people.

The Zulus of Africa have customs very similar to those of the ancient Jews. The laws of cleanness and uncleanness are examples. Sacrifices, vows, thank-offerings, and first-fruits receive attention as among the Jews. To remove a calamity blood must be shed, whether it is atoning for past error or averting future evil. When sons are absent from home a father may offer sacrifices lest they have sinned, as did Job. A messenger passes friends without stopping to salute them; but after he has finished his errand, he will salute them, and say that he saw them. Here is a reminder of Jesus’ command to His disciples and of that of Elisha to his servant. [“John Bull’s Crime” by Webster Davis, pp. 120-124.]

“Look in what continent we please, we shall find the myth of a creation or of a primeval construction, of a deluge or a destruction, and of an expected restoration. We shall find that man has ever looked on this present world as a passing scene in the shifting panorama of time, to be ended by some cataclysm

and to be followed by some period of millennial glory." ["Religion of Primitive Peoples" by Brinton, p. 122.]

Even cruel rites may have lessons for better understanding the new religion. In Peru at a certain season of the year the blood of a human victim was mingled with food which was then eaten. Among the Aztecs was a similar ceremony where a youth was slain and after his blood had been mixed with dough it was partaken of by the worshippers. [Ibid, 191.] In this way it was supposed that they became partakers of the divine nature.

"The fearful similarity of this ceremony both in its form and in its intention to that of the Christian Eucharist could not escape the notice of the Spanish missionaries. They attributed it to the malicious suggestions of the devil, thus parodying in cruel and debased traits the sacred mysteries of the church. But the psychologist sees in them all the same inherent tendency, the same yearning of the feeble human soul to reach out towards and make itself a part of the divine mind." [Ibid.]

Here is an opportunity for the teacher to make graphic the "new and living way" to the Father through the death of Christ. In such remarkable ways is the provision of God adapted to the felt needs of men.

But what shall be the attitude of the missionary toward things that are wholly bad? Usually he can simply ignore them, especially in the early stages of his work, and trust to the power of truth and right to overcome error and sin. When the light shines steadily and brightly the darkness will not trouble. The teaching of Christianity will always displace false religions when it gets a fair hearing. The most conservative mind and character is continually undergoing change, and hence is open to a greater or smaller change in religion.

IV. FINDING A POINT OF CONTACT, CONTINUED

The conception of a divine revelation is very familiar to the heathen, even the lowest. The shaman is in direct relation with divinity. Prophets and prophetesses speak out the revelations of higher powers. Where such "revelations" are not dishonest, modern psychology understands them to be an upheaval of the subconscious state. "Among the African Zulus any adult can cast himself or herself into the hypnotic state, and by this

obtain what they consider second sight." Among many Australian tribes, among the Kamschatkans, and among the Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego, as well as many other peoples, the mysterious power of the shamans or medicine men is shared by all adults in a greater or less degree. ["Religions of Primitive Peoples," pp. 56-57.] Usually however, especially in higher races, this peculiarity is confined to a priestly class. But always, as well as in dreams, these manifestations are regarded as an inspiration from the spirit world. Thus there is nothing strange in hearing the announcement of a special revelation from heaven. The people expect it to go along with all religion. It never occurs to them that a religion could be thought up out of a man's own consciousness. If a religion were presented to them as having such an origin it would be at once rejected. Warneck says, "If we give up the claim of bringing Christianity as a revelation of God to the heathen world, we must be content to see that world, sooner or later, pass over to Islam, for Islam claims to be a revelation, and by that claim the heathen national cults will be put to rout." ["The Living Christ and Dying Heathenism," p. 200.]

The missionary must give in simple language the message from God to men. Telling bible stories from both the Old and New Testaments is at once the easiest and most effective method. Every language is well adapted to story telling; and every people, like children, are interested in a new story, especially one that they believe to be true. Among all primitive peoples bible stories are listened to with interest; and from these they get a somewhat clear conception of the Christian's God, who He is, what He has done, is doing, and will do, and what His attitude toward sin and the sinner is. The stories of God's judgments in the Old Testament show the penalty of sin. The stories of Christ's life and death show God seeking to save. We read of the Kols: "The simple biblical gospel . . . fits into the hearts of the children and adults of this primitive people as a screw fits into a nut." "They grasped with a child-like vividness the stories of creation, the fall, Jesus' birth, His miracles, and especially His sufferings." [Ibid, 226.] Many missionaries testify to the impression that is made upon the heathen by the stories of God's dealing with men as given in the bible narrative.

A Hindu said to a missionary, "Reviling our gods, criticizing our shastras, and ridiculing our ritual will accomplish nothing. But the story you tell of Him who loved and died, that story, sir, will overthrow our temples, destroy our ritual, abolish our shastras, and extinguish our gods." [Quoted in "The Religions of the World" by Burrell, p. 116.]

A writer referring to India declares that it is not profound philosophy or theology that she needs, for she has already enough of that; but that what the Indian religions lack is facts and personalities, and these can best be supplied by the story of the historical, incarnate Savior.

Bible stories judiciously told will not antagonize the hearers. Yet as the sword of the Spirit they cut right across many of their old beliefs. They show the individuality of men, and that they are not bound by the beliefs and customs of the community. To the fatalist they show man's freedom and responsibility. There arises gradually in the mind a new group of spiritual conceptions. There is a new standard of right by which to measure their lives. Moved only by a bible story, people will confess their sins which otherwise they would not admit. They begin to apply the bible principles gathered from these stories to their own lives.

It is significant that primitive peoples are not afflicted to the same extent with the doubts of more advanced races. However they may reject Christianity for other reasons, they do not need our lines of Christian Evidences. They recognize Christian teaching to be true. It has a certain fitness for their nature, and they do not doubt its divine origin. It is as if an important part of a complex machine which had been lost was restored. It fits the place, it explains a gap, it enables the machine to do a splendid work it could not do before. That is sufficient evidence. He who made man made the bible which so fully meets His needs.

Most people are more influenced by an example or an illustration than by a logical argument. Dr. Hume, speaking of the Hindus, says "The Indian cares little for logical evidence. What he wants is the conclusiveness of an illustration or a simile." ["Missions from the Modern View," p. 99.] And again, "Nor do I try to prove the truth of the bible any more than the truth of my mother or wife or children. I show the

excellency of the bible. That is not only enough, it is the satisfactory way for the majority of the people in the West as well as in the East." [Ibid, 101.]

Primitive peoples do not find any difficulty in the sufferings and death of their Lord. Nor is it His humanity that grips them. It is the revelation of God, loving and seeking the lost through His divine Son, that finds and satisfies their inmost soul. "A new confidence and joy in God's eternal love is always awakened in every land by that revelation of God's own yearning for the love of His weak and erring human children, which was made by the life and sacrifice of His well beloved Son Jesus Christ." [Ibid, p. 25.] They accept Christ's teaching concerning Himself, "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father," and that one truth is worth all the world to the believer. The God who was unknown and ignorantly worshipped before is now seen as a loving Father.

But while they recognize these teachings as true, they are apt to say that it is good only for the missionary and his people, but not good for them and their people. Their old customs and their old thought of community religion still binds them. This difficulty is best met by a native preacher, who can take them on common ground and show from his past and present experience that it is adapted to their needs.

The Chinese, who are especially conservative, are more readily influenced by Christianity when away from their own land. Ancestral ties are then more easily broken. Being free from the restraints of relatives and friends makes it easier for them to change their religion. But Gale points out regarding the Koreans that those who adopted Christianity at home made much more useful church members than those converted abroad. The opposition encountered at home gave a fibre to their religion which conversion under easier conditions did not give.

Authority has a large place in primitive religions and primitive thought. Their religions are based on authority, and yet the people have been so long fed with uncertainties that they welcome among them a teacher who has a confident message. In our Savior's time the common people heard Him gladly, because He spoke as one having authority. If a missionary preaches with a "thus saith the Lord," and is so convinced of the truth and the absolute necessity of his message that he is

prepared to endure any hardness even unto death that it might be embraced by others, he is likely to get a hearing. Thus Christ preached and suffered. Thus Paul and all the great missionaries have done. On the other hand, if he apologizes for his gospel, and admits that it may and may not be from God, and that it may and may not meet the needs of men, his influence over the people is small. It is therefore of prime importance that the missionary believe with all his heart the message he preaches as being a divine revelation absolutely essential to the well-being of men. He must be able to say with Christ, "We speak that we do know and testify that we have seen."

Missionaries must be careful not to unnecessarily wound the religious feelings of their people, by unkind references to their gods or religious ceremonies. Most have been careful in this respect. Love is always tender toward the feelings of others. But sometimes serious mistakes have been made in this regard. In the presence of gross errors and cruelties the temptation to denounce and ridicule is strong. A missionary on the Niger spoke strongly against such heathen practices as human sacrifices, killing of twins, etc., with the result that the king of the country reproved him and so restricted his preaching that he was obliged to give up his work there. Some missionaries have suffered death because of these indiscretions. A Catholic priest in Madagascar snatched amulets from a chief and threw them into the fire, whereupon the chief in wrath slew him." ["The Living Christ and Dying Heathenism," p. 204.]

Most heathen religions are dominated by fear, fear of spirits of one kind or another. Neither severity nor ridicule can remove fear. It will only add to the misery which is already unendurable. We read that Paul and those with him were not blasphemers of Diana. Nor did Paul ridicule the idolators of Athens. If derision is to be used it should only be employed by a native convert. Such might safely follow the precedent of Elijah with the prophets of Baal, or the father of Gideon with his own people. It is love that brings people to penitence, that leads them to seek forgiveness, and inspires a holy life.

Rev. Robert A. Hume of India says that if the missionary claims that the Christian religion is absolutely the best religion in the world, it offends the cultivated non-Christian. He thinks that the claim is too great. But if on the other hand it is

claimed to be better than the religions hitherto followed by the people addressed it will receive a respectful hearing. The difference between the two ways of commending Christianity is of no account to the Christian teacher, but it means much to those he teaches.

In India one of the greatest hindrances to the acceptance of Christianity by the people is the eating of the flesh of the cow by Christians, including the missionaries. To the native the cow is a sacred animal. A deep-seated prejudice against missionaries and the Christian religion has its origin there. The parable of the Prodigal Son loses all its force upon them because of the killing of the calf. If Christians would follow Paul's method of abstaining from flesh for the sake of the conscience of others, it would greatly aid in the Christianization of India.

Of course there are times when strong measures are needed to prevent cruelty, and when such action may be wisely taken. On the island of Aneiteum it was the custom on the death of a husband to have his wife strangled. On one occasion a man was dying, and it was known at the mission house that unless prompt measures were taken the man's wife would be murdered. The missionary's wife, Mrs. Geddie, with the help of some native Christians, had the woman seized and against her will carried to a place of safety, where she was detained until a sufficient length of time after her husband's death to ensure her safety. Meantime she had to be watched or she would have strangled herself. Nor was she at all grateful that her life was thus spared. Going to Mrs. Geddie later with her child on her back she upbraided her for her act. Still later however, she saw things differently and thanked Mrs. Geddie for her kindness.

Such heroic methods as this are safe only after much preparatory work has been done, and when the missionary fully understands the people with whom he is dealing. Evils like the suttee and child murder in India, and foot-binding and child murder in China necessarily had to be disapproved of by the representatives of a loving and righteous God; but effective results have been obtained by persistent, kindly, and judicious effort that covered many years, rather than by denunciation that expected reformation in a day.

The many contradictions in the native religions may be

pointed out without ridiculing them. For example, there is the belief that fate predetermines all, while yet it is necessary that sacrifices be offered to avert calamity. No further use may be made of these than to leave a dissatisfied longing for a more consistent belief. But that means much.

The soul-stuff of the animist, capable of being transferred from one to another, may have its terrors removed and turned to practical account, by showing the marvelous power of influence. One person influencing another to good or ill, is really a transferring of his spirit to the other, but only with the consent of that other. And while reason is applying the truth, the old superstition will almost unconsciously melt away. In fact most superstitions, like the fear of the spirits in animism and the animal worship of Taoism, fall by their own weight when the truth is set before the people.

The continual looking back to a golden age long past has kept people in a dormant state for centuries. And yet by picking out the superior teachings of those early days, and contrasting them with the baser teachings and practices of to-day, a positive gain is made. Nor is it hard to find these higher truths in the teachings of most races.

The uncertain teaching concerning a future life among all non-Christian peoples must be carefully considered, as it bears on one of the deepest needs of man. Whatever its origin, there is in us a desire to live on when this life is ended. People wonder where they came from and where they are going to. Among the ancient Britons Christianity was welcomed because of the light which it "threw on the darkness which encompassed men's lives, the darkness of the future as of the past." An aged earldorman is quoted as saying, "So seems the life of man as a sparrow's flight through the hall when a man is sitting at meat in winter-tide with the warm fire lighted on the hearth but the chill rainstorm without. The sparrow flies in at one door and tarries for a moment in the light and heat of the hearth-fire, and then flying forth from the other vanishes into the wintry darkness whence it came. So tarries for a moment the life of man in our sight, but what is before it, what after it we know not. If this new teaching tell us aught certainly of these, let us follow it." [Green's "History of the English People," p. 54.]

When the Christian teacher declares strongly and without any uncertainty that the Son of God promised a place of future joy for His people, he is likely to grip hearts with hooks of steel. Gibbon in his list of five causes for the rapid growth of the early Christian church, puts in the second place "the doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth." [Gibbon's *Rome*, vol. 1, p. 523.]

Fear of evil spirits and all the miseries connected with spirit worship creates a longing for a mighty deliverer. Sacrifices do not avail to ward them off. Any little slip in the sacrifices will be avenged with fearful vows. In Korea demon pests by the roadside with grinning, horrible countenances are supposed to keep demons from passing. These during past centuries were the chief hope of the people. Into such a land filled with ancestral spirits, demons, goblins, dragons, hill gods, all malevolent and terrifying comes the missionary with the story of Christ. "Plenty of demons in the New Testament but they are all on the run; down the slopes of Galilee they go; away from Christ's presence they fly, till the blind sees and the soul is lighted up; hosts of them, howling devils; and devils that shriek and foam at the mouth. Never before in the history of Korea was the world of demons seen smitten hip and thigh. This wonder worker is omnipotent, for verily He has issued a reprieve to all prisoners, all who will accept of Him, and has let them out of hell. Throughout the land prayers go up for the demon-possessed in His name, and they are delivered; prayers for healing, and the sick are cured; prayers for the poor, and God sends means." ["Korea in Transition," Gale, pp. 88-89.]

Among primitive peoples the power of mind over matter is greater than among more advanced races. A curse or a prediction of death may produce death. To believe that evil spirits possess them is bad enough whatever may be the reality. Some missionaries have seen phenomena that have convinced them that there is indeed a possession of evil spirits as recorded in the New Testament. But whatever these aberrations are, they go out before the name of Jesus in a way that amazes even the missionary. Gale says, "Some of us have come east to learn how wondrously Jesus can set free the most hopeless of lost humanity. We have come to realize that there are demons

indeed in this world, and that Jesus can cast them out; to learn once more that the bible is true, and that God is back of it." [Ibid.]

The desire to escape from sin is much less prominent than the desire to escape from the power of evil spirits. The fear of spirits together with the bondage of fatalism has reduced the sense of sin. The new religion calls for right relation with God, for an interest in moral conduct, forgiveness, heaven. It calls them to give up not only ancestor worship but polygamy, slavery, falsehood, and other vices. This has little attraction for them. Love, mercy, meekness, honesty have for them but little meaning. Monogamy does not appeal to a chief with a large harem. Most peoples measure morality by custom. When Christian morality is set beside the heathen's custom, it is not easy for him to see that his old custom is in the wrong. Things that to the Christian are wrong are to him holy. Missionaries among the Pakpaks found them killing and eating their own aged parents. When reproved for this inhumanity, they said, "Every people has its own custom, and this is ours." ["The Living Christ and Dying Heathenism," p. 153.] Mohammedanism differs from Christianity in allowing ancestor worship, polygamy, slavery, falsehood, and a belief in fatalism to survive. It demands certain fastings and formal prayers. These are in line with the old notions of religion and are readily accepted. But with bible visions there comes a desire for a higher life. They want to be delivered from the power of sin as well as from the fear of spirits. Then they soon reach the experience of the apostle who said that what he would do that he did not. There is need of a new motive power. A Chinese convert thus contrasted Confucianism and Buddhism with Christianity. A man is in a deep hole and cannot get out. Confucius going by gives him good advice. But it does not get him out. Buddha passing by says that if the man could get part way up, he could help him the rest of the way. But the man cannot get up far enough. Then the Savior of mankind comes to him, and takes him from the horrible pit, and sets his feet upon a rock, and establishes his goings, and puts a new song in his mouth.

The present emperor of China, after having an interview with Dr. John R. Mott, said to him, "You must change your

plans. I want you to stay in China and visit not only the great cities, but the small cities and towns where the young men and the schoolboys are, and give them this message. My reason is that Confucius teaches us the truth, but your message tells us of a power that enables men to obey the truth." ["The Christian Work and Evangelist," 1914, p. 403.]

V. TEACHING CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

There is need of some consideration regarding the time most suitable for presenting Christian doctrine to primitive peoples. What preparation is necessary to precede the presentation of such doctrines as go with the life, death, and resurrection of Christ?

Professor O. T. Mason thinks that in the training of the lower races we should pursue a regular course in the following order: food, hygiene, dress, shelter, war, industry, ornament, the arts of gratification, traffic, family, organization, government, and last of all religion. ["Adolescence," vol. 2, p. 721.] His idea is that the omitting of any of these stages requires too great an effort both physically and psychically, and tends to discourage by offering an unattainable goal.

President G. Stanley Hall in his "Adolescent Races and their Treatment," as given in "Adolescence," volume 2, has the most thorough treatment of this subject that we have seen. He however at least partly agrees with Professor Mason regarding preparation for Christian teaching. He says that first civilizing and then Christianizing or basing evangelism on the alphabet and education, is the pedagogic way and that the reverse method has only a logical sanction. ["Adolescence," vol. 2, p. 736.] He further says, "The psychology of religious growth is now teaching us the desirability of laying long and chief, though not exclusive, stress upon the Old Testament in dealing with pre-adolescent children, and reserving the more intensive teaching of the New Testament for the teens. Savages are children and youth, and the races that live under the influence of the higher non-Christian ethnic faiths also especially need to be kept in the pupillary state toward their own faith long enough to make it a kind of Old Testament propaedeutic to the New." [Ibid, p. 745.]

Again President Hall, in "Educational Problems," volume

2, page 69, shows the danger of suppressing the bad and the false without eliminating them, with the result that the evil still lives on in the submerged regions of the soul. In this subconscious soul, after the Freudian principle, it later makes trouble. "From the secret recesses of the spirit they motivate feeling and will, even long after they are lost to the light of the intellect." Later there is a revival of this substructure, and there is so much energy goes to it that the newer intellectual faith dies, and in its place there is an outburst of credulity and fanaticism or worse. "All that dies an unnatural or precocious death in the soul, tends, often most pathetically, to live again, and in this rehabilitated form is often worse and more ghastly than much that came of its own order of psychic growth. These elements, voluntarily expelled, always strive to get back to consciousness, so that progress by unnatural negation is always unstable and insecure. Only if the soul buries its own dead, in its own way, are there no revenient haunting ghosts." ["Educational Problems," vol. 2, p. 70.]

But may there not be a short-circuiting, by which both the primitive mind and the child mind can pass directly from the lower stage to the higher without suppression, and with a real elimination both emotionally and intellectually? Freud's method of cure was to bring up the subconscious into consciousness, thus having the errors of the lower self eradicated. But in spiritual things there is the difference that the sinner does not lose sight of the condition in which the new faith found him, nor of the steps by which he has since risen.

Emotionally the new experiences may be so similar to the old as not to leave a gap. An apostle exhorts us not to be "drunk with wine wherein is riot, but to be filled with the Spirit." The exhilaration which attended the drunkenness, and was its chief object, is provided by the superior method of the filling of the Spirit. The woman of Samaria, of the fourth chapter of John's gospel, sought to gratify her emotional nature by wrong social alliances. Jesus offered her a better way by means of the water of Life. What the lower forms of social life provide to meet the emotional needs of primitive men, the higher forms of social life provide for in the Christian church.

Nor are the stories of the New Testament so different from those of the Old Testament, or those familiar to primitive peo-

ples, as to make a great intellectual break. The miracles of the New Testament are very similar to those of the Old, and not unlike those claimed by medicine men. The conception of God manifest in the flesh, as we have already seen, is familiar to many primitive people. The book of Genesis gives appearances of God as marvelous and hard to accept. The life of Christ gives stories as readily appreciated by the child and primitive men as that of Abraham or Moses; and even the resurrection and ascent of Christ can well come as early as the story of the ascent of Elijah.

But when the child or primitive man has learned the substance of New Testament teaching, and yielded his will to the will of God, there may still be a large concession made to the natural proclivities of the race. The Christian child is not expected to think and act as an adult. There is the woods loving stage, with its craving for hunting and fishing, which can be met with the sports of the woods and the streams. The pugnacious tendency can be turned to good account in ball games, or by changing the object of battle from fellow-being to a task worth mastering. The selfish and hoarding instincts can be utilized in gathering and preserving objects of value, overcoming the danger of prodigality, while prodigality itself can be led to benevolence.

What is the experience of the mission fields regarding the time for presenting Christian doctrine? No amount of theory can take the place of established facts.

Bishop Colenso tried with twelve Zulu boys to give an educational course that would be preparatory to their receiving the Christian religion. He found that in learning they made rapid progress. But when he thought them sufficiently advanced to be introduced to the Christian religion with its claims upon their lives, they exchanged their civilized clothing for loin cloths and went back to their old homes and pagan manners. ["Daybreak in the Dark Continent," p. 159.]

In the early years of missionary work in Greenland by the United Brethren, chief attention was given to moral duties. The missionaries watched the natives to see if there was any working of conscience when they did wrong. But their minds were so dark that no check of conscience was apparent. For six years there was no visible success in the mission work.

Then a robber, Kajarnak, heard the story of Christ crucified for sinners. At once a change came over him. What the teaching of duties could not effect in others, the story of Calvary did for this darkened savage. The missionaries then took up their work differently and more zealously, teaching the gospel of salvation by faith in Christ. A visit paid the missionaries by a delegation from the home church infused into the mission new evangelistic zeal, and from that time they had a large measure of success. The change is attributed to the emphasis being given now to the free grace of God in the blood of the Lamb, and giving less attention to "the fruitless learning of many truths, needless at least to beginners, not duly used and improved for want of true life and power first obtained through the blood of Jesus." ["History of Greenland" by David Crantz, vol. 1, p. 386.]

It was at one time thought that the native Australians were too low to be reached directly by the gospel and must be educated up to it. Dr. Christlieb shows that "this opinion is refuted by the Moravian Missions in Gippsland." ["Protestant Foreign Missions" by Christlieb, p. 22.] He also claims that the result of missionary work around the world absolutely proves that "the most degraded heathen because they are also men, listen to the gospel, and learn to believe it; that no race is so spiritually dead that it cannot be quickened into new life by the glad tidings; no language is so barbarous that the bible cannot be translated into it; no individual heathen so brutish that he cannot become a new creature in Christ Jesus; and that therefore our Lord and Master, revealing Himself to us as the Way, the Truth, and the Life, in the widest sense, gave no impossible command when, embracing without limit all suffering humanity, He said, 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.' " [Ibid, p. 23.]

The result of mission work in the South Seas is valuable testimony. "In these islands dwelt ferocious savages constantly engaged in desolating wars, cannibals who killed and ate each other, and among whom cannibalism was but the crowning vice and crime of a system of iniquity, the like of which has seldom been found elsewhere." ["The Miracles of Missions," p. 11.] Yet whole islands were transformed by the story of the Cross. In Raratonga it was but little over a year before the whole

population turned from idolatry to the worship of God. Nor was this change merely formal. Their whole social as well as religious life was revolutionized by the change. On the island of Aneiteum is a tablet in memory of John Geddie which says, "When he landed in 1848 there were no Christians here, and when he left in 1872 there were no heathen." ["Life of John Geddie," p. 508.] The story of his leading those cannibal savages to clean and gentle Christian lives is in line with the record of the early apostles winning by the preaching of the Cross. The same method with similar results are seen in Erromanga, the martyr isle, the Fiji islands, very many islands of the Pacific, among the Karens or "wild men" of Burmah, and wherever the gospel of Christ has been carefully presented, backed by loving Christian character, and wisely followed with Christian teaching.

Let us give one more example, this time from the city slums, which in many ways are lower than darkest heathenism. Dr. Charles A. Berry of Wolverhampton was called one night to see a dying woman in a home of ill fame. He talked with her, according to his usual custom, of Jesus as a beautiful example. Looking out of her eyes of death she said to him, "Mister that is no good for the likes of me. I don't want an example, I'm a sinner." Then Dr. Berry found himself face to face with a distressed soul and without a message for her. In desperation he thought of the gospel his mother taught him and he told the dying woman of Christ's sacrifice on the cross for sinners. The woman exclaimed, "Now you are getting at it. That's what I want, that's the story for me." Dr. Berry from that night changed the whole method of his ministry, henceforth always having a gospel of mercy for lost souls. [Missionary Review of the World, 1909, p. 731.] But these are only a few instances out of a multitude of similar ones of which the Christian centuries are full.

The consciousness of guilt is one of the most fundamental facts of the human soul. Not only have all sinned but all know they have sinned. To be sure this sin may be merely an omission of some ceremony, while sins of a moral character are not noticed. Sacrifices and offerings with a view to atoning for sin are almost universal. The desire to get rid of this burden of sin is the chief incentive to religion. Everywhere there is

a sense of insufficiency before the bar of conscience. They feel with Paul that what they would not that they do; and they cry out with him, "Wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?"

The sense of guilt often becomes intensified with the preaching of Christ. Setting His holiness and unselfishness in contrast with the vice and selfishness of men is often used by the Holy Spirit to produce very deep conviction of sin. Within the last few years there have been notable cases on widely separated mission fields of revivals of religion, which began by large numbers being stricken with a sense of guilt. They would confess to having committed very gross sins, telling what these sins were. "There were confessions of opium smoking, drunkenness, stealing, adultery, and violations of all the commandments. These were hard things to confess, and all the torture of the judge would not have drawn forth these confessions, but God's Spirit gave them no peace until they had confessed and found forgiveness with Him." [The Revival in Honan, Rev. J. A. Flimmon, in "The Presbyterian Record," 1909, March, p. 120.] An abiding result of such revivals is invariably a people of vastly higher character.

Emotion has a large place in human life, and must be considered in all teaching, but especially in moral and religious teaching. It is common for people to know duty and not do it, because of the will not being influenced. When however the emotions have been sufficiently affected, the will operates and conduct is directed. The story of the cross of Christ more than any other incident in all literature appeals to sympathy. Here God Himself suffers for the sins of men. When the story is first heard by a thoughtful person, it touches the emotions in a way that we, who have been familiar with it all our lives, can hardly realize. A heathen chief on hearing it replied in amazement, "Our gods do not love us that way." The gods of most savage races are represented as hating the people because of their sins. In the gospel story there is instead the account of a love passing the conception of men.

There is summed up in the crucifixion of Christ the constraining power of a great ideal. Instead of a multitude of precepts on what we should do and should not do, as in other religions, there is the appeal of love and sacrifice to the heart. All duty

to God and man is included in love, and the heart that has been taken captive by the story of the cross is ready for training in duty to God and to man.

At this point, is the demarkation between Christianity and all other religions in regard to good works. Other religions state that certain things must be done in order to have the favor and fellowship of Divinity. With some it is the offering of sacrifices to placate the wrath of their gods; with some it is attending to moral relations with men. But Christianity reverses that. It teaches that Christ died to establish right relationship between God and man. It then calls for the acceptance of that relationship, and the doing of good works, not in order to get the favor of God, but from love, and from fear lest we grieve the Spirit of God.

We are also to emphasize the fact of a living Christ working with us and abiding in us. This truth is not hard for most primitive peoples to accept. They already believe that gods are at work among men. But their conception of the character of God must be changed. He is a God to be loved, to be trusted, to rejoice in, and whose promises are to be tested in daily experience.

Very young children readily grasp these fundamental facts of Christianity. Having heard the stories of Christ's life, death, and resurrection, they are easily led to accept Him as Savior. Many of the most prominent and successful Christian workers were converted when mere children. It is the testimony of Charles H. Spurgeon and others who have had large experience with both children and adults, that those who became Christians when children are the most stable in later life. In harmony with this is the experience of missionaries. Often those converted the earliest, having the least preparatory training, have been the most effective helpers. Of this we might instance A Hoa, the first convert under Dr. McKay in Formosa, who after twenty-three years of testing was the chief of all the native preachers there.

The moral teachings of Confucius can be made texts or starting points for Christian teaching. But the climax must be made with the motive power which is essential to the keeping of those moral demands. The Cause and Effect of Buddhism can be used to advance correct thought and action. Paul laid down

the law relentlessly that whatsoever a man sowed that should he also reap. Many superstitions might be hurried to oblivion by a judicious use of that recognized principle of both Buddhism and physical science. But the Buddhist readily sees that the Christian individual and the Christian community have something of real value that he lacks. He holds the absurdity of believing in law without believing in God. He works toward an ideal which lacks ideal inspiration. For Buddhism consciousness is an evil to be escaped from. Not gaining life as in Christianity, but the extinction of life is the end. To gain that men must separate themselves from all lusts of the flesh that would nourish a desire for life. It is thus a religion without hope. "This condemnation it has incurred by parting with that highest stimulus to human virtue and endeavor, which lies in the belief in a living God." ["Christianity and the Progress of Man," p. 170.]

But the need of hope asserts itself. The craving for something higher than has yet been reached will not down. There is the great heart cry for the fellowship and help of a super-human power. When the Buddhist is led to see that his need is met in the living Christ, he is not far from the kingdom of God.

Now is there a possibility of making over the old religion by lopping off some of its branches, and grafting in scions from the new religion? Wherever Christianity is at work it produces an indirect result in changing the native religions. "In Western India even 25 years ago it was a common thing for most Hindus to say to the Christian missionary, 'Your religion and ours are very different.' Now after contact with Christianity it is far more common to say, 'There is not much difference between your religion and ours.' This great change illustrates what the result on Hinduism is of its contact with Christian teachings. Christian ideas and principles are gradually fulfilling and supplanting Hinduism." ["Missions from the Modern View," p. 170.]

Under the influence of Christianity vigorous efforts have been and are being made to-day to reform the old faiths. The Brahmo-Somaj of India represents a very earnest and intelligent effort to accomplish this. It went far in adopting the best of Christian teaching and customs. But the difficulty with

such reforms is that they leave out the great essential of Christianity, the dying and living Christ, with its appeal to man's emotional nature. Moozoomdar, representing the Brahmo-Somaj at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, after showing the need and difficulty of obtaining personal holiness, told how they seek it. "Devotion only, prayer, direct perception of God's Spirit, communion with Him, absolute self abasement before His majesty, devotional fervor, devotional excitement, spiritual absorption, living and moving in God, that is the secret of personal holiness." ["The World's Parliament of Religions," vol. 1, p. 350.] When Christ is thus left out, Christianity is excluded. Christ represents men as being by nature dead, and says that He came to give life. He says that He is the bread of life and the water of life, and that whosoever believeth in Him shall have everlasting life. The missionary then can recognize no religion as sufficient that does not have as its center the dying and living Christ.

This does not mean that we are to Americanize or Europeanize the other nations, but that we are to give them the spirit which has produced the best that there is in American and European life. Christ did not seek directly to change laws or social institutions. He implanted a spirit which revolutionized all departments of life. Yet many of these changes were brought about very gradually. "The Jews who became Christians had still their Jewish type of Christianity, and the Greeks who became Christians developed a characteristic type of Christianity, and the Romans who became Christians developed a Roman type of Christianity." ["Missions from the Modern View," pp. 86-87.] Yet as time goes by and the gospel leaven works, the errors which separate men go out and the good which draws them together increases. Men everywhere are strikingly alike psychically as well as physically, and have the same spiritual as well as physical needs. The multiplication table is the same for the Hindu as for the American. Astronomy, Botany, Geology mean the same to all races. And so too the best moral and spiritual system for one race is the best for all. But we must not think that all the lesser things that have a place in the structure of human progress are of American or European origin.

The attitude of the religious teacher toward the old religions

may be likened to the attitude of the teacher of modern hygiene, medicine, industrial methods, political science, philanthropy, pedagogy toward the old beliefs and methods. The belief that sickness is the result of the anger of the gods must be removed, and a belief in the efficacy of pure water, and other hygienic conditions inculcated. But while the new scientific spirit must displace the old superstition, it will probably not be best to apply all the requirements of the health department of a modern American city. Native methods may be best employed where they fit in with scientific conceptions. We may well hope that the political systems of the most advanced nations will not be adopted as a whole by any primitive people. There are things in those systems which can be profitably copied. But what is needed is for the new Christian spirit to evolve from the old methods, with suggestions from every nation, a new system superior to all others.

The missionary must learn to tolerate patiently and gracefully inferior conditions, physical, industrial, social, religious, for his own comfort as well as his best usefulness. This we are slow to learn with our Western impatience with things outgrown. Mrs. E. H. Conger says of her experience in China, "When I first went into my kitchen I was heartsick, it seemed to me that there was literally nothing with which to work, not even a range." The cook was interviewed and he explained. A queer brick oven was pointed out which seemed incapable of any good. But by their own peculiar methods excellent results were produced. "At first I tried to have them learn my way of doing, but I have already concluded to tell them what I want, but let them get the results in their own way. I am rarely disappointed." ["Letters from China" by Sarah Pike Conger, p. 7.]

So it is in religious matters. The overzealous Westerner is likely to be impatient with the really inferior methods and ideals of the East, but he must learn that much error must be borne with patiently, until the new converts have reached a more mature stage of development. The missionary who expects the converts to at once put off all the sins of the flesh, and to put on the whole of Christian virtue, will be doomed to bitter disappointment. Not only does the flesh lust more strongly against the Spirit because of ages of carnal ancestry, but it is hard for

the new converts to see that what the missionary calls sins are really wrong, especially those that are most gratifying to the flesh. The constant relapsing of ancient Israel and the need of persistent effort to bring them to a certain standard of religious and moral conduct, has its lesson for those working among people with low spiritual and moral ideals.

Things may be very helpful at a low stage of culture that are not needed at a higher stage. Jesus spoke of divorce serving a need on a lower plane, while it was not to be thus tolerated on the ideal plane. The Confessional may serve a useful purpose with primitive peoples, and later be outgrown. These people feel a need of confiding to the seen. A missionary among the Spokane Indians told the writer of the desire of Christian Indians to confess their sins before the celebration of the Lord's Supper. Nor can there be any doubt that if such a confession is properly guarded, only good can come of it. James, 5:16, says, "Confess therefore your sins one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed." This has been neglected by the Protestant church. The use of the Confessional by modern Psychotherapy shows that not only among primitive people but also in lands called Christian it has a place.

VI. EDUCATIONAL WORK

Along with the appeal to the emotional nature there must be a development of the reason. Unless the reason is educated there will be no permanent uplift through the emotions. Natural science forms a ready means for such development. A little astronomy will overturn many age-old superstitions. The Siamese thought that an eclipse of the moon meant that a great sea monster was trying to swallow it; and they got out all their noise making instruments to frighten it away. When the true explanation of an eclipse is given them, at once their old theory falls. Botany, geology, physics, physiology, even in very elementary form, establish them in their new emotional bias. The uniformity of the laws of nature convinces the intellect as to the unity and immanence of God, and polytheism dies.

This scientific study can also have an important bearing on the subject of hygiene, which is so greatly needed in all non-Christian lands. The evil effects of strong drink, opium, foot-

binding, and other abuses of the body and mind may thus receive a natural and effective treatment.

Art should have a place in the pedagogy of missions. It is noticeable that the children of primitive peoples who are educated in our schools excel in writing, drawing, and other manual work. Samples of drawing of animals, birds, flowers, maps, from schools among the American Indians, the natives of the Hawaiian Islands, and the Philippine Islands, indicate a proficiency that white children do not have.

Artistic work is done also by girls in the homes, basket work, bead work, that is not equaled by the daughters of the whites. The magnificent temples of India and the artistic work of the Japanese show what non-Christian people are capable of achieving in art. And yet the fact remains that most non-Christian art is intolerably crude. The idols of most countries are inartistic, grotesque, and hideous. Even in China this is true.

Dr. G. L. McKay of Formosa regarded it as a part of his mission among the Chinese to train their aesthetic taste. He beautified the grounds of his college for that purpose. After describing the grounds he had planted and beautified he says, "The order and beauty are refreshing, and the fine appearance of things is a help to the college. Chinese people and officials visit, wonder and admire, converts walk around and rejoice. Is such a part of mission work? Yes, most emphatically yes. I for one went out among the heathen to try to elevate them by making known to them the character and purposes of God. Our God is a God of order. He loves beauty, and we should see his handiwork in trees, plants, and flowers; moreover we should endeavor to follow the order which is displayed so visibly throughout the God-created, star-studded universe." ["From Far Formosa," p. 293.]

The place of rhythm in human life suggests a large use of music and the dance in education. Sight and sound follow the laws of rhythm. The heart action is rhythmical. Our ability to concentrate attention follows the same law. The baby is soothed by rocking. The soldier's courage is increased by martial strains. Rhythmical motions are used to produce hypnotism. Primitive peoples often conduct their work according to rhythm, sometimes accompanied by a measured melody. In our religious services we see the effect of music on the emotions. Slowly

measured music produces reverence. Quick music leads to action, and is employed by evangelists and the Salvation Army. Rhythm contributes to the pleasure of reading poetry. It also catches and holds the attention, and by giving thought groups aids the intellect. The dance and beating of drums and cymbals are probably universal among men.

Though most peoples make much of music, usually it is undeveloped. Sometimes it is a rasping sound of only two or three tones. Anyone who has ever heard Chinese singing wonders how so intelligent a people can tolerate such unmusical sounds. But while there is plenty of room for us to improve native music, great care must be exercised lest the loss be greater than the gain.

Thomas Nelson Baker, a negro, has a suggestive series of articles on the negro melodies. He attributes the power of the negro to thrive under conditions where other races die to their melodies. He calls them "an antidote for the awful mental disease of melancholia." The Indian pines under reverses, but the negro, as Carlyle said, will grin and dance and sing. Baker says that the survival of the negro is not a matter of body or intellect but of soul. "The oppressed race that hangs its harp upon the willows and sits down and weeps is committing race suicide." "The negro soul is the negro's only hope in this country, and so sure as he gets his soul educated out of him, so sure is his race doomed to the fate of all other weaker races that have come into contact with the Caucasian race." Again he says, "It was through these melodies that we get that high degree of soul culture that enabled the negro slave to love where others would hate and sing where others would pine away and die."

Negroes educated according to modern methods are led away from their old melodies to more classical music. Here is a danger. Mr. Baker commends Fisk University for educating and not Caucasianizing the negro. The negro tastes and feelings are developed and not suppressed. This writer closes by saying, "The American negro has many needs but his greatest need is leaders who will teach him how to save his soul, and sing and keep singing until the day breaks and the shadows flee away." ["Record of Christian Work," 1908, June, July, Aug.]

Modern missions, in contrast with the earlier missionary meth-

ods, makes much of education. The school is established along with the chapel, and a little later comes the high school and the college. This method has been adopted after seeing the unsatisfactory results of the older method.

The famous missionary Francis Xavier was a man of great zeal and energy. He traveled far, working indefatigably in India and Japan. He prepared a few simple exercises for his converts, the Creed, the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ave Maria, and got large numbers to accept baptism. But beyond the simplest elements of his religion he did not try to go. He aimed rather at securing large numbers of converts than a people advanced in Christian knowledge. The same method was followed by his immediate successors.

But these converts proved very unreliable. For example, in Japan in 1581 there were two hundred churches and 150,000 native Christians. But when European teachers were obliged to withdraw in 1606, there was not sufficient educational force left to carry on the work, and Christianity well nigh died out in the empire.

In contrast with that may be cited the early church in Madagascar. Here the bible was given to the common people, and they were taught to read it. When persecution, the most bitter, came on, and the missionaries were driven out, the converts remained true to their new faith. At the end of twenty-five years "when if not plucked up by the roots it might have been expected to be found feeble and half dead, it was strong and firmly rooted, and among its precious fruits were many of the soldiers, the nobles, and even the royal household." "The Christian population was five-fold greater than when the attempt at extermination began." ["The Miracles of Missions," pp. 185-186.]

Traveling evangelists of the type of W. C. Burns and Francis Xavier do much in familiarizing a people with the character of the foreigner, and arousing a curiosity regarding his message. But the positive knowledge imparted to the people is very small.

Chapel preaching, where people throng at set times as in the days of Paul to hear what "this babbler says," may give a little definite idea of what the missionary is there for. But the best work is done after the public service is over, when interested ones remain with the preacher, who is now teacher,

to talk over the new religion. Dr. John Ross of Manchuria says that in these quiet discussions nine-tenths of his converts are made. From these converts the catechumen classes are formed. Here they can be taught the moral principles of the bible, things that appeal to the common needs of the human soul. Questions of biblical criticism need not be touched. "In the cross of Christ they find an all-satisfying portion: as there they find expounded problems which Confucius refused to touch, which Buddhism and Taoism have answered so as to mislead. In religious truth and as a guide to life, the gospel is all their salvation and all their desire." ["Mission Methods in Manchuria," p. 90.]

Along with Christian teaching much can be made of the native classics and native history and geography. The Chinese classics are vastly superior to the classics of Greece and Rome which are taught in our schools. They are purer and form a better basis for Christian teaching. Some mission teachers will begin a school with only the teaching of the native classics. This disarms prejudice at once. Then later it is an easy step to show the superiority of the Christian classics, and to let Christian light give a new meaning to old truths. Chinese scholars have said that they never understood their own classics till they got the help of Christian teaching. The history of their own country and the biography of their own great men may be of as much value and certainly of greater interest to any people than the history of other lands and the lives of other people. Then incidentally a comparison with these of the history of Christian countries and the lives of its best men and women can be used most effectively to produce thought and conviction.

One missionary says, "When I am talking to a Buddhist and wish to produce in him conviction of sin, I take the commandments with which he is familiar and quote them to him. The ten commandments of Buddhism are as good as the ten commandments given through Moses to produce in man the impression and the conviction that 'by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.' When I want to reach the same end with a Confucianist, I use the law of the five duties growing out of the five relations." ["World Miss. Con., 1910," vol. 4, p. 100.]

Alexander Duff thought that among the Hindoos western science was essential as a means of overthrowing superstition. Among the Chinese on the other hand, western science is less needed than a careful training in distinguishing things that are different. Chinese education gives all its emphasis to a training of the memory. In this they are marvelously successful, but logical accuracy is not thought of. Educated Chinese see no inconsistency in holding views that are mutually incompatible. [Ibid, 110.]

The power of the school to overcome caste, especially in India, may be noticed. It is impossible by moral suasion to get the upper classes to give the lower classes an equal standing with themselves. Even the majority of Christian converts will not recognize this duty. This is true in Christian lands as well as in non-Christian. The teaching of Christ that the way of service is the way of greatness is a lesson that His followers are very slow to learn. But when the lower classes have been given a better education than the higher classes, and are better adapted to hold the higher positions in governmental or other spheres, the being looked down upon is changed to a being looked up to. Here is the real solution of the negro problem in America. As soon as a large number of negroes have risen to the level of or surpassed the whites in general culture and in professional and industrial progress, and have proved themselves worthy of the highest government positions, then the prejudice of color will give way. Thus Christian education is the great leveler of caste bound races.

The need of educating a native ministry is so apparent, and the number of Orientals flocking to our shores in these days so great, that the question naturally arises, "Why not educate those from abroad in our schools, and then send them back as workers among their own people?" Many of those from abroad, after adopting Christianity, have a desire to return and teach in their home land. Would not then a course in Western learning along with the experience of Western living be a fitting preparation for such work? Well meaning people have enthusiastically tried this method of advancing foreign mission work. In a very few cases it has been found eminently successful. Such was that of Neesima of Japan. But with rare exceptions, and these chiefly Chinese and Japanese, such a

course has proved unsatisfactory. Some after being educated have preferred to remain in the land of their education, where they have had successful careers. Others have returned to their homeland, unfitted by their residence abroad for useful work there.

The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions had a very instructive experience in this matter. In the year 1816 they established a school in America for the express purpose of educating young people from heathen communities. The constitution declared its object to be "the education in our own country, of heathen youths, in such manner as, with subsequent professional instruction, will qualify them to become useful missionaries, physicians, surgeons, schoolmasters or interpreters; and to communicate to the heathen nations such knowledge in agriculture and the arts as may prove the means of promoting Christianity and civilization." ["History of the Sandwich Islands Mission" by Rufus Anderson, pp. 11, 12.] To show the cosmopolitan character of the pupils, in 1823, nine pupils were from the Sandwich Islands, fifteen from various Indian tribes, three from China, others from Greece, New Zealand and other places. For some years much interest was taken in the school and high hopes were entertained for its usefulness. But results were disappointing, and the school was discontinued after 1826. Here are a few of the difficulties which were met. "It was not found easy to decide what to do with the youths, after their education was completed. It was now known also that those who had returned to their native lands failed to meet the expectation of their friends. The abundant provision for them while in this country, added to the paternal attentions they everywhere received, had been a poor preparation for encountering neglect and privations among their uncivilized brethren; and the expense of maintaining them, when returned, in any tolerable state of comfort, was much greater than it would have been had they never been habituated to the modes of life in an improved state of society." "A simultaneous effort to train Greek and Armenian youths in this country, for the most part in the ordinary academies and schools, and some of them even in colleges, proved equally unsatisfactory." [Ibid, pp. 13-14.]

At the present time educational work in the mission fields to

a greater or less extent is carried on by all the churches. Graduates of these schools at once take leading positions in political, professional, and industrial lines. Graduates of Robert College, Constantinople, and the Syrian College, Beirut, are permeating Turkey with Christian influence. All over China mission schools are infusing the modern educational spirit, and raising up men who become leaders among their people. Only a few years ago the education of girls in China and Turkey was ridiculed. To-day their education is sought for by all classes.

As to whether day schools or boarding schools are best for the lower races is a question at present before the Indian educators of America. There is variety of opinion and much is said for both.

If the children are taken from their homes to boarding schools, as is done in connection with our Indian work, there is secured regular attendance upon the classes, which is impossible with day schools. Parents take so little interest in the education of their children that they keep them at home a large part of the time. The influence of the home working against the influence of the school is also avoided by this means. At large boarding schools there can be much better facilities for industrial work, than is possible at small day schools.

On the other hand there is danger of the child being educated away from the home by this method, and made incapable of identifying himself properly with the life of his people; or if he does the latter, he may throw off all the good he got at the school, and thus nullify the patient work of years. In the day school, conducted near the pupil's home, there is close contact maintained between the child and the home, and there is also the touch of the teacher felt in the home, which is invaluable. There is not a storing up by the pupil of many things to be put in practice around the home at some future time; but he goes home every night to put in practice the suggestions of the day. The pupil is given a lesson in hygiene or improved methods of gardening. He goes home to see how it works. The teacher calls at the home and talks over with the parents the things that the child is learning, and may suggest ways of applying these principles in and around the home. The home of the teacher is also an important factor, which is missed in the boarding school system. Nor is there any place where the

young child can usually get as much love and care and permanent good as in his parent's home.

The great difficulty in carrying on day schools is to obtain suitable teachers in sufficient numbers. A man and wife are best adapted for this work. Sometimes in mission schools two ladies serve well, one acting as teacher and the other as home maker. In some places there is a third who acts as visitor. Thus they are companions for one another, and escape the excessive loneliness of one solitary teacher among a people of alien customs and sympathies.

As the writer visited some of the Indian reservations and government schools, and talked with teachers and missionaries about them, the plan followed in some places of combining the two methods commended itself to him. Among the Pima Indians at Sacaton, Arizona, there are day schools for the smaller children, and the government boarding school for the older ones. The boarding school is sufficiently near the homes to keep the children in touch with their people and to allow of frequent intercourse. Among the Papagoes at Tucson, Arizona, the work is similarly conducted, though here the boarding school is controlled by the Presbyterian church and the day school by the government. At both these places results were clearly superior to those found under other conditions, and seemed to justify this combination of day and boarding schools on the same reservation.

SUMMARY

Though there are a multitude of varying religions in the world, there are certain characteristics common to them all. This is at least in part owing to their having a common origin in the nature of man. As men resemble one another physically and psychically so they do religiously, and the same religious stimulus will produce the same or a like response. All primitive peoples offer prayer to their deities. Thanksgiving and other festivals are observed among widely separated races. The priesthood, sacrifices, fasting and other institutions of religion are found among most peoples. Stories in the Christian's bible bear a striking resemblance to many embodied in other religions. Thus it is easy to adapt Christianity to the conceptions of primitive peoples.

Many traits of lower races may be retained and allowed to co-exist with those that have been regarded as distinctively Christian. Such an addition of primitive beliefs and habits may even produce a superior character. Many Eastern characteristics off-set Western defects, and so should be carefully utilized. Care must be exercised by the religious teacher lest he discourage worthy traits in the primitive man, simply because they are not according to Western usage and modes of thought.

A little effort suffices to find a point of contact between the religion of the missionary and that of the people among whom he works. All recognize a deity and a possible connection between the human and the divine. All value truth, recognize sin and some of its results, have a desire for reconciliation with God, and want a clearer light on the dark problems of life. Many religious customs and teachings are sufficiently alike to form a point of contact between them.

The conception of a divine revelation is very familiar, and when one goes among primitive peoples with a message that he claims to have come from God he readily gets a hearing. Story telling attracts hearers. Not condemning false teaching but the simple telling of bible stories catches and holds the attention. Such also leads to conviction for sin and a desire for better things. Example and illustration are always better than logical argument. Primitive peoples have no difficulty in accepting the miraculous, and are familiar with the conception of God being manifest in the flesh. Care is needed to avoid wounding the feelings. Religious prejudices must be respected. Truths regarding the deeper needs of the soul will always interest and attract.

When and how should distinctly Christian doctrine be presented? The experience of mission fields gives valuable testimony regarding this, and goes to show that both intellectually and emotionally primitive men can connect with the simpler Christian doctrines and modes of life, without any later bad results being in evidence. Christian doctrine meets a felt need of the most untutored of men. Such moral teachings as those of Confucius and Buddha form a good preparation for the gospel, as they show a need that only Christ can supply. No religion is sufficient without the living Christ, but Christ

can use a great variety of thought and custom in adapting Himself to human needs.

Missionary administration must give science and art a leading place. Science overturns in an easy and natural way age old superstitions. Art appeals to all men and has an elevating influence. Music is found everywhere and is of high educational value. Without educational work purely religious teaching fails to give stability to thought and character. There must be a training of the intellect in addition to having the emotions influenced and the conscience affected. The native classics and biography can be used to good advantage. Schools can remove evils like caste better than most other things. Having schools located among a people is better than taking the students to a foreign land to be educated. Day-schools and boarding-schools each have advantages, but where both are conducted together best results are produced.

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THE REALITY OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

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The existence of religious phenomena few or none dispute. A classification in broad terms makes practicable studies from various points of view upon this data. Not so many, however, have gone into the question of the reality of the experience as a distinct experience, having a place of its own in reality. As a contribution toward this, an analytic study of the religious consciousness is necessary. Such a study is that which follows.

The first question which arises is that of the relation of religion to the will. Can man control it? As a preliminary answer, man can control religion to the extent of being able to seek or not to seek it. Religious influences, as they lie about us from infancy, are not here in question, for these influences do not constitute our experience of religion. When a boy grows up, it only too frequently happens that he deliberately rejects and turns from those influences, and ceases to have the experiences that he would if he remained true to the teaching of his childhood. He can shut those influences out of his life. By the influence of the companions whose company he seeks, a new set of influences and experiences take the place of the old. On the other side, a man brought up with one type of Christian teaching, and knowing religion through some one type of religious experience, may deliberately, because of some feeling of inadequacy or unrest, seek a fuller or different experience. He may not have clearly in mind just what it is he seeks, and he may never find rest, but he will by his own will change his religious experience. All these cases are cases where the experience is known in some form to the man who seeks to change it. The question might be raised whether a man who knew nothing of the experience, except by hearsay, could by seeking find it. The teaching that no man by searching can find out God seems to deny this. Whatever the correct exegesis of that text may be, we have to bear in mind that we are not at this point saying that in the religious experience man does find out God. That problem will trouble us enough when we are ready for it. Now

we are asking the question without regard to its consequences, seeking only the correct answer, whatever it may be. Yet seeing its possible importance, we must consider it. As far as we can define terms, a man can deliberately seek and find this experience. To one who has seen the devotion, especially in public worship, of some loyal church member, or has seen some evidence of loyal service to man which seems to come from the religious experience of the one under observation, then it is possible for the observer, wishing to induce in himself the same spirit of worship or of service, to seek and to put himself under influences that will bring to him the same experience. It is as possible as the effort, which may be crowned with success, of an admirer of art to attain some appreciation of true artistic spirit. Consequently, man can, by effort, at least partly change and control his religious experience.

The consequences of this may be stated in the form that man can induce the religious experience, or can bring about a new form of the experience as he wishes. In so far he can create the experience. It is not something that will hide from him, and come to light only of its own accord. Not all religion, therefore, is of the type of sudden conversion, or what a surface reading of the New Testament seems to give as St. Paul's experience. Religion takes normally and as a possibility its place among the other experiences of life, whose lack we can correct by seeing the experience. As we can seek to gain the experience of heat or cold, so we can seek religion. To this extent it is like ordinary perception.

The case to which we referred, of a boy turning from home influences and with that, from religion, might really fall under our next heading. As man can change, so he can reject religion. Yet as this problem is so much wider than this particular instance, it will be well not to dwell on this one case. The real point at issue is whether religion is so all-powerful that whether a man will or no he must submit to it. It is to be conceded that he may not act according to its impulses, and yet he may have the experience. The boy leaving home can not take out of his life that home experience, even though he prevent any return of it in the future. If the conception of the religious experience is that of the incoming into man of God's all powerful grace, which a man may disobey, but which he can not reject

as an experience, then he is not free to reject it. A man may shut his eyes and refuse to see, and be able under ordinary conditions to refuse to look at the scene before him. If he cannot do this in religion, then religion is a different sort of experience. We must remember that it is not necessary to claim that when once the experience is upon a man, that then he can not avoid it. When a man's eyes are open, very frequently he can not help seeing. Yet if his attention is distracted, and he is thinking of something else, he may not perceive the scene before him in any conscious way. It would seem that at times, at least, religion is like this. While if a man lets himself go, his religious consciousness may become more acute, whether emotionally or intellectually, he may ordinarily, by turning the current of his thoughts in other directions, prevent the coming into consciousness of this experience. In a crowd a man may remain impervious to the mob spirit if his interests are centered elsewhere, while if he lets himself be swayed by the mob, he may go the full distance of approval of their acts, and share in their experiences. Such is the case with religion. The spirit which a man brings to worship, all devotional writers recognize, is crucial for the experience of worship. If he comes in a prayerful spirit, the full experience may come to him, but if he is distraught, the words of the familiar prayers fall meaningless on his ears. So by rejecting the religious experience we mean that its entrance into consciousness is dependent on what is already there. The man may, by allowing other interests to precede, shut out religion.

Religion is therefore not always so compelling that it can force its way into consciousness against a man's will. Whatever bearing the doctrine of election may have on this point, if it means that God forces those whom he elects to salvation to have sense of assurance of his presence, we must question it closely. It may not mean this, but if it does, the doctrine must be changed to allow for the rejection by man of the religious experience. The arguments on which predestination is based start from the idea of God. Since we are trying to arrive at the idea of God as he may prove to make himself known in experience, our discussion must take logical precedence, and if we are wrong we must be met on our own ground. If we find, as we have, evidence that man may refuse and

succeed in the refusal, by staying away from religious influences, or by opposing other interests, then any doctrine of God's nature must be made to explain this. It can not succeed by dogmatically denying facts. If God is made known to man in an experience which man may reject, then we can not define the religious experience as always prevailing. There is this to be said, though, that we are not seeking to prove that man may always be able to reject religion. Just as there are times when a man may not refuse to see what is before him, under the impulse of surprise, perhaps, so there may be moments when, taken by surprise, a great wave of religious consciousness may sweep over him before he can make the attempt to shut it out. Still this does not make religion any different from vision. Again, religion takes its place in this regard among normal experiences.

As man can by seeking find religion, and as he can reject it when it comes to him unsought, so when he is conscious of religion he is able to modify it. Even St. Paul, whose experience we have been taking as a type of the irresistible religious experience, tells us that he was not disobedient to the heavenly vision. (Acts 26:19.) He also tells us that the expression of the religious state, such as "speaking with tongues" should be controlled. (I Cor. 14.) This is not merely a matter of the expression of religion. Just as religion may be shut out if what is already in consciousness holds the attention too strongly, so it can be obscured in consciousness by other ideas and experiences. As a man grows older those things which enshrined for him religion come either to mean more to him, or else gradually lose their meaning. The tendency, which many have pointed out, for conversion to occur near or at the age of adolescence shows the very considerable influence of a man's nature and surroundings upon his religious experience. That it may also be modified by direct effort of the will is true in at least some cases. A man who deliberately makes the effort by prayer to increase and build up in himself a sense of God's presence, is changing his consciousness of religion. Whatever truth there may be in the emphasis on sacraments and outward forms made by the great mass of Christendom rests on this possibility. The church teaching insists that through the outward form man can change the inner experience. Men set apart one day out of seven in the

belief that only by forming deliberate habits can one continue, ordinarily, in touch with divine forces. Only so will most men continue to have any consciousness of religion that is at all definite. Man may, therefore, if he will, modify his consciousness of religion.

The results of this possibility of modification are to differentiate religion somewhat from perception. What a man sees he sees, and while he can be indifferent to some details, he can not really change those details. Blue remains blue, if he sees it at all, or if it changes, the change is not due to his willing it. It is evident that we are dealing with something more like insight, or artistic perception. As a man may increase his ability to perceive beauty, so he may, we have found, increase his consciousness of religion. This results in the conclusion that religion is more a matter of internal mental life, and perhaps has to do, as art does, with values, rather than with material objects. It at least opens the way to this result. It does not prove that such a result shuts out the possibility that in the religious experience it may be some new type of objects that are perceived. The importance of the possibility of modification lies rather in the question of the relation to the will. We are plainly dealing with something that is man's own experience, over which he exercises some control. It is not an entirely passive experience which comes to him like a dream, going its own way independently of his will, but something which claims from him the necessity of exercising on it his will power. It thus comes into the real world of action. Not merely real because it is in consciousness, it is also real because man may make it the object of desire. In this it does not stand alone among human experiences. As a man may desire and work to gain a consciousness of history or science, so he may desire and work to gain a consciousness of religion. We are dealing with an experience which is vital, which seems to many among men something to be striven for with all their strength. The anchorite in the desert felt religion to be very real when he gave up all for it. Not only, then, do we find it really in consciousness, we also find it known and real in so far that men consciously seek to bring it to fuller focus in their lives.

These three points that we made are arguments only for the possibility for control by man's will. In many cases we find

religion proving itself above such control. In human life religion came, both for the race and the individual so early that we are not conscious of any will to receive or reject it. It is a part of our life. This is very often true also of those sudden crises which to many are the main examples to be studied. Whatever may have been the underlying train of events when St. Paul was struck blind on the Damascus road, it came to him as a totally unexpected experience. The same is true of St. Augustine, and many who could be mentioned. Every conversion, even if it has been long desired, comes with this shock of surprise. Frequently also, on the emotional side, there arises in man's mind during worship a type of consciousness of which he has had no forwarning, and which often it is difficult to keep under control, much less to put out of his mind. The revival spirit sweeps one away sometimes even when the sober will is somewhat opposed. The quieter influences of religion, too, affect a man without his effort. The solemn service often at the most unexpected times brings to the worshipper a greater depth of feeling than he has known before. Also, at times, when he seeks that feeling, he can not find it. All other things may seem as usual, yet the experience does not come. Whether it be sin, or lack of faith does not matter, man can not always, by simply willing it, get religion. In both ways, therefore, in coming without man's will, and at times in eluding that will, religion proves itself above complete control by man.

So far this gives to religion the right by the second of our tests to be called an experience. It is not simply a creature of man's will. This also differentiates religion from morality. Morality concerns entirely man's will to act. If it came upon him without his will, his action would not be free, and so, not moral. But religion, in coming or staying independently of man, is shown to be different. It is therefore not dealing with values as morality deals with them. This point is of importance because it leaves open the question of the origin of the experience. If it were a product of man's own will, then it could not possibly reveal objects beyond man. As it is not, in its origin, man's creation, we may find that it does come from a source outside of man. It may be more like perception than like fantasy.

A man may reject religion, but reckon with it he must. In

rejecting it he must recognize it as a force which he can keep out of his life, but not one which he can destroy by the mere fiat of his will. The methods by which he succeeds in thus barring it show this. When he turns from religious associations, and avoids church going, or refuses to go to the church where the experience which he shuns holds sway, he recognizes the impulse to the experience as something exterior to himself. When he shuts it out of his life by centering his attention and energy on other and conflicting things, he does not control it as he does his desires, but as he does the view of a scene he does not wish to see. He erects barriers against it, so that it can not enter. There are times when a man deliberately stifles any appearance of religion within him by sheer force of will. He forces his attention away from it, and sees that no expression of its presence goes forth into action. Yet even here, the most that can be said for will power is that it called forth something which requires the utmost power to destroy. Man may, at times, if the experience is not strong, turn from it as he does from a dream. This proves only that religion may not always be a real experience, that it shades over into something else. Yet we have to notice that even here we use the expression, "he turns from religion." What he does, in our ordinary idea, is to refuse to give religion a place. It is not that he refuses to create it. He may turn from it as from a dream, but we do not usually think of him as putting it aside as he does a possible action. A dream is in some sense, as not completely controllable by man, an experience. So our analogy has not hurt the claim of religion to be an experience. There is still the possibility that it is more like a waking dream, called forth or not as a man wills. This may be true in some cases, and rejection not involve giving to religion any other reality than that of a rejected possibility. This does not, however, affect those other cases where its rejection implies that it is something to be struggled against, if it is to be destroyed. It is possible that religion may not always be what we have described as an experience. But those cases where it is not, where it remains a rejected possibility, are not cases of the presence of religion but of its absence. Where we have religion, frequently even in rejecting it, a man finds it to be real, and that it makes its effect on him despite his will. When a man who has fought against all "tenderness," and sought to immerse himself in the

struggle for self-betterment, finds that sometimes, in spite of his growing coldness, he is tempted to do some act of kindness, when he realizes, as Dicken's Christmas story portrays, that he has not conquered, he knows that in rejecting religion he has not destroyed it. In spite of him it has proved its claim to existence.

Because it can not be blotted from existence by the mere arbitrary will of a man, religion may at times, even if not always, be a real experience. It is real in the sense of exerting, whether passively or actively does not matter here, some force in opposition to being willed out of existence. This does not mean that it is necessarily of the type of the will, nor does it prove at once that it is identical with the social will. For perception gives cases where, especially if they are painful, we find an experience persisting in spite of all attempts to ignore it. As this quality of opposition to control is a characteristic of any real experience, we have not proved more than that religion is such, by showing that at times it resists the individual will. Again, it does not necessarily imply that we are dealing with a power in man alien to his nature, and therefore of divine origin. All that we have done is to find the way still open to discover the source of the experience.

The last of the three points which we examined in regard to the power of the individual over his religious experience was that of the ability of the believer to modify his experience. We need not discuss the fact that not always can he so modify it. That is really included in our conclusion that he can not always reject it. If he can not always reject it, then there are limits to his power of modifying it. The more important thing is to realize that religion can modify the rest of life, or change the will itself. Of this we need little proof. The story of the life of John Bunyan, to take a classic instance, illustrates the great power of religion to change the whole course of life. The Inasmuch mission in Philadelphia, founded to help men who have fallen into evil so far that only despair remains, by men who have themselves been in that state, and who attribute the change to religion, is a modern instance. Again and again, though by no means always, has conversion, the coming into man of religion for what he regards as the first time, meant a turning point in his life. To say that while the change is attributed to religion, yet it was really due to something else, is not a valid objection.

What is in consciousness is that the religious state and the change are related as cause and effect. It might be shown that the religious state was only itself the result of a third something which produced the change. This is to go behind the experience in a way which we have not as yet attempted. As we are not attempting to say how the experience has its effect, one theory here is as useful as another, and no theory of how it works takes away the fact that some change is effected in connection with the religious experience. Religion has taken this definite place in the real world. The consciousness of religion is a consciousness of something that is able to affect and change man's life. It can exercise power over him as well as he over it.

This gives us the complete result necessary to asserting that the religious experience is a real experience. As the experience of pleasure or pain from the perception of some object can affect us, so can religion. It therefore takes its place alongside of perception as a mode of experience. It can be focal in consciousness, and by its power to change consciousness can claim that focus for itself, often suddenly, as in conversion, sometimes in the quiet power of religious habit. It is an experience that can affect and hold its place in consciousness. Yet in all this it remains possible to man to control it. It is his experience. It is therefore real by any test that we can apply. Real because it is in consciousness, as a possible object to man's will, as bringing power to bear on man, and, in the combination of these qualities, being as truly an experience as any experience of life. Religion therefore is real. It is not the idle creation of man, nor the by-product of some powerless unimportant nook, to be disregarded as of little moment. Experience itself, since this is also truly an experience, can not be adequately described without reference to this. Religion must be explained before we can rest satisfied with our understanding of life or reality.

In thus giving religion a place in the real world, we have also made possible a definition of that place. We find that at times the consciousness of religion can be very definite, that it has often definite direction in that it moves men to definite things, and that it very frequently can be dated; also, that it has very often very distinct emotional color. Yet we also find that at other times what we call equally exactly "the consciousness of religion" is indefinite as to its object,

has no one direction to the resulting impulse, or works out in conflicting directions, that with great bodies of men the time element does not enter into the experience, and that the emotional tone is variable, sometimes religion being passive, and sometimes active. It has however further become evident that while some of the categories which apply to perception apply here also, many do not. The chief difference is found in the fact that definiteness does not seem to be a characteristic of religion. From a survey of the field no clue is given us by which we may be entitled to conclude that the indefinite forms are less typical. As far as ordinary presumption goes, it is equally the indefinite, especially some of the mystical experiences, which give us the typical forms. Perception must be definite in all its clearer forms. Man strives, if his perception is indistinct, to obtain clearer and more certain knowledge. If we see indistinctly, we approach nearer to the object, or consult an eye specialist. With religion, not only is such an attempt not usually made, but we have from many the idea that to make it distinct would destroy the religious element. Such would seem to be valid interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of the abolition of desire. This applies, it is to be noted, not only to definiteness as to the content perceived more or less passively, but also to the emotional content. It is therefore evident that if we are to do justice to religion in all its forms we can not define it as we would perception. Definiteness can not enter as a term in our description. Religion therefore stands apart not only from perception, but from the moral forces, and also from emotion. It may be connected with any or all of these, but not necessarily so, so far as our study has thus far shown. We have to be careful, therefore, as we go on, that we do not carry over into our study of religion ideas and presuppositions based on our conception of any of these other kinds of experience. Religion must be judged by itself, for it is unlike the other ordinary types of consciousness.

Our discussion has had to do with the relation of religion to man's will. Again we found a great indefiniteness. At times found when sought, rejected at man's pleasure, and modified by him as he willed, within certain limits; in other and no less typical cases, it came without being sought, or when sought did not come, it came even when the man sought to exclude it, and it resisted change by man's will, but instead

changed him according to its own working. Again it does not fall under the usual categories, as it refused to be found within the limits set perception, morality, and emotion. In coming to this conclusion, in view of the fact that it has a certain independence over against man's will, it was difficult not to use language that would imply that in the religious experience we have to deal with another will. As we were careful to point out, the bare fact of a certain independence of the will was common to any real experience. Yet such experiences also point, usually, to some source outside of the individual will. What a man perceives is either his will, or something that is not his will. Religion is very evidently, since it resists his will, not identical with it. It therefore takes its place in the other class of experiences. Its likeness to perception differentiates it from the products purely of men's desires. In passing, it might be interesting to note that this would seem to discourage attempts to get men to desire religion, and the description of heaven, etc., in terms to awaken desire. So far as the desire is met by religion, and no more, religion is not religion. It is not what we have found people to mean by the term. It is an experience which opens to man a realm which he can not completely control. Since, however, it is not a perception of that realm, for it is not in its nature the same as perception, we can take it as an ordinary way of gaining knowledge about a new field. We can not go to religion as we would to our sense of hearing, or our knowledge of emotion to learn of this new region of life. We have to go in another direction. It is this difference not likeness to perception, that makes our present inquiry into the form of the experience necessary. The primary object of a study of any experience must be to gain more knowledge of that experience. The fact that on the very threshold we are balked by the seeming inconsistencies of religion forces us to avoid the direct attack. Before we can adequately describe this experience, much less answer any question as to its value, we have to further examine it in order to find in what its possible value may consist. We have to gain fuller knowledge of the experience. Our result so far has had this value, that it has given to religion a place in real experience, and has raised problems beyond what might at first appear.

CONCERNING THE RELIGION OF CHILDHOOD

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This paper is a preliminary report of a study being conducted by students of Waynesburg College and the writer, to ascertain the ideas of children on some of the fundamental conceptions of religion, together with some of the religious feelings and religious activities of childhood. Two seniors, Mr. J. Douglas Gold and Miss Erma Tennant under the writer's direction collected the data of the present paper. The study so far has included 25 subjects, from 10 to 12 years old. The children were from the families of the mercantile, professional, laboring and leisure classes. Of the 25, 15 were church members, of various Protestant denominations, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Christian, etc., with at least one Catholic; the remaining 10 were non-church members.

The method employed has consisted in asking the children, separately, a list of questions, and then by cross-questioning them and by further familiar conversation to make sure that their answers should be as definite as is possible for them. As controls, all were questioned in a similar manner, and none were given much time to think or any opportunity to obtain any aid or suggestion in answering the questions. We have endeavored to learn as nearly as possible the children's religious conceptions as gathered from their own experience and general teachings, rather than any ideas they might have received from some chance suggestion of parent or teacher, and which they might chance to remember.

The following list of questions were asked:

1. Do you believe there is a God? 2. If so, who or what is God? 3. Who or what is Jesus? 4. Are you afraid of God?
5. a, Do you like to attend church? b, Do you like to attend Sunday school? c, Which do you prefer? 6. Where is God?
7. Are you a member of church? a, Do you think church members are better than others? b, Do you think they ought to be better? c, Are you better now than you were before you united

with the church? 8. Do you ever make God any promises? 9. Are you afraid to die? 10. What is the Holy Ghost?

The first question, "Do you believe there is a God," appeared to be by far the most easily answered. Each child was reminded that of course he had been taught that there exists a Being called God, and that he had no doubt heard a great deal about God, but that what was most desired in his answer was that he should give his own beliefs and ideas upon the subject. Apparently none of the children had reached the age where even the beginnings of doubts could creep into their minds. Their answers were immediate, positive affirmations of their belief in God's existence. In most cases, there did not seem to be any clear-cut reasons for such belief. Seemingly, this belief of theirs was of an instinctive nature or perhaps partly the result of training, and its beginnings not comprehended by the child itself. We might state that 25 other children studied with another list of questions also each affirmed their belief in God's existence. So of 50 children examined on this point, all believed in the existence of God.

In the answers to question 2, "who or what is God," we find a wide divergence in replies. However, two general conceptions gradually made themselves apparent; namely, a spiritual and a physical conception of God. To those by whom He was conceived as a spirit, there did not seem to be quite so clear an idea as to those by whom He was conceived as anthropomorphic. The latter appeared to have in some cases remarkably clear ideas on the subject. One subject described God as a man, above medium size, old, with flowing white beard, in a long white robe, etc. Several others pictured with almost equal vividness His supposed physical characteristics. In rating the children on general conception, we did not consider how nearly their ideas of God approached the generally accepted one, but only estimated how clear-cut and distinct was the idea, whatever it might be. E. g., if a child showed a very incorrect conception of God, but could explain how He appeared to him clearly, he was rated higher than the child who happened upon the truer conception, though he had no personal ideas whatever concerning the matter.

We found in the children studied, the vividness of the conception of the church members to be in the proportion of 2,

while the vividness of the conception of the non-members was in the proportion of 9, or much higher. This might appear to show that the non-members had the better idea of God; but possibly we find it explained when we turn to the formative conception. Here again we may make use of a threefold classification: Those who conceive God as a spirit, those who conceive Him as a man and those who have little or no idea of the nature of God. Here we find the church members relatively much in the lead; those studied having the spiritual conception in the proportion of three to one in the non-members, while they had the less correct physical conception in the proportion of six, to seven in the non-members.

All this might tend to indicate that the church members, under the influence of their training, were beginning to lose their original child's lower conception of God and to be tending to the spiritual conception.

As to the relative prevalence of the spiritual and physical conceptions of God and of Jesus, God was conceived as a spirit in the proportion of 7 to Jesus as a spiritual being 5. As a man, God was conceived in the proportion of 2 to Jesus being so conceived in the ratio of 3.

In answer to the question, "Are you afraid of God," 18 of the 25 subjects answered with a direct negative, 4 that they were afraid of Him, 1 "rather afraid," 1 "sometimes afraid," and one we set down as doubtful.

In the matter of preference respectively for church service and Sunday school, the results show indications of a preference for the simple services of the latter by a proportion of 13.6 to 10. This is as we might expect.

As to whether the child church members should be better than the non-members, the former in the proportion of 7 to 1, said they should be better. The non-members in the proportion of 4 to 3 affirmed that they were just as good as the members. The church members also were unanimous that there had been a change for the better in their lives, *i. e.*, their habits, etc., since uniting with the church.

As to the relative proportion of boys and girls from 10 to 12 years old who unite with the church, our study tends to indicate that girls are the more numerous. Of those herein reported,

the proportion is 4 to 3. This result appears to tend to confirm Starbuck's conclusion that girls are converted at an earlier age than boys.

We had discovered very early in our questioning that everyone of our subjects said prayers, and that they not only said rote, committed prayers, but that they made personal petitions for desired objects and ends. Our eighth question was to learn the nature of these prayers, and particularly if the subjects in praying ever made God any personal promises, *i. e.*, does a child who desires something ask God for it and promise Him that if the petition be granted the subject will for a certain period of time remain a paragon of virtue, etc.? To this question there could be but two answers, yes or no. We received the "yes" answer approximately in the proportion of 3 to 1 for the "no" answer. The church members appeared to lead slightly in the affirmative answers.

The last question, concerning the personality of the Holy Spirit, as was expected brought the least definite response of any of the ten. To this question we required one of two answers. (a) an idea, meaning any idea the child might advance, (b) no idea, or the inability to express any view on the subject. The answers "some idea" to the "no idea" answers were in the proportion of 1 to 3. We might add that the "some idea" answers by the church members were in the proportion of 7 to 3 in the non-church members, while the "no idea" answers were in the proportion respectively of 2 to 3.

The answers given to the last question were very diverse, and it may not be amiss to quote a few of them:

A. Girl, 11 years old, church member, said the Holy Spirit is the "Father of All."

B. Girl, 11 years old, church member, said Holy Spirit and God are the same.

C. Boy, 11 years old, non-member, had apparently heard the Trinity dogma explained and gave a fairly good answer as to it being one of the three figures of the Godhead.

D. Boy, 11 years old, church member, answered "Some kind of a spirit," but had little or no conception beyond that.

E. Girl, 12 years old, church members, gave an excellent explanation of the triune dogma of God with the Holy Ghost as one of the three figures.

F. Girl, 12 years old, church member, answered, "The spirit of God," but could give no further explanation.

G. Girl, 12 years old, church member, gave the clearest explanation of any subject, and showed a surprising understanding of the Trinity dogma.

H. Boy, 11 years old, non-member, "Same as God;" no further idea.

It would appear that few of the subjects examined had received much instruction as to the personality of the Holy Spirit. We may add that an item of interest here is that subject G, who gave excellent answers to all the questions of the list submitted, was a member of the Roman Catholic church. Her answers were in accordance with the doctrines of that faith.

From the comparatively small number of subjects studied thus far, we are not warranted in making many generalizations, or in drawing many definite conclusions. A syllabus of present results is as follows:

1. Children of the classes studied believe in the existence of God.

2. Two different conceptions by them of God's nature emerge from the study (a) a spiritual conception, (b) a physical conception. A third class of children appear to have little or no idea as to the nature of God.

3. There are indications that the spiritual idea of God is more common in the minds of the child church members than in the minds of non-members.

4. There are indications that children of 10 to 12 are more apt to conceive God as a spirit than Jesus as a spirit. They also appear more prone to have the idea that Jesus is in the form of a man than in spiritual form.

5. There are indications that most children of the ages studied do not fear God, while a smaller proportion do.

6. There are also indications that children from 10 to 12 years of age prefer the Sunday school to church service.

7. Child church members are almost unanimous that they should be better than non-members. Only a small proportion of the latter believe that the former should be better.

8. The study thus far, tends to confirm Starbuck's conclusion that girls are converted at an earlier age than boys.

9. It is evident that some children in their petitions ask God

for things, and make Him certain promises in case their prayers are answered. Some do not make promises.

10. It would appear that fewer children of these ages have an idea of the Holy Spirit than of either God or Jesus. Also, that their ideas of its personality are more vague than are their ideas of God and Jesus.

Of other results, we are not warranted thus far in stating even indications.

LITERATURE, BOOKS, ETC.

Our knowledge of Christ; an historical approach. By LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER. New York, Holt, 1914. 166 p.

The author has given us an admirable little book which shows an excellent acquaintance with the recent literature on the subject, is also liberal, and cannot fail to impress those for whom it was especially designed, viz., Protestants who are brought up in severely conservative atmosphere and have to re-adjust their views "for the very sake of that Christian faith we long for and need." It is designed also for many others "who have turned their backs upon the church and even upon all religion, because they have not been helped to a new view, which would have shown them that such desertion is unnecessary, harmful, and wrong." The author says he writes solely to "advance the interests of Christ's kingdom among men" and to those who deem His work negative his only response is that his conclusions form a basis on which he has been "able to maintain a vital, positive faith in Christ as Master, Lord and Saviour. This basis has set me free to see and to hold before myself the simplicity of the gospel." The first chapter is on the sources of our information concerning Jesus, where the author tells us how meagre it is, why the gospels were written so late, and prompted by what needs, how they came into being, Matthew's logia, the Virgin birth, resurrection, miracles, and teachings of Jesus. The second chapter is devoted to His life, including early influences, His call, chronology, difficulties, the last journey to Jerusalem, the crucifixion and resurrection. The third is devoted to His teachings, and the fourth to the question of His divinity. Altogether it is an admirable introduction to the present status of the subject for those who have in them the instinct of religion.

The restored New Testament. By JAMES MORGAN PRYSE. N. Y., J. M. Pryse, 1914. 819 p.

The author seems to represent a type of progressive thought, not exactly theosophy or new thought, but a kind of revived gnosticism. He assumes that there is a secret body of knowledge contained in the New Testament, especially in the gospels, and also holds that it is connected with astronomical, not to say astrological, ideas. He has not availed himself to any great extent of the generally recognized current authorities, but has approached the subject in his own way. First he has translated large parts of the gospel in an original way. For instance, he

begins Matthew I as follows "To the sacred plain came Johanes, hierophant of the lustral rite, he who elucidated the purifying virtues to the four grades of men, who are the head, heart, the soul and the seed of every nation." His message was "Cleanse you both mind and heart for the realm of the starry spheres has drawn near." Not only that but the author has given us a poetic version of the gospels, entitled "The Crowning of Jesus" (pages 152-238). The gospel of John he says is a mystical romance, overworked and historicized into a crude harmony with the synoptics. In another poem (pages 403-461) he has described an initiation as recorded in the sacred zodiacal language by a seer, or in other words, he has given us a mystical version of the apocalypse with his own interpretations. There are further sections on the letters of Paul, the good tidings according to Mark, Matthew and Luke. The original translations and the comments upon these constitute the chief merit of the book.

Miracles in the light of science and history. By A. HUELSTER. Chicago, Illinois. Published by the Author. 164 p.

After an introduction, the author discusses miracles and faith, and their relations to science, the objections raised against them, viz., that they are impossible because opposed to natural law, are not sufficiently attested by competent witnesses, and that miracles no longer occur. In other chapters he discusses miracles and one's view of the world, their true meaning, greatest of miracles, and finally miracles and historic facts. The author has evidently not only studied but wrestled hard with himself to reach a definite conclusion upon this critical subject, and has evidently felt keenly the force of objections that have long been urged against the miraculous element in the New Testament. His faith, however, in miracles is apparently unwavering, although he often does not state his own position as clearly as might be desired.

The psychological aspects of Christian experience. By RICHARD H. K. GILL. Boston, Sherman, French & Co., 1915. 104 p.

The writer, a clergyman of considerable experience, here puts down his observations and reflections on sin, awakening, penitence and repentance, conversion and regeneration, the development of Christian strength, apostasy, the emotions of religious life, conscience, illusions and hallucinations.

Spiritual healing. By W. F. COBB. London, G. Bell & Sons, 1914. 312 p.

The author describes healing first among primitive people, then in the Greek world, early Christianity, the middle ages, modern times, Christian Science, spiritual healing and the body, dreams, suggestion, mass suggestion, with conclusions and finally a reasoned defense of Christianity.

The truth of Christianity; being an examination of the more important arguments for and against believing in that religion, compiled from various sources by W. H. TURTON. 8th ed. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913. 636 p.

The first part discusses natural religion; the universe must have had a creator and be designed by him. Man is free. God takes an interest in his welfare and therefore might make revelation. The second part treats the Jewish religion, its origin and history being attested by miracles and prophecies, therefore the Jewish religion is probably true. The last part is devoted to the Christian religion. It is credible, the four gospels are genuine, as shown by internal and external testimony, by the evidence of the Acts, therefore the resurrection of Christ is probable, the failure of other explanations increases this probability and other miracles of the New Testament are probably true, Jewish prophecies confirm Christianity, so does the character of Christ and the history of Christianity and the creeds are deducible from the New Testament, therefore the truth of the Christian religion is extremely probable.

The Books of the Apocrypha, their Origin, Teaching and Contents. By W. O. E. OESTERLEY. Robert Scott, London, 1914.

Much attention has been paid to the Books of the Apocrypha by biblical scholars of late years and this useful compilation gives us the results of their labors. It will be most welcome to those who feel that the strict line once drawn between the canonical and the uncanonical books led them to be read much less than they deserved. Yet the Books of the Apocrypha are to be found bound in with many old Bibles, particularly in those used in English parish churches one or two hundred years ago. Lovers of Pepys will recall the entry under date of Feb. 5, 1660, "To their church in the afternoon, and in Mrs. Turner's pew. . . . A stranger preached a poor sermon, and so I read over the whole book of the story of Tobit."

Perhaps the volume before us will introduce the Apocrypha to many more readers. On every ground the Books are well worth reading, abounding as they do in moral and religious maxims of rare insight and force, and showing the steady progress of religious thought among the Jews in the period between the prophets and the coming of Christ. Dr. Oesterley gives all the essentials and puts his results in handy and attractive form.

Index to the new Schaff-Herzog encyclopedia of religious knowledge. By GEORGE WILLIAM GILMORE. New York, Funk & Wagnalls Company (c. 1914.) 211 p.

This final index completes a very important encyclopedia, being volume thirteen. It is really a monument of American scholarship.

Die Religion der Griechen. Von ERNST SAMTER. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1914. 102 p.

A scientific foundation for a faith answered by healing, prosperity and peace. By EDWIN M. JOHNSON. (Vital law studies, No. XVI.) Kansas City, Vital Law Publishing Co., (c. 1914). 78 p.

Das Grundproblem Kants; eine kritische Untersuchung und Einführung in die Kant-Philosophie. Von ALFRED BRUNSWIG. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1914. 170 p.

Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern; ein religionsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur Frage nach den Anfängen der Religion. Von KARL BETH. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1914. 238 p.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NATIVITY

By G. STANLEY HALL

In its final canonical form the gospel story opens with a marvelous revival of procreative energy in senescence. Like the Baptist, Isaac, Joseph, Samson, Samuel and other Old Testament heroes had been born of one or both superannuated or else barren parents, whose reproductive energy seemed to be miraculously restored. Here Gabriel appears amidst the incense of the altar to an aged priest who is made aphasic before the people as a sign that his venerable and sterile wife shall bear a wondrous son. Nowhere was the passion for children which Ploss¹ has shown to be so strong and universal among lower races, more intense than among the ancient Hebrews. So here as incredulity yielded to certainty there was joy in the souls of this decrepit pair. Deities participate in many ways and degrees in the parenthood of great men, as Rank² has shown. John is only the herald, so that as this supernal reinforcement is given to his parents equal to that of the best in the Old Testament dispensation, it is already apparent that Jesus must be given a yet better one. Not to restore gerontic energy but to exercise this himself would be Yahveh's next step. There is a moving verisimilitude about the narrative of Luke the physician evangelist. Not only does modern psychoanalysis afford unnumbered cases of sex potency lost and won at all ages by suggestion (religious impressions being most effective among believers), but the literature concerning senescence shows often an "Indian summer" of restoration of this function. The curve of decline,

¹ Das Kind, 2d ed. Leipsic, 1911. Bd. 1, S. 1-24.

² Der Mythos von der Geburt des Helden. Leipsic, 1909. S. 93. English translation by F. Robbins and S. E. Jelliffe, N. Y., 1914. This is here traced in some detail in eleven cases.

too, is normally broken sometimes by repeated rises and falls before extinction is final. From the call of Abraham on, Jehovah often appears in a eugenic rôle if not as a master stirpiculturist and he exercises a unique control in this domain over his favorites. Moreover, as has often been conjectured from Nietzsche to Metchnikoff, possibly the complete or ideal overman will, like animals, be generative until he dies, and senescence, the dark counterpart of adolescence, will be done away. Now however the partial paralysis (here dumbness) such as may befall other functions in cases of the recrudescence of sex activity in the old, precedes instead of follows it. Zacharias' speechlessness, however, was only functional and temporary for this power was restored at the naming of the child. Perhaps the obnubilation of the linguistic faculty was symbolic or a counterpart of the hyperfunction of his son's future work of proclamation, as if more of this power than of others in the parent went over to the child. We are distinctly told, however, that there was no asemia. All we know of John too is true to the law that precocity is often a characteristic trait of those born of post-mature parents. Though but six months older than Jesus, he preceded him by a much longer period in his ministry. Again, age of parents and precocity tend to mono-ideism and perfervid dogmatic and perhaps narrow affirmations. Third, this power is subject to early decay and although John had heralded a new era, he had realized before Jesus came on the scene that he could not effect its consummation, so that we have clear notes not only of subordination but of waning power and anxiety lest his pioneering was to be left without an adequate sequel. Fourth, he was stern, uncompromising, and incapable of wielding the method of love, as Jesus could with his far greater strength of sentiment, which is characteristic of children of younger parents.

Thus the third synoptist makes here a real contribution not only well befitting his theme but peculiarly consonant with the best ideas of his age and race. In this domain he may have known rare facts such as often suggest still rarer and choicer fictions. Thus at the outset we must understand that there is a sense in which real art is always truer than history. We have here a worthy proem to the world's grandest epos. We see how always and especially in this circle and in these days of

fervid Messianic hope, parents yearned often inutterably for offspring, and how religious ecstasy may unseal the closed springs of life. A child thus conceived was from the Lord and of course must be a prophet. If the angel was a vision, the question whether the account is all fact or fiction, natural or supernatural, is therefore in each item only one of degree.

Six months later the same angel appeared to the betrothed Virgin Mary, announcing that the holy spirit should come over her, that she should bear a son to be called the son of God, calming her fear and felicitating her upon what Jesus was to be and do, and thereafter she was found with child. Joseph finding her condition was minded to put her away privately, but obeyed a dream-angel who commanded him to take her to wife, told him that the child was conceived of the Holy Ghost and would be Jesus, man's saviour from sins, and this he did, but "knew her not." Even if the angelic visit was not a veiled account of the conception itself, as the church and art have always assumed it to be, but only preparatory to it, this by no means opens the way to such baseless conceptions as that of Storfer³ that Mary was or became a temple hetera or vestal, and was rescued by Joseph, for there is no scintilla of evidence that there was any such custom then and there. Nor is it meant to be a record of true parthogenesis but the unequivocal meaning is that Yahveh himself for this one time became a father by an earthly bride, chosen out from among all women, as he had chosen the Hebrews from all races. As his only love she was thus the unique point of contact between heaven and earth, was not only the crown of womanhood but the most sacrosanct of all human beings, the supreme embodiment of "*das ewige weibliche*," combining like no other all the charms of virginity and maternity. Thus it was not strange that belief in the divine paternity of Jesus was generally current in the church from Ignatius early in the second century down. Tradition, independent of scripture, and more paramount over it in authority the farther back we go, soon came to regard this as a miracle in some sense complementing the resurrection. It appeared in the baptismal formula from which the first creed developed. Apocryphal literature amplified it, and even ascribed

³ Das jungfräuliche Mutterschaft. Berlin, 1914. Pp. 204.

to Mary herself a supernatural birth. Duns Scotus affirmed that she must have been especially sanctified in the womb and finally in 1854 Pope Pius the Ninth promulgated the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary herself, all this by a not only natural but inevitable psychogenetic sequence. Thus the Holy Mother although she bore children later to her human husband, was made semi-divine, and so Jesus' humanity was reduced from one-half to one-fourth.

Although we know nothing of Mary's line of descent, we are strangely given two pedigrees of Joseph, one ascendant and one descendant, in order to show that through him Jesus was a true son of David, as prophecy had declared the Messiah must be. Matthew gives three symmetrical series of fourteen generations each, back to Abraham. This was meant primarily for Jewish Christians. Luke's genealogy of Joseph contains five times fourteen plus seven generations and goes back to Adam, the "son of God," the father of all men, and was calculated to appeal to all Gentiles. It agrees with Matthew in fifteen names but departs from him in forty. The one register has fourteen generations more between Jesus and David than the other. The compiler of both these lists of forbears obviously held that Jesus was the son of Joseph. In both there are but few generations back to the very first fiat son of God by creation, Adam, a prototype of Jesus, God's son by generation. The inclusion of these tables in the two gospels that also record Jesus' divine paternity suggests that they took shape at a time when both the natural and the supernatural view of Jesus' origin were permissible.

Pagan legends more than Jewish abound in virgin births to divine fathers. Queen Maya, the mother of Buddha, was impregnated in a dream. Protagoras and Plato, and later Scipio and Augustus were sons of Apollo, and Alexander the Great of Zeus. All the kings of Egypt, to the last of the Ptolemies, were divine incarnations, with at least one celestial parent, and throughout antiquity and among all primitive people legends of demigods abound.⁴ The folk soul is always and everywhere

⁴ See among the copious literature on this subject Pfeleiderer: *Early Christian conception of Jesus*. 1905. Pp. 1-48. Also his fuller *Urchristentum, seine Schriften und Lehrer*, 1902, 2d ed. Also J. M. Robertson, *Christianity and Mythology*, 1910, especially p. 292 et seq.

disposed to ascribe supernal parenthood to great men. Especially in pre-cultural times eminence was more readily conceived as born rather than made. Some great deities, like Demeter, bore not only children but grain, trees and fruit. Fertilization may be caused by the sun, wind, by eating various things, by shadow, a breath, a wish, standing on a holy spot, etc. Fatherlessness is sometimes suggestive of matriarchal ideas, a form of primitive feminism. Often, too, the father alone brought forth motherless *Wunderkinder*. Of old it was not known that geniuses are nearly as liable to be born as sports in one stratum of society as in another. Thus the doctrine of Jesus' divine fatherhood was far more prepared for and more readily received among the Gentiles than among the Jews. Luke's story is the most simple and chastened as well as the most clearly motivated perhaps of all the mass of mythological material upon this theme, and hence has most verisimilitude. Thus it is easier to accept his highly typified rendering of this theme than any other and this itself means much.

Here it must be premised that the psychology of Jesus is not chiefly concerned with questions of historicity. Its prime problem is *how man came to believe* the things of Christianity. If we grant that all the facts occurred literally as reported, the problem of psychology is to explain why man accepted and clung so tenaciously to them, surds though they seemed. If they did not occur, our problem is only how man came to invent as well as develop the will to believe and so fondly cherished them. In the latter case the psychic motivation is the same as in the former, only stronger. No student of religion to-day would reject all not proven to be factual as worthless or as *eo ipso* of inferior value to history, as Strauss and his followers did before genetic and analytic psychology and the work and ways of the folk soul were known. There is a sense in which, just as art improves on and brings out the inner meaning of nature and life, and is thus truer than they, so religion transfigures events by showing forth their moral soul. The effort to show this forth should therefore appeal to those of all creeds as well as of none. It is a characteristic of religious happenings that they have a higher symbolic value above and beyond their historic actuality with which criticism and diplomatology deal. It is therefore no sophistication of mysteries to say that

there are many things that are so eternally true that sometimes the question whether they did occur here or there is a matter of relative indifference. This must constantly be borne in mind, in considering the entire story of Jesus from the psychological point of view, and thus its psychology is at all points constructive and not destructive.

If the annunciation was not a veiled account of the conception itself but only predictive of it, then the latter must have been a spiritual and not a spermatie quickening of the ovum, and the act of fertilization was not by the ordinary channels and thus its biological significance is lost and its historic value impaired. In the closest of all pagan parallels, the myth ritual on the walls of the Temple of Luxor, the Isis-headed Toth, logos and messenger of the gods, first announces to the maiden queen, Mautmes, that she will bear a son. In the next scene the holy spirit or the Egyptian paraelete, Knopf, holds to her mouth the *crux ansata*, symbol of life, and thus she is spiritually impregnated by the god Amun-ra; then comes the birth, the adoration, etc. On this view the actual infaire or epithalamium in Mary's case is left to the imagination, perhaps as too secretly sacred for record, so that we have here a hiatus. To ask, as some have done, whether there were really spermatozoa, is idle as a medical, important though it be as a theological question, for otherwise the divine paternity remains more or less symbolie with some impairment of the whole process of incarnation.

Back of and reinforcing all such cases of the mating of divine and human beings lies a deep and rank phallie stratum bottoming on cosmogonies wherein Mother Earth or the primal abyss is impregnated by rain, lightning, wind or heaven itself personified, for celestial powers are masculine. Unions of above and below often typify those of the transcendant and immanent, and sometimes later of the conscious and the unconscious or the soul of the race and the individual, all of which unions are often typified by conjugation. There was a time when sex fashioned the appereceptive organs for most of the phenomena of nature and when ritual copulation between pairs, one of which represented a high and the other a lower power, was thought to quicken all the fertilizing and germinant energies of nature and to be true sympathetic magie. Thus gods came to earth and left seed with the daughters of men, and rain, clouds and wind had

special inseminating efficiency. That psychic vestiges of this long but slowly suppressed cult and type of folk thought persisted as unconscious attitudes and predispositions to believe the chastened story of Jesus' origin, no psychogeneticist or analyst can doubt, nor that the often otherwise unaccountable rancor of modern skepticism against the "conceived by the Holy Ghost" phrase of the creed is reinforced by the momentum of efforts of ages to repress phallicism.

Children and pubescents very often, especially if they are of humble parentage and feel themselves gifted, begin to wonder if, with all their amazing uprush of youthful insights and aspirations, they can really be the offspring of their prosaic parents. They at least daydream that they are supposititious and perhaps of royal descent. Sometimes this propensity prompts aversion to the real parents, and such children may leave home in quest of surroundings more befitting what they have conceived for themselves or to find the social milieu to which their lineage entitles them. On this topic we have now quite a literature of both morbid and normal cases. When Jesus, at the age of twelve, eluded his parents and was found by them in the temple and reproached his mother for not wotting that he must be about his father's business, he could not have meant carpentering. This response was tantamount to a disavowal of Joseph's parenthood. From a consciousness of his precocious insight into scripture and the elation that would come from his discussion with the scholars of the temple he was already on the way to a sense of divine sonship. That this was not yet complete is indicated by the eighteen further years of subjection and obscurity. Nowhere, however, in all his ministry is there any scintilla of anything that indicates filial respect to Joseph such as the Jews insisted on to parents. From this the inference is clear to the psychologist that early in life Jesus was averse to his putative father, not because of any envious Freudian wish to take his place in the mother's affection, but because he felt the characteristic sense, so common in ephetics, of being superior to at least one parent. He already felt himself to have been sired by a more exalted personage. Reveries of this kind and the reflections which they cause concerning mothers too have in many a modern instance motivated coolness to and aloofness from them such as Jesus repeatedly is said to have given signs

of. The point here is that such an experience in his own soul may have contributed thus early one factor to the complex that had already begun its evolution in his consciousness and that developed decades later among the early Christians that no less than God himself was his father. Thus as a child he practically disowned Joseph. If the latter was not a myth as many scholars now think (so numerous are the pagan parallels to his function here), and if he was really an old man, as tradition makes him, stern and unsympathetic with Jesus' youthful aspirations, the latter's conviction that he was really apart from and above the other members of his family may have thus early begun to pervade Jesus' thought and conduct, and also to work suggestively in the minds of those who knew what was going on in his soul. This trend in the most intimate circle of the youthful Jesus thus helped to prepare the soil of tradition for the later full acceptance of the doctrine of complete sonship of God. Certainly Joseph nowhere appears as the father such a child should have.

During his public ministry Jesus seems, as we shall later see, to have gradually attained a conviction that was ineluctable that he was the only begotten of God. He showed elation when Peter declared him to be the son of the living God, told his disciples that he was from above and they from beneath, that he came from and would return to his heavenly father. His supreme achievement of rising from the dead which years before any of the gospels were written Paul made the chief thing he did, and the center of all his own preaching, was what chiefly documented him as infallibly the true son of the true God. At first he was thought to have achieved sonship or to have been raised to it by adoption or possibly, as among some of the heretical sects, by apotheosis. Another later more Alexandrian doctrine was that he pre-existed as *logos* with God from the beginning. These two views were, however, very happily combined in the Lucan conception of a literal, physical generation. This later view therefore sought to reconcile the other two. Hence the doctrine of Jesus' supernatural conception met a very urgent doctrinal need, for something like it in the decades immediately following Jesus' death became a logical necessity. It gave a completeness to the whole theory of Jesus' nature and

work which it would otherwise have lacked. It did not merely supplement reasoned thought like Plato's myths but was in some sense the combining capstone of the theanthropic system. It materialized not merely a metaphor but an idea and extended the divine strain of heredity back from Jesus' later public years to the very beginning, or the amphimixis stage of his life, thereby also incidentally fertilizing the imagination of those within the pale of its influence to seek to fill out the entire unknown period of his career, particularly his infancy and childhood, with very many apocryphal fabrications which, had he been thought to have achieved sonship only in his later years, would have remained as unknown and uninteresting as it had been before this belief prevailed.

Besides the exigencies of theory, Jesusism began with a belief in the death and resurrection, the *punctum saliens* of all. Paul taught and seems to have known almost nothing of Jesus save that he died and rose, and has very little to say of his life or even his teachings. The conviction that he died as a propitiation for sin and rose and ascended, if it did not originate, chiefly promoted the interest in his previous life and motivated the composition of the first three gospels. All that was impressive in Jesus' personality, life and doctrine thus came to supplement and increase the prime impressiveness of his ultimate fate. Together these two traits made a seiche or tidal wave that surged backward until it transfigured the very origin of his life. Belief in this marvel is thus a most eloquent monument of the impression which the Pauline plus the Petrine Jesus came to have in the very early Christian consciousness. Belief in his supernal conception was a kind of *summa cum laude* degree which the Semitic folk-soul reserved for its supreme hero, a testimonial of what they thought and felt about him. So far as they, breeders of flocks and herds as they were, realized the biological difficulties of such a belief, assent to it was a euphorious *credo quia absurdum*, a voluntary offering up of reason to faith, which is the assent of man's deeper, larger and unconscious racial soul. What a hold it still has upon the heart, even in these days of science with its sense of the universality of law, is shown by the countless efforts of orthodoxy to conserve the vestiges of it whether by partial concessions to the *Zeitgeist*,

by allegorical and symbolic explanations, or by affirming it as a postulate of practical reason pragmatically justifiable because it has worked so well, or by vociferating it as a mystery which the will must compel us to believe—all of which is far better than the smug complacency of religious half-culture which sees nothing in it but a worthless and outgrown superstition.

Again, Luke's story is an amazingly pure and sublimated account of the act of begetting, so prominent and often crass in the Pentateuch. Still more is it in contrast with the gross phallic cults of the Canaanites and the sex corruption of the people among whom the new faith was first proclaimed. It was animated by the spirit of the then new celibacy at its best incipient moment, when chastity was beginning its great work of setting a backfire to the lewdness of the age. The salutation hail, health or wholeness invokes the condition precedent to all human achievement and is the universal form of greeting throughout the world. There is naturally virginal hesitation but no trace of modern parturition phobia. If degradation of this function to an orgy marks man as a sinful fallen creature we have here its progressive long-circuiting till in the place of marital rights exercised by gods or their representatives in the *jus primae noctis*, it is exalted to a type of the union of the church as the bride with the heavenly bridegroom. The erogenic impulse that serves the species is here spiritualized until instead of the hedonic narcosis there is only the desire to produce the type, totemic, heavenly man, the long awaited Messiah, redeemer, saviour. If the ecstasy of love gives life a higher value because it first teaches what real pleasure is, and thus makes goodness understood, it is the passion for noble offspring that makes it a sacrament in which each partner is in place of the divine to the other and every conception immaculate. But there is no physical or even psychic ecstasy. Asceticism has suggested nothing colder, for the submission and consent are hardly more than mechanical. Some think, as we saw, that Luke designs in this scene to describe only a preparatory dream or trance, a kind of license to wedlock direct from heaven, superseding human ceremonials and certification, but perhaps justifiable by the prevailing Messianic expectation. It has been suggested that this hope pervaded the souls of every maiden in the circle

from which Jesus sprang with a force inversely as her realization of the percentile number of chances that the lot of divine motherhood might fall to her, or directly as her sense of individual fitness for this function. Romantic love in any modern sense, deep and perennial though its wellsprings have always been, had little literary development among the ancient Hebrews save so far as in their minds it was always religious. No race so fused love and piety as we see in the song of Solomon. As the Greeks and Romans idealized it in pastoral life and amid sylvan scenes with perhaps Pan, satyrs and fauns, so the Semitic mind was prone to give it a celestial interpretation colored with reminiscences of the ancient promise to Abraham. Even if it was first a legend doomed to pass into the service of dogma, it may have been lived out as a fact in Mary's subjective experience. Belief in it, whether as fact or fiction, may have been more or less euhemeristic, and its use for purposes of race pedagogy may have been at first with some consciousness of apocryphal fabrication. In any case the artist had a hard task. We do not know how much of the mythic material of his age was at his command, but especially among a race so pure the character of Mary must not only be preserved from all possible suspicion but exalted. A race of herdsmen would not be predisposed to believe in a birth that eliminates human male parentage. Joseph too had to be made both content and continent, while Mary's consent would not only jeopardize her spouse's love but involve risks of aspersion and perhaps humiliation.

Over against the above view that Jesus' life was so tremendously impressive that the inference of a supernatural birth was inevitable and irresistible, is the skeptic argument that his deeds and words were felt to be insufficient in themselves, and hence were in need of the glamor which this kind of accrediting gave; it was necessary to glorify a career that without it would have been more or less inglorious; it was an *ab extra* certification *ad maiorem gloriam vitae Jesu*. This motive was involved in many of the pagan deifications, as in the case notoriously of the weaker and baser later Roman emperors. Christian apologists have used it to confirm lapsing faith in Jesus, so that belief in it has in many cases been a product of defect and not

of excess of faith. This, however, is a question of history and that it was not the case with Luke or the early Christians has been abundantly shown.⁵

Here it was a tribute to a great life, a choice of the least of two miracles, divinification at some later point of his life, or else at its very source. Conception by the spirit of truth was less miraculous than any other explanation of the wondrous light that broke forth from him in maturity. It had to be believed quite apart from its objective reality. Had the birth legend contravened a less universal law, its cogency as an argument and its value as a tribute to Jesus' greatness would have been less than as it now stands. If we can conceive it as an actual fact, proved or provable by all the tests that modern science could suggest, its significance would be isolated and its worth impaired.

Again, had he been what he was by nurture rather than by nature, had he been made rather than born great, the developmental schema of his life would have been less spontaneous, aboriginal, indigenous. By this token, his qualities were due to preformation rather than epigenesis. Had he been a great pundit or rabbi, his mind charged with the ideas of others instead of filled with his own (as Plato reproached Aristotle with getting his thoughts through reading rather than from inspiration by inner oracles), he would have been less divine for acquired possessions are less assimilated or less a part of ourselves than those that are innate. His trust in his own originality was so great that he yielded to its suggestions with abandon, and this from-within-outward trait of supreme genius points to a hereditary source.

So too does the fact of his uniquely orthogenic life. Conversions involve drastic upheavals, storm and stress, a new direction, and therefore loss of more or less of the original momentum, as we see in cases of the Paul or Augustine type. Regeneration involves some break with the past, the graft of a new

⁵ See best of all Allan Hoben's compilation of data and authorities of the anti-Nicene period. Lobstein, "The Virgin Birth of Christ," tr., N. Y., 1903, only shows in a ponderously judicial way that this belief was "a myth created by popular devotion," that it "ceases to remain a real fact but stands out as a characteristic creation of the faith of the church," that it is a symbol we must lay bare, etc.

stock upon an old one, a fresh start with abandonment of some lines or acquisitions. It is not a mere acceleration such as we see at normal adolescence but there is more or less of a rupture that suggests the invasion of an alien principle or a sudden irruption of God into the soul. Saving though this be, it involves the loss of impulsion for something old must be sloughed off and life must be built over again more or less and on a new plan. Had Jesus been a converted sinner, as Schrempf and others have urged, as we shall see later, and especially had the change come over him just before his public ministry, his life would have lacked unity, his evolution would not have been rectilinear. Had he served a long apprenticeship to learning, his birth and heredity would have tended to shrivel toward insignificance, because instead of his origin his regeneration by learning would have been the point of cardinal interest, and what had preceded might have been left to oblivion. God would thus have been in some sense the father of his subsequent life only. But for a type of life which all outer biographic incidents cannot explain, and where the primordial impulsion is all, the problem of its source becomes urgent just in proportion as the mature life and its effects unfold into ever greater significance. The record indicates that Jesus never referred to any early pivotal experience, nor did he contrast his early with his later life. His own reticence and that of those who knew him best concerning the first three decades of his life is singular. Perhaps he lacked autobiographic interest because he was so intent upon his father's business here and now that he had not time or energy to be reminiscent, which would be flight from reality in the sense of Janet and Freud. Perhaps he had so completely digested his past that all its lessons had been made over into forms of impulsion to advance his mission. Perhaps he had grown so fast that he felt the past life far behind. His early experience had consisted in pressing rapidly upward through all the characteristic experiences of humanity, and only when he emerged above the common lot of man into Desjardin's "phenomena of altitude" did his life have unique superhuman meaning. On this view the years of apprenticeship did not count but only those above the range of common humanity. Perhaps others had gone as far as he had before the advent of John and he may have felt that had he died then or before he

would have added nothing intrinsically either new or valuable to the world. Many thus hold that it was at this point that he transcended and became superman in a unique sense. He looked toward the future even more intensely than he did toward the past because what was to come would eclipse all that had gone before. It was his present personality that had a value and told. Had he attained old age he might have fallen into its habit of reminiscence. Thus without touching here the mooted question whether Jesus passed through distinct developmental stages in his public ministry, his consciousness must have been penetrated to a unique degree with the sense of rapid development. The child does recapitulate the history of the race by leaps and bounds, living as it were millenia in hours and minutes. If we assume that Jesus' psychic development was exceptionally rapid in this sense, the inference to an exceptional divine initial momentum must have been inevitable.

There is no indication that Jesus was always consciously working over and interpreting on an ever higher plane the experiences of his childhood and youth, like Goethe, but the trajectory of his life was so steep and he conserved so uniquely the naïveté and rate of growth, rapidest in infants but which in others is progressively slowed down, as Minot has shown, that he never departed so far from the primitive *nisus generativus* as others do. This must thus have contributed its own quota of impulses to the construction and acceptance of the psychopedagogic masterpiece of the Lucan tale. If infancy is Wordsworthian or if we accept Freud's conception of the all-dominance of childish wishes, and if these influences were less abated in Jesus, whether or not he was conscious of their source or date, then he was peculiarly heaven-born in all that this metaphor can mean.

Thus, in fine, while if we could psychoanalyze the faith of those who at first or now affirm this belief perhaps no Christian would be found who held to it in the sense orthodoxy assumes (and certainly belief in its literalness would not meet the criteria a modern psychology would test it by), nevertheless its truth so far transcends historicity that the psychologist of the folk soul can say, summing all the above trends, with a fullness of conviction that criticism can never give, and that

the old faith never knew, that Jesus was veritably "conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary."

This belief shows forth the dual nature of Jesus as God and man, and therefore as fit to be a mediator between the two. Even if we interpret God as humanity generally, as over against the individual with Feuerbach, or if we regard God as the phylogenetic and the individual as the ontogenetic element in the human species, or God as the unconscious and man as the conscious component, all is not lost but a new and pregnant suggestiveness is brought to light. This doctrine too, when supplemented by the exaltation of Mary, to be "mother of God," expressed the sinlessness ascribed to Jesus, rectifying the fall of man through Eve, and made Jesus the founder of a new race higher than all the sons of the first Adam. Even Sanday,⁶ obsessed as he is by the classic credal view, falteringly suggests that the divine element in Jesus' theanthropic soul may have been not unlike the subliminal self. Who that is intuitive, ingenuous and spontaneous, in bringing himself to bear with all his resources upon some theme or cause, has not had the experience of feeling himself caught up or swept along (or occasionally restrained like Socrates) by a higher power which he felt to be not himself, but which we now interpret as the soul of the race breaking into that of the individual? This complex of submerged constellations, which man has always been prone to conceive as superhuman, divine or demonic possession, the afflatus or inspiration of a muse, or a revelation from on high, Jesus interpreted as his sonship. Holtzmann, Baumann and other recent christologists have emphasized as a chief trait in Jesus' life and character that instead of being occasionally dominated by this higher self he was almost continuously so, that in a word he was nearly always a trifle ecstatic, exalted, erethic, or in a state of spiritual second breath. It was thus that he introduced a new, more normal type of consciousness, viz., one in which this generic social or racial element preponderated over and subordinated the ordinary hypertrophied selfish individuality. This it was that brought in a higher, saner unity of the soul, made it less liable to bifurcation or discord, more immune from wasteful disharmonies and most

⁶ Christologies, Ancient and Modern. New York, 1910.

forms of obsessions by the haunting sense of inferiority (Adler), which we now know to be so prolific of psychic disorders, so that the dangers of schizophrenia or the splitting up of the total soul of the individual into multiple personalities are vastly reduced. Every individual should be the organ, agent, manifestation, son of the species, incarnate it, come out from it, and having done his appointed work, return whence he came. Jesus alone did this ideally because he was the totemic man, and more than any other the typical embodiment of the race, the best unipersonal exemplar of the race idea, the true superman, the entelechy of what is good and best in the human phylum. Thus if we think of Jesus as race-man instead of God-man, the symbol-myth of his divine impregnation still has pneumatic meaning. If there were two wills in Jesus instead of one, as the Monothelites affirmed, the individual was completely subjected to the racial will, which was the core of his nature. The unique authoritativeness of Jesus' teaching ("It hath been said but verily I say unto you") and the breaks with current custom and opinion also mark the apartness, solitariness, loftiness of his genius, and suggest creative energy revealing itself in the very depths of his nature from a source as primordial as the beginning of life. In the comment of his friends about his parents and in the reproach that nothing good could come out of his early home or in his remark that a prophet is not without honor save in his own country, he recognized the proneness to seek in heredity the causes of all unwonted variations and also showed that he was on the way to a conviction (that Galton has shown to be false) that real greatness cannot have a humble origin.

Again, in the act of impregnation the race soul evicts and takes possession of that of the individual, and that is why these experiences stand out with such a dazzling transcendent light that there is a rupture of continuity with the before and after of experience, and a sense that we have something here that can never be expressed in its terms. This explains the fact that the hedonic narcosis is really indescribable so that amorists can only bode forth its raptures by inadequate tropes and symbols. It also explains why sometimes both man and woman, especially if neurotic, have often conceived that the partner's place was momentarily taken by some higher spiritual

personage, be it angel, demon or deity, or been in a twilight stage of consciousness most favorable to idealization. For describing the processes of the race soul or the superenergized life generally, we still have only crude phrases, metaphors and allegories. Here man is paraphasic and nearly all our thought forms concerning it are still borrowed either from sex or religion, which are always in such close sympathetic rapport with each other. Of old in the pinnacle moments of supreme affirmation of the will to live there often lurked in the background of the soul vestiges of the time when marital rights were thought to be exercised by the gods, as the reins of consciousness were handed over to the sympathetic system if not to the very biophores in the biological rejuvenation of fertilization. No individual editorship can thus ever adequately express the collective experience of man in any, and least of all in this, domain. It has suffused the world with a new joy and is the eternal basis not only of optimism but of all that is ideal and of the transcendental world.

This brings us to the most fundamental of all the many formative forces that shaped the nativity concept and gave it such a hold upon Christendom. To understand this we must pause for a very cursory glance at what might perhaps be called the psychogenesis of the transcendant, belief in which, though by no means identical with religion, is closely bound up with it. It springs from several roots and the first of these, with which it really begins, is animism, that ascribes psychic states more or less like our own to inanimate things and processes. This, as all know, attributes rudimentary sentiency to stones, weapons and every object, and postulates something that survives their destruction. More developed, it extends to forces of nature, streams, clouds, heavenly bodies. It is by its impulse that we assign souls to flowers, trees, and animals, and in a word, become anthropomorphic. This is, of course, quite distinct from idolatry which it always precedes, for this regards special objects as abodes or embodiments of spiritual beings. This propensity in the human soul prompts to nature worship and may issue in pantheism but the main point is it made dualism.

A second root of the religious consciousness is found in the difficulty the soul feels in accepting the great fact of death.

Primitive man saw his friends born, grow to maturity, and then in an instant they were transformed into a decomposing corpse, so that the momentum of habit impelled to the belief that something invisible survived independently of the body. Of course these early concepts of self were fantastic. It was named breath, wind, echo, shadow, image, cloud, eye, heart, butterfly, etc. The first ghosts were very tenuous, pallid, weak, unreal, and led a flitting existence, perhaps under the earth amid tombs or battle fields, or frequenting their old haunts by night, hovering about their relatives, occasionally seen and heard and in a limbo state, neither very sad nor joyous, neither very good nor bad, so that the life of the poorest man was preferable to theirs. Their number was sometimes pictured like that of the autumn leaves. They were perhaps herded by some stronger soul, living or dead, or drifted aimlessly, thickly populating some parts of space, seeking perhaps to revive their fading memories, or save themselves from being resolved back into nothingness by reincarnation. So strong is the impulse to believe in them that the opinion has been set forth with great learning that one of the chief objects of funeral rites was to bring home to the minds of survivors that their friends were really and completely dead, body and soul, that is, to lay their ghosts beyond the possibility of revenance, and free man from the bogs of crass spiritism and necromancing.⁷

It was of course a great epoch when the chaotic ghost world first began to be ordered and systematized. One of the most important stages in this development was the idea of associating pleasant posthumous states with previous merit, and painful ones with ill desert, thus giving man a universe in which virtue and happiness on the one hand, and wickedness and pain on the other, got together, as they do not in the world we know. Thus the growth of the conception of posthumous rewards and penalties was an immense gain for virtue, wherever the latter was rightly conceived, for the transcendental ghost world was idealized and was introduced as a great factor into human conduct, and then of course conceptions of hell and heaven were more and more elaborated.

When this transcendentalized motive is at its acme there are

⁷ See this point amplified in my article, *Thanatophobia and Immortality* *Am. Jr. Psychol.*, Oct., 1915.

uncounted legions or cycles of archangels, heavenly hosts or the great dead conversing on high themes at least in some boat-house on the Styx or guardian spirits guiding their favorites, or others that inspire, heal, obsess or blight man. There are embodied ideals of duty, wisdom, strength; gods become highly personified and heroes of mythopeic biographies, loaded down with symbolisms, always superior to man, but made on the same pattern, and so an immense culture power in the world. Especially the Hebrew, Greek and Teutonic mind definitized these deities and demigods which more or less filled the orders of existence from man upward, but the Oriental mind which was more prone to revel in temporal rather than in spatial expansion, preferred the doctrine of transmigration and even karma, a law to which all the worlds and Brahma himself is subject, according to which the soul of each individual is living out a single stage in a series of many and perhaps an infinite number of lives. The ethical element is of course effective for each reincarnation is up or down the scale of being according as the previous life was lived. Thus each man, animal or god has been his own creator and souls do not choose their own lives freely beforehand, as in Platonic myth, but are subject to the iron judgment of desert.⁸

⁸ Bastian in his various works would correlate this trend with conceptions of temporal extension of the life of superior elect ones who led an existence extraordinarily prolonged but continuous and not broken by the links of generations as in karma. The adept is more than a patriarch and must perfect his soul by labors, introversion, alchemy or what not till his life is more or less subtleized and rejuvenated, and he approaches the Mahatma stage in which he has gained all knowledge, can pass through space, leads a kind of charmed, magic, supernal existence, not longing for death like the wandering Jew nor translated like Enoch but residing in obscure places and teaching the few elite who seek and are able to find him. Sometimes in these views too there are hints of both pre- and post-existence. This great concept has its penates and its euhemerism and indeed this point and those above described may borrow features from one another.

Again, the transcendancy motif in a more generic form but in the same sense may crop out in the philosophemes of successive cycles or epochs. At the end of the world here all things return as they were. Perhaps everything is obliterated and a new start made, and every item of the preceding era repeated or, as other of the Stoics who were fond of this view thought, nothing is repeated. While the conception of infinite past time requires that every possible combination of the cosmic elements should

Now it is very hard for us to realize the immense significance of that great movement of the human spirit that at last culminated in the more evolved forms of polytheism or in monotheism. The latter particularly brought order into the chaos that had hitherto reigned in the domain of the Beyond and placed at the head of the universe not an Olympian who had won his throne by evicting an earlier dynasty of gods and was always in danger of attack, but one supreme being to whom all other powers and persons in the whole transcendental world were subordinated. This gave loftiness of soul and unity of mind, so that the noumenal world was never so real and its ethical power never so great.

In the above I have only sought to indicate in rough phrases the new standpoint of the genetic origin of the other world concept as if it in all its forms was in fact a product, ejection, projection of the racial soul, working slowly and in the main unconsciously. There is of course no assumption whatever concerning the objective reality of God, heaven, souls, etc., but there is only insistence that quite apart from the problem of their existence is another and very distinct one, viz., that of the genesis of the conceptions of them. No matter here whether their *esse* is their *percipi* or not. It is only the latter that is here involved. It is even superfluous to raise the question whether back of this argument lies a fond unconscious hope or belief that the folk soul is so fecund that it would have engendered and extradited from itself this counter-world in just its present form, even if it had no existence save in human thought.

Now the organ with which this supernal world is known is called faith; the evidence of things not seen if not their very substance and reality. It is into such forms that the mighty energy of man's soul unfolds through the ages, so that there will always be a sense in which the divine will be the noblest creation of the soul of man because to accept a belief and to make and to create it are only different degrees of the same energy. This idealization of another world and the develop-

have been exhausted, the idea of an infinite number of parts require that they should never be exhausted and that everything that happens every moment should be absolutely new. The transcendence here is in the mechanism which controls this eternal recurrence or makes it impossible.

ment of a life here that consists of other world conduct, such as forms of worship, are of a realm of existence that supplements and is the counterpart of this, especially if it is one of which all the ordinary content of experience seems a promise and potency:—this explains why such beliefs lie so close and warm about the human heart and why they are often so clung to against evidence and even against interest. It is because they are necessary for the totalization of the soul, and so exactly fit the imagination that is the totalizing faculty by which man transcends his own limitations of time, space and personality towards the dimensions of the race, and thereby becomes a citizen of the universe which is henceforth no longer in any part a chaos but a cosmos.

This objectivization of man's racial soul first makes possible the supreme human tragedy of the amphibole between faith and sight, idealism and positivism, the spiritual and material view of the world. The true adjustment of the relations between the transcendent and the immanent, subordinated neither to the other, and using both aright, is perhaps the supremest of all the problems of higher race pedagogy or statesmanship such as the Semitic mind so persistently ascribed to Yahveh. In both the race and the individual we see the reciprocal relations between these two elements and each tends to be inversely as the other. When for instance the Jews were led captive or lost their fatherland they remembered God, recalled the promises, gathered and studied their sacred literature, but in prosperity they forgot Yahveh. When Rome was declining it seemed that the hope of the world that had centered for generations about its most marvelous political organization, was failing, and men slew themselves from a despair which perhaps but for Christianity would have become absolute. Thus the rankest superstitions sprang up, were accepted and cherished. Such excessive otherworldness always prompts mystic cults of many kinds, a gasping longing for modes of higher knowledge, a theo- and parousia-mania, ecstasy, trance, as we see in the Alexandrian philosophies, a longing for visions, revelations from on high; or the subordination may express itself in asceticism, self-abnegation, strenuous efforts at exiguous liturgical purity, and in every means of realizing and apprehending the supernal or penetrating the veil, and everywhere too the assumption that the other

world is inversely as this, that the blessing is for the poor in spirit, for those who suffer, that all sorrows and even tortures will be compensated by heavenly joys. If the old Jerusalem is destroyed the new one comes down from heaven. When the Greco-Roman civilization collapsed the new heavenly kingdom of the church appears in Christendom in Augustine's City of God, which is the transfiguration of the antique state idea. Sacrifice is the way of salvation.

Thus man is at once a citizen of two countries of very different constitutions. The religious consciousness has generally worked apart from the secular and works by different categories and has other rubrics. There are everywhere dual characters in which religion is separated by a watertight compartment from daily life. Their pathetic souls are torn by the conflict between faith and reason, or feel with Jacobi that there is a light in the heart that goes out when we carry it into the head. Among the English it was Hobbes who chiefly set the fashion, so conspicuously followed in that land, of keeping religion and rational activities entirely apart, and Newton and scores of more modern English and American thinkers have thus partitioned their souls.

It is still more pathetic to unduly subject one to the other and to force reason to capitulate to faith or to Rome by some immolating *credo quia absurdum*, positively bolting doctrines and cults as a way out of skepticism or postulating some extreme *solipsistic* idealism to escape agnosticism, putting documents where ideas should be, or conversely attempting to expel faith and idealism and to plant the feet solidly upon the earth of positivism or even materialism.

Now it is against one and all of these forms of double house-keeping that the theanthropic consciousness, of which Jesus' conception symbolizes the beginning, is at once a standing protest and a way of deliverance. This great and new insight is nevertheless very simple. It is the quintessence of genius to posit its own inmost thought as the truest thing in the world for all men. The great religious geniuses, like all the greatest reformers, have but two words in their vocabulary, now and here. So too science proclaims that all that ever was or will be is now. Prophecy is fulfilled, ideals realized, not merely in some remote time and place but in our day, land and souls.

That was the note struck as we shall see by the preaching of the Baptist which acted like an alarum and it is also the key to all the work of Jesus. God, the kingdom, judgment, are here and now. The transcendant is no longer to remain where Jewish formalism, tradition or later patristic metaphysics tended to banish it, at some remote point, but all promises are fulfilled now, so that human consciousness can again become homogeneous and unitary. The transcendant world never drifted so far from the immanent as in Jesus' day and to reunite them was his great achievement. The divine siring of a God-man could not have occurred in any such sense where pantheism prevailed, because divine incarnations come to consciousness in all souls. Nor could it have occurred in the domain of polytheism because heroes, leaders and gods have others beside them. But in Jesus and his circle the Jewish monotheistic idea had culminated and his great work was the realization that the one supreme God is also in all we can ever hope to know of him realized in the highest and most human of souls; that henceforth this reciprocal relation between transcendence and immanence is at an end and that in Jesus' nature, way back and down to his birth as well as in his adult consciousness, there was perfect harmony and atonement and the plain and solid establishment of both the basis and method of complete unity between all that the most romantic faith and all science can ever truly attain.

Still further, as the Semitic and Hellenic cultures, independent at first, mingled later in the way Hatch, Zellar and others have shown, fertilizing each other, it was from their union that the new religious consciousness arose, which was so radically different from either of them but which later came to wield the accumulated resources of Christendom. It would be wrong to represent the Jewish mind with its theocratic principle as the full type of the transcendant, or the Greeks with their love of the sense world and their worship of beauty as a complete type of the immanent mind. It is sufficient to note in them the predominance of these tendencies respectively. We must therefore postulate something like a native Greek element in the mind of Jesus and realize that in his consciousness the best of each of these ethnic cultures entered.

Also, just as the fertilized ovum becomes not only quick and

growing instead of inert as before, but is a more complex and complete unity, so the union of the hither and yonder world in the new sense of immanent deity, which Christianity brought, was the *punctum saliens* of all. It was not only mediation but atonement and salvation. Thus again we see that it was a sound and most genial instinct that placed the germ of this new standpoint in the impregnation itself, so that this consummate religious genius in whose life is found the vital node of the highest religion, is given by Luke a *point de repère* which places him and his wondrous postulate in just the right position between God and man at the start as more born than made. In him the Socratic sentiment that no evil could befall a good man, living or dead, which Leo Haas and Dr. Gompers have made the basis of a neo-Socratic ethics and even of an ideal community of paidia or free joyous activity, to be attained by three distinct paths, developed into a sense of trust in a heavenly parent. By just so many parts as Jesus felt himself divine the transcendant became immanent and the immanent became transcendant, so that the chasm that had come to yawn between things earthly and things extramundane was bridged and a new set of apperceptive centers given, around which were to be readjusted all the facts and interests of human life.

This union left two residual forms of ethnic consciousness behind, out of which it took the life, so that they were deciduous. As their later history shows, their ultimate fate was like that of the polar globules or chromosomes which after the union of the sperm and germ cell are extruded from the impregnated ovum. On the one hand the Jewish mind went on to ever greater refinements of literalism, textual symbolism, allegorical exegesis, extending to numbers, form, positions of letters in Talmud, Targum and Masoretic rules, and in liturgical and ceremonial purity, the one as exiguous as the other was tortuous. On the other hand Greek thought in Philo, Plotinus and Proclus lost itself in striving to retrace the steps by which the soul emanated down through the enneads from some supersensible source. The real world was felt to be in a low, almost dungy state of alienation, estrangement or heterization. Although *nous* was the very first emanation, an ectype of the divine, the lapse had gone so far that it was desperately hard to get from the world of common experience to a divine reality

or from it to us. Thus the only mediation the Alexandrians knew was for the soul as product to turn again to its origin and seek mystic absorption as in trance-like states with the navel-gazing in silentaries.

In view of all the above, have not both the church and the higher critics laid too much stress upon the literal physical historicity of the divine sonship of Jesus? Suppose faith in it as a biological marvel wanes. We can conserve its essential truth by conceiving Luke as an inspired creative genius who felt the various trends and verities characterized above, and as the inspired oracle of them invented his narrative which will forever remain a psychopedagogic marvel of the *bien trouvé*. But for him there would have been a lost chord, an unfinished window in the Aladdin palace of the system of Jesusism.

In all times, places and ranks, pregnancy has had special social and hygienic treatment and regard. Gravid women are prescient and often prophetesses, and their very whims and picae are perhaps commands. They are often isolated or subjected to perverted regimens, exempted from many usual duties, and there are endless superstitions concerning the effects of diet, the susceptibility of both mother and unborn child. There are many magic rites as well as horoscopes, presents, visits and predictions. In this field Luke ventures to give us only a very brief sketch of the old and the young mother together in high converse in a hill country. The feature he stresses is exultation and save for the possible interpolation of Elizabeth's query, "Why the mother of my Lord should come to me" and the phrase in Mary's magnificat, "Henceforth all generations shall call me blessed" his sketch is artistically well tempered and proportioned. For the rest the seclusion is so effective as to reveal nothing even to the scholar. The deep hunger of the soul of both expectant mothers is satisfied and the loftiest possible conception of the future of both children is freely indulged in. It is all the work of the Lord, to whom praise and thanksgiving are rendered. The salutation of Mary brings the first "quickenings" of the unborn in the senescent woman, an experience which is the focus of much folk lore and custom, but is here prelude of John's later relation to Jesus. The heart of Mary overflows with an euphorious sense of triumph

and gratitude for God's power and goodness as manifested in her condition. Although herself of low estate, she exults that she is chosen to bring boundless blessing to her people. Strange to say, we have no intensive study of the unique psychic state of normal women during the incubation period, but Luke's depiction of it as exultant and focused on the career of the future child is an ideal paradigm of what should be as delicate as it is bold and creative. The prenatal stage of life is now recognized as too significant to be omitted from any complete biography. If there was none of Ferenczi's sense of *Allmacht* in the embryo, unless in the case of that of the leaping John, it finds ecstatic expression in Mary. The narrative of the poet physician evangelist almost suggests the Hippocratic sentence, "Godlike is the physician who is also a philosopher." Genial as this is, there is nothing marvelous or impossible about it. Its perpetual moral to modern mothers is, retire with an older woman in the same condition into the country. Give your imagination free scope to abandon itself to daydreams of what you hope your offspring will be and do in the world, for possibly your crudest wish will not be without prenatal influence. We cannot be too thankful that our author did not indulge in any of the weird or monstrous fancies of the Oriental or even of the Greek polytheistic mind in treating this period of their heroes or demigods. Luke seems to have had here no dogmatic purpose but sought merely to show that Jesus' prenatal stage was passed under the most favorable conditions and perhaps also that his own clairvoyance later was presaged by the state of his mother, for Jesus' whole career was in a sense a magnificat of the Lord. In John's birth the relatives come with festive awe. The father ratified the mother's wish that the child should not bear his name, and having written this on the eighth day at circumcision Zacharias' tongue was loosed and he was filled with the spirit and glorified God who had accomplished his prophecies to Israel, and apostrophized the child as bringing light and salvation, all in eloquent rhapsodic terms. It was a fulfillment of the old covenant of redemption from enemies, a more complete service, and the promulgation from on high of a new way of peace. It was the beatitude of a venerable priest wreaking his soul in expressing its sentiments at the moment of being suddenly freed by a great joy

from the repression of nine months of mutism, and all this was a most natural if exceptional ebullition. Primitive races prescribe jubilation, offerings, set speeches of recognition and welcome to the newcomer, and precautions against the evil eye, demons, and other malific influences (Ploss: *Das Kind*, Bd. 1, S. 49-145). Here the dominant note, in which all others are merged, is grateful joy.

Six months later Joseph had to journey with his gravid wife to Bethlehem to be taxed, and there, because the inn was full, she bore her child and used a manger for its cradle. By night shepherds nearby saw the glory of the Lord like that which appeared of old when the tabernacle was builded in the wilderness, and an angel announced the Saviour's birth and told them how to find him, and a Gloria by a heavenly choir followed. They came, adored, proclaimed the glad tidings, and glorified God. Jesus on the eighth day was named, circumcised, and brought to Jerusalem, where a poor man's sacrifice of turtle doves and pigeons was offered.

The nativity, which has hallowed all the Christmas season, with which the association of the resurrection at Easter is the chief other Christian festival, singularly barren of details as the record is, has been extravagantly amplified in apocryphal legend and has always been a favorite theme of art and pious meditation. Its setting is pastoral and bucolic and makes Jesus in a sense homeless. Critics have thought that the journey is insufficiently motivated and even inconsiderate of Mary's condition, and have suspected its veracity because the note of fulfilling prophecy was too dominant. But if the symbolism of the place and circumstances of the birth itself is meagre (and Luke here falls far below the possibilities that his theme should inspire), he has not failed to stress the cardinal point that at the nativity heaven and earth came together. This he represents in the apparition to the shepherds to whom is first supernaturally revealed all the gospel that there then was, viz., that at last a divine child was born. Not the great or the rulers even of the synagogue but humble herdsmen first heard this gladdest of all glad tidings, as if in token that the lowly should be exalted. It is idle to attempt to explain this vision upon natural or psychological grounds for it was collective. It seems more like an individual invention of poetic

license than a legend, is doubtless more allegory than history, and it suggests that Luke may here have been touched by the old-fashioned afflatus of the prophets. Mary brought forth among the kine, the herdsmen first knew and acclaimed the future Lord. There was no accoucheur or nurse save nature, and none was needed. There was no concourse of friends or relatives as at John's birth. Its very simplicity and secrecy were perhaps meant to enhance the impression of its sacredness. Parents and child—they three were alone with God and his dumb, domesticated creatures, but the high heavens knew it and responded with a marvelous effulgence, celestial music and angelic apparition, showing how the world above was now in new and sympathetic rapport with earth and its children. As Mary's psychophysic organism was the best nidus for the unique life that was to realize all the higher possibilities of humanity, so earth itself was beatified and crepitated with rapture as in the old days when heaven itself was procreative on mother earth, which here rejoices to receive its celestial lord. To explain how the shepherds knew, expositors and apologists have evoked telepathy and kinship, secret but undiscovered sources of information, and tense expectancy ready to pass at a touch of fancy or of any fancied stimulation from a state of hope to one of belief. An aurora in the cold Christmas sky and a subjective aura involving optical and aural centers with a flush of suffusing transport, have been conjectured, but the whole narrative is really more suggestive of dream life or even of literary imagination than of any well known laws of meteorology. But the psychic atmosphere at least was tense to the discharging point.

Only Luke, the paidologist of the New Testament, gives us the idyll of Simeon, very aged, devout, expectant, waiting for some visible embodiment of the hope and promise of his heart, and dying content with the newborn infant. This embodied symbol of the great expectation is another cradle song of moving pathos. Greek and especially Platonic friendship at its best was between mature men and adolescent boys, but here extreme age and infancy are brought into contact and death is given perhaps its most natural consolation by the sight of a new life with which it has just time to make contact and to which blessing may be transmitted. Thus souls full of grandparenthood nor-

mally wait with joy and expectancy for an object which the soul that strains with tension into the future can clasp. Thus too the infant is made to inherit the hope of a venerable saint in Israel who facing death rejoices at the glimpse of a new life in which all his own unfulfilled expectations as well as those of his forbears are to be realized, and all of which therefore seem much nearer. No crucifix, ceremonial, rite, song or act of worship is more satisfying to dying eyes than that object which is more worthy of love, reverence and service than any other in the world, a newborn child.

The prophetess Anna at the age of eighty-four who had fasted and prayed in the temple ever since she was left a young widow, saw the babe by chance in her ministrations and gave thanks and spoke of him to all who awaited consolation. The irradiation also widened toward the east and Oriental wisdom, impersonated by the magi, followed a new star such as many a myth describes as appearing at the birth of those destined for greatness. Some think we have here in adumbrated form some hint of how Luke's story came to be attracted into so many points of resemblance to that of the early life of Buddha.⁹

⁹ In the *Lalita Vistara* the life of Buddha is said to have begun in heaven, where he is described as instructing the other gods and telling them he proposes to descend and be born of a virgin as a man. Despite the protests of his fellow deities, having appointed and installed a successor he proceeded to earth. In the *Clementine Homilies* the heavenly Jesus first became man in Adam, then in Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses; and other incarnations are to be expected. This gnostic view is very Oriental. So Buddha had experienced many incarnations but his passion for this one was that it was to be the last. His mother, Queen Maya, withdrew from her husband to be for a time, an ascetic, and when in a dream she saw a white elephant enter her body, she knew that she would bear a son who would be mighty, perfect and a saviour. When he was born, he cried with the voice of a lion, "I am the noblest and best thing in the world. This is my last birth. I will put an end to birth, old age, sickness and death." Then the earth quaked, heavenly music was heard, supernal light filled all the worlds, all creation was in ecstasy, pain ceased, the poor became rich, the bond free, the sick well, etc. Then came hosts of heavenly deities and offered homage and gifts of spices, garments and song. There then lived a great seer, Asita, who saw the signs in heaven, and coming to the city, entered the palace and saw the infant Buddha with all the thirty-two signs of greatness. He then sighed and wept because he was old and feeble and therefore could not profit by the teachings of the new sage. A parallel is also found to Jesus' visit to

Warned again by a dream, Joseph fled with mother and child to Egypt to escape the machinations of Herod, who soon after slew all the children of two and under in and near Bethlehem. This wholesale slaughter destroyed those who would naturally have been Jesus' playmates had that been his boyhood home, and made him more solitary and unique, for his mates would be either older or younger than himself, or perhaps girls. The assumption that this cruel monarch was in the state of superstitious terror of an infant accomplished five things, viz., it represented the Messianic expectation as so prevalent and strong that this alien ruler shared it and trembled for his crown before a possible usurper; accepting the vaticination of sages, it gives us a sense that Jesus was especially cared for by heaven; it gave Matthew the opportunity to apply prophecy to Jesus as he has such a passion for doing, although often as here without appositeness; it provides for Jesus a sojourn in Egypt, brief though it was, and thus brings his life into some analogy with the children of Israel who dwelt there from Jacob to Moses; it gave an added motive to the deep if repressed aversion of Jesus' circle and the Jews generally to the Romans who were the agents of Jesus' execution, although Pilate was more just than Herod. Dread of the latter's successor impelled Jesus' parents upon their return from Egypt to settle not in Judea but in Galilee, although by means of this fear Yahveh was at the same time accomplishing a prediction that Jesus was to be Nazarene and also "called out" of Egypt, for prophecy was inexorable like the Greek fates. To fulfill it is represented by the synoptics not as a conscious purpose of Jesus but as God's way of controlling the destiny of his son from first to last.

With this ends the meagre canonical record of the infancy which was to be so copiously amplified by tradition later. The latter made Jesus a wondrous infant, far more so than the holy bambino suggests. The light that streamed from his body and

the temple when he was twelve. When Buddha entered school he knew all the sixty-four Hindu writings, astonished and confused his teachers, fell into an ecstasy of pious meditation, and lingered a whole day until, at night, when his father discovered him, he first blamed his lack of spiritual insight, but returned home and dwelt with him, accommodating himself to the customs of the world, and busied with endeavors to become more pure and perfect.

the halo about his head express the natural charm that attaches to infancy raised to its highest potency, for he was not only a *Liebeskind* but a *Wunderkind*, and although far more is said about his being adored than about his being loved, in the history of child-study we have few times, places and people wherein childhood has been even more worshiped than loved. The newborn child comes in a sense direct from God or out of the heart and soul of nature and it is easy for parents to abandon themselves till they find a charm in every feature, contour, act, and enmesh the infant in superstitions and credulities some of which are cherished for each child only in the heart of its mother. In the case of Jesus the rudeness of the stable environment gives a good background for maternal tenderness, makes it more necessary and brings it out in bolder relief by way of contrast. Even if supernal beings and happenings are not an integral part of the psychic furniture of parents' minds, what mother has not at least flittingly thought of some kinship of her offspring with deity? It is, however, a strange note that this conviction despite all we are told did not take deep or permanent possession of Mary's mind as is apparent in the signs of her incredulity concerning her son's mission.

Jesus was a *first born child*. Modern science inclines us to think that the endowments of heredity for the eldest child are at least in some slight degree inversely as in most ages his superior rights of inheritance have been. The record distinctly eliminates (Mat. I, 25) the perfervor of the first stages of married life to which some assign the cause for the inferiority which is often considered a handicap on the future life of eldest children. The record more directly seeks to intimate that there were no accidents of *prima paru* which could cause any stigmata. Thus it seems as though here nature and instinct did their perfect work and that prenatal influences, which now in the ebb of the wave of Weismannism are being more and more credited, were, despite the journey and the untoward environment, on the whole ideally favorable to the best that nature could do, so that the child entered the world with the full and maximal momentum of a favorable heredity, the first fruit of parents whose average age might not have been very far from that which modern statistics of greatest viability in the offspring designate as the most favorable for parenthood. At

least there is no reason to doubt that both were at the zenith of their mental and physical development or near the apex of maturity which gives greatest completeness of all reproductive energies.

We can at least conjecture that Jesus was especially a *mother's child*. Fatherhood, whatever we make of the record, is more in the background. Tradition makes Mary fairest among women and her beauty may have been transmitted to her son, despite the ugliness of the earliest portraits of Jesus, whose form and figure do small credit to his mother's or father's good looks. The holy mother is most beloved and is represented as devoted to her son to the end of his life, long after the death of Joseph. There is much reason to believe that sons tend to produce the psychic superiorities of their mother and girls of their father, while boys inherit from the latter chiefly their physical traits. At any rate, there are principles of cross inheritance. The closest association between mother and son is involved in the entire development of Mariolatry and the trait of meekness and subjection to the divine will, a note first so strongly struck in Mary's attitude at the annunciation, is also cardinal in the teachings of Jesus, a point that Harnack has pointed out. Moreover the beautiful soul of Jesus was very rarely endowed with intuitive powers which also suggests maternal predominance or prepotency.

Fascinating, especially to celibacy, in all ages is the rare union in one person of the charms of virginity and maternity. Maidenhood has charms all its own, with its delicacy, unsullied purity, reserve, idealization, intuitive penetration, and these in many a chapter of history and literature have achieved great things for the individual and for the race. Motherhood beams with a very different light. The bud has blossomed and borne fruit, the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and also the tree of life have been tasted, the intuitions are larger, the quality of innocence loftier. These two sides of womanhood here blended have evoked love and adoration in the world second only to that which Jesus himself has called forth. Religious sentiment here idealizes woman as she is conceived to have come from the hand of God, and many a Protestant envies his Catholic friends their attitude toward the Blessed Virgin. No one has ever asked

whether she knew Egyptian, Chaldean, or even could read or write her own tongue. She cannot be conceived as bemoaning fancied limitations of her sex or wishing to make sex a sect, but she triumphs and glories in her womanhood and has been adored all these ages as its supreme type, more generic, nearer to the race, richer in love, unselfish devotion and intuition than man, so that the Madonna idea which teaches that it is more holy to be woman than to have achieved eminence in any kind of superiority, should teach our own sex a corresponding lesson. The worship of Mary has been of potent influence in safeguarding womanhood from the growing danger that it will decline from its orbit, lose just confidence and due pride in its sex as such, till in lapsing toward mannish ways its original divinity becomes clouded.

But even if this occurred, we have another oracle most closely associated with "*das ewige weibliche*" and to which we can always turn, viz., *das ewige kindliche*. The oracles of the latter will never fail. However distracted we are in the mazes of new knowledges, skills, ideals, conflicts between old and new, unable though we may be to thrid all the mazes of our manifold modern cultures, we do know that there is now one supreme source to which we can look for guidance and which alone can tell us what is really best worth knowing and doing, save us from misfits, perversions, the wastage of premature and belated knowledge, and that is the child in our midst that still leads us because it holds all the keys of the future, so that service to it is the best criterion of all values. It epitomizes the developmental stages of the race, human and prehuman, is the goal of all evolution, the highest object of that strange new love of the naïve, spontaneous and unsophisticated in human nature, so that we might freely paraphrase the old prayer of the most ardent of all the church fathers, Tertullian, "Stand forth, O heart and soul of childhood. Reveal thyself to us more fully. We want thee stark naked, unclothed of all disguises, false tastes, bad habits, partial theories, with the purity of that divinity in thee unshadowed just as thou camest forth into the world, fresh from the hand of the Heavenly Father. The norm of thy development is our only sure guide, our pillar of cloud by day and fire by night."

Thus in the combined mother-child worship we have a new orientation of the world toward the ingenuous, germinant, unconscious, instinctive elements of life.

Joseph was a dreamer. Four times his chief decisions were motivated by an angel in a dream, perhaps the same one that appeared in the collocation with Mary, each intervention being in the interest of the child as if Gabriel were perhaps its special guardian. Jesus does not seem to have inherited his oneiro-mantie tendency even if Joseph was his father, unless in the far more generalized and lofty propensity to commune with spiritual powers, although the Johanne is more suggestive of some such paternal propensity than the Petrine Jesus. Still, if, as tradition has it, Joseph was old and Mary young, and age in the parent tends to precocity, while the youth of Mary would tend to the conservation in the offspring of the best traits of childhood, we have in Jesus' premature wisdom, on the one hand, and his naïveté and spontaneity on the other, traits that well comport with this combination of adolescence and senescence in the parents.

Finally, it would be cowardly to refuse to face certain ancient traditions and various heretics, skeptics and schismatics since Cerinthus such as have appeared adown the Christian centuries, and a few contemporary writers who have intimated that Jesus was the natural child of both his parents, while some of them have gone so far as to insist that his conception was the result of love without wedlock. This view has never had any very able or scholarly presentation, and has always been extremely repugnant to the Christian consciousness. Many if not most Christologists now really hold with Keim that it was all a sublime afterthought, that the idea of divine parentage owed its origin to motives that arose later, and that Jesus and his parents lived and died with no suspicion on the part of their neighbors and friends of anything exceptional in his birth, and that there was no taint of calumny in this respect from his enemies. Every candid mind will admit that from the biological standpoint alone considered it would be hard to demonstrate any necessary disadvantage in legal or technical illegitimacy *per se*. Not only have there been great and good bastards in history, but many authorities conclude that foundlings, who are usually illegitimate, are not inferior in health, strength, beauty or in-

telligence, while some have even thought them superior to the average child, or at least to what the latter would be if reared under similar and usually disadvantageous circumstances. They certainly excel in viability orphans, one or both of whose parents are usually less vital than the average. To assume that affection strong enough to defy social restraints is associated with an unusual degree of fecund energy, or that in the classes where such restraints are really felt, as they were intensely among the Jews, there is more probability of real affinity according to the complemental theories of Schopenhauer or Weininger or any other, would indeed in the present state of our knowledge upon these themes be probably unwarranted. There may be, however, some degree of comfort in reflecting that in case the higher or lower criticism should ever compel us to fall back to this position, all would not be lost and that we might even find some unexplored sources of consolation, perhaps in the ancient and long drawn out Stoic distinction between nature and convention, or between life on the one hand and the man-made law and institutions on the other, which would suggest where the line of the new apologetics as to this point could best be reformed. If there be in the record or in contemporary tradition any suggestion of a cruder moral or social state where paternity is more uncertain than maternity, there is no less evidently a somewhat compensating intimation of the stage of the pristine power of the mother to tame and domesticate the father, while even if complete capitulation were ever made to these fears, we may hope it will not be until the world is sufficiently enlightened and democratized to deeply feel, as we do in modern instances of those who come into the world handicapped by such a stigma, that a man is really what he is for all that. The most superficial periscope will show that granting even the literary truth of the record, there would have been contemporary gossips who doubted as Joseph himself did when "minded to put her away." She was passing fair but beauty sometimes provokes envy and stirs malicious tongues, and the record does not intimate that these were silenced by any vision such as that which quieted the mind of Joseph. Everything we know of these days indicates that irregularity in this respect, even in the humblest classes, would not escape censure, such was the rigor of the Hebrew conscience upon this point. Some

have urged that even if there was danger of a social taint or the suspicion of a lapsus this would not ill comport with the prenatal trip to Bethlehem which might have had another cause than the desire to be honestly taxed or with the nest-hiding intimation of birth in the stable or even the foreign trip to Egypt just afterward. If this was in the slightest degree the case, detractors were met by the boldest of all possible poetic conceptions which must have been at the very least no less effective than they are in the church now. Many women since, too, some mothers of historic significance as well as others of enfeebled minds, have yielded to a superstitious interpretation of the natural exaltation that comes to all normal and right womanhood in whom the consciousness of prospective maternity is implanted, for many of them have yielded to the fond illusion of impregnation from supernal personages. Some superstitious mind-and-faith-curists of our own day are sincere in the conviction that if faith is strong enough this can occur without male agency, as if by recrudescence of the long-lost power of parthenogenesis. We must admit that the narrative as it stands, although a masterpiece of what might be called the higher psychopedagogical engineering or politics, and although as we have tried to show, it is a key to perhaps the greatest culture question of early Christianity, will continue in the future, as it has been in the past, to be a stumbling-block to morosophs and skeptics of the coarser type.

Save only the resurrection, nothing in the New Testament puts such a strain on faith as does the demand to accept the conception of Mary by the Holy Ghost literally as a biological fact. It is especially hard on educated young people, who have been brought up within the pale of the church, while the reticence that veils such subjects makes the problem which we now approach all the harder. Hence *its pedagogy* presents one of the most difficult problems in the whole field of religious education. To merely protest that it is a physiological impossibility is both banal and tends to obliviousness to its higher symbolie meanings, which are of greatest culture value, because such a course tends to obscure still more our sense of what the mythopeic folk-soul is and does and is thus not only anti-aesthetic but anti-religious. To discuss frankly in detail, as we have tried to do, the psychic core behind belief in it as a fact and

its implications, is, we freely admit, not without danger to the average lay believer (whom we are not addressing here) of encountering the resistance by which the normal instinctive shame and modesty tend to veil sex, but also of arousing the old *odium theologicum* to the highest pitch now permitted to it. Analysis of this belief is the last thing the church wants or that the clergy will permit or even undertake in their own souls. It is a holy mystery from which they as rigidly exclude reason and science as the church of the past did where it felt its own precious values jeopardized. For this attitude the modern geneticist has no longer censure but seeks only to offer both appreciation and explanation. The middle way between both these extremes first recommended concerning this (and two or three other cardinal articles of ancient faith), is to ignore and allow it to lapse quietly to innocuous desuetude from the Christian consciousness, which has now other and more pressing themes. Its ritual iteration has been called now a mere form, a vague invention, an auto de fe, a protestation of loyalty not so much to the particular fact as to what the founders used so vitally to believe, or an expression of tenderness to the obsolete convictions of our forbears, a modern instance expressive of the old instinct that made Confucian ancestor worship, etc. Another form of this tendency now appears in the call to all who are both cultured and Christian to strive to realize to the saturation point all the higher spiritual meanings of this dogma, till the inner conflict concerning its literary verisimilitude is forgotten, somewhat as we have tried to do above. Intense and many as are the storms of controversy that have raged throughout every Christian century about this point, it is happily no longer a storm center, save only at a certain stage of development during the storm and stress period of youth. Here it is perhaps experienced academic teachers of religious thinking who best of all realize how often ephebic doubt, which may in the end sweep away all ecclesiastical influences, begins with this to it veritable *caput mortuum*.

Now the psychological fact is that each of the above trends exists in every one intelligently interested in Christianity. Those at the extreme of assent and dissent and all those between differ only in the degree of prepotency of the one or the other of these dispositions and in the rigor with which they seek to repress the

non-preferred and submerged inclinations in their own souls of the deeper unconscious tendencies of which even the expert psychologist still knows so little. It is only a commonplace to note that many of the most vociferous denunciations of heresy in others are really often only attempts to exorcise the spectre of doubt in the minds of champions of the faith. What was it that inspired Omar, the friend and successor of Mohamet, having just seen his master breathe his last, to go out of the tent and affirm with the most solemn oath that the founder of the Moslem faith still literally lived and vow to decapitate anyone who doubted or denied it? Why, when it was proven by every method of critical evidence, that William Tell was a solar hero and never really existed, did Swiss scholars who knew better deny it and excuse themselves for so doing because of the fear of its effects upon Swiss patriotism as well as upon the local prestige of Uri, which abounded with historical monuments commemorative of incidents in Tell's career? It is easy to say that in all such cases, in the phrases of Kant, the founder of the pragmatism that James, Schiller, Dewey and especially Vaihinger have elaborated, that the postulates of the practical may suspend the pure reason and assert their native predominance over the understanding or that the will or wish to believe becomes supreme or that feeling, particularly the sentiment of conviction, transcends the intellect. This fertile trend of thought helps us very much and is in the right direction, but farther explanation is necessary and is now to some extent possible here.

Deep down in every individual slumbers a racial soul which acts autistically and comes into the consciousness of the individual only in the most imperfect and fragmentary way as the writhings of the giant Enceladus were fabled to cause the occasional eruptions of Etna. To grasp another halting metaphor (for truth here has as yet no language save symbols, and these are but faintly suggestive), all strata of man's soul abound in fossils representing many long past stages of culture history, only they are not dead fossils but forces still very active below the threshold of consciousness. The fundamental mechanism here involved first crassifies into material form truths too volatile to be otherwise held. Such varieties are materialized and cached in myths and rites. A strong propensity to inertia in-

clines us to escape from the attempts to realize them in the here and now, but nevertheless to sacredly conserve them for the future benefit of the self or the race soul. They are mummies, penates, idols of an unknown but not unknowable divinity, which transcends them. In this form they are above fact and are a part of the larger history of the race which has not yet been written because it has not yet occurred. The affirmation of credence in this dogma, for such it is, in the face of modern science, suggests an iceberg broken from some ancient glacier and full of frozen or fossil remains of life, long since extinct, moving sometimes with crushing momentum, directly against a strong wind, a phenomenon which would seem paradoxical to one who did not know that it was impelled by a deeper, stronger, denser undercurrent. The wind which carries all surface flottage in its own direction can only reduce the momentum of the iceberg since it is nine-tenths under water, showing but one-tenth of its bulk to the less dense element above. To those who do not know psychic undertows, there seems thus now a new miracle, viz., the fact that intelligent people protest belief in such a surd. Credence of Luke's story of the inception of Jesus' life itself is now a marvel and indeed it would be so had it actually occurred as recorded. We make it true because we want it to be so, and we wish it true because the feelings, which is a collective name for the blurred vestiges of ancestral experience in us, betone and animate it with their own creative vitality.

Thus at bottom man feels his own nature to be divine. He dimly senses, though he knows it not, that all deities are ejects, projects, ectypes of his own being, objectified in the interests of his own better self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control. He does not venture to affirm all this of his own individuality for he is too conscious of personal limitations and defects. He feels dimly vast and transcending possibilities in himself as if the entire genus homo were trying to come to the birth in him. He responds and even aspires to all that is best and greatest in life, history, art, religion, and tends more or less faintly to realize all his wildest ideals and ambitions, for the good, beautiful and true, but on the other hand he feels his own "excelsior" impulses thwarted, repressed, checked, gradually finds that he must renounce the fulfillment of most of his wishes and youthful day-dreams. Hence he comes to have a sense of

inferiority, incompleteness, sin, ignorance, weakness, if not insignificance. His fond longings do not materialize but on the contrary they fade so that there is always progressive disappointment, disillusion, a sense of shortage and unworthiness, which may culminate in despair. This experience is inevitable and universal, varying only in degree as we pass from the earlier and more generic on toward the later and more specific stages of life.

When to man, torn with these antagonistic experiences comes the suggestion that there is or was a member of his own species, in all points like him, who actualized all his fond might-have-beens (even though he had to give them another and better interpretation), an exemplar embodying the higher man idea which was in danger of being lost, who not only lived and died but was even conceived without taint of man's gravest sin, who lived himself out fully and with abandon, with no repression, and nevertheless was faultless, who was a complete man and also at the same time all that there was of essential divinity:—this suggestion men seized upon with an avidity unprecedented. It was the gladdest possible gospel, evangel, good tidings. It appealed to the oldest, deepest things in the soul, which had been long overlaid. It brought salvage by reversion to the oldest, deepest, soundest elemental forces in human nature, before it was fabled to have fallen to a stage of less vitality, a pristine experience which old oracles typified as eviction from paradise. Man found consolation for a sense of his own defects by falling in love with the highest redaction of his old ideals of humanity that he could make. If the individual was frail and sinful, the type man that slumbered deep within him incarnated all the best things, that man in all his history had ever imagined. There will thus forever be a sense in which the full deification of Jesus means the potential deification of man. Thus in the story of Jesus' conception the folk-soul completed the apotheosis of man. Jesus coming down to earth is only the ambivalent form of saying that man was exalted to divine sonship. Each is the necessary truth and complement of the other. Our belief in it is a revived wish of the infancy of our race and helps it on toward re-realization.

All religions, particularly the Hebrew Christian, bottom in a sense of loss and restitution or departure from a norm and

return to it. Something archetypal was lost and is found. The psychogenetic problem is what is typified by the reminiscence of paradise to which we hark back. To this problem I find an answer new and true in the cycle of thought represented by Durkheim and his school, which so far as it applies here may be succinctly stated as follows. There was once a stage, through which all races passed, which was marked by tribal solidarity of a kind and degree we have so far lost that it is hard for us to even conceive it. The supreme, all-absorbing unity was the social group, clan or tribe, in which the individual lived, moved and had his being, or was as a cell in a larger organism. All he was and did was in its service. Sometimes, as in corroborees, or in time of great public excitement or danger, all not only came together but acted, felt, thought as one, and personal ends were completely merged in those of the social group. Of this stage we have a survival although a very aberrant one in the psychology of the mob. Each felt strong, was angry, fearful, good or bad, with the strength, etc., of the whole, and so each was exalted, ecstatic, enlarged, potentialized as the spirit of the community entered, expanded, and swept through his soul, and all his always very strong gregarious instincts reached their acme upon such occasions. These experiences constituted inspiration, regeneration, for the incipient fragmentary isolated egos that combined in them. Real life was experienced on these communal, festal occasions when each person's individuality was merged in the soul of his folk—at the same time swallowed up and vastated and reinforced. Perhaps, too, as this group of investigators opine, in this state the individual transcended even the species to which he belonged and had an experience of unique unity and fusion between himself and the universe, becoming sympathetically one not only with his clan but with nature itself.

However that be, our point is that religious experiences to-day are reminiscent of this largely lost state of solidarity, and that our devotion to the type-man, Jesus, is reinforced by this atavistic element that had its source as indicated above. The "saved" soul's attitude toward Jesus has thus as one of its survival components what our ancient tribesmen forbears felt in their joint celebrations toward the sippe, stirp or social whole of which each was a member. The devotion and loyalty and

even their direction, when we analyze from patent to latent, is the same in both, although its object is given a more definite, personal, artistic and morally more perfect as well as a more portative embodiment, for Jesus typifies the human race and not merely one aggregation of its units. The conception myth means not that one individual of it but the genus man was God-made, however we interpret God, even indeed if we identify him with nature.

When man slowly achieved the conquest of the great mammals between whom and himself the struggle for existence was so long and hard, glowed with the first flush of lordship over the brute creation, and realized that there was nothing higher in the world than he, and when capping all this he developed a few strong human groups, perhaps themselves isolated when the globe was sparsely populated, but often meeting and subduing other weaker groups and amalgamating them into an ever larger aggregate (meanwhile anthropomorphizing nature in all its aspects), it is no wonder that he felt his type or *eidos* to be the consummate thing in all the cosmos, at the same time its crown and its key, and so often came to project images of his collective folk-self as gods, always made, if always unconsciously, in his own image. His deities of old tell us what man really thought of himself and his species. His pride often made him excite even the envy of the gods he had made, and he was always bending them to his will, while their very nature and doings were simply the objectivization of his own inmost collective soul. They were made of his own traits and ideals and their degree of objective reality was exactly inversely as man's lack of knowledge of his larger, social self and its theo-thetic activities. To bring them back, to re-subjectify them, is the perennial endeavor of religion. To ascribe to them the power to generate men, however, always marks an important step in their subordination and rehumanization. Having begotten, gods re-enter the domain of man and take the first step toward their own dedivinization. After Christ became God we hear no more of the sublime Jehovah of the prophets inhabiting eternity, filling space, etc., for his absoluteness was gone and his twilight had begun. Whatever theory of kenosis or the degree in which God went over to his human son in the incarnation we proffer, the conception of the latter was the knell of the old prophetic magnification of

his infinite attributes. He is no longer transcendental, independent, apart or above, but is smalled down to the compass and dimensions of man from whom he sprang, on whom all ideas of the gods are first patterned. With Jesus' origin some virtue went out of Yahveh and certain of his more absolute traits were sloughed off, so that he and his kingdom could be reidentified with man and his kingdom. We can thus already see that here as everywhere orthodoxy is only an effort to conserve the right intellectual conception of man's orthogenesis and is always both truer and wiser than it knows.

Primitive Christianity thus meant race solipsism so far as pertained to religion, all of which was resolved back into man, as Berkeley and idealism by his slogan, *Esse est percipi*, reduced all the world back into the individual, and the idealism of Fichte resolved it back into an absolute will, as Hegel did into reason. These three thinkers were only doing over again, although far more consciously and methodically for nature, what Jesus, John, Paul and the early Christians, had done more instinctively and unconsciously for God and all his entourage. In the first centuries of our era, in other words, theology began to be slowly resolved back to anthropology, as later epistemological idealism had anthropomorphized nature in its way. Patristic literature was constantly applying the predicates of God not so much to man in general as to *redeemed* man, as mystics have always been fond of doing. Much that Feuerbach says along this line would have been truer had he not made the fatal mistake of relatively ignoring the difference between the redeemed and the wicked because God and man become identical chiefly only in the soul of saints and the elect. In them prayer is a dialogue between the individual and the racial or unconscious self within, misconceived as without, himself. Thus there is a sense in which man's knowledge of God is progressive self-knowledge. Especially in becoming good man becomes God, participating more or less in his ipsissimal nature. This saving sense of kind was not absent from the souls of the wicked and vestiges of it were even in devils. It is thus man's better generic self outwardly projected that man has always and everywhere worshipped. Religion apotheosized man, purging away all individual sin and error and than himself thus spiritualized there is no other God. Thus only a son of man can become son of God. First man

strove so long and hard to exalt himself to deity that he overdid it and so later had to struggle long and hard again to reduce Godhood back to humanity. Now universal man (as once it was only totemic, racial man) is the only criterion of truth as well as of all moral and other values. God is the soundest core and essence, the truest instinct of man. As known he is our own deepest self-knowledge and as unknown he is man's sub- or unconscious nature, and hence his objectivity is always secondary and never primary. The antithesis between God and man is then really that between the individual and the genus homo, Comte's "*Le grande être*," Hobbe's "*Leviathan*" at its best, purified, sublimated, made free and invested with all the worthy attributes of the race. His goodness, justice, love, etc., are really man's and valid only to and in man. He is the truth, virtue, beauty of man. The real atheist is thus only he who denies these attributes to man. To think meanly of one is to do so of the other. Thus man is not merely the measure of the religious world but the *fons et origo* of it all. In the stage of heterization, or the diastole of the folk-soul, it ascribes to God all that it wishes but has had to renounce for itself, so that, as objective, he is our relinquished self or its complement. The Pelagians said man, the Augustinians said God, is good, wise, great etc. Both are true and the truth of each lies in the reciprocal ambivalent truth of the other. This is the only sense in which God is the creation of man. Having been thus evolved in the slow saecular process of psychogenesis, he became himself invested with personality, turns back, makes man his object and is said to reveal to man again the stored-up wisdom, goodness, etc., with which humanity had gradually endowed him. Thus man became the object of the subject he had made and to whom he had given power over him. Then comes a third and final stage in which man himself, having been the victim of the creation of his own soul, to which he had long subjected and even humiliated himself, began to realize that his gods and religion are really made by his own deeper and always creative soul. As this process of realization advances, man feels himself immeasurably exalted and even rejuvenated, and this process and result is the essence of Christianity. Thus we have a reciprocity; now objectivity is very real and crass, and then subjectivity in its turn may go too far.

We might thus add to the motto *vox populi, vox dei*, and say the soul of the people is the very soul of God. This republics and democracies should feel even more than monarchies which are in fact always less theocratic.

Now nothing in the culture history of the past has been so fecundating as these processes, especially when the analytic stage is passing into the synthetic, deities are slowly reducing themselves to human form and the bifurcation of *Diesseits* and *Jenseits* is being overcome. Thus some of the *obiter dicta* of Feuerbach may still be of service in bringing into clearer light a new philosophical appreciation of the birth story of Jesus. It might be called the return of the not so much prodigal as ostracized God to his father, man. He had wandered into a far country and lived there long in splendor, but the lure of the fairest of earth's daughters only typifies his home-sickness for his fatherland, Mansoul. So there is a sense in which generic man or humanity is truly God's father and is recognized as such by the title son of God, which Jesus gave to himself. Thus God's homecoming commemorates man's coming to the glory and strength of his maturity, and Christianity is thus documented as the best and last of all religions, for it is all *ad maiorem gloriam hominis*. Of this new debut of God or of God's return into human life and of the prodigious advance which its ever deepening widening processional down the Christian centuries caused, Luke's preluding galaxy of introductory incidents to this supreme human drama, is a fit and noble proem.

THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH AND THE TYPES OF BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY; A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

By R. S. ELLIS.

INTRODUCTION.

Death has had a profound influence on the human mind. Much of the progress of science has been due to the hope of finding an elixir of life that would avert or at least postpone the fatal shears. "Death," says Schopenhauer, "is the inspiring genius or Apollo of philosophy. . . . Without death there would hardly be philosophizing." (Werke, hrsg. von Deussen, München, 1911, II., 527.) But if science and philosophy owe much to death, religion owes even more. It is primarily the fact of death that has made man feel the helplessness, the dependence, which Schleiermacher calls the essence of religion. It is death that has caused man to ask what is the value of life, and it is death that has forced upon him the imperative question, "What follows?" To this question mankind has almost universally replied with a belief in the preservation in some way of the individual's life. The problem of death is thus inseparable from that of the belief in a future life, and it is with it as such that we shall be primarily concerned in this paper.

Upon the hopes and fears connected with death and the future life religion has long placed great reliance in attempting to control man's moral conduct. It will hardly be denied that the consciousness of the necessity of death and the belief in a future life where virtue will be rewarded and vice punished has often been productive of great good, neither can it well be denied that it has often been productive of evil, and this evil has not been limited to the vicious practices of savages,—it is also found in our midst. Dr. Hall in discussing the fear of death writes: "The development of the doctrine of immortality, and its utilization as a moral motive, vast and preponderating as is the service it has rendered, has also brought a body of terrors, which work havoc with many nervous systems, not tonic

enough to react properly to them. How rightly to administer this fear, which has always been one of the chief problems of religion, seems to be looming up again to pedagogy. For practical as well as scientific reasons, further studies are urgently needed here to give eschatological problems a firmer and more natural foundation." (25:224.)

Unquestionably the belief in a future life needs to be submitted to a psychological analysis in order that its motive force may be more intelligently and effectively utilized. Psychology cannot, it is true, determine the ontological validity of the belief in immortality and in this paper we shall not attempt to discuss that phase of the problem. We shall not raise the question as to whether man is or is not immortal,—that may well be left for the philosophers and theologians. Our problem is to determine the sources of the belief in immortality, to find the value of these as controls of conduct, and finally to indicate the pragmatic or pedagogical application of the results to moral and religious education.

Nearly all men have believed in and desired some form of immortality but the desire has been by no means limited to personal immortality. The Buddhist does not believe in, nor does he desire, personal survival,—his ideal is rather through devotion to the welfare of his fellow men to rid himself of the traits that make him an individual and finally to merge again with the spirit of the cosmos. In so doing he believes that through his good works he secures for himself an immortality of influence. This desire for influential immortality is world-wide though most consciously expressed by peoples of the highest civilization. The third form of the desire for immortality is, in terminology at least, the outgrowth of Weissman's theory of the immortality of the germ plasm and has received the name 'plasmic immortality.' This is, as its name indicates, the immortality that one has in his descendants. Francis Galton has probably done most to show the true significance of this kind of immortality and it has received its most conscious expression in the eugenics movement of the present. It is not, however, essentially a doctrine of modern times,—the idea and the desire are common among primitive men.

We have differentiated the immortality belief into three types: personal, influential, and plasmic. All of these are to

some extent egoistic but in influential and plasmic immortality there is much more of altruism than of egoism,—they tend to place the emphasis on the immortality of the race rather than on that of the individual. Spidle objects that the latter two of these conceptions are not to be classed as beliefs at all because they are in a way certainties (41:12); but theoretically as well as practically it is desirable that we know which of these forms of the desire is truest to human nature and thus offers the greatest possibilities for the control of conduct. In order to understand better the true significance of the different beliefs we shall trace their development both phylogenetically and ontogenetically and attempt to estimate more accurately the forces to which each owes its being.

THE PHYLOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH AND THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY.

It was only with the dawn of human intelligence that the problem of death really arose. On the intellectual side this was due largely to the development of articulate speech, for along with this has developed the ability to reason abstractly and thus to grapple with problems that otherwise would not have aroused interest to a very great extent. Speech further made possible the transmission of thought from individual to individual and so created a tremendously broader mental world. Imagination was intensified and intellectual curiosity increased. The basis was thus found for a gradually increasing social heredity, and as the mental life of the individual was no longer limited by the limits of his own sensory experience the possibility of the rise and spread of any belief was greatly increased. Moreover, the increase in intellectual curiosity and ability naturally led man to a realization of what no animal seems to know, namely, that he must die.

In addition to his superiority of intellect man also has more highly developed emotions which cause him to feel more keenly certain aspects of his experience. He is more essentially a social being,—is more dependent on the co-operation of his fellows than is any other animal. But his greatest superiority over the lower animals lies in his moral development which causes him to demand that the world be governed by the law of justice.

The imperative prerequisite to this higher development was a longer period of immaturity as has been shown by Fiske. But along with this there has necessarily come an increase in parental care and affection. Man, far more than any of the lower animals, loves and cares for his offspring. The recognition of this fact is so important in considering the rival claims of personal and racial immortality that it seems well to consider the statements of several authorities on the subject. Sutherland says: ". . . in the struggle for existence an immense premium is placed on parental care, and . . . not until this has been developed can the higher nervous types become possible." (45:I. 40.) Ratzel writes of primitive man: "Motherly love is so natural a sentiment that the modes of expressing it need no authentication; but we often come across instances of tenderness on the father's part toward his offspring. No doubt there are cases of cruelty, but these are exceptions. All who have gone deeply into the question agree in praising the peaceful and kindly way in which those of one household live together among uncorrupted natural races" (33:I. 122.) Westermarck likewise says: "That the maternal sentiment is universal in mankind is a fact too generally admitted to need demonstration; not so the father's love of his children. Savage men are commonly supposed to be very indifferent towards their offspring; but a detailed study of the facts leads us to a different conclusion. It appears that, among the lower races, the paternal sentiment is hardly less universal than the maternal" (48:529.) Westermarck continues by citing numerous authorities showing that most savage tribes show strong parental affection. We cannot, I think, safely question his conclusion. The very existence of any tribe is sufficient proof of the parental affection of its members. How vitally important this fact is will appear as we continue our study.

Before taking up the primitive conception of death and the future life one further problem, the primitive conception of the soul, remains to be considered. To understand what is primitive man's idea of the soul is, as Durkheim says, no easy matter; for the ideas of civilized men who believe most firmly in its existence are likely to be varied, fluctuating and obscure, and we should not expect primitive man to have even so clear

ideas as his more enlightened brothers. A review of primitive beliefs on the subject will, however, bring out several important points.

The objects to which souls are attributed by different tribes vary from tribe to tribe. In Australian tribes, for example, men are always supposed to have a soul while in some cases women and children do not. (13:344.) Other tribes credit almost everything with a soul; the Fijians, for example, "attributed souls to animals, vegetables, stones, . . . and many other things" (21:410), but all of the things credited with a soul were generally thought of as being animate. In fact, Arnett concludes that "By soul the savage probably means life" (3:153). This view is supported by several facts: the soul grows and decays with the body (13:347); it is considered to be the blood or breath, or to be located in some vital part of the body as the heart or the head (13:348). Often the shadow or the reflection in water were supposed to be souls. (23:77-100.) In fact a man might have several souls, the Bataks had seven. (11:112.) These could and quite often did exist apart from the body. It left the body during sleep, or if the savage were going into battle he could leave his soul in a safe place so that he could not be injured. (22:II. 95sq.) Very often the individual had a race soul and an individual soul and the former of these remained with the totem plant or animal. But whatever else the soul was, it was always life and power.

As we have stated, primitive man did not limit life to things really alive, but neither did he regard all things as animate. If he did so he made great allowances for variations in the degree of animation of different objects. To a certain extent then at least certain objects were the antithesis of soul. His world was dualistic, though not absolutely so. He comes to differentiate body and soul and to consider the latter as the essential principle of life.

The causes of this separation of body and soul are probably many but one of the strongest must have been the dream. As Ferenczi has shown, primitive man's beliefs are largely governed by *die Allmacht der Gedanken*. He places greater value upon his psychic experiences than does his more realistic civilized brother. Like the child he does not always separate the real and the ideal. And so when he wanders in a dream from

the place where he fell asleep and finally awakes to be told by his fellows that his body has not moved, he very naturally reaches the conclusion that it was his soul that was wandering apart from his body. Or again when in a dream he sees a dead friend whose body he has seen decay he is likely to conclude on awakening that he has seen a real soul or ghost and hence that his friend's soul or ghost exists apart from his body. As a matter of fact savages believe that sleep as well as death is caused by the soul being away from the body. (21:291, 395.) It is probable that the dream is largely responsible for the belief. This argument is, as is well known, an old one in anthropology.

To the influence of this should be added that of seeing ghosts at night while awake; for, as Crawley has shown, the soul is largely a product of night. (11:208.) Such illusions have probably done much to develop the belief in the soul and its survival of bodily death.

A view as to the origin of the idea of the soul that is well worthy of consideration is presented by Crawley, who says: "When primitive man first saw an object in memory, he saw the soul for the first time; he was then conscious of something besides the thing,—the mental replica, the thought of the thing." (11:76.) "The idea of the soul is thus the automatic result of the reaction to perception; it is a mental repetition of sensation." (11:75.) And from this it follows that "The soul is, by the very fact of its origin, separable from the personality." (11:212.) There is probably much truth in this view.

If we regard the soul as representing the life and power of any object then its origin would be only a matter of forming an idea of and giving a name to life as the savage saw it. Their beliefs support this view abundantly: to steal a man's soul is to kill him, the lightning kills the soul of a tree when it strikes it, etc. Thus considered there is no mystery attached to the origin of the belief though much has been attached to it in its development.

Let us now consider the primitive conception of death. On the lowest scale of intelligence death is regarded as an unnatural occurrence, as something that cannot result from natural causes. It is believed that human life would continue forever on this planet if some supernatural agency did not

intervene. Thus Durkheim, who has made a careful study of the beliefs of primitive men, says: "in the lower societies death is never considered as a natural event due to the action of purely physical causes; it is generally attributed to the evil offices of some sorcerer." (13:373.) Quotations from numerous other authorities could be given to show the correctness of the above but they are unnecessary.

It does not seem difficult to account for this belief. To the savage, life seems to be the natural thing because he knows only life through experience. He knows exceedingly little of natural laws and in proportion as he is ignorant of the regularity of such apparently irregular phenomena as death he very naturally supposes the existence of some unknown force to bring them about. This belief in the natural immortality of man on earth does not then reveal any particular desire for immortality,—it betrays rather the inability of the intellect to cope with the riddle of death.

Rivers gives a somewhat different account of the primitive idea of death especially among the Melanesians. He says, "death in primitive thought is not an event, but a durable state or condition." (34:405.) The name for this state is *mate* and the very old and those for some time dead are alike said to be *mate*. There is no sharp point of transition from life to death, instead there is a gradual death beginning with the onset of senescence and continuing until the individual is forgotten. This shows how real the after life is to the savage.

Let us now see what primitive mourning and burial customs indicate as to primitive man's attitude toward death and his belief in immortality.

When death occurs in a tribe there is great lamentation and wailing. The relatives often cut off their hair, besmear themselves with dirt or other mixture, mutilate themselves with knives to an extreme extent, and at times they hire professional mourners to show their sorrow at the departure of the deceased. But it has been often noted that there is apparently as much if not more fear than sorrow evident in these demonstrations. The reason for this according to Frazer is two-fold: on the one hand the relatives fear that the ghost will be offended if he is not properly mourned for, and on the other hand they fear that they will be suspected of having plotted his death if they

do not show great sorrow at his death. (21:135sq.) This certainly brings out clearly primitive man's dislike and fear of death and the dead. His attitude will appear more clearly from certain burial customs.

The nature of the burial ceremony among primitive tribes as well as the attitude toward the dead is well shown by the following quotation from Howitt describing the ceremony among the Herbert River tribes of South-East Australia. He writes: "A shallow grave is dug with pointed sticks close to the water, and the father or brother of the deceased, if a man, or the husband if a woman, beat the body with a *Mera* or club, often so violently as to break the bones. Incisions are generally made in the stomach, on the shoulders, and in the lungs, and are filled with stones. After this the body is placed in the grave, the knees drawn up to the chin, and laid on its side, or seated head erect. Weapons, ornaments, in fact everything which the deceased had used in life, are put with the body, and the whole is covered up, and a hut is built on the top of the grave. A drinking vessel is put inside the hut, and a path is made to the water for the spirit to use. The legs are generally broken to prevent the spirit from wandering at night. The beating is given in order to so frighten the spirit that it would be unlikely to haunt the camp, and the stones are put in the body to prevent it from going too far afield. Food and water are often put on the grave. After the burial the camp is often shifted to a distance. The grave is visited and kept clean, often for years after. The spirits of the dead roam up and down for a time in the places they had frequented during life, but finally go to the Milky Way." (27:474.)

The foregoing description serves to bring out very clearly certain beliefs about the dead. The reader must be immediately impressed that to the primitive mind even a near relative may be a dangerous enemy when dead and so must be kept away from the living. The theory of Robinsohn that burial originated in the desire to render the dead harmless seems then to be highly probable. (36:126.) It further suggests that the tomb stone may have been originally intended to keep the dead man in his grave quite as much as to do him honor. (36:97sq.)

In addition to the above theory Scott suggests that the funeral ceremony is for the purpose of securing an irradiation of

grief by securing its free expression and at the same time removing further cause for grief by getting the corpse away.

Some explanation is needed to account for the tendency to make the grave as beautiful as possible. This appears in very low tribes and is partly to be accounted for by the desire to please the ghost and give it a pleasant place to dwell in. In case of civilized peoples, however, such an interpretation would obviously be untenable. A further reason must be found and it is present, I think, in the Freudian theory that burial is an unconscious *Deckphenomenon*, i. e., that it is for the purpose of covering up the memory of our sorrow and diverting our attention. By making the grave as beautiful as possible we lessen greatly our horror of the dead. The diversion is thus twofold: on the one hand the corpse is removed from sight so that we more easily forget its existence; on the other hand by making the burial place as beautiful as possible we tend to think more of the beauty of the visible monument than of the ghastliness of the invisible corpse. There is much in favor of this theory: without it, in fact, it does not seem at all easy to account for certain aspects of burial customs. In case of primitive men, however, it seems probable that a different principle is operating.

Here we may suppose with Freud that the feelings go in pairs of opposites and that even in those cases where a feeling is strongly expressed there is present at the same time, though unconsciously perhaps, its opposite. If we so regard the expressions of hatred and affection which primitive man has for his deceased relatives, the different ways of treating the dead though apparently in no way connected, will appear to be very closely related. Any apparently great affection may only be the conscious reaction to the unconscious fear and its attendant hatred which we have already seen so much evidence of. A feeling of guilt might in a similar way produce this extreme manifestation especially when the soul of the dead is supposed to be still in or near the body. There would be a strong impulse to show an unusual degree of affection toward a spirit that would be hurt or angry if neglected. This motive probably has much to do with the beautification of the grave, though we must admit that primitive man may at times be governed by other motives.

There are many other interesting details about the burial

customs of primitive men; there are many ways of disposing of the dead other than by inhumation but for our purposes they reveal nothing of great importance: all burial customs tend to show certain fundamental attitudes and beliefs and the case given brings these out sufficiently.

Even a hasty survey of primitive burial customs leaves no doubt that to primitive man death is not the end of life. He believes that after death the individual still lives, though the ideas as to the nature of this future life may vary from tribe to tribe. Let us now attempt to see to what this belief in continued existence is due.

Crawley, starting from his theory that the soul is a mental image, finds a ready solution for the problem. He says, "The germ of its immortality is in the fact that it exists in the brains of others. A man dies but his image remains. The fact of death does not necessarily alter the character of the mental image, though such alteration is found; the permanence of the soul depends on the length of the memory of the survivors, on the affection the dead man inspired, or the strength of his personality. Remarkable characters develop into 'ancestors' and 'heroes' . . . The savage has no idea of absolute immortality. The soul itself dies; its existence, that is, depends on the memory of others." (11:212.) Feuerbach expresses a similar view as to the origin of the belief in life after death. (17:103.) There is at least much truth in this theory.

The most fundamental, however, of the theories advanced to account for the belief in immortality is based on the familiar maxim, *Quod volumus, credimus*. Man believes in immortality because he does not wish to die; the will to live is so strong that it refuses to permit such an entire negation of life as is death to be recognized as true. This theory has been held since the time of Epicurus but has received additional support through the studies of myths made by such contemporary writers as Rank, Riklin and Abraham. They have shown that the great ethnic traditions and myths are the expression of wishes that are rooted in the innermost depths of the folk soul. The way in which this has worked in religious beliefs is particularly evident from the various conceptions of heaven: the Indian believes in a Happy Hunting Grounds; the Scandinavian warrior believes in Valhalla where the brave would join in feasts and

boast of their exploits, and the early Christians—under strong Hebrew influence—believed in a heaven of gold, silver and precious stones. In each case heaven has been fitted up to satisfy a characteristic national or racial desire.

The wish has its fulfillment through the imagination which tends to create worlds in accordance with desire. This is seen in the dream life. As we have already noted, the savage who sees his dead friends again in a dream very naturally supposes that they are still alive. His own soul wanders during his dreams and so why not after death? Dreams have played an important rôle in the lives of all peoples and it seems certain that they have been one of the factors in producing the belief in immortality, but it is the wish back of the dream that is fundamental. We shall observe the working of this tendency of the mind to believe what it wishes to believe as we review the belief in immortality as it has appeared among different tribes and in the great religions of the world.

To the reasons for the belief in immortality given above should be added one suggested by Runze who points out that the belief in continued existence is largely due to the inability of the understanding to grasp the fact of death. (37:96.) In this respect the behavior of man is often very similar to that of the lower animals.

Let us next turn our attention to the fear that the living have for the dead. This is well nigh universal,—in fact, few of our contemporaries who believe in ghosts—as not a few of them do—would care to spend a night alone in a house which they believed haunted by the shade of one of their friends. There can be little question that all wish their friends happy, but very few care for their company once they have passed into the great unknown.

As an explanation of this fear a number of theories may be suggested. In primitive man fear and hatred would seem to be stronger than their opposites. As Wilson says, "we are compelled to admit that, in primeval life, men must have survived very largely because of the acuteness of their sense of danger." (49:360.) There were many more dangers to be encountered, diseases were more likely to be fatal, warfare was more frequent, starvation itself might often be imminent. With so many dangers it is not surprising if primitive man paid more

attention to what was hostile to him than to what favored him, and as he believed firmly that the dead were still alive and able to aid or to injure him it was natural enough that he should fear the ghosts of his enemies, but why should he fear the ghosts of his friends? This is the puzzling part of the problem.

Fuerbach offers a very suggestive theory to account for this. In the lowest tribes of primitive men death never takes place naturally, so that when a man dies he is always killed by the sorcery of an enemy. It is very natural then that he should be angry at having been violently removed from the pleasures of life. He would be jealous of all the living and would be very angry at his kinsmen if they did not avenge his death and properly mourn at his demise. (17:231sq.) Naturally then the living feared him.

Freud, similarly, explains this fear as growing out of the ambivalence of feelings which is so strong among primitive men. On the one hand there is real sorrow at the death of a friend, but on the other hand there is always a certain amount of joy due to more or less unconscious hatred. This causes on the one hand a sense of guilt at having wished for the death of the deceased and from the feeling that he was not justly treated while alive, and on the other hand it results in the projection of the enmity for the dead so that they are regarded as demons. (24:48sq.)

Other influences probably go to strengthen those already mentioned. Fear of the dead may result from associating the fear of death with the thought of the dead. A more important reason is that the ghost both in dreams and in illusions is most likely to be seen at night when, as Chamberlain has shown, fear is most easily aroused in man. (7:19sq.) If the ghost retained something of the ghastliness of the corpse the effect would necessarily be heightened. The unknown, the unusual, the unforeseen, the mysterious always has strong potentialities for causing fear and the more so among the ignorant who believe the worst of imaginable possibilities. To think of a man as dead is to think of him in an exceedingly mystifying state and so the fear of the unknown is added to any other fears that may be connected with the dead. Taken together I think the reasons given above will explain the greater part of the

fears that man has of the dead. That these fears are ungrounded is generally accepted by all,—at least during the hours of day.

The next problem we have to consider is the nature of the beliefs as to the fate of the departed. We have found that all primitive men believe in life after death but few if any of them believe in real immortality in another world. The other world is not at first regarded as either a very good one or a very bad one. The shade may only wander about through his old haunts, he may be in an underworld, or in a distant country, but in any case his life is supposed to be distinctly inferior to the life he lived before death. After a time this second life comes to an end,—generally by the soul being born again as a human infant, as an animal, or even as a plant.

This belief in reincarnation is very extensive: it is found in the religion of many primitive tribes at one extreme and in so philosophical a religion as Buddhism at the other. Some of the best studies of the belief have been made among the natives of Australia,—as an example of which we may take the account given by Spencer and Gillen of the belief of the Arunta. This tribes believes that every man has two souls, a racial and an individual one. The racial soul, *Arumburinga*, is changeless and eternal and serves as a sort of guardian spirit. The individual soul, *Ulthana*, is the real personality. At death the former of these souls rejoins the totem group; the latter one haunts the burial place for a time, visits the camp at night injuring its enemies, but on the completion of the mourning ceremonies it returns to the *Arumburinga* spirits and waits for the time when it is born again as an infant. (40:514sq.) Every infant born is a reincarnation of some person that has died. According to Durkheim, Strehlow gives a somewhat different account from that given by Spencer and Gillen. He agrees that every conception takes place through the agency of the ancestral spirits but there is not a direct reincarnation in the way in which Spencer and Gillen suppose. Instead of being reincarnated the soul of the dead man returns to his tribe at the birth of an infant to act as guardian for it until it has become strong. After two or three of these trips back to his tribe the ghost dies the second death and that is the last of him. (13:357.)

Stefanson reports a belief similar to the one just given. Speaking of the Mackenzie River Eskimos, he says, "every man

has two souls, the one with which he was born and the one he acquired immediately after birth. He may, in fact, have more souls than that. If three people, or thirteen, have died just before the child was born, then he gets three guardian spirits, or thirteen, according to circumstances. But when he dies it is none of these acquired souls, but the soul that he was born with, which in its turn remains four or five days in the house after death, which is then ceremoniously driven out to the grave, and which waits there until it is summoned to become the second soul of a new born child. No one knows what becomes of the guardian spirit after the death of the persons whose guardians they have been. I have repeatedly asked about it, but no one seems to have ever heard the matter discussed and no one seemed to think the question was of great importance." (42:401sq.)

Beliefs not essentially different from the above are to be found among most primitive peoples. The myths as to the origin of death very frequently indicate a strong belief in reincarnation. Death is considered to be the price paid for offspring: the individual dies but through his descendants the tribe continues. Individual death is the price paid for plasmic immortality. As Durkheim has said,—“There is, as it were, a germ plasm of a mystical order, which is transmitted from generation to generation, and which preserves, or at least is supposed to preserve, the spiritual unity of the tribe through the ages. And this belief, in spite of its symbolical character, is not without objective truth. For if the group is not immortal in the absolute sense of the word, it is nevertheless true that it survives the individuals and is reborn and reincarnated at each new generation.” (13:385.)

The belief in reincarnation has appeared in many forms. It has not been limited to man, nor even to the lower animals but in some cases has been made to apply even to inanimate objects, but when we consider the animistic tendencies of primitive man this is hardly surprising. It is sufficient for our purpose to attempt to interpret the belief as applied to man and to this we shall now turn.

One theory of the origin of the belief in human reincarnation is that it grows out of the resemblance of infants to dead relatives. Primitive man, seeing this resemblance, supposes that

the deceased has returned to life again in the infant. That there is much in favor of this theory is evident and it agrees well with the other theories.

Durkheim explains the belief among the Australians by pointing out that these natives do not understand how conception takes place, and he says, "Primitive man does not have the idea of an omnipotent God who makes souls out of nothing." (13: 384.) The only way an infant can get a soul then is for someone to die and leave his soul free to begin life over again. That there is much in favor of this argument we must admit, but it is the wish that is at the bottom of the belief: the other reasons mentioned are secondary.

When a member of a tribe dies there is the desire to have him back in the tribe again and especially so if he was a brave warrior. In such a case it would require very little ground for the savage to believe that the dead had returned to life. If a son of the warrior showed the qualities of his father it would very readily be believed that the father's soul was animating the son. The savage, accustomed to mysteries, finds almost anything credible. In the cases mentioned of the father's soul being reincarnated in his eldest son and the grandfather's in the favorite grandchild we have very clear evidences of the working of the wish. Civilized fathers and grandfathers often feel that their very souls are in their children and in case of the savage who believes that the soul is a separable being and is able to get along without the body it would be very easy to suppose that it had changed residences. In considering the forces that have made man superior to the animals we found the parental instinct of fundamental importance. It would be surprising under such circumstances if primitive parents did not feel that their life continued in the lives of their children. At any rate we have the facts of parental affection and belief in reincarnation. The reader may judge for himself as to whether their relation is or is not a causal one.

Closely related to the belief in reincarnation is the belief in resurrection. In religions of all kinds we find the belief that the dead are at times brought to life again. Great men have been supposed to die, be buried, and rise again. What is it that produces this belief in resurrection? It must of course be accounted for by some natural tendency of

the mind, but this does not seem so difficult. To the most intelligent death is hard to grasp, and in case of neurotics it often becomes an impossibility. The insane are often unable to believe that the dead are dead. The image of a person as living may become an obsession, a fixed idea. It may be impossible to get rid of it. Under such circumstances the recurrence to consciousness of the idea of the person being alive added to a half-realization of the fact of death may produce the belief in resurrection. In normal people the thought of a loved one as dead is intolerable and the preservation from despair may demand an ambivalent resurgence of hope that the dead will return to life. Under such circumstances the belief in resurrection may readily arise if the feelings hold too great sway over the intellect. It is in accord with this view that the heroes and great men have most often been supposed to be restored to life again because their loss is felt so deeply. The motives for the belief in reincarnation and resurrection are then very similar.

From our consideration of the belief in reincarnation it is then clear that in the mind of primitive man a future life was not assumed for the benefit of the individual but for the benefit of the race if for the benefit of anyone; the desire so clearly apparent is not for personal immortality in a spirit world but for racial immortality, for personal immortality in offspring, i. e., for plasmic immortality. In this primitive man is but expressing the parental instinct, the strength of which has so steadily increased with evolution. This has of course worked for the most part unconsciously but none the less effectively. The belief in personal survival is a later development, as is also the idea of reward and punishment for the deeds of the earthly life. To the development of these we shall now turn.

Before the belief in personal immortality could develop personality had first to arise, and as Chamberlain says, "It took ages to make mind, ages again to make man, still other ages to make personality." (6:278.) Not only this, but it was necessary that the individual should be remembered for a long period of time if he was to be considered immortal. It could come then only after primitive man had lost his belief that an injury to his image was an injury to himself. Before this time art was not allowed to develop and in the absence of some kind of an objective image the memory of a man rapidly weakened and

died. With the development of painting and sculpture it became possible to preserve the memory of a man through long periods of time, and as men were remembered for a longer time they came to be believed immortal. (6:278.) Crawley and Feuerbach, as we have seen, have also shown the relation of the image to the belief in immortality and Crawley points out that as a matter of fact it is the "heroes," the men who are remembered longest, who are first supposed to be immortal. When we consider that in many savage tribes there is still the belief that the possession of a man's picture gives one a peculiar power over him, it is not surprising that the belief in personal immortality is absent among them.

In the higher religions the other world comes to be primarily a place for rewarding or punishing a man for the deeds of this life. This idea is entirely absent in the most primitive religions and it never appears in any of them to the extent that it does in the religions of more civilized peoples. Its appearance presupposes a higher development of the ethical consciousness than is found in the lowest tribes.

Let us next consider several cases of the belief in a judgment in the next world. Rivers gives an account of one of the simplest kind in the belief of the Todas. There is another world, Amnòdr, which lies below this one. The spirits of the dead in going there must cross on a thread the river Pürvürkin; if they have been just and good in their life they are able to get over but if they have been evil they fall into the river and are bitten by leeches for a period of time proportionate to their misdeeds. When this is over they proceed to join the good in Amnòdr. They do not remain there always but after a time are reborn into the world. (35:397sq.) Codrington reports a more developed belief in Banks' Islands. When a man dies he goes to Panoi. If he is good he is allowed to enter the part where the ghosts live in harmony with each other but if he is wicked he must remain in the bad part of Panoi; and "those who remain in the bad place quarrel and die in misery, not in physical pain indeed, but restless, wandering back to earth, homeless, malignant, pitiable;" (9:274sq.) Here too we see the ghosts finally die. In the most primitive ideas of the future life the other world is like this only not so good; men follow much the same occupations as they did in life. From such

ideas was evolved the mediæval belief that the next world is so far superior to this that the stay on earth is considered as a period of trial and suffering. In savage belief, however, the other world is generally inferior to this one, but as the ethical motive which appears in the examples given is of great importance in the later development of the belief in personal immortality we should note briefly its basis.

Plato showed that the desire for justice is a strong element of the character of every good man and motivates much of our conduct. Kant, following in this line of thought, showed that in this world justice is not done, that the evil flourish while the just suffer; but since human nature demands that justice be done to all, that goodness and happiness, evil and misery, should go together, man instinctively tends to believe that there is another world in which justice is meted out to all. According to Kant then the desire for justice is the basis of the belief in personal immortality. In primitive tribes this cannot be true as we have found because there is generally very little if any difference in the treatment received by the good and the bad in the other world. The part it plays in other religions we shall note later.

As for the desire for influential immortality in primitive tribes very little definite can be said. Primitive men generally have very little room for individual distinction as compared to men of civilized societies. There were few things of importance that they did where they were not constantly confronted with the inflexible customs and taboos of their group. Their range of free action was thus very much limited. But even if this was true it must be said that in general primitive men showed the greatest respect for the beliefs of their group; they were not found wanting in a willingness to sacrifice their lives, if occasion demanded it, for the welfare of the group, and this—if I mistake not—is one of the strongest possible evidences of the desire for influential immortality. So I think that even in the most primitive tribes we find to some extent the desire for all three types of immortality but by far the greatest of these is the desire for plasmic immortality.

To summarize what seem to be primitive man's beliefs on the subject of death and immortality: All deaths are at first supposed to be due to a supernatural cause. The dead are supposed

to live on for a time after death very much as they lived during life and are intensely feared by the living. It would even seem that to primitive man the dead cause more terror than does death itself. There is generally no long life in the other world; real belief in personal immortality is the exception rather than the rule among primitive men. There is a very widespread belief that the dead are reincarnated,—that the individual perishes but that the tribe survives. The most important sources of the belief in a future life are the inability of the mind to grasp the fact of death and the altruistic wish to know that dead friends are happy. The belief in a judgment in the next world is not a factor of importance in regulating conduct in this life.

To complete our survey of the phylogenetic development of the attitude toward death and the belief in immortality we shall review briefly the beliefs as they have appeared in the different religions that have been held by the more civilized peoples. In this way we can more accurately estimate the validity of the conclusions already reached with respect to primitive man.

In taking up the beliefs about death and the future life as they have appeared in the more developed religions of the world we naturally expect to find many variations in the details of the beliefs but these need not prevent us from determining the answers to our two fundamental problems as to the relative natural strengths of the desires for personal, plasmic and influential immortality and as to the relative values of these for motivating moral conduct; for while beliefs will naturally differ among different peoples, the original nature of these different peoples can not differ greatly and an analysis of the varying beliefs and their sources should show which of the various motives are naturally strongest. Keeping this object in view let us pass in review the teachings of the different religions insofar as they relate to our problem.

The beliefs held by the more civilized peoples as to the nature of the soul and of death and their burial and mourning customs are of little importance for us because of their general similarity to those of primitive peoples. In nearly all the religions we find the belief in a duality of body and soul. Still in popular belief the soul is seldom considered to be immaterial.

In some cases we find the shadow considered to be the soul as among the Egyptians, in other cases the blood is the soul as among the Hebrews. (Deut. 12:23.) The belief in several souls is less frequent but is found at times. The conception of death likewise agrees well with primitive beliefs; the soul may be supposed to stay for a time with the body as was the case with the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans; but more commonly it is supposed to leave the body at death and depart for another world or perhaps roam about on earth. There is nothing especially novel about the conceptions of the more civilized peoples. With an increase in civilization mourning customs have in general become more sane. The Hebrews, for example, early prohibited cutting and mutilating the body as a sign of grief. (Deut. 14:1.) We still find, however, the primitive practice continued in the widespread custom of wearing mourning, though it has of course lost its primitive importance. It is no longer—let us hope—intended to pacify the ghost. In Oriental religions we still find some rather barbarous practices but generally they have declined with civilization. Burial customs have in general been determined by the belief as to the future state. In Egypt, where one of the souls was supposed to inhabit the body and where the body may have been supposed to rise again in this world after a long period of time, we find the practice of mummification. In Christian lands where the belief in bodily resurrection exists we find inhumation the general practice and hostility to cremation rather general. An examination of other beliefs shows similar agreement. Many primitive practices still remain,—as, for example, the custom of carrying the corpse feet foremost, although the fear that started the custom has ceased. Without going further into details we may, I think, pass over the beliefs and customs so far mentioned with the assurance that they contain nothing to disprove the conclusions reached as a result of the study of similar beliefs and customs among primitive men.

When, however, we turn to a study of the beliefs relating to a future life as they have appeared among the more civilized peoples we find great differences and it will be necessary for us to examine them in greater detail. This we shall now attempt to do by taking up each of the more important religions separately and attempting to determine just what they have be-

lieved about the future life and also what have been the sources of this belief.

The Religion of the Hebrews. The beliefs of the early Hebrews on the subject of the future life have been the subject of endless discussion but a consideration of the references to the subject indicates that their belief did not differ greatly from that of the native Australians of to-day. Thus Jacob, lamenting the supposed death of Joseph, says, "I will go down to Sheol to my son mourning." (Gen. 37:35.) It is said of Abraham that he "gave up the ghost . . . and was gathered to his people." (Gen. 25:8.) These passages indicate strongly, if they do not prove, that the Hebrews believed that at death the soul went to an underworld to continue its existence. There is little reason for believing, however, that at this time there was a belief in personal immortality.

The immortality that the early Hebrews did believe in was not the immortality of the soul in another world; "the futurity that presented itself to their minds," says W. J. Fox, "was a futurity to be realized by their descendants, or their fellow creatures, in this our world." (Works, VII. 223.) In many ways it appears that the early Hebrew desired and believed in immortality through his descendants rather than personal immortality in another world. This appears from the words of Jehovah: "I Jehovah thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me," (Exod. 20:5.) When the covenant is made with Abraham it is not a promise of eternal life for him personally but that his seed shall be in number as the dust of the earth and shall have a vast territory forever. (Gen. 13:15sq.) It was the belief that a man had no future life without posterity that made possible the sin and death of Onan for refusing to raise up seed to his brother. (Gen. 38:8sq.) I think then we are safe in concluding that the immortality most believed in and desired by the ancient Hebrews was what we have called plasmic immortality.

It was not before the second century B. C. that a very strong belief in personal immortality was found among the Hebrews. (8:244.) In the first century B. C. it began to appear strongly thus furnishing an easy transition to the belief of the early

Christians. It is probable that the belief in the resurrection of the body was the result of Egyptian influence because the Hebrews can hardly have escaped being influenced by the customs in which they were thrown during the exile. With the belief in personal immortality we shall deal later: it is sufficient to have shown that during the greater part of Old Testament history the immortality believed in and worked for by the Hebrews was the immortality of an endless line of offspring.

The Religion of the Early Greeks. The beliefs of the early Greeks respecting the future life were in general very similar to those of primitive peoples. According to Homer there is an underworld, a dreary place, where the souls of all go and are treated very much alike; but according to Pindar this dreary underworld is only for the wicked while there is another world where the good go and are very happy. (28:518.) It seems that the former of these views was the one most generally accepted by the people. The future life was not generally regarded as pleasant nor at first was it supposed to be endless. The kind of immortality that the early Greeks really believed in may be best understood by the following quotation from Harrison:

“The myths of the *heroes* of Athens, from Cecrops to Theseus, show them as kings, that is as functionaries, and, in primitive times, these functionaries assume snake-form. The daimon-functionary represents the permanent life of the group. The individual dies, but the group and its incarnation the king survive. *Le roi est mort, vive the roi.* From these two facts, of group permanency and individual death, arose the notion of reincarnation, *palingenesia*.” (26:xiv.) If space permitted it would be possible to give much additional evidence to show that the Greeks placed much more emphasis on plasmic and influential immortality than they did on personal immortality.

In its later development, however, Greek beliefs are influenced—among the educated classes at least—by the development of speculative thought. But since speculation does not succeed so well in reaching unified results as do the slow processes of the folk soul a number of contradictory theories arose. Epicurus and his school denied personal immortality, the Pythagoreans held the theory of metempsychosis, and Plato was an advocate of personal immortality. The Greek religion came to place more

emphasis on personality but it lost little of its social character. Even the Olympians, the individualistic gods, were governed by Themis, a symbol of herd instinct. (26:485.) But with the rise of philosophy the religion began to lose its distinctive character as a national religion and we may well neglect its later development.

The Religion of the Romans. The beliefs of the early Romans were typical of primitive men. By the time Roman civilization had reached its height, however, a change had come about. The common people believed in a future life where rewards and punishments would be meted out. Not so with the educated classes; Catullus probably represents their belief most accurately when he describes death as "nox perpetua dormienda." Juvenal says that in his day even the children no longer believed in the underworld. It is evident that belief in personal immortality was not strong in Rome. "In each case it is life, not death, that is of interest to the living; death is rather a negation than anything distinctly realized." (19:392.)

Christianity. On first thought Christianity seems in many respects to be the antithesis of the religions so far discussed. Instead of teaching racial and influential immortality it has often advocated celibacy as the ideal of conduct—hence voluntary race suicide as the end of human existence on earth—and, in the same spirit, it has often inculcated a spirit of scorn for this world and its affairs and the opinions of mere men. Christianity has, in short, tended to turn its back on this world—as if it were hopelessly bad—and has taught men to look forward to a future life for their happiness. In so doing it seems to negate the desires which we have found to be fundamental in other religions. However, before we are in position to state conclusions we must examine more closely the sources of the Christian doctrines and note what forces have been active in producing the spread of Christianity.

Though apparently a new religion Christianity retained many elements from the older natural religions. Jesus seems to have accepted the doctrine of immortality as it was found in the beliefs of the Hebrews, the Greeks and some of the Oriental peoples. The belief in the resurrection of the body is in all probability to be credited to Egyptian influence. (10:331.) It is this that has caused inhumation to be so tenaciously retained

as a mode of burial. Many Christians still believe that at the last day the body will come forth from the grave, and so quite naturally they object to destroying it by cremation. In the account of the birth of Jesus we see a survival of the primitive beliefs regarding conception. In the doctrine of salvation we find the symbol of rebirth. It represents the deeply rooted desire for reincarnation. Christians and primitive men alike agree that to be immortal one must be born again. Along with this we see the traces of ancestor worship and the strong feeling of tribal unity in the doctrines of the fatherhood of God and the universal brotherhood of man. Not infrequently it is true Christianity has put a premium on individualism but altruistic love, sympathy, and aid have also been prominent. We are reminded that "whosoever will save his life shall lose it." Social duties have generally received great emphasis. It is these elements having a strong hold on the human heart because of their place in the development of the phylum that I am convinced have made for the permanency of Christianity. Yet in view of the emphasis on celibacy and on personal immortality with everlasting reward or everlasting punishment in a lake of fire it is evident that other forces have been working to produce the spread of Christianity. To an investigation of these we shall now turn.

Ignorance and credulity were of course necessary as a basis for these doctrines but they alone could not well have produced such results. Other forces were necessary and one of these was the development of priests and rulers of superior intelligence. There can be little question that in large part the belief in eternal punishment was produced in order to control more easily the common people and it was transferred to Christianity with all its barbaric harshness. It was the more effective because of the belief then common—and apparently held by Jesus himself—that the end of the world was near. The psychological effect of this was obvious, although it would be incorrect probably to say that the doctrine was invented solely for this effect. From another standpoint the belief in future punishment as well as future reward must be regarded as due in part to the wish for them. As Scott says,—“In days when enmity was wider spread, we find hell wider spread, and almost a necessity to present satisfaction. In some cases, indeed, the

joys of heaven were to consist partly in listening to the howls of the wicked, i. e., other people who are offensive to the imaginer." (38: 111.) This appears in the sermons of Jonathan Edwards and other instances showing this element of the belief have been cited by Tollemache. (46:41.) It is no more unnatural that one should wish an enemy to be punished than that one should wish happiness for a friend. To a much smaller degree perhaps the belief results from the desire that justice be done to all to atone for the injustice of this world. As this source of the belief has been much emphasized we may well examine it more closely.

Originally, as I think Durkheim has shown, the belief in a future life was not related to moral ideas in any direct way. The moralizing of the next world was a later addition. (13: 382.) But with the higher development of the ethical consciousness it came to be realized with increasing vividness that justice is not done to all in this world; virtue is not always rewarded with happiness, nor is vice always punished with misery. Man's sense of justice recoils from the thought that this must ever remain so and demands that there be another life in which all shall secure their just deserts. Where this belief is held together with the belief in a just and all-powerful God, it furnishes the strongest possible basis for faith in personal immortality. This argument has been most forcibly stated by Kant. It is of course only a specific form of the argument from the wish and has the same validity. Under certain conditions it is a factor of great importance but, as history shows, the part played by the future world in the development of religion often makes it impossible to suppose that it results from any sentiment that could be called ethical. Thus the Mohammedans believe in a future life for men where they are rewarded or punished but they do not believe in a future life for women. Yet women are the most zealous of the Mohammedans.

Those who demand a future life in the name of justice are simply showing their belief that every man should live a just and happy life on earth,—if he is deprived of this they desire to give him another chance. They emphasize the living of the full life; the immortality aspect is logically secondary. It is the means and not the end.

Once the belief grows up that this world is only a place of trial and suffering intended as a test and a preparation for a future life and that those who most fully deny their natural impulses will receive the greatest reward, we should expect those fanatics who accept most enthusiastically the doctrine to deny even the strongest impulses and this they did with the result that the vow of celibacy was considered most meritorious. So we see in the very renunciation of marriage and children the strongest proof of their natural regard for them. From our point of view this is a fact of the greatest significance because it is the natural desire of man that concerns us and not what he can be caused to do by taking advantage of his ignorance, fears, and excessive credulity.

If then we have justly interpreted the sources of the Christian belief in personal immortality it appears that in Christianity, as well as in the other religions reviewed, the natural desire for and faith in a future life is weaker than the desire for earthly immortality. In the present time with the rapid spread of education and the consequent decrease in superstition the abnormal aspects of Christianity are being forgotten; society is endeavoring to make this life worth while and to remedy evils here instead of leaving them to the mercy of God and the possibility of correction in another world. In so doing we are expressing again the ideal of racial immortality, and we are making the life of the individual better and happier than ever before.

Oriental Religions. In none of the leading Oriental religions do we find any strong belief in personal immortality. Their faith is limited almost entirely to plasmic and influential immortality. This we may see by examining several of the leading religions.

The attitude of Confucius toward the question of death was that of the agnostic,—thus his question, “While you do not know life, how can you know about death?” (Chinese Classics, tr. by Legge, 7th ed., I, 185.) If we may accept the testimony of Parker the beliefs of the Chinamen of to-day do not differ greatly from those taught by Confucius. Parker says: “There is no dread of death, except in so far as it is painful and a sad severance. Though the Buddhist stories of Heaven and Hell are freely repeated, no Chinaman seriously believes them, nor is

his conduct ever motivated, as it is with Christians, by hopes and fears of what may happen in a future life." (Studies in Chinese Religion, London, 1910, p. 12.) The Chinese do, however, emphasize the importance of posterity: it is the greatest of misfortunes to die without a son. The Chinese religion also recognizes the importance of influential immortality.

Similarly Shinto and Bushido do not teach personal immortality but place great emphasis on plasmic and influential immortality. The moral heredity of a family is one of its strongest forces and to preserve the family line and its traditions is the most sacred of duties. It is this spirit of duty to the group that has enabled the Japanese—without hope in a future life—fearlessly to face death. A more striking case of man's desire for influential immortality rather than life itself could hardly be given. The readiness of the Japanese to die for their country is well known—we should not forget the real source of their bravery.

The belief of the Brahmins with respect to the future life is expressed by the doctrine of the *karman*. According to this doctrine every deed of a man's life plays a part in determining the future destiny of his soul, and it is only the effects of his deeds that survive him. The soul itself is immortal but with each reincarnation there is a change of consciousness and no memories are retained from the past life. The immortality of *karman* is then essentially an immortality of influence. In the later period we learn from the Laws of Manu that the Brahmin believed he could not attain eternal happiness unless he had a son to make the proper sacrifices. (Manu, VI. 35.) Plasmic as well as influential immortality was then greatly desired.

In Buddhism celibacy is highly commended and the immortality that the Buddhist strives for is essentially an immortality of influence. This will appear from the following quotation from Shaku: "man's life is not limited to this existence only, and . . . if he thinks, feels, and acts truthfully, nobly, virtuously, unselfishly, he will live forever in these thoughts, sentiments, and works; for anything good, beautiful and true is in accordance with the reason of existence, and is destined to have a life eternal. This is the Buddhist conception of immortality." (Buddhist Conception of Death, *Monist*, Vol. 17, 1907, p. 1.)

It seems safe to say then that the Orientals have not developed very strong faith in a future life in another world. Some desire and believe in plasmic immortality, all seek influential immortality.

We have now passed in review the most important facts relating to the phylogenetic development of the attitude toward death and the types of belief in immortality. We have attempted to give a psychological interpretation to these in order to determine their real significance. The following conclusions seem justified: 1. primitive man's fear of death and the dead is due primarily to his superstitions about the cause of death and the nature of the dead; 2. his belief in a future life for the individual does not result primarily from a desire for such a life but rather from his inability to grasp the fact of death; 3. the immortality desired by primitive man is racial rather than personal and appears with greatest force in the belief in reincarnation; 4. in higher civilizations the belief in personal immortality appears and survives largely through the agency of the priests but no religion long succeeds in remaining vital if it does not emphasize the social aspects of life,—the altruistic aspect of the attitude toward death appears strongly in the strength of the desire for plasmic and influential rather than personal immortality; and 5. conduct is generally found to be motivated more by the desire for plasmic and influential immortality than by the desire for personal immortality.

To throw more light on our problem we may now turn to the development of the attitude toward death and the belief in immortality as it appears in the individual.

THE ONTOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARD DEATH AND THE BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY.

The very young child's idea of natural death seems to correspond very closely to the Melanesian idea of it as expressed by the word *mate*. Natural death is not an event but a state or condition. The very old are partly dead; they cannot run and play as the child does; when they do die they are not supposed to be fully dead for some time. (Cf. 38:88sq.) The abstract idea of death is of course impossible for the child. So when children wish people dead, as they sometimes do, it is not so bad as it seems,—they only wish the offensive person out of

sight. The thought of death is, in fact, not necessarily unpleasant to the child: funerals may even be interesting and pleasant events. (38:93.)

The fear of death can hardly be considered as instinctive. As Ferrero points out, children do not fear death *per se* (16:361sq.) This fear must be acquired from experience. (38:118sq., 25:223, 14:31.) Stekel's conclusion that all fear is fear of death does not seem then to hold.

The natural ideas of children with reference to the nature of the dead are difficult to secure because of the instruction received from parents and teachers. Nevertheless we do know a few things of value. Children, like primitive men, ascribe life to inanimate things and to a greater degree to the dead; they often think of them as having smother feelings, being asleep, cold, feeling the damp and the rain, wanting to turn, being tired, lonesome; they often fear they have been buried alive, etc. (38:97.) The belief that the dead are alive in their graves must be considered as a natural one while the belief that the dead have gone to heaven is to be credited mostly to the influences of instruction.

For the most detailed study of children's ideas about immortality we are indebted to Street. From the data at his disposal he concludes that children have very undeveloped ideas as to the nature of the soul and the future life. Their attitude toward heaven was not very favorable. Only one fourth of them desired to go to heaven, the others preferred to remain on earth. In those cases it appeared that heaven was desired because some loved one was supposed to be there rather than because heaven was supposed to be in other respects more desirable than earth. The question of rewards and punishment does not seem to have affected the attitude toward a future life very much. (44:283sq.) In 80% of the cases the belief in immortality was credited to the instruction received in religion. Among those who doubted the existence of a future life boys were more numerous. (44:285.) This study shows then very clearly that the child does not desire a future life ordinarily,—he is far more concerned with the life of earth and regards it as more satisfactory. In this he at least agrees with primitive men, and perhaps with a majority of those who are civilized. And when he does think of death he thinks of it from the altruistic

point of view. If he commits suicide it is for the effect it will have on others.

In early childhood we have found little fear of death but from the age of seven there is a fairly gradual rise in the curve until the age of thirteen or fourteen when as Dr. Hall says,—“The horror of death seems most intense in the years just preceding the great altruistic tide of adolescence.” (25:223.) In describing this fear he says,—“Dread of death is apt to focus, now on fear of crape, . . . on the creepy feeling of worms, being buried alive and being nailed in, . . . etc. The young are apt to fear death for themselves, the old for others. Only 11 reported specific fears of hell. In nine cases religion has removed fear of death, but in far more of our returns it has caused or increased it.” (25:223.) From this period when fear is greatest until the age of about twenty there is, according to Scott, a decline in the fear of death; at twenty there is a rather quick drop in the curve for a short time, followed by a gradual decline until the beginning of the period of old age when the curve rises gradually until death. (38:109.) I do not regard the latter part of this statement as established but that is to be discussed later. We shall now turn to the period of adolescence.

Adolescence is pre-eminently the period of the dawn of altruism and love, and this is of the greatest significance in determining the general mental attitude in other directions, especially in religion; for, as Dr. Hall says,—“Psychologically, religion and love rise and degenerate together. One test of an age, race, or civilization is to keep these two as near as love and death are to each other, and in as wholesome relations.” (Adolescence, II., 126.)

It is in adolescence then that we should expect to find the first great awakening to the vital problems of life. The studies of religion made during the past two decades show conclusively that it is at this period that religion takes its rise. Among nearly all peoples initiation, confirmation, and conversion are characteristic of adolescence, and while among Protestants conversion has tended to lose much of its proper significance, it still remains true that with the development of physical and mental powers during adolescence, the youth or maiden accepts the customs and beliefs of the group,—which in Christian societies means of

course the acceptance of the belief in immortality, for whatever is the customary belief in any group is almost invariably accepted by the adolescent. We see then that the acceptance of the belief implies an acceptance of social responsibilities rather than a desire for eternal life in another world. The importance of this is exceedingly great in estimating the value of the belief as a stimulus to moral conduct. Its value as a control rests more on its relation to social than to individualistic feelings.

Some light has been thrown on the adolescent attitude toward death by the study of suicide. There are very few who at this age do not at some time consider self-destruction. Scott found in his investigation that only 7% of those reporting had not at some time in their life thought of self-destruction. (38:98.) The ages for which this was most generally reported ranged from twelve to seventeen. The actual number who do at this age commit suicide is of course not very great but it is the motive for it in which we are primarily concerned.

According to Adler suicide grows out of a strong feeling of *Minderwertigkeit* and a stormy effort at over-compensation. This leads to suicide in order to cause pain to relatives, friends and lovers and force them to recognize the worth of the deceased. The feeling of *Minderwertigkeit* itself is very often due to uncertainty as to the future sex rôle. (1:356sq.) Ferrero also held that suicide was for the purpose of causing sorrow to loved ones. (16:364.) Eulenburg collected data regarding suicides of persons under twenty and of those cases where the cause could be learned more than half in case of females and a smaller number in case of males were due to misfortunes in love. (15.) In a number of cases lovers died together. On the mental side it must be admitted that death can become agreeable by having agreeable ideas associated with it. (16:366.) Further evidence of the part played by sexual factors in determining suicide is found in the results of the clinical study made by Pfeiffer. In three fourths of the cases dissection revealed a pathological basis for the suicide while the remaining fourth were evidently not entirely in good condition. (32:108.) In case of the females the sexual organs were in a majority of the cases found to be in a pathological condition. (32:155.) In the face of such evidence it must be admitted that the relation between love and the attitude toward death is very close. If

love is blighted life may cease to be worth living,—the will to live may be destroyed.

We see then how strong is the desire for plasmic as opposed to individual immortality. When the hope of the one is destroyed life itself often ceases to be valued. But this also shows the strength of the desire for influential immortality; for by no means all cases resulting from a feeling of *Minderwertigkeit* are due to sexual defect: many cases are due to a feeling of inability to meet the expectations of the group in which the individual is placed. The hope of attaining influential immortality is lost and with it the desire for life itself tends to disappear. In agreement with this Durkheim says that suicide is essentially a social phenomenon and “varies inversely as the degree of integration of religious, domestic and political society.” (12:222.) When man loses the support of social opinion life is less valuable to him and may become unbearable.

From the above I think it must be granted that the deepest desires of the adolescent relate to earth rather than heaven, to plasmic and influential immortality rather than personal.

With the passing of the period of growth there is of course the probability that ideas and beliefs will become static if they do not interfere with life. In case of a belief that has the sanction of society this probability is greatly increased. We should naturally expect then that once the belief in personal immortality has been accepted as a result of religious instruction it would ordinarily continue to be held for the remaining part of life. If it were a vital part of the spiritual life of a group we should not expect to find it weakening with the increase in age and the consequent approach of the time when the belief should be more vitally felt. Yet in many cases the belief weakens. Accurate statistics cannot be had to show exactly the comparative strengths of the belief at different ages but the following table from Scott is very suggestive:

	Ages	-16	16-20	20-40	40-
Believe in a future life.		95%	75%	63%	60%
Do not believe in it.		5	7	31	30
Not given	18	6	10

(38:104.)

From the above we see that with the approach of old age the number of believers in a future life steadily decreased. Simi-

larly studies made on college students show a decay in the belief during the last years of college. (29 and 41.) This is not difficult to understand: the intellectual elements of the belief are often destroyed by the study of science and philosophy, and scepticism follows. The greater variability of the male appears here in the fact that men doubt religious dogmas more often than do women. The important thing in this connection appears in the fact that the devotion for the supernatural tends to be transferred to the race. Apparently doubt with respect to heaven gives greater faith in man and things earthly.

With the increase in age there is a steady increase in the relative number of suicides, at least up to the age of about seventy when there seems to be a slight drop in the proportion. (43:181sq.) As Strahan, Durkheim and others have shown the rate does not seem to be greatly influenced by religious beliefs and fears. What it does now, I think, is a decrease in the will to live. From the period of maturity our strength and vitality tend to diminish. Very often this is accompanied by an increase in physical pains and dependent mental distress, and, as the Freudians have shown, each pain weakens the strength of the will to live. The discouraged lover is far more willing to meet death than is the successful one. The chronic dyspeptic may find life unendurable while his friend with a good digestion is full of the joy of life. Life is by no means unconditionally desirable, and the dread of death as co-function of the love of life is subject to the same conditions of increase and decrease in strength. An excellent illustration of the working of this principle is found in Abraham's psycho-analytical study of Segantini. The latter's misfortunes and sorrows had prepared him to face death without fear if not with pleasure.

This decrease in the strength of the will to live has also very close relation to the sexual life. If we neglect the period of childhood we find that the period of greatest sexual activity is characterized by the smallest number of suicides and as sexual activity declines suicides increase. This is only one of the many evidences of the close relation between sex and death. Witness, for example, the adolescent's fears, or the despair of those for whom love has been blighted by venereal disease—no despair could be greater. It is only in proportion as love is kept strong that life is valued.

Some writers go so far as to hold that man should with the approach of natural death have an instinctive desire for it. Thus Metchnikoff in the "Prolongation of Life" (N. Y., 1907, p. 125), says: "It would be natural if, just as in sleep there is an instinctive desire for rest, so also the natural death of man were preceded by an instinctive wish for it." That a real desire for death seldom appears before natural death must be admitted perhaps, but that death inspires terror in the aged has not been demonstrated. On the contrary Bazelaire de Ruppierre, who made a careful study of the fears of the aged, states that death is generally peaceful. (4:61.) Nothnagel reaches the same conclusion. (30:48.) Whether or not a positive desire for death appears with age it seems certain that fear of death weakens.

The problem as to the kind of immortality most desired by the aged is a very difficult one to solve. According to Runze, "The desire for earthly immortality seems more characteristic of senescence than of the activity and religious enthusiasm of youth." (37:49.) But whether this is a correct statement of the case or not we cannot at present say. The evidence, however, indicates that it is.

As Egger has emphasized, the young have had few experiences to look back on with pride, their 'self' is less developed, their career lies mostly in the future, and consequently they tend to live in an ideal world, which is also a future world, where their hopes will be realized. Not so with the aged, their life has been long and filled with many experiences, their consciousness of self is highly developed, their aspirations have been for the most part attained or abandoned, they live not in the future but in the past. (14:32.) In so far as this is true—and I think we cannot doubt that it is largely so—the young must not be supposed to desire earthly immortality so much as do the aged. The youth with his confident idealism dreams of fabulous worlds of the future, while the man of long experience is more realistic and is content with earth.

Finally, as regards the aged, it can not well be denied that they tend to live in the deeds of their children. They are willing to make every kind of sacrifice to promote the welfare and happiness of those who continue the family line. The tie that binds child to parent may be, and often is, weak but the

tie that binds parent to child is one of the strongest by which the human heart can be bound. Normally the parent is not half so much concerned about a future life for himself in another world as he is concerned about the life of his child in this world. His deepest desire is not for personal immortality but for plasmic immortality. In individuals yet more altruistic we find a devotion not merely to one's family but to a larger social group or even to the human race as a whole. In such cases we find that the immortality most desired is that of works. The individual desires to accomplish something for the good of the race: his striving is not for personal immortality but for an immortality of influence.

If then we have correctly interpreted the desire for immortality as it appears during the different periods of life it seems safe to say that the desire for personal immortality influences conduct much less than does the desire for the other types of immortality. Before concluding our study of the ontogenetic development of the attitude toward death it is fitting that we attempt an analysis of the mental state when in the presence of death itself. To this we shall now turn.

In the mind of the average man death is supposed to be painful and distressing. Yet this is very seldom true. In the majority of cases death takes place only after a person has become unconscious and so neither pain nor distress can be felt. Studies made by Osler (31:19), Finot (18:225sq.), Bazelaire de Ruppierre (4:61), and Nothnagel (30:48sq.) show conclusively that both physical pain and mental distress—even in case of culprits—are nearly always absent in actual death though of course the sickness leading up to death may be painful. Even the irreligious die peacefully. Thus the Rev. J. Warton writes, "I am shocked, and my blood runs cold within me, when I hear, as I too often do, of the greatest of sinners, with no time for solid repentance, quitting the world with all the religious assurance of the greatest of saints; dying, in short, in the worst of causes as if they died in the very best." (47:252.)

The idea of death doubtless plays its part in making death terrible under some circumstances but there is reason to believe that such cases are rare. To Egger we are indebted for a careful study of the experiences of people who have been in great danger of death through drowning, falling from a height,

etc., but have been saved from death. These are not, it has been objected, real experiences of the dying, but there is little reason for supposing that they would have been otherwise if a fortunate chance had not prevented death from really taking place. If a man in water sinks and becomes unconscious but is pulled out and restored to consciousness the value of his testimony as a description of the consciousness of the dying should be as great as though he had really died and given us an account later—supposing of course that this were really possible. At any rate the results are worth consideration.

From the data at his disposal Egger finds that the consciousness of those who think themselves dying is characterized by four conditions: first, there is a sentiment of beatitude, a feeling of indifference and submission to the hand of Fate; second, there is an anaesthesia of touch and no feeling of sadness but unusual acuity of hearing and of sight; third, there is an unusual rapidity of thought and imagination; and fourth, much of one's past life is reviewed and especially one thinks of the effect of his death on loved ones. (14.) The first three of these points agree well with results already considered: here as in the cases reported we find the absence of pain or fear. The fourth point, however, deserves special mention. That much of one's past life is reviewed shows one of the traits most characteristic of consciousness when death is seriously thought of, i. e., the tendency to survey one's career, to ask what it has been worth, to select the dearest memories and take a last look, and finally to think of the loved ones who will be left behind. The accounts often show that the person who thought himself dying was far more concerned over the welfare of his friends than over his own fate.

As Egger points out the extent to which the past career presents itself to the mind depends on the age of the one having the experience. Children have no well developed 'self' and so of course there is no rapid review of the past life, but in the aged such rapid reviews are common.

Following Egger's article Sollier, Moulin, and Keller report additional experiences of those in imminent danger of death. (39.) Sollier finds the sentiment of beatitude common to all cases. This is not a positive feeling of well-being but rather it is the absence of pain. Moulin likewise finds an absence of

physical pain. Keller disagrees with the others in that he insists that in case of drowning there is a desperate struggle accompanied by great fear until exhaustion; then, he agrees, there is an absence of fear,—once the struggle is given up the drowning man lets himself go calmly to repose. So he grants the real point at issue.

Scott collected 25 cases of experiences near death. He finds the same absence of pain and fear but does not find the synthetic view of life reported by some observers. There are great variations,—“some slight irrelevant idea, or the thought of others being most frequent.” (38:103.) This fact of thinking of others which is so often observed lends strong support to the position of Egger when he holds that religion, in taking the final memories of a man as an indication of his feeling of responsibility to God, is only controlling and moralizing a natural phenomenon, for, as a matter of fact, the dying man is more often thinking of the judgment of his contemporaries and immediate posterity. (14:353.) In those who have been brought strongly under the influence of the Church we should of course expect to find this feeling of responsibility referred to God rather than to man, but an empirical study of the question seems to show that the feeling is more naturally directed to man. If this is true we have lost rather than gained by attempting to change the direction of the feeling, because the more natural direction must be regarded as having the stronger hold on human nature.

In the cases so far mentioned more attention has been given to the consciousness of those in danger of death by accident. There are of course certain differences to be observed in case the danger is from serious illness. As an excellent example of the mental state of one under such circumstances I take the following quotation,—“I, who in my living life had clung so hard to personality, had said there was no ‘*after*’ if the ego ceased to be, I, as I, did not exist. The individual was too little. And yet I was. And immortality, a continued being, an everlasting sleep, the continuance of self, annihilation even, or any other of the things which we desire or fear while this world shuts us in, just didn’t matter, for whatever was in that Beyond I knew was surely *best*.” (2:555.) This account is typical of what occurs in a great many cases of dangerous ill-

ness. There is an anaesthesia of the sensory end organs for pain and with the absence of pain there is no fear. The sick person loses interest in the affairs of life,—the will to live is deadened.

In many cases of serious illness there is of course no clear consciousness of the approach of death. The dying man, while still hoping to live, passes into a state of unconsciousness and dies. His attitude toward death does not consequently concern us especially.

The last words of the dying have often been quoted to show the attitude of the dying toward imminent death. An examination of many of these shows clearly that men die as they have lived and face death calmly and without fear. As typical examples I take the following:

“John Bunyan—Take me, for I come to thee.

“Thomas Paine (to Dr. Manley, who asked him, ‘Do you wish to believe that Jesus was the son of God?’)—I have no wish to believe on the subject.

“Rabelais—Ring down the curtain; the farce is over!” (5: 308sq.)

The dying are also often reported as having visions, and in these visions it has been noted that the faces of deceased loved ones often appear. This shows unquestionably that the consciousness of the dying tends very often to center on thoughts of others rather than on self.

In view of the facts given above it seems that we may safely accept the statement of Scott that “the conception of death does not awaken in the most of cases a very deep individualistic or self-centered consciousness. The centre of the idea of death and its radiations is outside of what is ordinarily called the self, and is essentially altruistic.” (38:118.)

In concluding this part of our study then we may say that a survey of the ontogenetic development of the attitude toward death and the types of belief in immortality shows that in the development of the individual as in the development of the race there is naturally more faith in and desire for plasmic and influential immortality than personal immortality. In no important respect is it necessary to change the conclusions reached in the study of the race.

CONCLUSION

We have endeavored to point out and interpret the essential characteristics of man's attitude toward death and the sources of his belief in a future life. One of the problems in which we have been most concerned is the relation between moral conduct on the one hand and the attitude toward death and the belief in a future life on the other. We have attempted to estimate the comparative strengths of the desire for personal, plasmic and influential immortality as controls of conduct. It is now in place to summarize our results and apply them to the question of moral and religious education.

To primitive man death is a mystery. He understands neither its cause nor its meaning. In the lowest tribes it is always supposed to be due to some supernatural force; no tribe thinks of it as being the end of individual existence. In fact, we have found that primitive men have a strong belief that death is not the end of life, that the ghost of a man lives on after death, and in the lowest societies this ghost is almost invariably greatly feared. Not infrequently it would seem that the ghost is feared more than death itself. But the future life is not eternal; after a time the ghost dies or returns to life as an infant. It is seldom that the other world is thought of as a place of reward and punishment.

The sources of the belief in a future life we have found to be numerous but the most fundamental of these have probably been the inability of the understanding to grasp the fact of death and the desire to know that the dead still live. Although these two have been supplemented by other forces they must be considered as primary. The persistence of the belief is of course largely due to its incorporation among the customary beliefs and traditions of the different religions.

The consciousness aroused by the idea of death is not, as has been generally supposed, primarily an egoistic one; it tends far more to center on others and so is to be considered as essentially altruistic. Man tends to think of the influence of his death on others rather than of its influence on himself.

We may now attempt to answer the question as to the value of the different types of belief in immortality as controls of conduct. In so doing let it be clearly understood that we are not raising the question as to whether these different beliefs

are or are not true: our problem is rather to determine the influence these beliefs may have on conduct, i. e., to determine their value as motives to action. We can neither prove nor disprove personal immortality but we can determine with more certainty the influence of the belief on the conduct of those who hold it.

There can be no question, I think, that the belief in a future existence in another world where one is rewarded or punished according to his life may often have considerable influence on conduct for good or for evil. There are of course those who believe that sound morality is impossible without the belief and so they urge it as the fundamental basis of all moral and religious instruction but that their position is not well taken the following quotation from Fox shows clearly:

“When modern Christians are disposed to be censorious, as modern Christians sometimes are, on those who hold not the like faith with themselves, for their want of the great death-hope which Christianity boasts,—when they point to the non-anticipating bed of the dying unbeliever, and, without regard for a life which may have been irreproachable, utter expressions of stern condemnation,—let it be remembered that such were the deaths of the patriarchs of humanity,—of the fathers of nations,—of the oldest members of that Church which in most theologies is identified with the Christian Church,—of those who are believed to have gone first into the kingdom of heaven, and to sit down with whom is one of the common descriptions of paradise. Thus bounded were their views and the futurity that presented itself to their minds was a futurity to be realized by their descendants, or their fellow creatures, in this our world.” (20:222sq.)

The above quotation points out clearly enough that the belief in personal immortality is not necessary for a life of high moral character, but it is not sufficient to let the argument rest here. A three-fold objection must be offered to making the belief the foundation of morality. The first of these is suggested by the following quotation from Powell:

“I doubt if the doctrine of immortality, as generally taught, has not been productive of more mischief than any other doctrine of a false creed. That which renders this life tame, despicable, a thing valueless, is precisely what we do not need,

and which we cannot too much regret. It is not religion, for it does not honor the noble, it does not worship the true and beautiful. It has no ideals but the unseen. Its skeptic is not the man who lacks faith in things, in man, in deeds, but he who lacks faith in ghosts and rituals." (Our Heredity from God, 4th ed., N. Y., 1889, p. 414.) From the ethical standpoint the doctrine, as generally taught, is even more objectionable because of the motive to which it so often appeals. There can be no question that in endeavoring to cause men to be good by threatening them with hell-fire we are appealing to a low part of their nature and cannot secure in such a manner the development of their higher and better moral and religious nature.

In the second place the belief in personal immortality as a basis of moral education may be opposed on the ground that it is by no means a secure one. With an increase in education the firm believer often becomes sceptical (29 and 41) and in such cases there is inevitably the danger that morals will be undermined along with the faith which serves as its foundation. This alone is a danger of no mean proportion.

But aside from the objections given, the attempt to found morality on belief in personal immortality neglects important psychological principles. If conduct is to be most effectively regulated it must be done by securing the proper development of natural tendencies and instincts. The higher moral characteristics must be connected with the fundamental instincts. Only in this way can the most effective and the surest permanent control of conduct be secured.

We have shown that the desire for plasmic and influential immortality is naturally stronger than the desire for personal immortality and there can be no question that the instincts from which the two former spring are among the strongest possessed by man. In fact, as McDougall says, "It is probable that these two instincts in conjunction, the reproductive and the parental instincts, directly impel human beings to a greater sum of activity, effort, and toil, than all the other motives of human action taken together." (Social Psychology, London, 1908, p. 269.) If this estimate of the strength and influence of the reproductive and parental instincts is correct—and I think we cannot safely question it—then there is no more secure basis upon which to build morality than upon the desire for earthly

immortality through posterity. In its wider irradiations this produces the desire to promote racial immortality and in so doing to secure individual immortality through one's influence in promoting the advancement of the race. To show the deeper meaning of this point of view we may well take the following quotation from President Hall:

"The 1,500,000,000 people, more or less, alive on the earth to-day are but a mere handful compared with the countless generations who are to proceed from their loins in the future. All posterity slumbers now in our bodies, as we did in our ancestors. They demand of us the supreme right and blessing of being well born, and they will have only curses for us if they awaken into life handicapped by our errors. Their interests should dominate all our lives, for that is living for the children, for our duty of all duties is to transmit the sacred torch of life undimmed, and if possible a little brightened, to our children's children in *saecula saeculorum*. This is the chief end of man and of woman. The welfare of all this cloud of witnesses is committed to our honor and virtue. The basis of the new biological ethics of to-day and of the future is that everything is right that makes for the welfare of the yet unborn and all is wrong that injures them, and to do so is the unpardonable sin—the only one nature knows" (*Eugenics Review*, Jan. 1910, p. 1sq.)

This point of view must be adopted by our system of moral and religious education if we are to do the greatest good. Such an ideal is at once more noble, more natural, and more attainable than have been the ideals that have dominated our education in the past and it must succeed.

If the view that our results have pointed to is correct and the desire for racial immortality is more natural and important then we should expect to see moral degeneration characterized by a lowering of the sense of honor which demands life under the best conditions for the unborn. The decay of a people would be paralleled by the decay in the parental instinct. According to Sutherland this is the case. (45:I. 125.) Greece and Rome fell and various other nations have fallen, not because of external foes, but because of the moral degeneration which caused a neglect of the duties of posterity.

With the proper system of moral and religious education, as

President Hall says,—“All longings for immortality will not be satisfied with the perpetuation of the shell of our selfish selves, but will focus on our immortal race as its true and proper object, with the larger perspective of all being in the background.” (Adolescence, I., 128.) Only in this way can we conform to the deepest instincts of the folk-soul, and in so doing secure the highest development both of the individual and of the race.

In bringing this paper to a close I wish to express my indebtedness to the numerous members of Clark University who have in various ways aided me from time to time, but especially must I express my obligation to President Hall for his unfailing suggestions, criticism, and encouragement.

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RELIGIOUS OFFERINGS IN JAPAN

By WILLIAM HUGH ERSKINE

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Man has created gods in his own image and according to his own needs. Happiness has been his chief pursuit as seen in the religious life among primitive peoples. In Japan the day for the *matsuri* is given over to holiday making, the temples are highly decorated, the people are dressed in their gayest clothing and none of the seriousness common to the religious life of the west is seen. It seems more like a picnic gathering than a band of worshippers.

On these festival occasions, at least one member of the family must go and pay his respects to the gods, and he the eldest son. Tracing this back we see that the eldest son himself was at one time considered the proper offering to the gods, when everything else failed. In the transition from the *sacrifice* of the eldest son, we find that he became the priest of the family, the religious head, the one to keep in touch with things divine, the one to keep the lights burning, to eat the food offered to the gods and thus by these functions get the divine power needed by the family.

This idea of the first son being the proper offering to the gods, is correlative with the first of the catch, the first of the grain, the first of one's handiwork, *i. e.*, the firstlings.

In the offering of the firstlings, man did not always offer the best that he was capable of producing, since he improved with experience, so we find man offering in addition, the best, the purest, the one without blemish, the perfect things.¹ In Japan we find the best rice, the best saké, the best tea, the best *mochi*, offered to the gods and also that the temple clothes are the best clothes.

A third thing to note, is that the offering is of vital importance

¹ In America we see the New Easter bonnet, the Sunday clothes, the clean shave, the best food, all for our religious sabbath. The Jews had their best wine, the best grain, the best of the flock, etc.

to the worshipper. In fact the food process is seen in the offering. In rice districts, the offerings are rice and rice products. In wheat districts, wheat and the wheat products. In tea districts, tea offerings. In the sweet potato districts, the sweet potato. In fishing districts, fish and fishing implements. The blacksmiths give iron offerings, the tinner, tin offerings, etc., etc. Thus every age and every trade has its proper offering, and the offering indicates the manner of the livelihood of the worshipper.

A fourth point, is that man has given the gods the traits of men and has endowed them with the gifts for pleasure common to men. The eldest son was offered because of the joy over the man child born in the family, and the promise of more children which it meant. The virgin was offered to show the desire to appease the gods with what gave man his highest enjoyment, for in that age the animal nature was in the ascendancy and not the intellectual or the ethical or spiritual. The dance of the *Kagura*, "god pleasure," shows forth man's effort to please the gods by giving the dance and food which delighted the eyes of man.

Thus to sum up, the offerings are the first, the perfect, the most vital, the commercially valuable, and the most enjoyable.

The classification of the offerings according to ages or work is a good aid to study but can not be said to show clear and distinct periods. One can not say that this offering began at this period and ended at another set time. All we can say is that one man tried a certain offering; it brought results; another tried it and it worked for him also, and it becomes the common use of the group as long as it brings results. This is illustrated in the story of the man with the wen on his face and the efforts of his jealous neighbor to follow his example and get his own removed.

The classification in this paper is a purely arbitrary one and one which I find fits the results of my study.

Port towns give the visitor to Japan a view of the new Japan with all the western improvements, and a few miles in the interior gives Japan as she was a few years ago. A hundred miles away from the beaten track gives Japan as she was a hundred years ago. Still farther in among the mountain people shows Japan as she was several hundred years ago. It was while traveling among the sea and mountain people in the

interior of the northeast that the facts of this paper were discovered.

PREHISTORIC CLASS.

For the purpose of clearness and as an aid to see the development of the offering, I have divided the offerings into twelve classes. The first are those of the time before Jimmu Tenno, when Japan was inhabited by the cave dwellers. That man wanted the desires of heart satisfied, and so as to show the gods what he wanted, he set apart the objects of his prayer. The prayer or desire set forth is seen in the *Emado* of every temple, where the prayers are pictured on a tablet of wood usually about six by four inches. The mother would have a picture of a woman of overflowing breasts, the man desiring to overcome the desire for *saké* or wine would have a picture of a wine barrel or bottle and a lock over it, meaning that he wanted his heart locked against the desire for drink.²

Our primitive Japanese wanted big nuts on the trees, and so he sets aside for the gods to see, big nuts as an offering. He wants clear water to drink, especially when the stream is muddy, or dry, so he sets aside the cup of water. This is still seen in the cup of water offered to the dying as the final service to one's dying relatives, it is called "*shinumizu*." The cup of water offered to the dead at the funeral, to the dead on the anniversaries, offered at the graves, on the family god shelf all the time, at the Holy places, at the high places, to the images of children, poured on the images as a work of merit, are good illustrations of its importance.

It must be borne in mind in the study of all ages, that the offering is to show the gods just what is wanted and not necessarily as a thank offering.

NATURAL CLASS.

The next age is that when man began to act like a human being, and his god takes on the traits of man. Our man selects his food and begins to live above the mere animal life. He wants good fruit on the trees, fine herbs, plants, fat and juicy

² Since writing the above paper, Dr. De Forest's daughter has published his notes on the *Emado* in a booklet called "*Ema*."

roots, all of the first rank, and so that the gods may know he selects the best and after admiring them, offers them to the gods in a very crude way. Natural plants are thought to have more divine power than the cultivated ones, even today. In addition to the fruit offerings and roots on the god shelf of the Shintoists, we have the offering of the many green plants in all parts of the empire. Especially sacred is the *sakaki*, the evergreen which at one time marked the holy places. The natural plants used in all funerals in Japan are clearly a relic of this age.

FISHING CLASS.

Man could not live by plants alone, so he in his search for food finds the rivers and sea filled with fish. He soon becomes a skillful fisherman, and while enjoying his work on the banks of the rivers as much as the anglers of today, he counted it not luck but divine power which gave him the fifteen pounder so well described in Kipling's American Notes. That the gods might know the size and the kind wanted, the best of the catch are offered. The *sonaedai*, offered seabream, is on every god shelf, even many miles away from the sea. The efforts of the fisherman to appease the gods, for the good catch, for the prosperity of the village, for the control of the waves, for the safe return of the men fishing at sea, are seen in every fishing hamlet. One of the three most prosperous temples in Japan is a fisherman's temple, where there is a wooden fish offered to the gods. A piece of this wood boiled in water will give a drink which is considered the best charm and cure-all for the fisherman, and the best aid in pregnancy for their women.

HUNTING CLASS.

Rainy days, or days when the waves were high, drove our Japanese into the mountains for food. To insure a good catch and the safety of the hunters in future expeditions, since many lives were often lost in capturing the wild beasts, the best of the catch, or the best of the flesh of the catch was offered. The many superstitions about the gods demanding the human being for food and the efforts to overcome these have produced in every hamlet a saviour, so that we are not surprised to find in

all parts and in all their religions the conspicuous part which a saviour plays in their religious life. Many westerners thinking that the idea of a saviour was borrowed from Christianity, but the idea was in Japan long before the time of the Christ.

Most of the offerings of this age were the best part of the beasts or of special parts thought to have special healing power, as the *liver*. These are offered and left on the god shelf so as to come in contact with the divine power and then are used for miraculous healing. The flesh was offered in much the same way, and then the eldest of the family ate this while the rest of the family looked on religiously. The best illustration of this class of meat offerings is seen in the story of the Ainu, now so common to American readers. The bear is captured and the gods thanked for their aid by the whole animal being offered and then after much religious ceremony partaken of by the tribe. The eating is as much a religious ceremony as the praying, for in eating divine power is obtained.

Among the Japanese proper, we see the offerings of fowls, rabbits, deer, wild boars, etc. And before the day of Buddhistic influence much meat was offered in all parts of Japan. A visit to Nara will show the part the deer has played in the life of the people.

PASTORAL CLASS.

The fifth age is that of the time when man trained his own animals for food and work. The cow is easily trained to be milked and the life of the tribe is prolonged. The ox and the horse and even the dog soon learn to pull the loads for the man and thus his life is made easier. These blessings are the gifts of the gods, who were at first, themselves animals, as the *Shimmei*, god horse; *shingyu* or god ox, etc.

A study of the *eta* or pariah of Japan will show the part the pastoral life had before the introduction of Buddhism. Yet while flesh eating has been forbidden, the pastoral age is clearly seen in the life of the people. Man needed a horse for war, bulls for pulling, dogs for watching and hunting, etc., and these wants are in the hands of the god. There is no ethical phase as in the sin offering of the Jews; yet the animals play their part in the development of the race.

AGRICULTURAL CLASS.

The sixth classification is that growing out of the need for food for man and beast. After roving over hill and dale and finding none, our early Japanese settled down to home life and to the cultivation of the fields around him and becomes the *hyakusho* or farmer. The fields are planted and watered by man but the gods give the increase, and so as to get this increase, the religious festivals connected with seed time and harvest arise. The first and the best of the grain are offered to show just what is wanted for next year. The *Ninamisai*, or new rice, *Kwannamisai* or god tasting, *Higan* or Equinoxes, the *doyadoya* or naked dance, the New Year or sun returning festivals, the many set days for the planting and transplanting, etc., connected with *Inarisan*, or *Hachimansan*, patron gods of the rice field, etc., are some of the many festivals of this age and class.

Out of the many agricultural feasts have grown many rites connected with the life of the family. The time for the wedding is when the plants are mating. The many stories connected with phallic worship and the sexual life too licentious to tell in a paper were as object lessons to the gods to show them what they could do for the crops. These stories must not be judged from our standpoint, their food depended on the successful crop, and as man seeks to be successful today, so the man of old sought the same, but with a different standard, and, who knows perhaps the people of a hundred years hence will be shocked and disgusted to read of our, to them, heathenish ways.

In addition to the food offerings there has developed during this age, the drink offerings. Japanese learned to make drink from the rice, which is called *saké*, and as these gave him a "divine" feeling, he soon offers some to his gods, at first much as the drunken man offers it to his friends. The drink offering is part of all the religions of Japan. Much as in the west the drink offering is a serious part of the offering and it is only when the ethical side of the religion is emphasized that there is a sentiment against it and then only after a great struggle is the drink offering done away.³

³ Witness the great conflict in the Christian Church over the substitution of unfermented wine for the fermented wine of the past.

Evaporation was not known to the primitive man so that the best of the wine was thought to be drunk by the gods. The *Miki* is on every god shelf, the kegs of saké are offered to the spirit of the dead soldiers on the Memorial Days. These services are usually held out in the open and the barrels are piled high, sometimes as many as a thousand being offered at one time, the usual count from one hundred and one to seven. (All offerings are to be odd numbers, never even numbers of anything.) Every visitor at the shrine is given a taste of the consecrated wine by the priest in charge on the payment of a small fee.

The eating and drinking together religiously, as of the forty-seven Ronins, and of other groups before any great task, or the drinking together of those about to commit suicide, all are for the purpose of getting divine aid in the task before them.

MANUFACTURING CLASS.

We come now to the Industrial classes and the offerings of the laboring class, for farming man needed tools and it took much time to keep in practice to make good tools so one set of men are set aside to make tools for farming and for war. This is the beginning of the trades and guilds in Japan.

As in all other classes, the best of the handiwork was consecrated and given to the gods of that particular trade. We have in this age the specialization of the gods as well as the specialization of work. A visit to any temple will show the efforts of the laborers to get a pair of wooden or iron clogs large enough for the gods to wear, or of tools of all kinds big enough for the gods to use.

As to just how Idolatry arose, the historians are not agreed. In old Japan the Emperor's picture has been honored from time immemorial. At first it was a crude likeness which was sent to all parts of the empire, so that the people might behold their king. Along with this picture went the story of his descent from the gods and of his divine rights. These pictures after the death of the Emperor were held over and honored and soon it becomes worship of the dead Emperor. "Picture reverence" is still a religious rite in Japan today, as on every holiday the school children gather before the closed doors of a shrine in

the School assembly hall or on the campus somewhere. On the call of the soldier-teacher, the principal opens the doors and the whole student body bow, formerly in worship but now in reverence, much as the saluting of the flag in the United States.

Another view, and in all probability a half truth, is that the men cunning with the hands made images of the dead Emperors or heroes, of course idealizing them. These at first were given by the artists as offerings to the gods, but as time went on, there arose a people who knew not Joseph and the idols instead of being offerings, become the gods whom the people thought served their fathers and whom they want to serve them, and so soon a hole is made in the back of the head for the spirit of the god to come in and abide and leave his blessing and divine power.

It is probably by a combination of the two theories mentioned that we get idolatry in Japan. The idols are the consecrated gifts of the artists in their efforts to develop both patriotism and godly fear. They are the work of the artists and not of the priests. Each idol represents the conception of a god whom the people want to serve them. The thousand handed god is a groping after the almighty, the god of large abdomen is another groping after the all-wise one, omniscience, the larger the abdomen the wiser the man. Thus we might go through the thousands of images in Japan, each a groping after a god to satisfy a need of man.

The writer's classification of the religions of Japan is four-fold instead of three as most writers contend. Shintoism or the imageless patriotic cult; Confucianism or the ethical ancestral cult; Buddhism or the philosophical cult, and fourth Nature-image worship, which is the religion of the masses, and includes phases of the other cults and many things too superstitious to be allowed in the others. It is in a study of these people that the facts of the paper were discovered.

It is during the manufacturing age that the differences are clearly seen and magnified. Man built a home for himself and the gods are left out in the rain and cold. This can not be, so we see groups combine and erect a temple or shrine for *their* patron god. A man will not work for a god who will not serve him, hence the differences in the gods are now beginning to be noted. People worship the god who serves them and only so

long as he does serve them, witness the tearing down of shrines and the destruction of temples common in Japan when the gods fail to send rain.

The Imageless cult with its holy ground was not so ready to cover its holy enclosure surrounded as it was with *sakaki*, or evergreen, and with the red *torii* at the entrance, a beautiful sight to behold. But the Buddhists had shelter for the gods and a place for men to assemble under a roof, and soon the Shintoists are divided and we have in Japan today some of the Shinto shrines covered and some uncovered.

The many *torii* in front of the covered or uncovered Shrines, are the beginning of the thank offerings, as one is erected every time the gods hear the special prayers of the people. One shrine has one hundred *torii*, this shows that it is popular and that the gods hear and answer prayers. Many rich houses in Japan who worship at the fox shrine have erected many beautiful *torii* in front of their shrines.

COMMERCIAL CLASS.

Man soon learns to barter if he finds some one who has something which he needs or wants badly. The religious life demands time and energy; moreover he finds from experience with exacting gods that it is no small job to work out his own salvation, and since other vocations have skilled men, why not have skilled men in religion, men who are adept in persuading the gods and in the art of prayer? The men familiar with the *old* forms of speech and with the *old* ceremonies are at first selected, the ways of the fathers being thought the only way to get the favor of the gods. The ancient way of doing things has always appealed to religious men as the true way, the old way brought blessings to the fathers, whom we have idealized and the details of whose every-day troubles we have forgotten. This scheme of getting men skilled in the power of winning the divine favor soon led to the priesthood and its establishment. These men became very proficient by experience, and soon the whole religious life of the people is turned over to the priests. He must keep the gods happy while the other men are allowed to seek their own happiness, and men are willing to pay. Religion makes the priests and not the priests the religion. The priests start out in all honesty to serve the people but as the people drift away from

the temple life, they wish to make their job sure and soon wrap it in rites and mystery which they alone understand. In this age we see the beginning of the consecration of money as well as the setting apart of certain men to care for the temples, such as the setting apart of the Levites. In the manufacturing age before the establishment of the priesthood, the men of the group or town worked together to erect the temple, then they called carpenters at will, but after the priesthood is firmly established, the average man seemed too defiled to attend to this work. This is seen in the consecration and purification of the carpenters to build the train, the decorators of the train and all the paraphernalia, the rice planters of the special rice, the street cleaners, etc., in the preparation for the coronation this Fall. In Japan it is state and religion.

Man still needs divine power to be successful in life. He has found that money is powerful for everything in this age and he now uses his money to buy divine power. He gives his check on the bank with the same object in mind, and with the same consecration as the primitive man gave nuts, etc., *i. e.*, divine power is needed in the struggle for existence. The check represents the results of his labors, the personalizing of his desires, and the giving of what is most necessary to his life, money. "This giving of money is right, and when accompanied with good works and noble living is efficacious, but when apart from good works it leads to a non-religious and non-ethical giving which benefits neither man nor priest," says a Buddhist priest, *after* the ethical side had become emphasized.

INTELLECTUAL CLASS.

Money being the craze in the commercial world, it gradually was seen that the man with executive ability was the man who made money easily, and that, therefore, education was the thing which gives man the proper perspective and a hold on things divine. Thus the ideal becomes the educated man, the educated priest, and education is the ruling passion of the day and consequently poems, songs, prayers, addresses, books on religion or the repeating of the beautiful prayers in religious service, the preaching of the silver-tongued orators, the belief in certain doctrines (which have been revealed to the intellect of man, and to which the gods demand an intellectual obedience) become

in a sense works of merit which win the divine power that man needs in the struggle for life and the pursuit of happiness.

It is in this way that the denominations arise. The priests work out their peculiar doctrine which they think pleases the gods and which they believe will give man a better hold on things religious and divine, and we have as a result the different sects warring over intellectual differences. Buddhism and Shintoism both suffered during this age and were divided and interdivided over hair-splitting doctrines.

Religion now becomes a form of doctrine, and develops into a cold philosophy like Buddhism or into a weak nature or image worship, something which can be seen and which appeals to the eye of the uneducated.

SYMPATHETIC OFFERINGS.

To side step a minute, let us look at another class of offerings, not in the economical classification:—the offering of their hair by women as a cure for sickness, or for ropes in the erecting of temples, or for overcoming family troubles; the offering of parts of one's enemy, either his finger parings, his hair, or a drop of blood, or even a part of his clothing, or a painting or image of the one to be affected or killed as in the *Ushi-no-toki-no-maeri* (going to the temple at the time of the ox about 2 A. M.) These and others similar are seen in all ages and among all classes of people, and seem to be a relic of the days of hunting; as the dogs were given the scent so the gods must be given the right scent or the curse will not fall on the right one.

FREAKS OF NATURE.

Another side line, is the discussion of the offerings known as the spirit filled, such as the freaks of nature; strange or peculiarly shaped stones, rocks, stumps of trees, or suddenly appearing stones in the path of man. The westerner when he stumbles curses the thing in his path, whereas the easterner, from fear of a good or bad spirit dwelling in the object, worships it for its blessing or for the overcoming of its curse. The stone or obstacle is placed by the roadside and the wayfarer pays his respects every time he passes. This practice led to the setting aside the things which he thought brought him luck. The lucky

stones, the queer trees by the wayside, which by walking around bring luck, the tools which used brought luck, all at first are set aside as offerings to the gods and then later become the objects of worship. Everywhere in Japan we see trees which have been fenced around and a *torii* (gateway) erected in front. The trees growing upside down, *i. e.*, with the roots for branches as at Kyoto, the prolific branched tree as at Nara which is used in place of the phallic worship of yore, etc., are some of the numerous illustrations.

Such things can not be classified, save as freaks of nature, which one man worked for his good and which others have tried, some successfully and others unsuccessfully, the object not being a god but an object holding divine power.

ETHICAL CLASS.

Returning to the line of thought of the paper, man finds that no amount of superstition, money, or education apart from good works gives peace of mind, nor will they guarantee happiness or success. Famine, pestilence, calamity and wars continue in the land. The thought then turns toward the priests and they are at first accused of not being faithful; they have lost their influence with the gods, and can not get the divine power needed. The faithful priests now turn to the people and insist that the gods are ever willing to bless the priests and those pure, but they will not bless the people of unclean lives. Clean hands and clean heart are demanded and in an effort to get this the ceremonial washings are introduced. Purification and the rites of purification come to the front, the outward form symbolizing the inward cleansing. The lavar for the washing of the hands before praying is placed before the shrine and the ceremonial baths are introduced, and we get an outwardly clean people. The baths of the Japanese are a part of the religious duty. The culmination of this washing is found in the Emperor's New Year's morning bath, which he performs no matter how cold the weather or the water, and is called *Hatsumizu*, beginning water. Meiji Tenno was faithful in the performance of this rite although the present Emperor, because of his weak physical condition, has the water made tepid. This is to guarantee a prosperous year for his people.

The next step is easily seen as following naturally the demand for cleanliness of the inner man, purity of heart and mind. Success and manhood are linked together and the ethical side of the Japanese religions now appear. The offerings now take on the ethical as well as the personal and social phases. The best illustration of this is the writer of the "*Onna Daigaku*" when he teaches "Even if you do not say your prayers, if you are faithful the gods will take care of you." "*Chujitsu na kokoro inori senakutemo Kami sama mamori.*" The words of Jesus are a parallel to this, "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and its righteousness and all these things shall be added unto you." So is Meiji Tenno's poem, "the faithful man lives in communion with the Unseen God." The teaching of the poem concerns Nintoku Tenno, the Emperor who saw the suffering of his people and released them from paying taxes for three years, teaching thereby that the gods and the Emperor sees the faithful and supplieth them.

The rules of the Samurai or Bushido give the teaching of the ethical side of the Japanese life, faithfulness being defined as obedience to the higher powers. *Harakiri* is a final act of consecration to one's duty to his lord. The one criticism was and is that it is based on the patriotic side only and as everything is fair in love and war, there are many practices taught which the Japanese themselves are ashamed of, such as concubinage, the end justifies the means, the slavery of the under classes, etc. For the best side of Bushido, see Dr. Nitobe's book.

HUMAN SACRIFICES.

The offering of the living to appease the gods is not the highest stage in the evolution of the offering, but common to all ages, the thing to be tried whenever everything else fails, it is the court of last resort, the supreme gift in any age. In Japan the fisher would give his first born or virgin daughter to appease the waves, the hunter his son or daughter to appease the gods of the wild beasts, the pastoral people his son for the overcoming of a plague, the agriculturist would bury the dead or the dying in his field so as to secure a better harvest and ward off ravaging insects, the builder of temple, bell or bridge would invoke the divine blessing by sacrificing a human being, the warrior would sacrifice himself to appease the gods of war

and also to inspire his followers, etc. These are known as "ikiumi," living burial, and are treated in a paper which appeared in the JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY, November, 1914.

PERSONALITY OR CHARACTER CLASS.

The twentieth century is known as the age of personality, and in Japan in all things abreast of the times, everything is "*jinkaku*." The magazines cry for men of character and they are seeking to discover and produce men of character as the greatest need of the times. The men of the past are being idealized and even the gods of old Japan are proven to be men of strong personalities, the highest ideal being the Buddhist priest who prayed that he might be born *again* as a man that he might spend his life in prayer in behalf of the people. The nation is not satisfied with the low standard of morality. Most Japanese novels of the present day deal with the unclean life of the upper class and the final victory of the man of character even though of a lower class. Character and living sacrifices in social service are the needs and the cry of the Japanese.

LITERATURE: BOOKS, ETC.

Phasen der Liebe. By F. MÜLLER-LYER. München: Albert Langen, 1913. Pp. xv + 254.

This is the fifth volume of the comprehensive work published by the author under the general title, "Die Entwicklungsstufen der Menschheit." *Phasen der Liebe* stands in close connection with the two preceding volumes, *Die Familie*, and *Formen der Ehe, der Familie und der Verwandtschaft*.

The transformation of the love feeling, of the marriage motive, and of the forms and phases of the acquisition of wives are discussed in the first three chapters. The discussion of the phases of marriage, the phases and the causes of the social position of woman, and the instability (*Labilität*) of sex customs complete the first part of the book.

In a brief *Allgemeiner Teil* are set forth the theoretical principles which guide the author in his systematic investigation of society. Accepting Comte's pronouncement that we have science only where what is known permits prevision, he asks, "Can sociology become a science?" His answer is, "Yes, provided it succeeds in discovering the lines of direction of social development." Each separate culture-domain (industry and commerce, family, state, religion, science, etc.) must be investigated from the origins to the present time, and the successive phases of its development ascertained. Thus the lines of direction of progress and the laws of evolution appear.

The enormous complexity which the mutual influence exerted by each aspect of culture upon the others—of industry upon science and vice versa, for instance—introduces into the prediction of future social forms is, of course, not to be overlooked. The sociologist may, nevertheless, at least hope to determine what are the highest culture forms towards which society is advancing.

In the last chapter the author attempts to apply the scientific method just described to the sociological domain investigated in the first part of the book. His conclusions will be found on pages 238-240. The more general line of development, apparent not only in the phases through which love has passed, but in every other aspect of culture, is described as an increased rationalization and humanization (*Vermenschlichung*) of the world, due to an increasing development of the human will and, more directly, to the increasing development of intelligence. JAMES H. LEUBA.

Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern. By Dr. KARL BETH. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. Pp. xi + 238.

This book is in substance an attempt to demonstrate the independence of religion from magic with regard to origin and nature. In the first chapters are discussed the theories of Frazer, Marett, Preuss and Vierkandt, in so far as they regard magic as a forerunner of religion, either

because magic passed into religion, or because the failure of magic became the incentive to the development of religion.

According to Beth, who in this follows recent authors, certain original forms of magic are independent of any idea of power, be it animistic or not; while the original religious reaction was brought out by the recognition of the presence of a supranatural and suprasensible, non-personal power, distinct from the forces belonging to the human and animal world. Belief in the existence of a power of that description is found among most of the primitive populations; it is the Mana of the Melanesian, the Wakonda of the Sioux, the Manitou of the Algonquin, the Mulungu of the Bantau, etc.

In the presence of this power man, according to our author, assumes not the attitude characteristic of magic, but that of religion, i. e., the attitude of awe and of humble dependence, leading to prayer and worship (pp. 208, 211). This power need not be, and originally is not, conceived as personal. Yet, the feeling of veneration which it induces leads to prayer and worship (pp. 209, 211, 212). Whether man's behavior is to be called religion or magic depends not essentially upon the nature of the power with which he thinks himself in relation, but upon the kind of feeling-reaction he makes to it (p. 212).

It is an error, thinks our author, to suppose that the fear of particular phenomena lead man to the belief in the suprasensible power; fear was a very secondary motive. Nature, particularly perhaps the night sky, awakened in man an astonished awe and a sense of weakness. These were the dominant emotions of the early religious reaction (p. 227). Later on, with the appearance of gods and daemons, a second religious level was reached—second, but not necessarily higher—which in most lands obliterated, at least for a period, the first level.

In the magic attitude there is no humility, no feeling of dependence; but rather a deliberate, self-reliant seeking of a particular advantage through definite means. "Magic and religion are opposites; they cannot be united" (p. 222).

The readers of recent anthropological literature will find very little that is new in Beth's volume and probably also little to criticise beyond the slurring of the difference which, it seems to me, must exist in the conception of powers calling forth on the one hand awe and a sense of weakness and nothing more; and, on the other, these emotions and in addition prayer and worship. I should insist that any power eliciting prayer and worship is thereby shown to have been, at the time, conceived of as personal. It is, however, not the fact that a power is personal which alone determines the kind of relation which man is to maintain with him. A personal power becomes an object of magic when instead of appealing to him by what I may call here psychological means (expression of submission, of humility, prayer, offerings, etc.), man thinks himself able to coerce him by non-psychological (magic) means.

The genetic independence of religion from magic—the main thesis of our author—is affirmed and defended in a book published by the reviewer a few years ago, but apparently not known to Beth. JAMES H. LEUBA.

A beginner's psychology. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 362 p.

The author here tries to write the kind of a book that he would have himself found useful when he was beginning the study of psychology, thirty years ago. He find it hard to relate the new book to the older "Primer," which will not be revised for every paragraph has been re-written. The greatest change, however, is that of attitude, less stress here being laid upon knowledge than upon the point of view. The author has tried to make his essay a model of clear thought, and with his high ideals of lucidity of both thought and language has succeeded to a greater degree than his preface gives us to infer he has realized himself. He has avoided the term "consciousness" as too slippery, and fears that the term "introspection" is "traveling the same road," though the time to drop it has not yet come. The work in its older form has been a valuable *vade mecum* for years to all students approaching the subject and this promises to be still more so.

The natural order of spirit; a psychic study and experience. By LUCIEN C. GRAVES. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1915. 365 p.

This book, we are told, is a work of compulsion. The author has had new experiences and seen new light. In the chapters the author gives us first a testimony to open-minded and reverent treatment of the future life and its psychic study. Next comes a testimony to creative adaptations and to a spiritual foundation. He then discusses the marvels of the ether, its energy and basic nature, the natural order of the spirit, the objectivity of the spirit world, historic approach to the spirit body, a word further on the origin and derivation of the spirit, testimony to spirit communion and communications, telepathy as a subterfuge from the spiritistic theory, an exhortation to come to the spiritistic interpretation, testimony concerning the skeptical intellect and the spirit communication. Then come experimental testimony, psychic bridging of the chasm, with successive dated sittings, discussion of mental picturing, of Myers' interview, and so on, through several chapters.

Theism and humanism. By ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, (c. 1915). 274 p.

This book constitutes the Gifford Lectures of 1914. The introductory lecture deals with metaphysics and the plain man, inevitable beliefs, the character of theism and what atonement is not. The second lecture discusses design and selection, develops the arguments from values, the cognitive and the causal system. The second part deals with aesthetic and ethical values, discussing aesthetics and theism, and ethics and theism; while the third part treats of intellectual values, and after an introductory chapter discusses perception, common sense and science, probability, calculable and intuitive uniformity and causation, tendencies of scientific belief, while the fourth part is a summary and conclusion.

The Ethiopic liturgy; its sources, development, and present form. By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER. Milwaukee: Young Churchman Co., 1915. 487 p.

This very learned work discusses first the sources and earliest form of the Ethiopic liturgy, treating its background, the Christian liturgy of the first four centuries, each in detail, concluding that the earliest complete Ethiopic liturgy was that of St. Mark, reconstructed in its probable fifth century form. The second part treats the development of the present form of the Ethiopic liturgy, first to the end of the *Missa Catechumenorum*, then from the beginning of the *Missa Fidelium* to the end of the institution, and finally to the end of the service, concluding that the Ethiopic liturgy is the *Ordo Communis* with the *Anaphora* of the apostles. Seventy-two pages of the book are devoted to photographs of the Mercer manuscript.

Story of Jesus for young and old. A complete life of Christ written in simple language, based on the gospel narrative. By JESSE LYMAN HURLBUT. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., (c. 1915). 496 p.

The author, who is well and favorably known as a writer in this field, here seeks to tell the story of Jesus Christ in a manner attractive to both old and young, to children and teachers. The narrative is thus adapted to the child as young as ten, so that he will not need to ask the meaning of a sentence or a word. In order to lead the younger readers to and not from the Bible there are no imaginary scenes or conversations, so that the book is a biography of Jesus and not a romance founded upon his life. The work is extremely attractive and readable and is illustrated by cuts on almost every other page, many of them colored. It is an admirable family book.

India and its faiths; a traveler's record. By JAMES BISSETT PRATT. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1915. 483 p.

The twenty-one chapters in this book give students with any cultural bent an excellent view of this subject, so voluminously written about. Among other things the author treats of Hindu worship, pilgrims, the many gods and one god, duty and destiny, Dharma, teachers, priests and holy men, reform movements within, the Brahmo and Arya Samaj, the Theosophists, the Kabir Panthis and the Sikhs, the Jainas, the Mohammedans, Parsees, Buddhists, education and reform, doctrines of modern Buddhism, its value and springs of power, Christian missions in India, what the West might learn.

A surgeon's philosophy. By ROBERT T. MORRIS. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Page & Co., 1915. 581 p.

In two-score chapters the author tells us how he had to construct a working religion of his own, and so came to worship the conventional physical entities and their combinations which appeared in all substances and activities. Among the topics discussed are religion, theology, the soul, sin, Christian Science, prophets, neurotics, clairvoyants, Freud, can-

cer, dogs, potatoes, trees, Santayana, eyes, graft, styles in dress, socialism, marital modernity, suffrage, news, smart set, etc.

The ten commandments, with a Christian application to present conditions. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, (c. 1915). 216 p.

This is a collection of ten sermons on the ten commandments, and the writer tells us they were motivated by the war which "suddenly thrust us back into a day of pagan horrors. The folly of the strife bewildered us. Whither had wisdom flown? Its iniquity filled us with loathing and we were driven to ask ourselves afresh what was wisdom and what was righteousness." Hence the moral bases of life are here re-examined and the primary ethical ideals of Christianity are scanned with new interest.

The basis of morality. By ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER. Translated with introduction and notes by Arthur Brodrick Bullock. New York: Macmillan, 1915. 288 p.

After an introduction, part two is devoted to a critique of Kant's basis of ethics; part three to the founding of ethics; and part four to the metaphysical explanation of the primal ethical phenomenon. The original work, of which this is a translation, was written in 1840, and twenty years elapsed before a second edition. This translation was first published in 1903 and only now has a second edition been called for.

Origin and meaning of the Old Testament. By THEODORE WEHLE. New York, R. F. Fenno & Co., (c. 1914). 199 p.

This book treats first of the Hebrew records in themselves, then of the invasion of Canaan and the establishment of the monarchy; then follow the division in the kingdom to the fall of Samaria, history of Judah to the destruction of Jerusalem, the exile and the return, and finally, the foundation of Judaism in general. At the end is a convenient chronological table. It is an excellent introduction to the subject, which is all it claims to be.

The positive background of Hindu sociology. Book 1.—Non-political. By BENQY KUMĀR SARKĀR, with appendices by Brajendranath Seal. Allahabad: The Pānini Office, Bhuvaneśwari Āsrama, Bahadurganj, 1914. 388 p.

The first book contains an account of the non-political writings, including landmarks and milestones in the political history of India, unity and diversity of Indian life. This is followed by a treatise on the data of Indian geography, ethnology, mineralogy, ancient Indian botany, zoology, with various somewhat technical appendices. This whole volume is meant to be an introduction to the author's English translation of a Sanskrit work on sociology.

The Arya Samaj; an account of its origin, doctrines, and activities, with a biographical sketch of the founder. By LAJPAT RAI. With a preface by Sidney Webb. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915. 305 p.

This is a very interesting account of the early life, the struggles and the teachings of Dayananda and the organization which he established.

We have here not only his religious inclinations but his social ideals and aims, methods of organization, relations to politics, the educational propaganda, philanthropic activities, with certain conclusions, and a number of illustrations of the hero of the book and his work.

Jesus and his parables. By GEORGE MURRAY. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914. 305 p.

The writer makes a very different division of the parables, of which he makes twenty-nine, from that of Jülicher. The former's groups are 1, grace in the individual life; 2, Pharisaism, the foe; 3, fellowship with God and the ideal; 4, the course of the kingdom; 5, discipline and judgment. All classifications of the parables of course are more or less arbitrary and no doubt very different groupings could be made with equal justification. Nevertheless groupings are necessary.

The inspiration of responsibility, and other papers. By CHARLES H. BRENT. New York: Longmans, Green, 1915. 236 p.

This work is a reprint of twenty-three papers and addresses given at various times, of which the title designates only the first eleven pages. Other interesting addresses are on Abraham Lincoln, Queen Victoria, McKinley, the coronation of George V, national awakening in the Philippines, prayer, Alexander Hamilton, financial missionaries, Christian unity, the world missionary conference, human brotherhood, the home, etc.

Divine inspiration. By GEORGE PRESTON MAINS. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, (c. 1915). 171 p.

The successive chapters prove that inspiration is probable and universal, deal with Hebrew inspiration, the Bible, its relation to science, a human book and not inerrant. Other chapters urge that religion is progressive, inspiration continuous, describe the spiritual mind, and point out the relation between inspiration and immortality.

Christian psychology. By JAMES STALKER. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, n. d. 281 p.

The chapters are, From Individuality to Personality; Body, Soul and Spirit; The Five Senses; Memory; Imagination; Habit; Reason; Heart; Will; and Conscience. There are appendices on Temperaments, and Relations between Psychology and Evangelism.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

	PAGE		PAGE
Adolescent girl among primitive peoples,	75	Education, race- and religion,	273
Ames, Edward Scribner,	31	—Traits of primitive people, retained in,	352
Bacteria as crime material,	134	Erotogenetic interpretation of religion,	23
Begging among Eskimos,	49	Eskimo culture, ethical phases of,	45
Belief in immortality,	466	Extra-nuptial relations among Eskimos,	59
Bibliography			
—Adolescent girl among primitive peoples,	116	France, catholic renaissance,	134
—Attitude toward death and belief in immortality,	508	Gambling among Eskimos,	50
—Erotogenetic interpretation of religion,	44	Girl, adolescent, among primitive peoples,	75
—Ethical phases of Eskimo culture,	72	Gods, origin of ideas of,	237
—Pedagogy of missions,	395	Greeks, religion of,	487
—Psychoanalysis and mythology,	209		
—Religion and race-psychology,	322	Hebrews, religion of,	486
Borrowing, a study in,	1		
		Immortality, belief in,	466
Catholic renaissance in France,	134	Inheritance among Eskimos,	45
Characteristics, criminal,	136		
Childhood, religion of,	411	James, William,	34
Christian doctrine, teaching of,	375	Japan, disposition of dead,	245
Christian elements in the Mahabharata,	135	—religious offerings,	511
Christianity,	488		
Crawley, Ernest,	29	Lang, Andrew,	27
Cult, Peyote,	1		
Culture, Eskimo,	45	Mahabharata, Christian elements in,	135
Cutten, George Barton,	32	Man, primitive, and his mind,	146
		Marriage and divorce among Eskimos,	50
Dead, disposition of, in Japan,	245	Mind of primitive man,	146
Death, attitude toward,	466	Missions, pedagogy of,	345
Divorce and marriage among Eskimos,	50	Mythology and psychoanalysis,	137
Doctrine, teaching of Christian,	375		
Durkheim's view of religion,	252	Naecke, P.,	24
		Nativity, psychology of,	421

	PAGE	BOOKS REVIEWED	PAGE
Onotogenetic development of attitude toward death and belief in immortality,	493	BALFOUR, ARTHUR JAMES:	
Orient, religion,	491	Theism and humanism,	527
Pedagogy of missions,	345	BETH, KARL:	
Peyote cult of the Winnebago,	1	Religion und Magie bei den Naturwölkern,	420, 525
Phylogenetic development of attitude toward death and belief in immortality,	468	BRENT, CHARLES H.:	
Psychology of religion,	466	The inspiration of responsibility, and other papers,	530
—of the nativity,	421	BRUNSWIG, ALFRED:	
—religious, problems and present status,	214	Das Grundproblem Kants; eine Kritische Untersuchung und Einführung in die Kant-Philosophie,	420
—social and religious,	273	BUFFET, EDWARD P.:	
Psychoanalysis and mythology,	137	The layman Revato,	270
Race-education and religion,	273	COBB, W. F.:	
Religion and her offspring,	325	Spiritual healing,	418
—and race-education,	273	COFFIN, HENRY SLOANE:	
—Durkheim's view of,	252	The ten commandments, with a Christian application to present conditions,	523
—early Greek,	487	Comment and criticism; a Cambridge paper,	270
—erotogenetic interpretation of,	23	DAVIES, E. O.:	
—Hebrew,	486	The miracles of Jesus. A study of the evidence,	270
—of childhood,	411	DAVIS, THOMAS KIRBY:	
—Oriental,	491	Mind and spirit. A study in psychology,	271
—presenting truth of,	360	FRAZER, J. G.:	
—primitive uniformity of,	345	The belief in immortality and the worship of the dead,	268
—psychology of,	466	GILL, RICHARD H. K.:	
—Roman,	488	The psychological aspects of Christian experience,	418
—sacrifices in Japan,	511	GILMORE, GEORGE WILLIAM:	
Religious experience, reality of,	400	Index to the new Schaff-Herzog encyclopedia of religious knowledge,	419
—psychology, problems and present status,	214		
Renaissance, Catholic in France,	134		
Romans, religion of,	488		
Sacrifices, human, in Japan,	511		
Starbuck, Edwin D.,	28		
Theft among Eskimos,	44		
Truth, presenting religious,	360		
Winnebago, Peyote cult of,	1		
Women, position and treatment among Eskimos,	66		
—power to leave their bodies,	134		

	PAGE		PAGE
GRAVES, LUCIEN C.:		MCDougALL, WILLIAM:	
The natural order of spirit; a		Body and mind. A history	
psychic study and experi-		and a defence of animism,	132
ence,	527	MAINS, GEORGE PRESTON:	
GUÉRARD, ALBERT LÉON:		Divine inspiration,	530
French prophets of yesterday,	127	MERCER, SAMUEL A. B.:	
		The Ethiopic liturgy,	528
HARDY, THOMAS J.:		MILLER, LUCIUS HOPKINS:	
The religious instinct,	272	Our knowledge of Christ,	417
HARPE, ADOLF:		MORRIS, ROBERT T.:	
Amerika und die Religion der		A surgeon's philosophy,	528
Zukunft,	269	MÜLLER-LYER, F.:	
HARTSHORNE, HUGH:		Phasen der Liebe,	525
Worship in the Sunday school,	124	MURRAY, GEORGE:	
HUELSTER, A.:		Jesus and his parables,	530
Miracles in the light of science		OESTERLEY, W. O. E.:	
and history,	418	The books of the Apocrypha,	
HURLBUT, JESSE LYMAN:		their origin, teaching and	
The story of Jesus for old and		contents,	419
young,	528	O'KEEFE, J. G.:	
		Buile Suibhne (The frenzy of	
JOHNS, C. H. W.:		Suibhne); being the adven-	
The Cambridge manuals of		tures of Suibhne Geilt. A	
science and literature,	122	middle Irish romance.	130
JOHNSON, EDWIN M.:		PAULHAN, JEAN:	
A scientific foundation for a		Les Hain-Teny merinas. Poé-	
faith answered by healing,		sies populaires malgaches,	131
prosperity and peace,	419	PRATT, JAMES BISSETT:	
JORDAN, LOUIS HENRY:		India and its faiths; a trav-	
Comparative religion, its ori-		eler's record,	528
gin and outlook,	122	PRYSE, JAMES MORGAN:	
		The restored New Testament,	417
KNOX, R. A.:			
Some loose stones,	272	RAI, LAJPAT:	
		The Arya Samaj,	529
LAIRY, MAZETTA:		RAPAPORT, MORDCHÉ W.:	
The psychic uplift, or the new		Religiöses Recht,	272
mind cure,	271	REINACH, SALOMON:	
		Répertoire de l'art quaternaire,	124
McCOMAS, HENRY C.:		ROBINSON, LEONIDAS:	
The psychology of religious		Marching men; or phases and	
sects,	121	problems of childhood, pul-	
MACCUNN, JOHN:		pit and pew	271
The making of character.		ROYCE, JOSIAH:	
Some educational aspects of		The Problem of Christianity.	272
ethics,	127		

	PAGE		PAGE
SAMTER, ERNST:		TITCHENER, EDWARD BRADFORD:	
Die Religion der Griechen,	419	A beginner's psychology,	527
SARKĀR, BENOY KUMĀR:		TURTON, W. H.:	
The positive background of		The truth of Christianity,	419
Hindu sociology. Book I—		Die Volkskundliche Literatur	
Non-political,	529	des Jahres 1911,	122
SCHARLIEB, MARY:		WEHLE, THEODORE:	
Youth and sex. Dangers and		Origin and meaning of the Old	
safeguards for girls and		Testament,	529
boys,	121	WEIDEL, KARL:	
SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR:		Jesu Persönlichkeit,	123
The basis of morality,	529	WOBBERMIN, GEORG:	
STALKER, JAMES:		Systematische Theologie, nach	
Christian psychology,	530	religions-psychologische me-	
STJERNA, KNUT:		thode,	126
Essays on questions connected		ZELTNER, FR. DE:	
with the old English poem		Collection de contes et de	
of Beowulf,	130	chansons populaires. Contes	
TAGORE, RABINDRANATH:		du Sénégal et du Niger,	123
Sādhana. The realisation of			
life,	125		

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